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PART V 
THE  LAW  OF 
CIVIL  OBLIGATIONS THE FORMALITIES  OF BARGAINING 
I. Ilztroductory. 
8 I. The Welsh Law of  bargaining, using the word bargain- 
ing in a wide sense to cover all transactions of  a civil nature 
whereby  one  person  entered  into  an  undertaking  with 
another, can be considered in two aspects, the one dealing 
with the form in which  bargains  were  entered  into, or to 
use  the Welsh  term,  the '  bond  of  bargain ' forming  the 
nexus between the parties to it, the other dealing with the 
nature of  the bargain  entered int0.l 
$2. The characteristic of  all early law relative to bargain 
is that the formalities attendant upon the bargain, not the 
subject-matter  of  the  agreement,  form  the contract,  and 
without the observance of  the formalities there is nothing 
to enforce. 
The conception that an agreement without the prescribed 
formalities was enforceable was a later development. 
Hence  we  find  the Welsh  Laws,  like  other  early  laws, 
deal mainly with the formalities and the legal consequences 
ensuing  on  the  observance  or  non-observance  of  those 
formalities rather than with the agreement itself. 
We have in the Codes matter dealing with the subject of 
agreements, e.g. the sale of  goods, loans, and the like, but 
we have a larger volume of  law dealing with the procedure 
to be observed on entering into a transaction. 
The  Welsh  Laws  recognized  three  principal  modes  of 
agreement, '  briduw ', '  amod ', and '  machni '. 
2. '  Briduw.' 
§ I. Not much is said in the laws about '  briduw '. 
The word is said to mean '  the dignity or honour of  God ', 
but the origin  of  the phrase  seems to be  a  popular  mis- 
translation of  an oath beginning with ' Pro Deo '. 
IX. 304 ; XIV. 658. 
B 2 $2. Any agreement could be entered into by '  briduw ', 
but, inasmuch as it was  a '  mutual bond ', it would seem 
that there must be reciprocal promises. 
The  fact  that  there  must  be  reciprocal  promises  in 
'  briduw ', '  amod ',  and  '  machni ',  seems  to prove  con- 
clusively  that  there  could  be  no  unilateral  obligation 
entered into. 
$ 3.  An agreement by '  briduw ' was entered into by the 
parties to the agreement grasping each other's  hand, and, 
while  holding  the  hand  of  the  other,  each  party  swore 
'  briduw ',  or '  Pro Deo', to  carry out the promise made by him. 
The swearing  with  clasped  hands  made  the agreement 
binding. 
It will  be  observed  that,  unlike  the  transactions  by 
'  amod ' or '  machni ',  no  third  person  was  involved  or 
made  responsible  to enforce  the agreement.  Hence  it  is 
said that an agreement  by '  briduw ' was  to be  enforced 
by the King  and Church, because  God,  whose  name  had 
been invoked in the oath, was the surety. 
The grasping  of  hands was  essential to the  agreement, 
and if  one person,  in the course of  the transaction, placed 
his hand on the shoulder or other part of  the body of  the 
other, instead  of  grasping  hands,  it was  an insult  which 
had to be compensated for with honour-price. 
§ 4.  Any person over  seven, being compos mentis, could 
enter into '  briduw ', even a married woman. 
An  agreement  by '  briduw ' was  enforced  by  suit  and 
distress. 
Early English  custom  had  the  same  mode  of  entering 
into bargains, and reference to it is made in Elfred's Laws, 
c. 33, under the name of  ' God-borh '.l 
3. '  Amod.' 
5 I.  '  Amod ', or  as it is  rendered  '  contract ',  plays 
a large part in the Welsh Laws, though inferior in frequency 
to '  machni '. 
Like '  briduw ', it was a mutual bond, and so there could 
be no '  amod ' where there was a unilateral agreement. 
V. C. 128,  132 ; VI. 108  ; XIV. 658. 
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$ 2.  The  ordinary  method  of  entering into '  amod ' is 
fully described  in the Venedotian  Code.  The two parties 
met, grasped hands, and stated what their promises were 
one to the other in the presence  of  special witnesses who 
were called '  amodwyr ' or '  contract-men '. 
An agreement entered into by grasping hands only, with- 
out the presence of  '  amodwyr ', was not an '  amod ', and 
a denial of  such an agreement was established by the sole 
oath of  the alleged promisor. 
Mere negotiations did not make an '  amod ', nor did the 
proposal  and acceptance  unless  and until it were  entered 
into by the grasping of  hands in the presence of  '  amodwyr '. 
The object  of  having '  amodwyr ' present  was  twofold, 
viz. to furnish evidence of  the agreement entered into and 
to provide for its enforcement when proved. 
'  Amod ' could  be enforced  by the '  amodwyr ' without 
suit, or after suit ; they, and not the executive arm of  the 
King and the authority of  the Church, being charged with 
the enforcement of  the '  amod ' when established. 
$3. Quite a number of  people were incompetent to enter 
into '  amod '. 
An idiot, a drunken man, a man sick unto death, a youth 
under fourteen, professed religious men or canonists under 
vows, women under the dominating rod of  their husbands, 
and the Sovereign were all incapable of  '  amod '. 
'  Amod ' was a personal obligation limited to the persons 
entering into it, and no person could, by '  amod ', contract 
so as to bind  a third person ; hence an '  amod ' by a son 
did  not  bind  the father, and  the  father  could  make  no 
'  amod ' to bind his son after his death. 
In the law  of  the land we  saw that, except  for certain 
lawful  needs,  no  ancestral  land  could  be  alienated  so  as 
to  affect  the  son's  rights  therein.  One  passage  in  the 
Dimetian  Code,  which  says  that an  '  amod ',  involving 
the passing  of  an  inheritance  for  consideration  or,  with 
the will  of  the  owner, without  consideration,  secured  the 
inheritance, might  seem to throw doubt on  this ; but the 
passage  simply  means  that  a  title  to land  acquired  by 
'  amod ' was  as good  a  title  as one  of  inheritance.  It does not  mean  that  a  man  could  disinherit  his  son  by 
' amod I. 
9 4.  An  '  amod ' to be  binding  must  be  entered  into 
freely ;  coercion and fraud annulled it. 
Fraud or coercion in fact not only annulled an '  amod ', 
but  coercion  had  the  effect  of  freeing  the person  acting 
under  it from  all  liability,  criminal  and  civil,  and  both 
fraud  and  coercion  entitled  the  person  who,  under  the 
influence thereof, had been induced to deliver property, to 
recover  the same ; if  it were land at any time, if  it were 
other property at any time within the period of  limitation. 
The performance of  an '  amod ' was also excused if  sick- 
ness, poverty, or military service prevented the obligor from 
carrying out his undertaking. 
Otherwise the sanctity of  contracts was supreme, and is 
best expressed in the adage that an '  amod ' was like a vow, 
which, if once broken, must be renewed and kept afresh. 
$5.  An  important limitation  on  the power  to contract 
existed  in  the provision  that no  contract  to supply  corn 
could be enforced after the expiry  of  the next succeeding 
calends of  winter.  The  object  was  to prevent '  forward 
contracts ' affecting ungrown crops, and to forbid specula- 
tion in the necessities of  life. 
' It is not right ', says the Code of  Gwynedd, '  to claim 
corn from one year unto another.' 
3 6.  Contracts were enforced by actions for specific per- 
formance through ' amodwyr '. 
A person breaking his part of  the '  amod ' lost all rights 
under  it, but  the other  side could  at any time  claim  its 
enforcement and performance. 
5 7.  Perhaps the most remarkable feature about '  amod ' 
in Wales was  the absolute  freedom  there was for freemen 
to contract. 
We  are  accustomed to the fact  that society  developed 
from status to contract ; but what  is remarkable  in  the 
Welsh Laws is that, while society rested on status, it was 
permissible for every freeman to contract outside law. 
This power is not referred to once or twice only, but the 
expressions that '  contract always overrides law ' and that 
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'  a  contract  contrary  to law must  be  kept ' are frequent 
both in the Codes and the commentaries. 
The  only  limitation  on  this  power  to  contract  outside 
the law  was  where  the contract  entailed  harm  or  injury 
to a  third person, e.g. a contract  involving the killing of 
a person or the doing of  an atrocious act. 
It is not that it was permissible to contract for the per- 
formance of  an illegal act : that is not what is meant. 
The  rights  and  liabilities  of  people  were  regulated  by 
law  or  custom,  and what  is meant  is  that, if  a  contract 
conferred rights or imposed liabilities on a person contrary 
to those provided by the law, the rights or liabilities con- 
ferred or imposed by the contract  were  to be given effect 
to in preference to those secured by law or custom. 
The exact scope of  this freedom to contract outside law 
can  be  illustrated  by  reference  to its application  to par- 
ticular instances. 
In the law of  marriage we  saw that '  amobyr ' was paid 
to the lord  by the woman's  father or kinsmen  giving her 
in marriage.  But, by virtue of  the power  of  free contract, 
the giver might contract with the woman herself  or a third 
person that she or he would pay the '  amobyr I, and in that 
case liability to  pay it  passed to the otherparty to  thecontract. 
Again we  have seen that the law provided for the right 
to readjust  partitions  of  '  tref  y tad', but, if  there  were 
an agreement at the time of  partition that there should be 
no readjustment, the contract overrode the 1aw.l 
4. '  Machni.' 
I.  The  third  formality  by  which  agreements  were 
entered into in Wales, and by far the most important of  all, 
was '  machni ' or suretyship. 
The Welsh Laws are full of  provisions regarding surety- 
ship, which seem at first sight extremely complex. 
One commentator  complains  that  suretyship  is  one  of 
the  three  complexities  of  law,  because  it  is  so  hard  to 
remember  and  reduce  to  rule,  while  another  plaintively 
'  V. C.  96-8,  134-6.  202,  330;  D. C.  448,  450,  542,  612; G. C.  788; 
IV. 30 ; V. 80,  go ; VIII. 198 ; X. 330, 366,  388 ; XI. 404-8,  410, 424 ; 
XIV. 636, 640, 658. remarks '  that if the most practised and greatest in the law 
were to study it from his youth to his old age, some point 
would  crop up at the end, of  which  he had never  before 
heard '. 
Not  only did the complexity of  the law  strike the com- 
mentators, but they were equally astonished that any one 
should, in view of  the risks involved, be foolish enough to 
become surety for another in a bargain. 
In the Book of  Cynog there occurs the following aphorism : 
' Be  not quick handed among a muItitude and take up no 
mischief  not originating with thee, and take not the debt of 
another upon thee without anything being due from. thee.' 
The  philosophy  of  backing  another man's  bills  can  be 
carried no farther than in the words of this old-time legalist, 
but  the  fatherly  advice  of  Cynog  to  his  sons,  and  the 
astonishment of  other commentators, overlooked  the fact 
that it was difficult to avoid being a surety if  asked. 
The Venedotian Code insists strongly on the social duty, 
and says that no one should refuse to be a surety if  he were 
a person who ought to stand.' 
5 2.  The  complexity  of  the  law  of  '  machni ' is  more 
apparent than real, and it is made so by confusing it with 
the  law  of  '  gorfodogaeth ',  the  law  analogous  to  the 
Roman '  actio sacramenti ', and the law of  distress. 
These are all allied  to the law  of  '  machni ', but it will 
conduce to a  better  understanding  if  we  deal  with  them 
separately and in their proper places. 
There were three kinds of  suretyship in the Welsh Law : 
suretyship to abide law,  suretyship on behalf  of  a  person 
charged  with  crime,  and suretyship  in  a  bargain.  The 
first is dealt  with under  Procedure,  the second  under the 
Law of  Crimes and Torts, and at present we are concerned 
only with the last mentioned. 
5 3.  ' Machni ' was, like '  briduw ' and ' amod ', mutual, 
that is to say, there was  a reciprocal  undertaking by two 
parties to an agreement.  The formality was applicable to 
all  agreements,  and  especially  to  sales  of  goods,  gifts, 
exchanges, and the like. 
V. C. 128 ; VIII. 184, 206 ; X. 334 ; XIV. 660. 
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We have noticed in '  briduw '  and in '  amod ' that it was 
necessary for the parties to grasp hands, and to repeat the 
substance  of  the  agreement.  Exactly  the  same  require- 
ments were needed in '  machni '. 
When two parties entered into an agreement by '  machni ', 
each  of  them  provided  the  other  with  a  surety  for  the 
performance of  his part of  the undertaking, e. g. in a transac- 
tion for the sale of  an animal the vendor gave the vendee 
a  surety who guaranteed  the vendor's  title to the animal 
and  the animal's  soundness-the  '  dilysrwd ' and ' teithi ' 
of  the  subject-matter-and  the  vendee  gave  the  vendor 
surety guaranteeing the payment  of  the price  at the time 
fixed in the bargain for payment. 
In a transaction by way of  suretyship, the surety and the 
man who gave him as surety, who is universally spoken of 
as the debtor (cyn~zogyn),  grasped hands, the surety and the 
man  to whom  he  was  given  as surety, the '  hawlwr ' or 
creditor  also grasped  hands,  and the debtor and creditor 
also did the same ; the substance of  the agreement  being 
repeated at each grasping of  hands. 
There  was  no  ' traditio ' or  handing of  property  over, 
except  in certain  transactions, but the grasping of  hands 
was  absolutely  essential ; it  sealed the bargain  and made 
it irrevocable,  and,  just  as in  '  briduw ', the  placing  of 
a hand on the shoulder of  another party, instead of  in his 
hand, was an insult to be compensated for by the payment 
of honour-price.l 
5 3.  If  there  were  no  mutual  grasping  of  hands  there 
was  no complete  agreement  between  those  who  had  not 
grasped  hands,  and any promise  made without  it was  of 
no effect. 
If, however,  any  two  parties  to  a  bond  of  '  machni ' 
grasped  hands and others did not, there was  an effective 
bond  between  those  who  had  done so, but none between 
those who had not.  A transaction,  in which some of  those 
engaged did grasp hands and others did not, was described 
as a delusive (gwaradog) or slip (pallog) suretyship, the latter phrase being derived  from the metaphor of  a  knot which 
did not hold. 
The  Dimetian  Code  is  so  concise  and  explicit  on  the 
subject that what it says is worth reproducing in full : 
'  If  there be one hand wanting in mutually plighting, it is 
called a slip surety ; the nature of  a slip surety is that one 
end is bound, and the other loose, and on  this account if  the 
creditor accept  the faith of  the debtor for paying the debt, 
and the faith of  the surety for compelling the debtor to pay 
the debt, then each of  them must be responsible by his agree- 
ment to the creditor ; if  he take but the faith of  one of  them, 
then only one  of  them is responsible to him ; if  the surety 
give his faith to the creditor to insure to him his debt he must 
be  responsible to him  for the whole debt since he takes not 
the faith of  the debtor.' 
The Venedotian Code and the Xth Book give the delusive 
sureties  in  the  familiar  form  of  Triads.  In the  former 
there  is  obviously  a  slight  corruption  of  the  text,  as it 
includes in the delusive suretyships the case where no one 
had grasped hands with another.  That was not a delusive 
suretyship, but no suretyship at all. 
The three delusive suretyships were the following : 
(i) If  the vendee bought and demanded a surety from the 
vendor  for  title  and  soundness, and  the  vendor  profferred 
a surety without taking him by the hand ;  then, if  the vendee 
took  the surety's  hand,  there was  no  agreement whatsoever 
between the vendor and vendee, or  between  the surety and 
vendor. 
There was, however, a bond between the surety and vendee ; 
and, if  either title or soundness failed, the vendee could recover 
from the surety ; but neither he  nor  the surety could make 
any demand upon the vendor. 
(ii) Likewise  if  the  vendor's  surety grasped  the  vendor's 
hand  only, and not  that of  the purchaser, the  vendor  and 
vendee grasping hands, the  only enforceable bond was  that 
between the vendor and vendee. 
(iii) If  one person entered into a bargain on behalf of  another 
and himself  stood surety for that other, the bargain was not 
binding on the person on whose behalf it was made.  The laws 
did not  recognize the act of  an agent, unless  that act were 
ratified by the formal procedure.  The agent, however, having 
grasped hands with the other party, was responsible to him, 
and that party to the agent. 
Of  course  these  instances  do not  exhaust  the delusive 
suretyships which  might  arise.  The same  rule  applied  if 
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the vendee's  surety omitted the grasping of  hands, and the 
grasping of  hands by the two sureties without the parties 
doing the same was of  no avail to bind the parties1 
$ 4.  The delusive sureties are also mentioned elsewhere in 
the Anomalous  Laws, but they must not be confused  with 
what  are  called  the  useless  or  futile  (ofer)  suretyships, 
referred to in the Venedotian Code. 
A  delusive  suretyship  was  one  where  promises  were 
made which  could  not be  enforced, because  the full cere- 
mony of  grasping hands had not been observed ; useless or 
futile suretyships were bonds, which either had been entered 
into with full ceremony and were useless because the sureties 
were in law incapable of  being sureties, or in which one side 
had given a surety and the other had not, and that other 
resiled  from the bargain  before  being  bound.  The surety 
given by the vendor in that case was useless, because  the 
vendee  did not wish  to avail himself  of  it, having resiled 
from the bargain, and he was  useless to the vendor as he 
had not guaranteed anything to the vendor. 
Yet  a  third  useless  surety is  mentioned,  viz.  where  a 
surety guaranteed title, which he could not guarantee, the 
vendor  having  no  title.  In that  case,  if  the real  owner 
came and demanded possession, it  must be restored to him. 
The surety was useless to preserve possession to the vendee 
as against  the  real  owner,  though  of  course  the vendee 
could obtain an equivalent from the s~rety.~ 
$5. We have said that among the '  ofer ' sureties were 
persons incapable of  being sureties. 
Incapacity might arise from two causes, the one want of 
will, the other want of  competency. 
The Welsh Laws never recognized any agreement entered 
into other than with full and free consent, or as it puts it, 
'  absence of  compulsion, free giving or suffering removal of 
property without impediment, threat, or question '.  Con- 
sequently,  if  any  one  induced  another  to become  surety 
either through fraud, coercion, or fear, the suretyship was 
of  no avail. 
'  V. C. I32 ; D. C. 428 ; VI. 108 ;  VIII. 176 ;  X.  342. 
V. C. 126 ;  XIV. 658, 702. I2  THE FORMALITIES  OF BARGAINING  PART V 
There  were  many  people  incompetent  to  give  or  be 
sureties ; the  question  of  competency  being  determined 
with  reference  to the time at which  the  transaction  was 
entered into.  So a person who was competent  to be or to 
give a surety was not relieved from liability if, after becom- 
ing or giving, he were rendered incompetent. 
Of  the persons  lacking competency, the most important 
was a woman.  A woman was competent to give or receive 
a  surety,  if  she  were  competent  to enter into  a  bargain. 
As the law puts it, '  a person who is competent  to inquire 
into  title,  is  competent  to provide  a guarantee of  title '. 
But, with  one exception, no woman  was  competent  to be 
a surety.  The one exception was the case of  a '  lady para- 
mount ' in Dinefwr, who could guarantee a bargain entered 
into by some one under her. 
Where, however, a woman provided a surety she was not 
competent  to produce  a  compurgating jury  of  women  to 
deny it ; her compugators must be men, and we must also 
not lose sight of  the fact that a married woman  could not 
ordinarily make a bargain, except through her husband.' 
$6. The ordinary rule  was  that a  surety had to be of 
the same  status as the person  for  whom  he gave  surety, 
hence  it  was  that the King  could  neither  give  nor  be  a 
surety. 
But in addition  to the  King  there  were  others incom- 
petent.  A  foreigner, a monk,  a friar, a hermit, a scholar, 
a  clerk, a man in debt, a  person  not free to attend court 
without permission of  his superior, a son under the dominion 
and authority  of  his  father, a  drunken  man,  a  leper,  an 
insane  person,  and  a  blind  man  were  all  incompetent, 
except that in Dinefwr a friar or a scholar could be a surety 
if his abbot or master allowed him to be so.2 
$7. There was certain property also for which suretyship 
for title was  unnecessary ; such property carried  its own 
guarantee.  In this category  were  money,  girdles,  knives, 
arms, all property brought  by a  woman  on  her  marriage, 
property given by a lord to his man, testamentary bequests, 
V.  C. 98,  Ion, 126-8  ; D.  C.  432 ; IV.  24,  30 ; VI. I 10  ; VIII. 208 ; 
XI.  404 ; XIV.  588,  658. 
V. C.  122-8;  D. C. 432 ; IV.  2, 30;  VI.  110;  XI.  404. 
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property  received  by  a  doctor from his  patient,  property 
received by a woman from her husband as '  wy'nebwerth ', 
or property taken as spoil of  war. 
$ 8.  No  suretyship was valid if  given for the payment of 
a reward for the commission of  a tort or crime.  Any person 
who stood surety for such payment  was  an accessary  and 
punishable as such.  So, too, the promisor ;  while the person 
who committed a crime and sued for the reward promised 
was at once punishable for the crime committed. 
A bargain conducted in open  market was  also in South 
Wales  not  a  subject for suretyship.  To such bargains the 
rule of  '  caveat  emptor ' applied, but it is significant that 
that rule is found nowhere  except in that part of  South 
Wales which came early under Norman influence. 
Persons bargaining in open market were of  the privilege 
of  the mart, and so a stranger and a  Cymro were on the 
same  footing  in  a  mart.  Free  trade  in  open  mart  was 
recognized  early,  and persons  incompetent  to give  or  be 
sureties were at full liberty to trade in market ~nrestricted.~ 
$9. The next question is whether a person  could stand 
surety for himself. 
The ordinary  formality  of  suretyship  was,  as we  have 
seen, for each party to proffer sureties to the other, but we 
find some references to a '  debtor-surety ', in some of  which 
it would appear at first sight that the possibility  of  a man 
standing surety for himself was contemplated.  Is this the 
correct meaning or not ? 
The references to the triple grasp, and the powers given 
to compel a debtor to pay, seem to preclude any such possi- 
bility, but the phrase needs examination. 
In the  Dimetian  Code,  p.  430,  we  have  the  following 
passage as translated by Mr. Aneurin Owen : 
' Whoever shall buy property of  another, and shall be him- 
self  surety  (" ac afo  mach  ehunan ")  for  the worth  of  the 
property, and die before payment of  the debt, and leave the 
property in  the custody  of  friends, the  claimant  is  entitled 
to payment for that property because the dead who  became 
debtor-surety to him  (" a fu vach kynogyn idau ")  was owner 
of  that  property : he  ought to swear . . . to having sold 
D.  C. 606 ; G.  C.  680;  V.  56;  VI.  120. I4  THE FORMALITIES  OF BARGAINING  PART V 
that property and to that person's  being debtor-surety (vach 
kynogyn) to him for the worth of  that property.' 
This  passage,  as given,  clearly  contemplates  a  debtor 
being himself  surety, but we  have to note that it does not 
appear in  all  the MSS.,  that in  some  the word '  ehunan ' 
is  absent  (which would  make  that part  run, '  and  there 
shall be  surety for  the worth  of  the property '),  and that 
in some the words '  vach  kynogyn ' do not appear, either 
the  word  '  vach '  or  '  kynogyn ' standing  alone.  Still, 
even if  we  take full cognizance of  these variations, the fact 
remains that the transcript  appears, standing alone, to be 
a fair collation from the MSS. 
In another part of  the Dimetian Code, pp. 396-8,  a '  mach 
cynnogyn ' is said to be '  a person who becomes surety for 
one unable to abide law on account of  poverty, and in that 
case the inability  of  the party  compels the surety to be 
a debtor '.  In yet another part of the same Code, p. 428, 
we are told that unless there be a triple grasping the surety 
is a slip surety, '  except where a person comes as a debtor- 
surety on behalf  of  himself  or  of  another  whom  he  does 
not produce as surety '. 
The  Venedotian  Code,  p.  122,  is,  however,  clear.  '  A 
man is not to take a debtor as surety . . . no individual can 
be both surety and debtor (vach kynogyn).' 
These  appear  to  be  the  only  references  to  the '  vach 
kynogyn ', and there is no possibility of  reconciling them. 
It is,  however,  certain  that  in  North  Wales  no  debtor 
could  stand  surety for  himself;  and what seems to have 
happened was that, where  a  debtor  became  im2overished 
and unable  to pay  his  debts, his surety, who had  then  to 
take on  all liability  without  hope  of  recovery, was  called 
a ' debtor-surety '.  This phrase became applied, as Norman 
influences spread allowing a man to give his own security, 
to a  man  who  pledged  his  own  property  as security  or 
'  wadium ' direct. 
We know as a matter of fact that in early Teutonic Law 
it was possible for a nian to be his own surety by giving his 
own '  wadium ' or pledge at the time of  the bargain, and it 
would seem as if  in South Wales this variation was accepted. 
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It is safe, it seems, to assume that the original formality 
required the surety to be a person  other than the debtor, 
and it was only as barter increased-as  it did more rapidly 
in South Wales, where  towns grew  up  earlier than in  the 
north-rendering  the  formality  cumbersome on  occasion, 
that the practice of  a man being his own surety was intro- 
duced. 
§ 10.  We have now to consider whether a surety's liability 
died with himself  or not.  Apparently it did not. 
The laws provide that the liability of  a surety was trans- 
mitted ,to his  son,  provided  always that the son  derived 
property  from the father.  It did  not  descend  if  the son 
did  not  inherit  property  from  his  father.  The same rule 
applied if  a  surety became civilly dead, say by becoming 
a monk and taking his property to the Church.  In the latter 
case the Church had to assume the surety's responsibility. 
If  there were no son, then the lord, who took the deceased's 
property by escheat, was responsible to carry out the surety's 
undertaking. 
The  Dimetian  Code  provides  a  procedure  for  the  case 
where a surety died before the debt was  paid  to establish 
the fact that the deceased was a surety.  The creditor swore 
with  six  others on  the surety's grave,  and thereafter  the 
lord enforced the suretyship.l 
$11. We have now to turn to the duties of  a surety. 
A surety given to a vendee guaranteed  title and sound- 
ness, and, if  title and soundness failed, he was responsible 
to enforce recoupment by the vendor to the extent which 
the law provided or else make the recoupment himself. 
A  surety given to a vendor guaranteed payment  of  the 
price at a fixed time, and, if  the price were not  then paid, 
he was bound  to force the vendee to pay  or pay himself, 
when called upon to do so by the creditor. 
The method  of  enforcing payment is described in detail 
in the part dealing with the Law of  Distress. 
It  is this which distinguishes transactions through sureties 
from  transactions  through '  amodwyr '.  They were  alike 
in the fact that it was a duty common to both to force the 
V.  C. 124-6 ; D.  C.  430 ; G.  C. 788 ;  IV. 32 ; VIII. 208. debtor  to pay;  they  were  different  in that '  amodwyr ' 
were not liable to make good the deficiency of  the debtor, 
whereas  the  surety was.  The contract-man's  duty ended 
when he had done his best to enforce payment, the surety's 
did not  until he  had paid  the uttermost  farthing himself 
where the debtor did not pay. 
The surety had, however, one chance of  postponing the 
evil day of  having to pay himself. 
If he were satisfied that the debtor was unable to pay at 
the time fixed, he could ask him to free him from his surety- 
ship by providing another surety to the creditor guarantee- 
ing payment at some future date.  If  the creditor accepted 
that  novation,  well  and  good ;  the  old  surety  was  dis- 
charged ; if  the creditor  would  not,  the surety remained 
liable. 
The absolute liability  of  the surety to pay was  subject 
to certain limitations in special circumstances. 
The failure  of  the surety to compel  the debtor to pay 
might  be  due  to various  causes.  If  it were  due  to the 
surety's  own  unwillingness to put the law  of  distress into 
motion, there was no excuse for him ; but it might be due 
either to the debtor being poverty-stricken or to the debtor 
being outside the jurisdiction  of  the lord where the liability 
was incurred and to his having no property in that jurisdic- 
tion.  In both  of  these  cases  the  surety  was  said  to be 
a surety for a nullity  (diddim). 
If  the non-payment  by the debtor was  due to poverty, 
the authorities differ as to the effect. 
The laws required  a  surety to compeI a  debtor to pay, 
even if  he reduced the latter to insolvency, and the test of 
insolvency was whether the debtor was reduced to his last 
garment or not.  The Dimetian  Code says that the surety 
was bound to pay the whole  of  the balance  due after the 
debtor had been  reduced  to this  state of  insolvency,  but 
one passage in the Anomalous Laws says that in that case 
the surety was only responsible for half  the balance.  This 
limitation occurs nowhere else, and, in spite of  its mention, 
it must be taken that the true rule was that a surety must 
make good all deficiencies caused by the debtor's poverty. 
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If the debtor had left the lord's  jurisdiction,  leaving no 
property therein, the same authority says that the surety 
was  only bound to pay half  the debt. 
The Dimetian Code has much more elaborate provisions, 
and these provisions  seem to represent  the real law. 
In determining the surety's liability in such a case, the 
first question was whether the debtor had left the jurisdic- 
tion  before  the due  date for  payment, that is  before  the 
date on which the creditor could have demanded payment, 
or after.  If  he had left before, then the surety was bound 
to pay half  the debt immediately ; for the other half  he 
remained  surety for  a  year  and a  day, at the expiration 
of which time, if  the debtor had not paid, the surety must pay. 
If  the debtor left after due date, then the question arose 
as to whether the creditor had made demand or not.  He 
was  entitled to make demand on  due date, and unless he 
did  so  and his  demand  were  refused,  he  could  not  come 
down on the surety. 
Now  the law provided that if  the creditor did not make 
demand on due date or within nine days of  due date, and 
the  debtor  thereafter  left  the  jurisdiction,  the  failure  to 
recover  was  due  to  the  creditor's  own  laches,  and  the 
liability of  the surety disappeared.  '  The obligation of  the 
surety ', it is said, '  shall be deemed to have passed  away 
in the path of  oblivion.' 
The Venedotian Code does not deal with this particular 
point,  but it does deal with something very similar  to it. 
It  is said that, if  the debtor were banished from the country, 
after incurring the debt and before payment, on account of 
a crime committed by him, the liability of  the surety was 
limited to one half  the debt, the creditor suffering the loss 
of  the other half,  each of  them  being  entitled to recover 
from the debtor whenever he returned. 
Somewhat analogous to the case of  the debtor being absent 
from  the country was  the case where  he  died  before  due 
date. 
Here  again  we  have  different  provisions  in  the  laws. 
The Anomalous Laws provide that, if  the debtor died, the 
surety was responsible for half the debt only, and he was not 
3054.2  C responsible for that half  if  the debtor had provided by will 
for its payment.  The Dimetian Code in one passage deals 
with  the  case  where  the  debtor  was  his  own  surety.  It 
provides that the creditor was entitled to follow the debtor's 
property into whosesoever's  hand it had come, and exact 
payment therefrom, if  he swore to the debt with six others 
over  the  grave  of  the  deceased.  This  provision  merely 
regulates the right of  a creditor to recover from the deceased's 
property, but it does not refer to the liability of  a  surety 
where the debtor had died. 
In another  passage  it provides  that the surety  should 
proceed  by a  like  oath to exact payment  from  the three 
persons nearest in kin to the deceased. 
The Venedotian  Code  states  that, where  a  debtor  died 
before  payment, the surety was  to compel the son of  the 
debtor to  pay, exactly as he would have compelled the debtor 
to pay, provided  the son had ascended  to property on his 
father's  death.  If  there  were  no  son,  and  the  lord  had 
taken  the  debtor's  property,  the  lord  became  liable  for 
the debt. 
The surety could  proceed  against the lord,  and, though 
that might savour of  contempt of  the lord's authority, it is 
specially  provided  that  a  surety  enforcing  payment  by 
a lord was not to be subjected to any punishment. 
It would  appear  from  these  provisions,  therefore,  that 
where  the debtor died, the surety was  to proceed  against 
the deceased's property as he would have proceeded against 
the  debtor,  and  we  may  conclude  that  if  he  could  not 
recover therefrom he must make good the liability himself. 
Thiq conclusion is definitely supported by the Xth Book. 
We have to note here that no  demand could be  made by 
the  creditor,  either  on  the debtor  or  the surety,  if  they 
were out on  military service,  suffering from the effects of 
a  violent  attack, or being  subjected  to a  prosecution  for 
theft. 
The  due  date  was  extended  until  those  causes  were 
removed.  But subject to this, the creditor must make his 
demand,  and he  was  not  entitled  to keep  the  surety  in 
suspense.  He could not grant time to the debtor for payment ; 
he must demand payment or get a new surety to cover any 
extended  period.  If  he  granted  extension  without  the 
surety agreeing, the surety was freed from all liability. 
It is simply necessary to add that a surety paying a debt 
due by  a  debtor was  always entitled, whenever  he could, 
to recover from the debtor, and that he was entitled, before 
being forced to pay himself, to a period of  eight days within 
which to make arrangements for paying.l 
5. Other modes of  bargainifzg. 
§ I. It must not be supposed  that at the time the laws 
were redacted every agreement must of  necessity be entered 
into by ' briduw ', '  amod ', or ' machni '. 
$2. As we have seen in South Wales, it was possible for 
the debtor to cover his liability to the creditor by handing 
over to the creditor at the time of  the bargain some property 
as a pledge, a '  wadium ', or '  gwystl ', which secured pay- 
ment, and in such a  case the ' gwystl'  could be  disposed 
of, on failure to pay on  due date, just  as a  pledge  seized 
under the law of  distress might be. 
§ 3.  In addition, just  as in Rome the '  jus civile '  required 
no formalities in some transactions and allowed agreements 
'  consensu ', so, too, in Welsh Law,  any transaction  other 
than sale or exchange could be effected by oral agreement ; 
in which case, however, there was a risk that a debt claimed 
or  agreement  relied  upon  could  be  denied  by  the  single 
oath of  the alleged debtor." 
6. Like $revisions in other systems. 
§ I.  The Welsh Laws in regard to formalities in bargain- 
ing, so far as essentials were concerned, did not differ from 
other systems. 
§ 2.  The Roman Law of  the XI1 Tables demanded the 
utterance of  words in a solemn form before a transfer  was 
effected  or  before  there  could  be  a  binding  ' nexus '  or 
delivery of  ' mancipium '. 
The right to property transferred depended also on certain 
prescribed  acts, e. g. ' traditio ', those acts constituting the 
V. C.  108, 122-4  ; D. C.  398, 400, 426-8,  430-2  ; IV. 6 ; VIII. 182-6 ;  x.  334, 392 ; XIV. 582.  VIT.  152 ; XI. 418. 
C  2 conveyance.  The  ceremony  conveyed  the  property,  and 
was not merely evidence of  the fact of  a contract or agree- 
ment to convey.  The principle, though not the method, is 
identical. 
Fj  2  The Irish Laws present a closer resemblance, but still 
there are marked differences. 
The Irish Laws appear to treat all transactions as '  con- 
tracts ' without reference to formalities as being the effective 
part of  the contract.  That is to say, agreement  itself  in 
Irish Law might  form  contract, no matter how the agree- 
ment was entered into.  In this particular Irish Law, which 
in  so  many  matters is primitive,  arrived  at a  conception 
of  contract,  approaching  modern  ideas, long  before  most 
other systems did. 
At the same time there are elaborate provisions  relative 
to sureties, directed not so much to indicate how an agree- 
ment  was  entered into as to provide for the carrying out 
of  agreements  when  made,  and  in  many  particulars  the 
Irish Law corresponds to the Welsh Law. 
What is very striking in the Welsh Laws is that bargaining 
was individual and not commu~lal. Throughout the whole 
of  the Welsh Laws, notwithstanding the importance attached 
to kin  responsibilities  and kin  rights  in  land  and in  the 
matter of  torts and crimes, there is not the slightest trace 
of  any  responsibility  on  account  of  relationship  in  the 
matter of  bargaining, beyond that it was  a social duty to 
stand surety for a  kinsman.  Bargaining was a matter for 
individuals,  and, wherever  any  liability  was  imposed  on 
persons other than those who were parties to a bargain, it 
was  imposed,  e. g. on '  amodwyr ' and  sureties, by virtue 
of  a  contractual relationship  freely  entered  into  by  such 
persons. 
In Ireland bargaining or contract was  not  entirely indi- 
vidual : the communal bond  of  the tribe is constantly in 
evidence.  We  get  frequent  references  to the  fact  that 
contracts were made by the tribe or family acting as a body, 
and to the power of  the tribe to repudiate contracts made 
by members of  it. 
The principle of Irish Law was that contracts were entered 
into by individuals under the sanction  or approval of  the 
tribe or family.  Sometimes such sanction or approval was 
assumed or deemed to have been given, because the contract 
was of  such a nature that consent to it could not be refused : 
in other cases such sanction was a necessary preliminary to 
make  it  binding  on  the  tribe,  and,  if  not  obtained,  the 
contract could be impugned. 
But if  sanction were  assumed  or  given,  the liability  to 
carry the contract out or to make good any loss occasioned 
by  non-performance  fell  upon  the  tribe  or  family.  For 
example, in the Senchus M6r, I. 183,  it is said : 
' The  default  of  thy  great-grandson, the  default  of  thy 
great-great-grandson, the  default  of  every  relative  as  far 
as 17,' 
and on p. 195 there is a similar expression. 
The most  eloquent  account,  however,  is in the Senchus 
M6r, p. 283.  The passage is worth quoting in full as showing 
the rigidity and all-embracing sphere of  the tribe : 
' Every tribesman is able to keep his tribe land ; he is not 
to sell it, nor alienate it, nor conceal it, nor give it to pay for 
crimes or  contracts :  he  is able  to impugn the contracts of 
his  tribe, and  to impugn every contract  of  his  kinsmen  for 
whose  crimes  and  securities  and  contracts  and  fosterage 
liabilities and land deeds he  is accountable.  Every litter of 
pigs (i.  e. a share in the young), every reward, every purchase, 
every  sale, every  covenant, every  contract,  every  tenancy, 
every giallna-security, every  service  is  properly due  to  the 
lawful tribesmen by consanguinity to whom  fosterage is due, 
and crimes as well as profits and losses and the support of  the 
common senior.' 
But, notwithstanding  this communal nature of  contract 
in Irish Law, we  find in the later tracts that contract had 
become an individual act, and limitations on the power to 
contract,  similar  to those  in  Welsh  Law,  had  taken  the 
place of  the earlier power of  the tribe to regulate contracts. 
The Corus Bescna, IV. 5, allowed the making of  contracts 
between  two '  lan ' persons,  two ' saer ' persons,  and two 
sane  adults.  It prohibited  contracts by  sons  under  the 
domination of  the father, '  fuidhir ' tenants, monks, ' daer- 
stock ' tenants, fugitives, women, and idiots, but it has the 
comparatively  advanced  provision  that  contracts  entered into by such persons might be ratified by the persons under 
whose authority they were. 
The  Crith  Gablach  prohibited  contracts  by sons,  bond- 
men, monks, and fugitives, and the Senchus Mar has similar 
prohibitions. l 
Though we have practically nothing relative to formalities, 
there are traces that the procedure of  '  amod '  and '  machni ' 
existed.  For example, we read of  the evidence of  a contract- 
binder being conclusive, of  immediate distress upon a surety 
who  evaded  justice,  of  two  classes  of  sureties,  kinsmen 
sureties  and  hostage  sureties.  The  former  were  such  as 
were given when both parties resided in the same country, 
the latter (giall)  such as were given when the debtor resided 
in another country, the hostage-surety given being resident 
in the creditor's co~ntry.~ 
We have also mention of  the right of  a surety to recover 
what he had paid from the debtor, of  the duty of  the creditor 
to proceed against the surety before suing the debtor, and 
many other indications of  a comparable system. 
As in Welsh Law much insistence is placed on the invio- 
lability of  contract.  '  The world  would  be evilly situated 
if  express contracts were not binding ', say both the Senchus 
M6r and the Corus Bescna, and '  the binding of  all to their 
good and bad contracts prevents lawlessness in the world ', 
runs the Senchus 
We have also reference to the fact that a contract debt 
must  be  paid  on  the specified  date,  or,  if  no  date were 
specified, on  demand, and likewise  we  have references  to 
the place of  ~ayment.~ 
The inviolability of  contract in Irish Law was, however, 
contingent, as in Wales, upon the absence of  fraud and the 
presence  of  full  knowledge  and  consent,  and  the  Corus 
Bescna, IV. 5, gives an account of  the effect of  incomplete 
knowledge or consent  upon  a  contract comparable to the 
Welsh Law relative to failure of  '  teithi ' and ' dilysrwdd '. 
The differences in the Irish  Law,  due to different  lines 
Senchus MBr, I. 51, 11. 283 ; Din Techtugad, V. 55. 
Senchus MBr, I. 139, 215-17 ; Bk  of  Aicill, 111. 5  13. 
'  Senchus MBr, I. 5 I ; Corus Bescna, IV. 3. 
Senchus MBr,  I. 147 ; Bk. of  Aicill, 111.  155. 
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of  development, are great, but  there  are sufficient indica- 
tions that the original principles were of  a similar character. 
5 3.  The  early  English  Laws  of  contract  are  meagre. 
Those laws being  of  a  fragmentary nature do not  give us 
the same details as to formalities as do the Welsh ones. 
That  similar  formalities  existed  there  is,  however,  no 
doubt. 
The existence  of  a  formality like '  amod ' is established 
by the Fragment on Oaths, c. 8 ; of  a warranty for sound- 
ness of  cattle and for payment of  price by the same Frag- 
ment, cc. 7, g, the Dooms of  Ine, c. 56, Edward's Laws, c. I, 
the Carta of  William the Conqueror, c. 10, &c. ; of  a formality 
similar to ' briduw ', or Godborh, as it is termed, by alfred's 
Laws,  c.  33 ; but the  principal  characteristic  of  English 
law was  the need  of  witnesses  and guarantors or sureties 
to all transactions, mainly as a security against theft.  This 
was  over  and over  again insisted upon ;  l  and it was  the 
common characteristic of  most Teutonic and Scandinavian 
Laws, e.g. the Lex Burgund., Tit. XCIX. 
As  to kinds of  transactions the English  Law  has  little 
to say, but we  do know  of  sales  and purchases,  deposits 
(where the law is comparable to the Welsh Laws), &c. 
$4.  The  provisions  of  the  early  Scots  Law  are  also 
meagre,  and practically  the only  law  of  civil  obligations 
found therein relates to the provisions that all transactions, 
particularly  of  the sale of  cattle, must be conducted in the 
presence  of  witnesse~,~  but  the  few  provisions  there  are 
seem  to indicate the same methods of  contracting as pre- 
vailed in Wales. 
3 5.  In the  Germanic  Laws  there  is  little  relative  to 
contract.  The Lex  Baiuor., Tit. XVI, cc. 9-15,  does give 
an  elaborate account  of  the procedure  to be  adopted  in 
contracts  of  sale,  in  which  special  emphasis is  placed  on 
the phraseology, a derivative apparently from Roman Law, 
but beyond that there is little in their Codes. 
See, e,  g., Ethelred's Laws, cc. 3, 4 ;  Hlothaire and Edric's Laws, c. 16 : 
Dooms  of  Ine,  c. 25 ;  2Elfred  and Guthrum's  Peace,  c. 4 ;  Athelstan's 
Ordinance,  c.  12 ;  Edmund's Council of  Culinton,  c.  5 ;  Edgar's Laws, 
c. 6 ; the Laws of  Edward the Elder, c. I ; Cnut's Laws, c. 24 ; the Laws 
of the Confessor, c. 38 ; and the Laws of  the Conqueror, c. 45. 
See, e.  g., Assize of  King William, c. 5. CH.  11  SALE  AND  EXCHANGE  25 
THE SUB  JECT-MATTER OF AGREEMENTS 
THE  common transactions mentioned in the Welsh Laws 
are '  cyfnewid ' (sale  and  purchase  or  exchange), ' llog ' 
(leasing  or  hiring),  '  benffyg '  and  '  echwyn '  (lending), 
'  adneu ' (deposit), '  rhodd ' (gift), and ' cymyn ' (bequest), 
with  which  may  be  compared  the  Irish  list  in the Corus 
Feine-loan,  lending, purchases,  contracts, and pledges. 
I. Sale, purchase, ad  exchange. 
§ I.  Wales, being a pastoral and agricultural community, 
was concerned  almost  entirely with  the sale and purchase 
of  animals,  but  the  rules  applicable  thereto  are  equally 
applicable to the sale and purchase of  goods. 
The Welsh  Laws recognized no  distinction  between  sale 
for a monetary price and exchange for other goods.  Both 
are  called  '  cyfnewid '.  The  absence  of  differentiation  is 
no  matter for surprise,  as the sale and purchase of  goods 
was made at least as often by barter as by the giving and 
receiving of  a price in money. 
$2. A sale or exchange might be effected through surety, 
contract, or '  briduw ',  but the first named was the principal 
form in actual practice.  No  sale or exchange without  one 
or other of  these formalities was fully binding.l 
A  sale was  completed  and property passed  the moment 
the parties  to the  transaction  sealed  the bargain  by  the 
clasping of  hands.  Immediate delivery  of  the property or 
the payment of  price was not a necessary ingredient of  the 
contract, they were incidents to the contract  which  could 
be enforced. 
§ 3.  In every sale of  goods or animals there was on the 
one hand a warranty of  title to convey and a warranty  of 
soundness  (dilysrwdd and teithi),  and on  the other  side  a 
warranty to pay the price at the time fixed in the agreement, 
V. 76 ; VI. 124 ; VIII. 176 ; X. 304 ; XIV. 590-8,  658. 
the warranty being usually covered by security.  The Corus 
Bescna is identical in its provisions regarding soundness. 
The guarantee of  soundness had a few exceptions, which 
appear to show the beginnings of  a rule of  ' caveat emptor '. 
They are so few as to deserve notice. 
Reference  has  already  been  made to the traces  of  this 
rule in transactions conducted in open market.  In addition 
the Venedotian  Code, p.  268,  exempted from liability  the 
vendor  of  a  horse  suffering from  internal disorders,  if  he 
swore  to his  ignorance  thereof  at the time  of  sale :  the 
Gwentian Code, p. 706, laid down a general rule of  '  caveat 
emptor ' in regard thereto, while the Dimetian Code, p. 572, 
maintained  that  a  guarantee  of  soundness  included  all 
internal disorders.  The VIth Book, p.  98, provided a rule 
of  ' caveat  emptor ' in all cases of  animals with defective 
teeth, and these are the only instances in the laws where 
the doctrine was applied. 
$4. We have to consider the effect of  selling an article 
or animal whose title or soundness failed, and the effect of 
non-payment  of  the price agreed upon. 
In no case was the contract voided ; it had been irrevoc- 
ably sealed by the grasping of  hands. 
In the case of  non-payment of  price at the fixed day the 
vendor  proceeded  to  recover  the  price  by  putting  into 
motion the law of  distress (q.v.) either before or after suit. 
In every transaction of  sale the price must be paid at once 
or upon  a date fixed for payment  in the agreement itself: 
if no time were fixed, the debtor could pay when he chose. 
If the price were not paid at the time of  agreement, the 
date for payment must be at least one day later. 
Time  for  payment  could  be  extended if  the fixed  date 
happened to fall on Easter Day, Whit Sunday, or Christmas 
Day, for a  week,  but, subject to that exception, payment 
had in law  to be  made on  due date.  The creditor  could, 
subject  to the freeing  of  the surety from  liability  if  the 
latter  did not  consent,  extend  the period  of  payment  for 
the debtor's benefit, but if  the debtor insisted on payment 
on  due  date,  the  creditor  must  accept  payment  or  find 
himself  debarred for ever from claiming. There was no bar to payment being made before, if  there 
were  no  contract  to  the  contrary,  but  a  creditor  who 
demanded payment before due date, lost the right to claim 
on the proper date : he had to wait until the expiry of  the 
same  number  of  days after  due  date, so, if  he demanded 
payment  a  week  before  due  date,  he  had  to wait  until 
a  week  after due  date had expired  before  he  could  seek 
payment.  In Irish Law a creditor suing prematurely was 
fined five '  seds '. 
In case of  failure of  soundness the vendee also proceeded 
to put the law of  distress into motion to recover damages, 
and the  amount of  damages he could  claim  was  fixed  in 
the laws themselves.  Nothing was left to the idiosyncracies 
of  judges  in determining  the quantity of  damages.  They 
had to decree the amount fixed by custom. 
Such amount was a definite proportion of  the legal worth 
of  the animal or goods. 
The general rule was that if  an animal were clean,  that 
is one whose milk could  be  used  for human consumption, 
half  the legal  worth  of  the  animal  was  the standard  of 
damages ; if  it were unclean, one-third.  In the Gwentian 
Code the universal rule was one-third the legal worth. 
There were certain variations of  too minute a character 
to be worth repeating. 
The guarantee of  soundness was not for all time, and we 
have already noted  in the chapter on  the Worth of  Men 
and Things the time limitation. 
In the case of  failure of  warranty of  title the vendee was 
entitled to recover the full value which he had paid.  The 
warranty for title endured for ever. 
But it must be  noted  that this warranty was  for title, 
and not for continued possession.  There was, therefore, no 
insurance against the animal being stolen.  Title was only 
guaranteed  so  long  as the vendee  retained  the article in 
his own possession, and, if  he parted with the property to 
another, the vendor's warranty did not enure to the benefit 
of  the  new  vendee.  If  the  new  vendee  found  his  title 
challenged, say by a charge of  theft, he could protect him- 
self  by relying  on the first vendee's  warranty to him, and 
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the charge was then diverted to the first vendee, the property 
being  placed  in  his  hands.  The first  vendee  could  then 
protect himself  by relying on the vendor's warranty to him. 
This was  in theft  cases  called  the law  of  the '  anvaesaf ' 
(q.v.),  but the principle was operative in all matters where 
warranty of title had to be supported. 
If, however,  the vendee  lost  the property, the warranty 
ended with the loss, but the benefit of  it revived immediately 
the property found its way back to the vendee's hand. 
We  can  see,  therefore,  why a vendee,  purchasing  pro- 
perty '  bona fide ' from a vendor who had stolen it, could 
not retain the property against a claim for recovery by the 
true owner.  His sole remedy, warranty having failed, was 
to recover damages from the vend0r.l 
2. '  Llog.' 
$ I. The second transaction referred to in the Welsh Laws 
is '  llog ', which Mr. Aneurin  Owen has rendered in various 
places as '  interest ', '  lending ', and '  hiring '.2 
Interest was prohibited  in the time of  these laws by the 
canonists, and '  llog ' does not mean interest.  Nor does it 
mean  lending.  ' Llog ' was  simply the leasing  out of  the 
property by the owner in return for a hiring fee, which the 
canonist doctrine allowed. 
The  word  ' Ilog ' is  derived  from  the  Latin  '  locatio ', 
and the transaction  is identical  with the '  locatio  of  the 
Roman Law. 
$2. Not much is said about ' llog ' in the Codes. 
The Venedotian Code, p.  180,  refers to ' Ilog ' of  land in 
one place  only, where  it is said that the owner of  land is 
free to lease (lloget) it for the space of  a year without  per- 
mission of  the lord ; while the IXth Book, p. 276, says that 
no one has a  pre-emptive  right in respect  to a lease, par- 
ticularly if  of  ' manured ' land. 
$3. '  Llog ' could be effected by '  briduw ', '  amod ', or 
' machni ', but  the  transaction  could  be  entered  into  by 
'  consensus ' without formality. 
V.C. 116, 122-6,  130, 264, 266, 268, 270, 274, 276, 278;  D. C.  564-8, 
570-4 ; G. C. 706,  710-18;  VI. 104,  120; VIII. 182, 186, 188, 208 ; X. 
344 ;  XIV. 702.  '  IX. 240. When  property was hired  out in '  llog ',  the lender  did 
not part with the ownership thereof, but, during the currency 
of  the period  of ' llog ', the owner, being out of  possession, 
was not entitled to swear to it as his, nor was he entitled 
to inquire from the person to whom he had leased it what 
was being done with the property. 
The transaction of  '  llog ' required that the identical pro- 
. 
perty leased was to be restored on the expiration of  the lease, 
and not property  of  a like nature.  It had to be returned 
immediately the period expired, along with the hiring fee. 
5 4.  While property leased on ' 11og ' was in the possession 
of  the hirer, the latter had to take all reasonable care of 
it, and return it in the state in which he had received it, 
and, provided  reasonable  and lawful  use  alone  was made 
of  it, the hirer was not responsible for any damage to it. 
Consequently, if  a hired animal lost its life or was injured 
while with the hirer,  he was not  to pay compensation for 
it, unless  he  had  used  it in  contravention  of  the  agree- 
ment  of  hiring.  If  it were  injured  by  unlawful  use,  the 
hirer paid for it, his own oath being sufficient if  he denied 
having used it otherwise than he would have used his own. 
In every case the hiring fee must be paid. 
§ 5.  The use to which animals or goods leased on '  llog ' 
could  be put was  expressed  in the agreement,  and use  in 
excess of  such terms was illegal, and must be compensated 
for.  The standard illustration given in the Codes is the case 
where  a man hired  a horse  to ride  for  a  certain  distance. 
If  he rode it beyond  he paid a surreption fine to the lord, 
and handed over half or a third of  the extra profit he had 
derived from such user to the lessor. 
We have exactly the same rule in the Senchus MBr, I. 169, 
'  Wherever there is use, there is payment for use ; wherever 
there is wear, there is payment for excessive wear of  a loan.' 
3. ' Benfyg ' and  ' echwyn '. 
§ I. '  Benffyg ' and '  echwyn ' are different forms of  loan. 
The  Roman  Law  divided  loans  of  property  into  two, 
'  commodatum ' and '  mutuum '.  The Welsh  Law had an 
V. C. 248,266 ; D.  C. 572 ; G. C. 744 ; VI. roo ; IX. 240 ; XIV. 588, 
5 90-8. 
identical  division  into  '  benffyg ' and  '  echwyn ',  and  a 
though  not  identical,  division  appears to exist  in 
the  Irish  Law  of  '  arra ' and '  anarra ', the former corre- 
sponding to '  benffyg ', the latter to '  echwyn '. 
Mr. Owen translates the two words as ' loan '  and '  borrow- 
ing ', using  the  translations  indiscriminately.  The  terms 
cannot  be  rendered  exactly  into  English,  and,  in  the 
presence  of  Latin  equivalents, it is unnecessary  to  seek 
English ones. 
$ z. '  Benffyg ' or ' commodatum ' was a gratuitous loan 
for a  period  of  an article  or  animal, at the expiration  of 
which period the exact article or animal had to be restored. 
' Echwyn ' or ' mutuum ' was a gratuitous loan, also for 
a period,  at the expiration of  which  an equivalent  for the 
article or animal loaned had to be restored. 
Some  things  were  incapable  of  being  the  subject  of 
'  benffyg ', e. g.  seed-corn ; the exact  seed being  used  for 
sowing  could  not  be  restored,  but an equivalent  in kind 
could be, and a loan of  seed-corn would accordingly  be an 
'  echwyn '.  So, too, nothing that was liable to waste could 
be the subject of  '  benffyg '. 
On  the  other hand,  land  could  never  be  the  subject 
of  ' echwyn ' ; it must  always be  hired  (llog), or if  lent 
gratuitously, be lent as '  benffyg '. 
§ 3.  The ownership  of  anything given  in ' benffyg ' was 
not  separated  from  the  lender;  he  could  not,  however, 
swear to it as his during the period of  ' benffyg ', as it was 
out  of  his  possession  legally;  but  he  could  swear  to it 
after the period had expired. 
$4. There was  a  material  difference as to liability  for 
damage caused  to ' benffyg ' from  that caused  to '  llog '. 
In the latter case,  as we  have  noted,  provided  the lessee 
took  reasonable  care  of  the  property hired,  he  was  not 
responsible for damages caused ; but, in the case of  '  benffyg ', 
the  borrower  was  responsible  for  all damage  caused,  and 
was  liable  to make  compensation  therefor.  Even  if  the 
damage  caused  were  not  permanent,  e.g. temporary  dis- 
ablement  by accident,  the borrower  must give  the lender 
an equivalent  for use until complete recovery,  and, failing recovery, the substitute could be retained by the lender as 
his own. 
$ 5.  A ' benffyg ' could be created by '  briduw ', '  amod ', 
or ' machni ', though no formality was compulsory, but the 
Gwentian Code advises in such a case the taking of  a pledge 
(gwystl) from  the  borrower,  for  otherwise  his  own  oath 
denying the loan sufficed to prove there was no loan. 
$6. In all cases of  ' benffyg ' the purpose  for which  it 
was made was stipulated in the agreement, and any use of 
it in excess entailed a surreption fine to the lord and a sur- 
render of  half  the profit accruing from such use to the lender. 
A person  taking goods on '  benffyg ', denying the loan, 
had to refund double the value when proved. 
$7. Inasmuch as a ' benffyg ' had to be restored in the 
state it was in when lent, no person could create a charge 
on such property, or as it is called '  return it with a surclaim 
on it '.  The application of  this doctrine to the case where 
a third person claimed the subject-matter as his, or in virtue 
of  a charge on it in the hand of  the person to whom it had 
been lent, is enlarged on in the Anomalous Laws. 
It is provided that the borrower must take the property 
at once to the lender, and if  the latter admitted the loan or 
the loan by him  was  proved,  and that the third person's 
charge existed on it at the time of  loan, the borrower could 
return it to the lender subject to the claim.  If  the lender 
denied  the charge, the borrower  could  prove  its existence 
at the time of  loan. 
If, however, the borrower admitted or it was proved that 
at the time of  loan there was  no  charge on  the property, 
then  the  lender  could  force  the  borrower  to defend  the 
claim of  the third party, and decline to accept the property 
back  until the claim  were  removed  from  it.  Should the 
borrower  discharge the third party's claim or give sureties 
to answer for it before reference to the lender, he created 
a charge on the property, and he could not call on the lender 
to recoup. 
The rule of  '  arwaesaf ' applied to all '  benffyg ', alleged 
to be  stolen property in the hand  of  the lender, who had 
passed it on to a bona fide borrower. 
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If a  borrower  himself created a  charge on  the loan, he 
was  compelled  to  restore  to  the  lender  property  of  an 
equivalent value free of  charge. 
$ 8.  In '  echwyn ', inasmuch as the identical property lent 
was not to  be restored, the ownership in the article lent passed 
at once to the borrower.  No question, therefore, arose as to 
excess use, and no stipulations restricting user were needed. 
Likewise  there  could  be  no  charge  of  theft  where  the 
'  echwyn ' was retained beyond the stipulated period. 
Like  '  benffyg ',  an  ' echwyn '  could  be  effected  by 
'  briduw ', ' amod ', or '  machni ', or  by  pledge  or  '  con- 
sensu '. 
$ 9.  In both '  benffyg ' and '  echwyn ' a definite date for 
return of  the article lent or its equivalent was fixed ; but, 
if  no date were mentioned, it could be demanded back the 
following  day,  and  if  demand  were  not  then  made,  the 
period of  currency was fixed as a year and a day.l 
4. '  Adneu '  or Deposit. 
$ I.  The transaction of  '  adneu ' is in the main identical 
with the ' depositum ' of  Roman Law. 
It is briefly mentioned in the Codes, but with some detail 
in the Laws.  The references to it in the Codes are sufficient 
to justify us in asserting that the transaction was known in 
very early times. 
$2. A deposit  both in Welsh and Roman Law was the 
entrusting  of  property  to  another  for  safe  keeping.  It 
could be made in Wales with or without '  briduw ', ' amod ', 
or ' machni '. 
Ownership in the property was not transferred by the act 
of deposit, and the owner was entitled to recover the identical 
article deposited by him. 
So long, however, as the property was in the hands of  the 
bailee, the owner could not swear to it as his, as property 
must always be in hand before it could be sworn to ; title 
and possession in early law being so closely allied as to be 
almost indistinguishable. 
Bk.  of AiciII, 151, 153, 155 ; V. C. 248, 266-8;  D. C. 572, 598; G. C. 
708, 728 ; IV. 12 ; VI. 124 ; VII. 168, 170 ; IX. 302 ; X. 324, 378, 380 ; 
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There is an interesting discussion in the laws as to whether 
the owner of  a  deposit  could prosecute  for its theft  while 
in the depositee's  custody.  He  could  not  swear  to theft, 
as he had to swear to its having been taken out of  his hand, 
and the ultimate conclusion arrived at that he could pro- 
secute is not arrived at on any logical ground. 
$3. The prime duty of  a depositee was to take such care 
of  the article  deposited as he would  of  his  own  property. 
Consequently,  if  the deposit  were  lost  through  negligence, 
the depositee had to make good its value. 
There  are numerous  references  to a  depositee's  liability 
where the property was stolen from him.  If  it alone were 
stolen,  the  depositee  was  primarily  responsible  to  make 
good the loss : he was not responsible if  goods of  his own 
were  also  stolen  and there  were  distinct  traces  of  house- 
breaking ; nor was he responsible if  the deposit  had been 
buried in the ground and had been dug up by the thief.  In 
the latter case, apparently, the owner could come down on 
the lord to recoup him. 
The responsibility of  the depositee extended to a deposit 
burnt in his house. 
§ 4.  A  deposit  made  in  the precincts  of  a  church  was 
illegal  and  irrecoverable;  and if  the  depositee  became  a 
receiver  of  stolen  property  and his  house  thereby became 
forfeit, the  sentence  of  forfeiture  did  not  extend  to the 
deposit. 
The owner could demand the return of  his deposit at any 
time, and a denial of  receipt  by the depositee involved the 
latter, if  the deposit were proved,  in  a  penalty  of  double 
the value of  the dep0sit.l 
§ 5.  There are incidental  references in the Anglo-Saxon 
Laws, which show that the same rules existed in the main 
in that law.  There is a slight referencc to the same system 
in the Lex  Baiuor.,  Tit. XV, providing that the bailee  of 
animals was  not  responsible  for  damage caused  by  them, 
and further providing sim~lar  rules as to liability for burnt 
and stolen deposits. 
'  V. C. 244-8,  258 ; D. C.  484 ; IX. 238 ; XI. 420 ; XIV. 588, 590-8, 
652, 672. 
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The Irish Law also had similar rules relative to the loss 
or  destruction of  deposits,  the test  always  being  whether 
there was or was not negligence in guarding.l 
The references are slight, but sufficient to show that the 
same law was of  wide prevalence. 
5. '  Rhodd ' or gqi. 
5 I. '  Rhodd ' or gift is referred to in both the Codes and 
the commentaries. 
A  gift  caused  the  immediate  transfer  of  ownership  in 
the property to the donee.  A gift once made was irrevoc- 
able, and that rule applied to donations of  land by a lord, 
which could not be revoked by his successor. 
$  2.  Gift  could  be  made  by  '  briduw ', '  amod ', or 
'  machni ', but none of  these formalities was  essential.  It 
could be  effected by delivery into the donee's  hand in the 
presence  of  witnesses,  or by delivery  under  suretyship  or 
indemnity by the donor against claim. 
In every  case  removal  by the donee was  essential, but 
the  requirements  of  removal  were  satisfied  if  the  donee 
removed  it for  a  short space and then returned  it to the 
donor, apparently as a deposit. 
In making  a  gift  it was  permissible  for  the  donor  to 
contract that any profit  made  by  trading with  it should 
accrue to himself, but, without such contract, he could claim 
nothing. 
$3. The necessity  for  delivery  of  possession  before  the 
gift  could be considered  complete gave rise to an interest- 
ing  comment  on the case  where  the donor  sent a  gift by 
a messenger,  and the messenger,  having given  no sureties 
to deliver it, misappropriated it. 
The commentators say that the donor had parted with 
the  property,  and the donee had not  received  it, and so 
neither  could  recover  from  the  messenger.  If,  however, 
goods were sent by messenger, say to market, there was no 
separation of  the dominium over  it from  the owner,  who 
could  accordingly  charge  the messenger  misappropriating 
with theft.2 
1  Ir. Laws,  I. 279-81  ; IV. 191-7. 
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6. '  Cyrnyn ' or  bequest. 
$ I.  The Welsh Laws contain references to the power to 
will.  The  question  of  this  power  in  early  law  presents 
a number of difficult points.  Was there, in early law, any 
general recognition  of  the right  to dispose of  movables  to 
take effect  post  mortem ; if  so,  was  it co-extensive  with 
.  the right  to dispose  of  property  inter  uivos ; was  a  will 
revocable ; and what  formalities, if  necessary,  had  to be 
observed in order to make a will valid ? 
On  all these points the Welsh Laws throw no light, and, 
from  the  references  in  the  laws,  it is  impossible  to  say 
whether  the right  of  bequest  was  of  tribal origin,  or  was 
derived  from  Roman  Law,  or  from  the later  law  of  the 
canonists. 
All we can say with certainty is that the power to will is 
mentioned in the Codes and Laws. 
$2. Bequest  is referred  to in the XIVth Book,  p. 702, 
as one  of  the  modes  of  acquiring  property,  and  in  the 
IXth Book, p. 254, it is said that, in case of  dispute between 
two persons as to which of  them was entitled to a bequest, 
the statement of  the parish priest through whom it was made 
was conclusive. 
This latter appears to suggest, but it is only a suggestion, 
that bequests were death-bed gifts without  delivery made 
in the presence of  the priest. 
$3. The Venedotian Code has three references to bequests, 
and the other Codes one each.l 
In the first  mentioned  it is said that a  sick man could 
only bequeath  a ' daered ' (apparently in this case meaning 
donations for masses, funeral charges, and the like) to the 
Church, '  ebediw ' to the lord, and his  debts, meaning, it 
would  seem,  the assignation  of  definite  property  to meet 
the '  ebediw ' and debts due.  It is specially provided that 
a son may disregard any other bequest made by a sick man, 
but if  he  did so he was  an '  uncourteous ' son, and if he 
disregarded  a  '  legal  bequest ',  relative  to '  daered ' and 
debts,  he  was  to be  excommunicated  as a  publican  and 
pagan. 
V.C.84,2$4,  320; D.C.452;  G.C.760. 
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The impress of  the Church is very apparent in this pro- 
vision ; but it is difficult  to say whether  the reference to 
a bequest  by a sick man meant that only bequests by sick 
men were legal or that all bequests were legal, subject to a 
limitation of  power  in  the case  of  a  man '  in  extremis ' 
making a bequest. 
Death-bed gifts, it may be remarked, are in some systems 
of  law,  e.g.  the  Mohammedan  Law,  regarded  with  very 
considerable suspicion : on the other hand, other survivals 
indicate that wills derive their sanctity from the fact that 
they may be executed '  in contemplation of  death '. 
In another passage  the  Venedotian  Code  states that a 
thief  under sentence  of  death might,  if  he were  childless, 
bequeath his movables, but, if  he had children, his  power 
of  bequest  was  limited  to  the  making  of  provisions  for 
'  daered ' and  debts.  It is  improbable  that  thieves  had 
a wider power of  will than ordinary individuals. 
Elsewhere it says that no one could  make a  bequest  of 
an  ox,  engaged  in  co-tillage,  without  consent  of  his  co- 
tillers,  the  reason  given  being  important,  viz.  that  only 
that which is in possession could be bequeathed. 
The Dimetian Code simply says that the title to a testa- 
mentary  bequest  was  safe  without  '  machni ',  and  the 
Gwentian  Code  prohibits  any  bequest  of  cattle,  boilers, 
fuel-hatchets, or coulters to any one but the younger son, 
who would be heir thereto in case of  intestacy, as they went 
with the homestead. 
$4. In the Surveys we have some references to intestate 
succession, indicating thereby  the right  of  bequest  under 
custom. 
No  mention  is  made  of  it  in  Isdulas  and  Uwchdulas. 
Elsewhere the rule was if any person  died intestate, having 
a wife, half  the goods and chattels went  to the lord, half 
to the wife,  saving  the  corn,  which  went  to the  Raglot, 
and saving the rights of  the Church, which were practically 
nil under Welsh Law.  If  deceased had no wife  the whole 
went  to  the  lord,  saving  the  same  rights.  The  felon's 
right  to  will  is  expressly  recognized  in  the  Survey  of 
Denbigh. 
D  Z In the Black Book of  St. David's there are some occasional 
references. 
In Ystrad Towy when a beadle  died his movables went 
to the lord  until his  accounts were  settled ; in  Meydryn, 
the movables  of  all intestates went  to the lord, and like- 
wise  in  liolveran,  where,  however,  we  get  the  old  rule 
that the  lord  should  regrant  land  to the  nearest  heir  in 
blood. 
In Llanteufi there is an interesting note re the succession 
of  childless widows to land.  The lord seized all land where 
there  was  only  a  widow,  but it  is  said that the old  rule 
had been  that the widow  got  a  regrant  till  death  or  re- 
marriage, and then the nearest heir was invested. 
§ 5.  These provisions help us but little, and it is apparent 
that the right of  bequest was in a state of  flux. 
The fact appears to be that so far as land was concerned 
there  was  originally  no  power  of  bequest,  and  that  the 
power  to will  movables  arose  under  the influence  of  the 
Church. 
From the very first  the Church took a  keen interest in 
the  disposal  of  the  movables  of  deceased  persons,  and 
was insistent  that the proper  destination  of  a  dead man's 
goods was to purchase masses for his soul.  It was out of 
this that the claim of the Church to exercise testamentary 
and intestate jurisdiction  appears to have arisen. 
However, the references we  have show that some power 
to will  was  recognized in  the tenth  century,  and that in 
all probability the Church was behind the conception. 
Perhaps  the fact that the  Irish  Law  of  wills  seems to 
have grown  up under  ecclesiastical influences is sufficient 
to  determine  that  among  Celtic  peoples,  as among  the 
Germanic tribes, the power of  bequest was a comparatively 
recent innovation. 
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AN important part of  early law is that which relates to 
the responsibility  for the acts of  animals. 
The subject falls naturally under two heads, the law  of 
cattle trespass,  and the law  of  damage to persons  caused 
by animals. 
Nearly  all early societies, it may be  remarked, regarded 
animals  in  a  sense  as responsible  creatures  liable  to the 
same  penalties  as men  for  acts  done.  This  interesting 
chapter in early thought is dealt with by Sir James  Frazer 
in vol. 111, chapter VI, of  his Folk-Lore of  the Old Testament. 
I. Cattle-trespass. 
§ I.  As  is  natural  in  any  society  dependent  on  agri- 
culture  and  pasture,  the  Welsh  Laws  lay  down  rules  in 
regard to trespass by cattle on corn and grass lands.  Many 
of  these rules are too meticulous to be of  interest, and their 
principal  value  lies  in  the  fact  that  they  illustrate  the 
thoroughness with which the codifiers did their work. 
Apart from these meticulous provisions the law, however, 
has  interest.  The  rules  lay  down  broad  principles,  and 
throw many sidelights on the economic structure of  society. 
§ 2. The first main principle of  the law of  cattle-trespass 
was that no person,  however  exalted his status might  be, 
was  exempt  from  liability  to make good  damages caused 
by his animals. 
The second was that every man must look after his crops 
and fields and do  that which  lay in his  power  to protect 
them  from  trespass,  and every  person  must  see  that his 
animals did not trespass on the lands of  another. 
The rules  illustrate  once more  that the general rule  of 
Welsh Law was that duties and rights were interdependent, 
and that a man who contributed to loss by his own negli- 
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This is well put in the Venedotian Code, pp. 322-4  : 
Every man is to mind his corn, and every owner his animal. 
Every crop that a person shall harvest he is to look after and 
thereafter the cattle are free.' 
5 3.  The duties imposed on a cultivator are very simple 
and clear.  He was obliged to fence his fields, and to keep 
his fences in proper order from sowing time till the harvest 
was gathered in.  He was obliged also to garner his crops 
by fixed dates and not to leave them on the fields ; and when 
he  had garnered  them  he  was  bound  to take  reasonable 
precautions to protect them.  Provided he did that he had 
definite  rights  against  the owners of  animals  causing  loss 
to him. 
The chief  crops referred  to in the laws are corn-which 
meant wheat-barley  and oats, orchard produce (especially 
apples), hay, cabbages, flax, and leeks. 
Land was broadly  divided  (apart from wood  and waste) 
into corn lands, hay meadows, and gardens. 
It was the duty incumbent  on every person  to keep his 
garden land fenced all the year round, and the fences made 
had to be  of  sufficient durability to prevent  the ordinary 
animal, while  straying, from  walking  on  to the land.  It 
was  recognized  that  no  fencing  would  keep  poultry  off 
land, but the fences had to be of  such a nature as to keep 
cattle off.  Provided that were done the owner of  a garden 
could  recover  compensation  from  the  owner  of  cattle  or 
poultry breaking through a fence or flying over it and causing 
damage.  The fences  round  fields  were  not  of  so  careful 
a  nature.  Fences,  however,  of  a  rough  nature had to be 
placed  round fields, and, if  the field were a hay meadow, 
they had to be maintained in order from the 17th of  March 
to the 1st of  December. 
After  corn had been  cut the  latest  day up to which  it 
could  be left in the fields  was  the  1st of  December.  By 
that time corn must be garnered and placed in stackyards. 
Round the stackyard there had to be a triple band of  inter- 
woven osiers or the like, with a door or gate allowing ingress. 
The gateway must be of  wattle, strengthened by a wooden 
plank in front and two on the back. 
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From  the  time  the  first  sheaf  was  brought  in  till  the 
1st of  December  the  gateway might  be  left  open  for  the 
wind to blow through, perhaps for the purpose of  preventing 
combustion, but on the 1st of  December  the gateway had 
to be closed, and, if  it were not, no compensation for damage 
caused was allowed. 
With this may be compared the provisicln  in the Dooms 
of  Ine, c. 40 : 
'  A ceorl's close ought to be fenced summer and winter.  If 
it be unfenced and his neighbour's cattle stray in through his 
own gap he shall have nothing from the cattle.' 
If  any one placed  his  stacks in the open  fields without 
the regular stackyard fence he had no right to recover any 
compensation. 
From the 1st of  December until sowing time the ordinary 
fields were open for all cattle to graze upon at will.  There 
was  an exception  made debarring the freedom of  swine to 
come on meadow or arable land : they had to be confined 
to wood  and waste 1and.l 
Subject  to these  precautions  being  taken  the owner  of 
land or crops was entitled to damages for trespass. 
He had three remedies. 
$4. The first applied where the damage caused could be 
made  good  by  the  restoration  of  a  like  quantity.  For 
example, if  a sheaf of  corn were damaged, the owner of  the 
animal had to replace it by a similar sheaf, the owner of  the 
damaged sheaf  retaining it as well. 
If  there were a  dispute as to whether the damage were 
caused  by  uncaptured  animals  belonging  to  a  particular 
person,  the alleged owner of  the trespassing animals could 
swear they were not his, and his oath was conclusive, but, 
if  he were not prepared to swear, he was responsible.  If  the 
damage were caused to corn near a hamlet, the residents of 
the hamlet  had  each  to swear  the  animals  were  not  his, 
and then the whole  damage was  levied pro  rata  on  every 
bullock in the hamlet, it being  the duty of  the hamlet to 
keep animals off  neighbouring  corn. 
V. C.  322,  324,  326,  328,  334 ;  D. C.  578,  606 ; G.  C.  720 ; V.  92 ; 
VIII.  198 ; IX.  268 ; X. 344 ; XIV. 594. If  there were any dispute as to the amount of  damage, 
the oath of  the owner of  the crops was  conclusive, but if 
it were a  question  of  area, and the owner of  the animals 
was  prepared  to surrender  out  of  his  land  a  similar  area 
with a similar crop, then his oath was conclusive as to area. 
If the actual damage  could not  be  compensated for  by 
the surrender of  an equivalent, there was a fixed cash pay- 
ment, which was always made for trespask on lands before 
the crops thereon began to mature. 
There could be no recovery  of  compensation for damage 
to crops if  the demand were made after the 1st of  December 
following  the  time  when  the  damage  was  caused,  and 
damages to grass land could only be recovered by the next 
remedy.l 
$5. The second  remedy  was  the right  to seize animals 
trespassing, and holding the same until definitely regulated 
pound-fees were paid. 
There  was  no  system  of  local  pounds :  each  person 
impounding impounded on his own premises, and the captor 
was not entitled to take his capture to another '  tref ' than 
that in which the damage was caused. 
Seizing or  impounding  animals  on land, which  had not 
been  adequately protected,  was  prohibited,  and  any one 
doing so was fined for surreption and the cattle impounded 
were liberated. 
Certain limitations were placed on the power to impound 
young  animals.  Calfs,  lambs,  and  kids  could  only  be 
impounded  from  one  mealtime  to  another,  and  at  the 
expiration  of  that time they were set free without pound- 
fees.  Foals following their  dams were  also not  to be  im- 
pounded. 
Bulls,  swine,  stallions,  boars,  rams,  and  he-goats  were 
also exempt from being impounded during certain seasons, 
but apparently their owners must compensate for loss. 
Poultry  could  not  be  impounded  when  trespassing  on 
corn, except for a fortnight after sowing and after the corn 
had begun to form in the ear. 
V. C.  322,  326,  328,  330;  D. C.  554-8,  560 ; G. C.  740,  742,  744 ; 
XIV. 592-6,  602,  652. 
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Before an animal could be impounded it had to be corn- 
pletely on the land ; so, if  a horse merely stretched his head 
over a fence or  only  planted his two forelegs in the corn, 
he was not to be impounded.  The sole right of  the person 
whose crops were damaged in that manner was to recover 
the amount of  the damage caused. 
Strict rules  are laid down as to how  and when  animals 
could be impounded, and for their treatment in pound. 
Seizure had to be made while the animals were actually 
on  the land trespassed  upon.  If  they were  pursued  and 
made good their escape from such land, they could not be 
impounded. 
If, in seizing an animal, the captor injured it, he had to 
make  good  the injury, but  this did not  involve payment 
for injuries caused accidentally.  For example, if  an animal, 
while being driven off  land, fell and broke its leg, the captor 
paid no compensation. 
Owners of  land were permitted to use dogs to drive cattle 
up to the boundary of  the land on which the trespass was 
being committed, and, within those limits, any injury, short 
of  killing, caused by the dogs did not have to be compensated 
for.  But if  the dogs of  a neighbour joined in the chase, and 
they caused injury, the owner of  the dogs had to pay for 
injury  occasioned.  If  dogs  were  used  to  drive  animals 
after  the boundary was  passed  a '  camlwrw ' was  paid  to 
the King, and the trespassing animals went free. 
There was no duty incumbent on the impounder to inform 
the owner of  the animals impounded ; the latter had to find 
out  for  himself  where  his  animals  had  gone  to.  Seizure 
must be open, however,  and animals impounded could not 
be concealed, and if  an animal were concealed by the captor 
and it died he had to pay its legal worth.  In impounding 
also the captor must drive the aninials seized, and should, 
for instance, he ride a captured horse to the pound, he lost 
all right to recover damages. 
The impounding  had to be  effective,  and if  an  animal 
escaped from its pound the captor could recover nothing. 
Domestic animals had to be tethered, wild animals to be 
put into an enclosure.  Animals seized belonging to different owners were not to be kept together, nor were animals of 
different  species,  lest  they  should  fight  and  injure  one 
another.  Still if  the animal of  one man in pound killed or 
injured the animal of  another, the owner of  the animal, not 
the impounder, paid for the damage. 
The  captor  of  trespassing  milch-cattle  was  entitled  to 
milk the animals until released, but no one else was without 
his  permission.  He  was  at liberty,  too,  to  arrange  for 
feeding  animals  captured,  and  apparently  to  charge  for 
their feed. 
The  fees  payable  for  impounded  animals  are given  in 
very great detail.  They were not high, and never exceeded 
a penny per head.  Beyond that there is nothing of  interest 
in the scale of  fees except  that an animal trespassing  at 
night paid double. 
The owner  of  the impounded  animal  had  the  right  to 
demand release immediately  on  the tender  of  fees  and of 
security to compensate for damage caused.  He could not 
demand  release  without  doing  that,  and if  he  demanded 
return without offering payment or a pledge, the impounder 
was not responsible if the animal died in his custody.  On 
the other  hand, if  he  refused  to release  when  the  owner 
proferred  a pledge, he paid for any damage caused to the 
cattle thereafter. 
A  person  whose  animal  had  been  impounded  had  no 
other remedy  whereby  to recover  his  animals  except  by 
payment of  the pound-fees, and, should he be so injudicious 
as to sue  for  theft  or  surreption,  he lost  all right  to the 
impounded animal, and if  there were any allegation that the 
impounding  was  illegally  effected, the oath of  the captor 
was concl~sive.~ 
In the  Irish  Law  there  is  a  very  elaborate  system  of 
impounding  for trespass.  The law  there forms in  reality 
a part of  the law of  distress.  It would be of  little value to 
detail the Irish Law here.  It suffices to note that in many 
details,  e.g.  the  system  of  pounds,  the  prohibition  on 
mixing  different  kinds  of  cattle in  pounds,  the increased 
1 V.  C. 262,  322,  324,  326,  328,  330,  332,  334;  D. C.  446.  558.  560; 
G. C. 708, 740,  744, 786; V. 44; VI.  114 ; IX.  240-2,  268 ; XIV. 594-6. 
fees for trespass according to time, and the right to drive 
trespassing cattle off  fields, they closely resemble the Welsh 
Laws. 
They provide also for the payment of  compensation, but, 
as usual, in the most meticulous fashi0n.l 
Other systems have not much to say about cattle-trespass. 
The provisions  of  the Lex  Salica,  Cod.  I, Tit.  IX, fairly 
represent  the general Germanic Law,  and are comparable 
to the Welsh ones. 
All damage in meadows and enclosures had to be made 
good by the owner of  the cattle.  Impounding was permitted, 
but a person  impounding had to inform the owner, and, if 
he  did  not,  any cattle injured  or  dying  had  to be  com- 
pensated  for.  Similar  rules  occur  in  the Lex  Burgund., 
Tit. XXIII, XLIX, and CVI. 
§ 6.  The third remedy for cattle-trespass in Welsh  Law 
was the right to kill the animal trespassing. 
This right was  confined to geese  trespassing on  corn  or 
in a stackyard, and to pigs trespassing on woodlands. 
Woodlands in Wales belonged either to the tribal bodies 
or the territorial lords, with certain rights therein pertaining 
to the freemen.  Some woods were reserved, some unreserved. 
The herds of  swine, which we find playing an important part 
in the economy of  early Europe, were of  importance in Wales 
also, and they were free to roam in the woods. 
There was,  however,  a  close  season  in  reserved  woods, 
extending  from  the end  of  September to the beginning  or 
middle  of  January,  during which  swine were  not  allowed 
in the woods. 
As their capture in woodlands was difficult, the owner of 
the woods was entitled to kill swine trespassing in the close 
season.  The right to kill is definitely regulated. 
A  territorial lord could kill the tenth pig,  and every pig 
over  ten,  while  an  ordinary  ' uchelwr '  could  kill  every 
tenth pig.  Why the law of  tithes should have been applied 
it is difficult to conjecture.  It was out of  this system that 
the later law of  pannage devel~ped.~ 
Ir. Laws, I. 157, 161, 183,269,305,  32s ; V.  137, 141 ; also the Breatha 
Comaith issa Aridso. 
V. C. 328 ; D. C. 554, 560, 606 ; G. C. 742. 792 ; IX.  268 ; XIV. 596. 44  RESPONSIBILITY  FOR  ANIMALS PART V 
$ 7.  Certain animals causing  damage were exempt  from 
liability  'for  damages.  Bees,  birds,  other  than  domestic 
fowls,  and wild  animals  which  had been  tamed, were  so 
exempt :  they  were  considered  as outside  the control  of 
the possessor. 
$8. Connected with the law of  trespass on land is the law 
of  trespass in herds and precincts, the law of  ' nets '. 
Briefly stated that law provided that  every person  had 
precincts  in which  trespass  by  animals must be paid  for. 
The  King's  '  nets ' were  his  demesne,  his  stud,  and  the 
flocks of  his ' maerdref ' ; the nets of  a freeman his pasture 
land, his herds of  cattle and swine ; the nets of  a ' taeog ', 
his herds of  cattle and swine and his house ; and the law was 
that in addition to the right to seize and impound, the owner 
of  animals trespassing in the nets paid a fee of  fourpence. 
It was one of  the privileges of  Arfon that there were no 
royal nets in that c0untryside.l 
2. Injuries  by  aninzals. 
$ I.  The same rule applicable to cattle-trespass, viz. that 
every person was responsible for damage caused by domesti- 
cated animals of  his, applied to injuries and other damage 
caused. 
Likewise the rule applied that no one was responsible for 
the acts of  wild animals, even if  kept as tame ones. 
Payment was enforced by the ordinary law of  distress. 
$2. Damages by animals were not to be compensated for 
if  the animal  acted  in  self-defence.  They  had the same 
right  as human beings : 'Not only have  men',  it is .said, 
'  the liberty  to withstand  violence,  but irrational  animals 
also have the right.'  So if  one animal attacked another in 
the usual place of  resort of  the latter, that latter was entitled 
to defend  his  right to be  in that place.  Damages  by the 
aggressor had to be paid for, but the defending animal was 
free.' 
$3.  Injury  caused  by  a  rabid  animal  had  not  to  be 
compensated for, nor injury caused by one vicious animal 
to another. 
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By '  vicious  animal ' was  meant  a  male  in  pursuit  of 
a female of  its own kind.  Consequently, if  a stallion killed 
another  there  was  a  contest  between  'vicious  animals ' 
beyond the reasonable control of  the owners, but if  a vicious 
animal killed one which was not vicious, full worth had to 
be  paid.' 
S 4.  Injury by a mad dog was not paid for, but this did 
not  imply that a person  could not  defend himself  against 
a mad  dog.  On  the contrary, if  a  person  were  attacked 
by  a  dog,  mad  or  otherwise,  he  was  entitled  to defend 
himself.  In the quaint phraseology of  the law the person 
attacked could place his  weapon between  himself  and the 
animal, and if  the dog ' went upon the weapon so as to be 
killed ',  nothing was to be paid for it.  The Anomalous Laws 
allow  killing of  a  mad dog in self-defence without  qualifi- 
cation. 
Though injury by a mad dog was not to be compensated 
for by the owner, this only  applied where  the owner had 
no  reasonable  ground  for suspecting his  animal  might  be 
a danger. 
If  he had a  dog,  accustomed  to bite,  he  must  keep  it 
within  nine  paces  of  his  own  house.  It could  be  killed 
with  impunity outside  that limit, but  within  it  any  one 
killing  the  dog  had  to  pay  zs., because  the  animal  was 
within his own territory, to protect which it was his duty 
and instinct. 
Even so, however, no one was to keep a dog accustomed 
to bite after it had bitten three people.  The master was 
then compelled to kill it himself. 
The owner of  a dog was also liable to pay for all blood 
drawn by it at its legal worth,  but if  the dog were  killed 
the amount was reduced by 16d. 
The owner of  a dog was not responsible for the act of  the 
dog, if  set on by strangers : the liability to pay was then 
transferred to the person setting the dog on. 
These provisions, though at first sight trivial, are of  value 
as indicating  the principles  on  which  liability  for injuries 
caused  was  based.  Those  principles  were  responsibility 
=  IV. 4. for that  capable  of  control,  subject  to  a  right  of  self- 
defence.' 
$ 5.  A further interesting provision as showing communal 
responsibility  is the case where  an animal was injured by 
another without it being known whose animal caused injury. 
If  an animal were killed or injured by another in the same 
herd, the oath of  the herdsman was conclusive as to which 
animal caused the injury, and the owner thereof paid ; but 
if  an animal were killed near a hamlet and not in the herd, 
the owner of  the animal killed took relics with him  to the 
hamlet,  and put  every  resident  to the  oath that he  was 
ignorant  as to which  animal had  killed  the other.  If  all 
swore ignorance, the value of  the animal killed was paid by 
the whole hamlet, the value being assessed on every bullock 
in the hamlet." 
$6. We may add here the rules relative to injuries caused 
to animals.  Every one injuring an animal, whether by an 
advertent or  inadvertent  act, paid  compensation therefor, 
just  as he would pay if  he injured a human being. 
He might, however,  take  over  the  animal  and keep  it 
until it was  cured, returning the animal then, and in  the 
meantime  giving  the  owner  another  animal  of  the  same 
quality for use.  Should the animal die or be incapable of 
being restored, the animal given for use became the property 
of  the person to whom it had been given. 
Killing or injuring an animal in self-defence entailed no 
liability,  if  done  in the  reasonable  exercise  of  defence of 
one's own life. 
Inadvertent injury to a hired animal was not to be com- 
pensated for : it was part of  the risk of  ' Ilog '. 
If  injury were caused  deliberately,  there was  frequently 
an addition of a '  camlwrw ' to the c~mpensation.~ 
$7. These provisions are not peculiar to the Welsh Laws. 
By Tit. VIII of  the Roman Law of  the XI1 Tables, com- 
pensation for all injuries or damages caused by four-footed 
animals  had  to be  paid  for,  but  the  damage  could  be 
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liquidated  by  the  surrender  of  the  animal  causing  the 
damage. 
In the Irish Laws the same general provisions are to be 
found.  There the damages  were  reduced  if  the attacking 
animal were  killed, but subject  to that full compensation 
had to be paid. 
Exemptions  were  accorded  to bulls,  rams,  &c., in  the 
rutting season,  and to horses  fighting among themselves ; 
and identical  rules  in regard  to injuries  by  dogs and the 
liability of  the setter-on are given.  Even in such a matter 
as that where injury was  caused by an animal in a herd, 
and it was not known which particular animal was respon- 
sible, there was a parallel rule providing that the owners of 
the cattle might pay the damage jointly  or cast lots among 
themselves to determine who was to pay.' 
In the early English Laws rules of  a similar nature exist, 
particularly  in  Blfred's  Laws,  cc.  23,  24.  Injuries  by 
animals to men had, as a general rule,  to be compensated 
for and the offender delivered up ; dog-bites were paid for 
at fixed  rates,  and if  one  animal killed  another,  the live 
animal was sold and the proceeds divided between the two 
owners. 
Similar rules occur in the Germanic laws, but it suffices 
to give the references to a few : Lex Salica, Cod. I, XXXVI ; 
Lex Alamman., Pactus 111, cc. 17,18 ; Lex Baiuor., Tit. XIV; 
Lex Burgund., Tit. XVIII ; Lex  Langobard.  (Ed. Roth.), 
cc. 322 et seq. ; Lex Saxon., 11. 57 ; and Lex Ripuar., c. 46. 
Ir. Laws, 111. 181-7, 193,~31,26g,271,359,  381,415,  441, 529; V. 183 ; 
Heptads, VII. 
'  D. C. 496-8,  500 ; G. C.  730-2  ; XI. 414 ; XIV. 576. 
'  D. C. 562 ;  G. C. 714, 744 ; XIV. 652. 
V. C.  I 10-12, 264 ; D. C. 496 ; G. C. 744 ; VI. loo ; X. 308,  382. CH. IV  PARTITION  OF  MOVABLES  49 
MISCELLANEOUS  PROVISIONS 
A FEW  miscellaneous provisions remain to notice. 
I. Payment of debts of deceased persons. 
3 I.  It was  the rule  of  Welsh  Law  that there  was  no 
personal responsibility on the part of  any person to pay the 
debts of  his father or ancestor.  It was also the rule, as we 
have seen, that, except for special necessities, no person in 
possession  of  '  tir  gwelyauc ' could  charge  that  land  for 
debt,  so  as  to affect  the  property  after  his  death ; but, 
though that was the law, heirs, on succeeding to property, 
were  responsible  to  pay  the  debts  of  the  deceased  pre- 
decessor.  That liability  was  limited  to the extent of  the 
property received, so, if  property descended to a number of 
heirs, each contributed pro rata. 
The liability to pay debts was confined to persons succeed- 
ing by '  natural right ', and no liability attached even then 
to pay for the unlawful acts of  a predecessor in title. 
'  Alltuds ', who  had no  ' natural right ' of  ascension to 
a predecessor, were not responsible for such debts.l 
§ 2.  The Welsh rule is identical with  the Germanic and 
Celtic rules prevailing elsewhere. 
The  Sachsenspiegel  incorporates  the  Germanic  rule  in 
Art. VI : 
' Qui haereditatem percipit  debita solvit  quantumcumque 
haereditas in mobilibus vel sese moventibus perdurabit.' 
The same rule is found in the Leges Burgund., Tit. LI, 
the Lex Langobard. (Ed. Roth., c. 365), and the Lex Ripuar., 
c*  77. 
Under Irish Law the rule was similar, the test of  liability 
being  whether  the  heir  had  inherited  property  (Senchus 
M8r,  I. 227), and  also  under  Scots Law  (Leges  Quatuor 
Burgorum, c.  89). 
V. C.  124 ; D. C. 432 ; V. 54 ; X. 392 ; XI. 396-8. 
2.  Partition of  Movables. 
3 I.  The  rules  for  partition  of  landed  property  have 
already been  considered :  the rules  for  partition  of  other 
property are few, but simple and complete. 
3 2.  No person could be compelled to maintain co-owner- 
ship against  his  will : the right  to partition  of  movables 
was  absolute,  and, if  refused  by a  co-sharer,  the lord,  on 
being appealed to, must divide. 
Property  might  be  physically  capable  or  incapable  of 
partition. 
If  capable of  partition, and there were two co-sharers, it 
could  be  divided by  one of  two methods.  The co-sharers 
jointly  made  a  rough  partition  into  two  portions.  Each 
co-sharer took one of  these two portions and divided it into 
two  again, then each co-sharer  chose one part out of  the 
portion  so divided  by the other.  That mode  of  partition 
was called partition by agreement. 
If  that mode were not adopted, then the person who was 
lowest in status divided, or if  status were equal, the youngest 
in  age  divided,  and the  other  chose.  If  it could  not  be 
ascertained  who  had lowest  status or  who  was  youngest, 
division must be by agreement. 
But  if  one  party  were  averse  from  dividing,  the  one 
desiring partition divided, and the other party chose which 
portion he would take. 
If  there were more than two co-sharers, the person desir- 
ing partition divided the property into lots, and the person 
with the highest status chose his lot first, then the person 
next  to him,  and so  on,  the  last  lot  being  left  for  the 
divider.  If  status were equal, choice was made in order of 
seniority. 
If  the property were incapable of partition,  e.g. a cow, 
the person  seeking partition  fixed its value, and the other 
party chose whether  he  would have the property, paying 
the divider's share, or would take half the valuation, leaving 
the property with the divider.  The property remained joint 
until the valuation was paid.l 3. Meaning  of Pro$erty. 
$ I.  We have discussed under the land laws the Welsh 
coilception of  '  priodolder ' rights, and in dealing with bees 
in  the  succeeding chapter the  conception  the Welsh  had 
of  acquisition of  property in '  res nullius ' is considered. 
Very  little  is said in the laws beyond  that as to what 
constituted ' property '. 
Undoubtedly,  the  early  legal  mind  could  hardly  dis- 
tinguish  between  possession  and property,  and the whole 
of  the law  of  procedure  is coloured by  that fact, but the 
beginnings of a distinction are apparent in the laws. 
tj  2.  In the  Dimetian  Code,  550-2,  movables  found  on 
a  man's  land and belonging  to an unauthorized  squatter, 
could  not  be  appropriated until  three  days or nights  had 
elapsed ; and, in what we may call the law of  treasure trove, 
there are clear indications, though they be of  a late period, 
of  a  differentiation arising.  Under  that law  everything  a 
'  priodawr ' found  concealed  on  his  land  belonged  to him, 
except  gold  and silver,  which  belonged  to the  King,  but 
articles found entangled in a weir could not be appropriated 
by the owner of  the weir. 
Wreckage  before  payment  of  port  dues  and  flotsam 
belonged to the King, but if  not claimed by him  the finder 
could take it.  If  port dues had been paid, the King claimed 
nothing,  and the  owner  of  the vessel  was  entitled  to all 
wreckage.  The  distinction  is  crudely  expressed,  but  the 
beginnings of  a distinction between possession and property 
are manifest.l 
$3. In the law of  lost property the growing distinction is 
more manifest, though the rules are to be found principally 
in the commentaries. 
Ownership  in  property  lost  by  negligence  was  never 
parted  from  the  owner,  except  in  the  case  of  a  needle, 
a horseshoe, or a penny. 
If two persons both lost property of  a similar nature, and 
one of them found one of  such lost properties, he retained 
it  until  the  other  went  to law  and  established  his  own 
title to it. 
' V. 46, 52-4,  72 ;  VI. 102. 
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Animals could never  be claimed by the finder.  He had 
to apprise the lord  of  his find,  and the latter proclaimed 
the  discovery,  and  if  they  were  not  claimed,  they  were 
regarded as '  waste ' of  the lord's. 
So too  was  the rule  regarding  valuable  property  found 
on the roadside, though one authority implies that the dis- 
coverer of  lost property was entitled to keep it, for it states 
that if  two persons, walking in single file, came across lost 
property, then, if  the foremost of  the two found it, he must 
share with the hindmost, but if  the hindmost found it, the 
foremost, who had passed it by, had no claim. 
Property lost through gambling was not regarded as lost 
property.  Though  frowned  on,  gambling was  not  illegal, 
and anything lost in gaming was irrevocably lost. 
The  XIVth  Book  is  free  from  the  complication  that 
possession  and  property  are  almost  identical,  and  deter- 
mines that property  in a  thing is  never  lost, unless it be 
voluntarily parted with, but even then it is apt to confuse 
and identify  the parting  with  possession  and the parting 
with property.  That is, it does not distinguish the parting 
with  possession  with  intention  to retain  property  therein 
from the parting with possession with intention of  delivering 
ownership. 
This  distinction  must  be  constantly  borne  in  mind  in 
the law of  procedure, for, without it as the key, much of  the 
law of  procedure is uninte1ligible.l 
V. 48, 72 ; VI. 1x6  ; VIII, 240; XIV. 588, 590-8. CH.  v  HUNTING  ; RES NULLIUS  5  3 
THE  GAME LAWS 
5 I.  THE  game laws partake of  many characteristics, but 
in view of  the light they throw upon certain early concep- 
tions  of  property,  they  may  be  conveniently  considered 
under the Law of  Civil Obligations. 
$ 2.  In early Wales sport was not an exclusive royal or 
baronial  privilege.  Hunting  and fishing  were,  as a  rule, 
free to all freemen, and some animals could be hunted also 
by the unfree, notably the otter, wolf, fox, and roebuck. 
The exclusive rights of  the King were very limited.  He 
was entitled to every male hawk and aerie in his dominions, 
and every one slaying a hawk paid  its legal worth to the 
King, plus  30d.  to the owner of  the land on which it was 
killed. 
We have here an inferential recognition of  the freeman's 
right  to hawks  on  his  own  property,  and the Survey  of 
Denbigh expressly reserves to freemen hawks found in their 
private woods. 
Ravens,  buzzards,  and cranes were all royal birds,  and 
beavers,  martens, and ermines were royal animals, for the 
killing of  which the legal worth was paid to the King, not 
as a '  fine ' for a criminal offence, but as compensation  for 
trespass. 
In addition, the King had a few special hunting privileges. 
The times of  hunting are mentioned in the Codes, and the 
King was entitled to enter  on  any land i11  the pursuit  of 
game. 
In a chase he was entitled to unleash his hounds thrice 
before the hounds of  any one else were let go, and a hart 
set up by his hounds was inviolate.  It was called the King's 
hart, and should, by chance, another hound overtake it the 
carcass belonged to the King, and must be retained by the 
finder for his disposal. 
The only trace of  anything in the nature of  a fine is found 
in the unauthorized slaying of  a King's hart. 
$3. All  free Welshmen were at liberty to hunt in their 
own tribal lands.  Moreover,  if  a  freeman were on a road 
and saw an animal of  chase  on another's  land, or  in the 
King's  forest, he was entitled to shoot at it from the road. 
If his  arrow struck the beast,  he was  at liberty to follow 
it wherever  he  chose.  He could  not,  however,  enter  on 
another man's land until he had hit his quarry, and wherever 
he overtook it he gave one-quarter of  it to the owner of  the 
land.  If he lost sight of  it, and it died on the land of  another, 
the owner of  the land finding it got three-fourths if  it were 
edible, IS. if  it were not. 
Pursuit of  an unhit animal was not reserved to the person 
who first unleashed his hounds.  Any one was at liberty to 
let  loose his hounds after any animal, but, if  it were over- 
taken by any hound, the carcass belonged to the man who 
had first unslipped his dogs, provided that he continued in 
the chase until the animal were 0vertaken.l 
8 4.  The importance of  these regulations lies in the views 
taken of  property in that which was wild. 
The Roman Law  held it was immaterial whether a man 
took  wild  beasts  or  birds  on  his  own  ground  or  that  of 
another.  '  Whatever of  this kind you take is regarded as 
your property so long as it remains  in your keeping,  but 
when  it has escaped  and recovered  its natural liberty,  it 
ceases to be yours ', and '  A wounded animal is not yours 
until you have captured it '. 
The  Roman  Law  took  as its test  of  property  in '  res 
nullius ' the  effective  seizure  and  control  of  the  hunted 
animal.  It paid no regard  to any claim by the owner of 
the land on which the animal was.  The Norman Law, on 
which  the  whole  of  the  subsequent  English  game  laws 
was based, gave property in the chase, subject to the very 
wide royal privileges, to the owner of  the land.  Possession 
of  land carried with it the right to everything on it. 
There were two diametrically opposed principles in these 
V. C. 286-8 ; D. C.  496 ; G. C.  736-90 ; IV. 6,  8. 
a  Just. Lib. 11,  Tit. I. 12. 5  4  THE GAME  LAWS  PART  v 
two  laws.  The  Welsh  Law  occupied  a  sort  of  midway 
position  between the two,  being produced possibly  by the 
clash of  the two views. 
Game was '  res nullius ', and no  one  could  trespass  on 
another's  land  in  its pursuit,  but  effective  control  com- 
menced from the moment when a man marked it down as 
his own by wounding it, and he was then entitledto follow 
it  up anywhere.  The  King,  being  '  owner  of  all  land ', 
could enter, without trespass, on any land. 
$5. The killing of  stags was prohibited, except by hunt- 
ing, except when the stag was trespassing on corn. 
Snaring  and  trapping  appear  to  have  been  common 
practices.  Any one could  set a snare or trap on his own 
or waste land, but should a strange animal or passer-by fall 
into the trap, the snarer had to pay for the injury caused. 
He could avoid damages to a human being by placing a cross 
to indicate his  snare,  but  that  precaution  did  not  avail 
against animals, even if  trespassing. 
Setting of  snares on the land of  another was  forbidden 
under penalty of a fine paid to the owner of  the land, who 
likewise walked  off  with  the carcass  caught.  An  animal 
caught in a snare, escaping therefrom, and falling into the 
snare of another, belonged to the setter of  the first snare, 
if  it carried the net with him.l 
Netting  was  permissible  anywhere,  and if  any bird  or 
animal became enmeshed in a net cast, and it broke the net, 
the owner of the animal was obliged to pay for it, unless 
the intruder were  killed,  in which  case  it was  considered 
to have met with just retribution. 
The principle  applicable  in  these  rules  is  the same  as 
applied in the provision that wounding an animal gave the 
right to claim it. 
Similar rules exist in the Lex Alam.,  Tit. LXXXV-VI, 
Lex Angl. et Werion., c. 61,  Lex Rip., c. 70, and in the Book 
of  Aicill, 111. 273, 451-3. 
5 6.  Fishing was unrestrictedly free to every one in Wales, 
in the sea or the river, for the sea and the river were in- 
capable of appropriation, and fish were naturally '  res nullius '. 
l  V.C. 288; D.C. 552; G. C. 764; V.  52; VI.  102-4. 
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Attempts  to appropriate  and preserve  waters  seem  to 
have been made in early times, for one of  the privileges of 
Arfon protected the freedom to fish in the Seiont, Gwyrfai, 
and Llyfni.  In South Wales,  perhaps under Norman  in- 
fluences, partially preserved  waters were recognized, for it 
is provided that a person fishing in such waters must give 
two-thirds of  his catch to the owner of  the water. 
The absolute freedom to fish was not interfered with, so 
far as can  be  judged,  by  any prohibition  in  any  of  the 
Norman surveys of  the fourteenth century, save in the First 
Extent of  Merioneth. 
Cymmer  Abbey  had, however,  by  grant  of  Llywelyn, 
special rights in the waters of  the Mawddach estuary, a most 
exceptional case. 
A peculiar provision  in the Anomalous  Laws  gave  fish, 
cast  up by the sea, to the King under the general law  of 
jetsam, until the tide had ebbed for the third time. 
Fishing  was  conducted  by  weirs,  hooks  and lines,  and 
nets.  The nets in use were the salmon net, the grayling 
net, and the trout net.  Bow-nets were also in use.' 
3 7.  Some light is thrown on the conception  of .property 
in that which was wild in the law regarding bees.  Bees are 
often chosen as a means of  illustration in many early laws, 
because of  the importance of  honey as a sweetening material 
before the introductioll of  sugar, and because of  the impor- 
tance of  wax in the service of  the Church. 
The Roman Law regarded wild bees as ' res nullius ', and 
no one had a right to wild bees on his own land until he had 
obtained physical possession of  them by hiving.  Any one 
coming on  the land of  another could secure possession  of 
the bees by hiving them, but the owner of  the land could 
prevent trespass on  the land;  nevertheless,  once  trespass 
was completed and the bees secured, he could not recover. 
In early  English  Law the bees belonged  to the owner  of 
the land, though the doctrine was never  developed in that 
law.  It was  developed  in the Norman  Law in Jerusalem 
along those lines. 
V. C.  106, 302;  D. C. 552, 584; G.  C. 724;  1V. 4; V. 52, 102; XIV. 
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The Brehon Law is hopelessly involved, and nothing  is 
more  characteristic of  the ancient Irish  tendency  to hair- 
splitting than the extraordinary tract Bech  Bretha, which 
is entirely devoted to the law of  bees. 
In the Welsh Surveys bees and hives found on the lord's 
lands or in his  woods went to the lord, whoever  was the 
finder. 
If  found  on  the property of  freemen  they belonged  to 
the finder;  likewise  in  Caimeirch if  on  the  property  of 
a '  nativus ', but  in Isaled  and Uwchaled only if  found by 
him outside the woods, if  within the woods they went to 
the lord.  Common woods were for this purpose deemed to 
be  the lord's. 
$8. The differences in the provisions illustrate in a most 
striking manner the conflict of  different conceptions. 
The  original  Welsh  principle  was  the  same  as that of 
Roman Law.  A  swarm of  bees  on  a  branch  was  a  free 
hunt, '  for bees are always on the move and have no haunts ', 
but the idea of  the right of  the owner of  the land obtained 
recognition so far that the finder could claim only a penny 
or the wax, the owner of  the land getting the swarm accord- 
ing to the Venedotian Code.  In the Dimetian Code the owner 
of  the land had the option of  letting the finder take the swarm 
or purchasing it for 4d., the price in Gwent  being reduced 
to a penny and the wax. 
A peculiar  illustration of  the growth of  Norman ideas is 
found  in  the  Anomalous  Laws,  which  provides  that  if 
a swarm were in a tree on the boundary between two pro- 
perties, the owners of  the two lands were to strike the tree 
alternately with axes, and he got the swarm on whose land 
the tree fe1l.l 
The rules as to bees are of  considerable value as illustrative 
of  the  conflict  between  the  Roman  conception  of  ' res 
nullius ',  which  was  apparently identical  with  the  Celtic 
one, and the Norman conception of  the land carrying with 
it everything that was on it, above it, or below it. 
V. C. 284-8 ; D. C. 502 ; G.  C.  740 ; IV.  94  ; VI. IIO. 
CO-TILLAGE 
8 I. THE  Welsh Laws contain many regulations in regard 
to co-tillage.  They are dealt with here, under the Law of 
Civil  Obligations,  because  the view  that is taken is that 
they form a branch of  the law of  contractual relations. 
Prof. Lloyd, in his History of  Wales, remarks that, save 
in the Triads (which he rightly rejects as evidence), there 
is nothing to suggest  that a system of  co-tillage  existed in 
medieval  Wales  among the  free  tribesmen,  and that the 
'  village community ' existed only among the unfree. 
It is  correct  that  the  laws  do  not  say that the rules 
regarding  co-tillage  apply  to  free  tribesmen ;  but  it  is 
equally true that they do not say that they are confined to 
the unfree. 
The remark that the '  village community ' existed only 
among the unfree is indubitably correct ; but it can be said 
also  that  the  village  community,  in  the  sense  of  being 
a  communal  body,  existed  only among a small section of 
the unfree, viz. those holding on '  trefgefery ' tenure or in 
'  maerdrefs ', which formed a small minority of  the unfree 
villes, 
No other writer maintains that the rules as to co-tillage 
apply to the unfree only, and, if  the contention be correct, 
we would have to limit their operation to a minority of  the 
unfree population. 
$ 2.  Apart from the  Triads, however,  there seem  good 
grounds for believing that the regulations applied to freemen 
as well as to the unfree. 
The first consideration is that these rules occupy a pro- 
minent  place  in the Codes, particularly in the Venedotian 
Code.  It is difficult to believe that such prominence would 
be given to rules applicable only to a system of  cultivation 
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and  who  numbered  but  a  small  minority.  One  of  the 
characteristics of  the Codes is that they view most  things 
from the point of  view of  the King and the freemen.  They 
are codes of  the customs of  freemen, and the unfree are, at 
most, dealt with incidentally. 
§ 3.  Then, if  these rules  applied  only to such unfree  as 
had a communal village organization, they would seem to 
be superfluous.  The laws lay it down  explicitly that the 
regulation of  cultivation in the '  maerdrefs '  was in the hands 
of  the '  land-maer ', and in ' trefgefery ' villes in the hands 
of  the '  maer '.  Those  officers had full power to regulate 
the whole  of  the joint  cultivation in  those  villes.  What 
need could there be of  rules, directed not to guide him but 
to guide  cultivators  undertaking  joint  tillage,  when  such 
tillage was entirely under his discretionary arrangements ? 
9 4.  The next  consideration is more  important.  When 
we examine the rules, they appear to be not rules determin- 
ing how a joint  village community, unfree in nature, is to 
conduct  its joint  cultivation,  but  rules  determining  how 
a contract to join in cultivation between free contractors is 
to be given effect to. 
Welsh society, prior to say A. D.  1300,  knew  nothing  of 
manorial  cultivation ; it knew  little of  such a  conception 
as a '  village community ', and consequently little of  joint 
ploughing as it prevailed in England.  It did know a great 
deal about co-operation  among freemen,  and the rules  of 
co-tillage  appear  to be  customary  rules  determining  how 
co-operation in agriculture was to be given effect to. 
5 5.  If  we recall what the economic situation was among 
the freemen and the '  treweloghe aillts ', we shall be able to 
appreciate the purpose of  these rules. 
We  have  tried  to point  out above that, in  the Welsh 
tribal system, there was  a constant appropriation of plots 
to different  units  within  the  original  clan,  especially  for 
agricultural purposes ; in other words, separate occupation 
of  separate plots by separate individuals or groups, that is 
the '  priodolder ' system, applicable to freemen and '  trewe- 
loghe aillts ' alike. 
Giraldus Cambrensis draws a vivid picture of  the country- 
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side in his own day, and shows how the tribesmen occupied 
holdings and had their huts, not in a village, as the term is 
understood  in  England,  but  scattered  about  over  the 
countryside. 
Now it seems obvious that, if  there were many of  these 
separate holdings, it is more than probable that the occupiers 
would not keep plough-oxen requisite to plough each holding 
separately. 
The Welsh plough-yoke contained four or eight oxen, and 
it is most  unlikely  that an individual or  family,  holding 
a small culturable area, would maintain eight or four oxen 
to be used solely for ploughing that small area.  The prima 
facie probability is that holders of  small plots would each 
have one or two oxen, and would, when the time for plough- 
ing arrived, pool  their  oxen.  We know  that in England 
the extent of  holdings was determined in terms of the number 
of oxen each holder had to supply for the lord's ploughing 
and the common cultivation. 
The principle was the same, viz. that men maintained one 
or  two oxen, or  even  a share in an ox, and at ploughing 
time  pooled  them, the  latter compulsorily  as a  serf,  the 
former by customary contract as a freeman. 
§ 6.  A  system  of  co-tillage  under  contract,  as distinct 
from common cultivation by a village community, appears 
to have prevailed in Ireland. 
In the Cain Aigellne,l  dealing with  the law  of  husband 
and wife,  it is said that either  party may make  a lawful 
contract,  such  as the '  alliance of  tillage ', with  a  lawful 
tribe when  they have not  the means  themselves of  doing 
'  the work of  ploughirig ', the gloss adding that such contracts 
should, if possible, be made with fellow tribesmen. 
In the same laws  a son was empowered to make a con- 
tract freely in some cases, such cases including '  an agree- 
ment  for  reciprocal  ploughing  when  the  father  is  not 
ploughing ',  which  the  gloss  interprets  as  '  joining  in 
CO-ploughing  with  another  person,  when  the son finds no 
place for ploughing with the father '. 
Similar rules are found in the Book of  Aicill, pp. 269, 271, 
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as in the Welsh Laws, relative to the care of  oxen engaged 
in co-ploughing. 
§ 7.  Omitting references in the Triads to co-tillage, the 
references in the laws appear to be applicable to a system 
under  which  separate  '  priodorion ' combined  to plough 
their lands by common effort. 
The  Venedotian  Code,  pp.  314 et  seq.,  describes  the 
method  employed in making  an arrangement of  this sort, 
which is identical with that employed in ordinary contracts : 
' Whoever  shall  engage  in  co-tillage with  another, it  is 
right for them to give surety for performance and lnutually 
join  hands, and that  after they have  done that, to keep it 
until the bond  (mngl) be completed ;  ' 
'  mag1 '  implying apparently a contract-bond (vide  Glossary). 
It then proceeds to denote the order in which the plots, 
which each party to the contract desired to have ploughed, 
were to be  ploughed ; first the ploughman's, then that of 
the owner of  the plough-irons, then that of  the owner of  the 
ox yoked nearest the plough on the furrow side, then that 
of  the  owner  of  the  corresponding  sward-ox,  then  the 
driver's,  then those  of the owners of  the other oxen,  the 
ones  nearest  the plough  giving  their  owners  the right  to 
precedence in ploughing, and, where yoked together, those 
on  the  furrow  side  having  preference  over  those  on  the 
sward side.  The last '  erw ' to be ploughed was that of  the 
owner  of  the  plough,  the  ' cyfar  of  the '  gwasanaeth 
(kasnat), as it is called. 
When the ploughing was finished the parties to the con- 
tract separated, unless there was a contract between them 
to the contrary. 
These provisions  seem to leave no room  for doubt that 
the  law  is  dealing  with  co-tillage  under  contract.  The 
remaining rules point to the same conclusion. 
It is provided that every party to the agreement should 
bring  whatever  was  required  of  him  to  the  ploughing, 
whether  it be an ox  or  a  ploughshare  or what  not,  and 
entrust them to the ploughman and the driver, who were 
thereafter  responsible  for  their  safe-keeping  and  were 
enjoined to treat them as their own.  If  a person  entered 
into an agreement and did not send his ox to the ploughing, 
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he lost all right in the co-tillage.  Every one was obliged to 
come '  willingly and orderly ', and should he delay and after- 
wards desire to come in, he had lost all right in the tillage. 
If his ox, after coming to the ploughing, fell ill, whether 
from a  wound,  or  fighting with  another ox or  any other 
cause, it was his duty to find another ox in its place.  He 
was not  allowed to sell the ox he had contributed to the 
joint  ploughing  until the '  niagl'  was  complete, and, if  he 
removed  his ox from  the joint  work  before  his own  land 
was ploughed, that land was not to be ploughed afterwards, 
and, if  he removed it after his own land had been ploughed, 
it was incumbent upon him to find another ox. 
In fact, while ploughing was going on, the owner of  the 
ox lost all right of  disposal of  his own contribution ; his ox 
could not be pledged, it could not be bequeathed  even, he 
had lost sole possession of  his property for the time being, 
and was, therefore, incompetent to deal with it, for posses- 
sion and ownership were co-extensive. 
The  contractual  nature  of  the  undertaking  is  further 
shown by the fact that a person engaged in co-tillage could 
not substitute another ox for the ox brought first, without 
common  consent  of  the  others  engaged  in  the  contract, 
provided  it was  able  to work.  He  could  not  substitute 
a horse, or a  mare,  or  a  cow  for  an ox contracted  to be 
supplied.  If  he did, and the ploughing went on with one of 
them  yoked,  the owner  could  claim  no  compensation for 
damage caused to the animal, nor could he get his own land 
ploughed under the contract in absence of  an agreement. 
P?o  stranger could  interfere with  co-tillage while it was 
proceeding,  no  creditor  could  distrain  on  an ox engaged, 
but if  a party to the contract used  an ox he had stolen, 
the owner of  the ox could remove it. 
The contractual nature of  the arrangement appears even 
more clearly from the provision that there was nothing to 
prevent any one entering into any number of  agreements 
for co-tillage with different people, but the first claim on his 
services and oxen lay with the persons with whom he had 
made his first contract, and it was only when that contract 
had been completed that he could and must engage in the 
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The nature of  the agreement  further appears from two 
other provisions.  If  one party wanted rough  bushy land 
of  his  own cultivated, and the other '  cleared  ground ' of 
his own, the latter might object to having to assist in more 
difficult work for his partner than what he was demanding 
himself.  The law provided he must abide by the agreement, 
and plough whatever land the other party had, unless they 
had contracted otherwise. 
So too, if  one man had land a long way off, and another 
land near by-a  state of  affairs only consistent with separate 
holdings-and  the latter objected to travelling a distance, 
the law  stepped  in to regulate  the matter, and provided 
that in no circumstances were the oxen to be taken out of 
their  own ' cymwd ', and, within  the '  cymwd ', they were 
to be taken only so far as the weakest ox in the team could 
travel without fatigue and without  rendering him unfit for 
work.  The journey also was in no case to be so lengthy as to 
prevent the animal returning nightly to his ordinary stall. 
5  8.  Minute  instructions are given  as to the duty and 
qualifications of  the ploughman and driver. 
No one could be a ploughman in co-tillage unless he could 
make  a  plough  from  the first  nail  to the last.  Between 
them  the ploughman  and driver were  responsible  for  the 
care of  the animals and the plough, with the one exception 
that the owner of  the plough-irons kept them in order. 
The driver was expected to furnish bows for the yokes, 
also all rings and pegs needed for harnessing the team.  He 
was also expected to yoke the cattle, and he was especially 
enjoined '  not  to break  their  hearts'  by  overwork.  The 
ploughman had to assist the driver in yoking, but in unyok- 
ing his duties were confined to unloosening the team nearest 
the ploughshare. 
If in driving  the driver injured any animal, he had to 
pay  compensation  unless  he  swore he had used  it  as  he 
would have used his own.  The ploughman was prohibited 
from beating or bruising his teams, and if  he caused  any 
bruise or injury he paid the owner compensation. 
fi g. The position  of the oxen in the team was regulated 
by agreement, and no animal could  be  removed  from  the 
furrow side to the sward side without consent of  the owner. 
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If  by any chance the animal of  any co-tiller  died  from 
over-ploughing,  the  owner  was  not  compelled  to furnish 
another,  and he had an '  erw ' cultivated for him, which 
was known as the ' erw ' of  the black ox.' 
Another  regulation  of  interest  is  concerned  with  the 
quality of  the ploughing.  If  any party thought his  own 
'  erw ' had not  been  ploughed  properly,  the ploughman's 
land was  to be  examined  (hence the reason  for ploughing 
his land first), and every one else's land was to be ploughed 
to the same depth and breadth. 
When the ploughing was over, the oxen and implements 
were  restored  to their  respective  owners,  who  took  them 
home.  Co-tillage ended with the ploughing, and harrowing 
formed no part of  the undertaking. 
fi  10.  Lastly, we must note the provision that disputes re- 
garding co-tillage  could be  entertained  by the Courts and 
disposed of  summarily by the judge of  the ' cymwd ' ;  and, 
if  a formal plaint were lodged, it went to the sessions and 
was disposed of  there, not by summary procedure, but after 
invoking the whole procedure of  the Co~rts.~ 
Moreover,  the  lord  of  the  territory  could  enforce  the 
keeping  of  a  contract  to co-till,  and any one refusing  to 
abide by an agreement, voluntarily entered into, was fined 
three kine, and the produce of  the land belonging to himself, 
which was ploughed or to be ploughed, was handed over to 
the other par tie^.^ 
5  11. Many of  the provisions in the Welsh Laws as to co- 
tillage are  no doubt meticulous, and in themselves not worthy 
of  notice, but they assist us in obtaining an understanding 
of  the  circumstances to which  they applied.  On  the one 
hand, they are obviously  not confined to co-tillage by the 
unfree ; on the other, they are inconsistent with an identi- 
fication with  the common  tillage of  the English  manorial 
system. 
Considered in  detail, the rules  appear  to be  concerned 
with  the  co-operation  of  individuals  to  secure  for  each 
one the cultivation of  land occupied by him by means of 
contract. 
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THE  LAW  OF CRIMES 
AND  TORTS INTRODUCTORY 
5 I.  MODERN  conceptions  of  crime presuppose  the exis- 
tence of  two factors, a State whose laws or regulations are 
broken, and punishment inflicted by the State for a breach 
of  those laws and regulations. 
In archaic  communities  there was  no  State whose law 
could  be  infringed  or  which  could  inflict  punishment  for 
infringement. 
That which we now call crime was, in such communities, 
an injury caused to an individual or a group of  individuals 
bound  together by a  tie, generally  of  relationship  real  or 
assumed, and the remedy for an injury was for the individual 
or  individuals  injured  to  take  revenge  upon  the  person 
causing the injury. 
The growing social consciousness of  mankind, faced with 
the perpetuation of  revenge upon revenge-the  vendetta- 
attempted to meet the evil by instituting in the first place 
not punishment, but reparation.  An injury, theft, murder, 
or what not, was not conceived of  at first as a crime against 
the community which should be punished, but as a wrong 
or tort against a person  or persons, to avoid vengeance for 
which the person injuring must pay compensation or repara- 
tion, according to a fixed scale sanctioned by custom. 
The payment of  compensation or reparation was enforced 
by public opinion.  A person who did not submit to public 
opinion was ostracized, or, to use a modern term, outlawed, 
and the person injured was then entitled to fall back upon 
his  original remedy  and wreak  vengeance  without  fear  of 
reprisal. 
Some communities, with which we are not now concerned, 
followed a slightly different line.  They conceived of  a wrong 
as a  sin  against  s  Divine  Being,  and substituted  for  the 
right of  private vengeance the hope of  divine punishment. 
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' Vengeance  is  mine,  I will  repay',  and they removed, 
or attempted to remove, the operation  of  retribution from 
mundane  authorities,  and  succeeded  in  confusing  'sin' 
and '  crime '. 
This was only possible in a theocratic State, and every- 
where it failed in its object. 
It was  only  when  a  community  obtained  for  itself  an 
executive arm, the King,  that tort developed  into crime. 
The King at first enforced the reparation which was decreed 
by custom,  taking  a portion of  the reparation  as his  due 
for enforcing it. 
Gradually the conception arose that a tort to an individual 
might be a breach of  the peace of  the community or of  the 
King, the executive arm of  the community, and hence the 
conception of the King's peace,  a breach  of  which was to 
be punished.  Criminal Law was thus established. 
tj 2.  In English Law this conception obtained definite and 
final currency  by the pronouncement  in section  2  of  the 
Conqueror's  Law,  though  throughout  the  Saxon  period 
there had been a steady growth, whereby the King's '  grith ' 
or '  mund  had usurped the field hitherto held by '  tort '. 
If  we  study the early  history  of  any of  the European 
peoples  we  shall  find  the  King  constantly  and  steadily 
extending  the  scope  of  his  executive  power,  not  for  his 
personal  aggrandizement  so  much  as in  the  interests  of 
maintaining peace in the community at the head of  which 
he stood. 
With the extension of  his power, the protective organiza- 
tion of  the tribe, clan, or kin gradually weakened, surviving 
only partly as the instrument which the King used to enforce 
his peace,  and partly as the basis  of  a social or economic 
structure which the King did not interfere with. 
tj 3.  The growth from the period  of  vengeance,  through 
the period  of  reparation, to the final period  of  punishment 
was nowhere marked by any violent alteration.  The expan- 
sion was  gradual  and oftentimes  uneven.  So far as it is 
possible to say, with any degree of  certainty, theft was the 
first matter which came to be regarded as a crime, that is 
as something for which reparation was not the sole appro- 
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priate remedy, but for which punishment must be awarded, 
and among the last torts to develop into crime was killing. 
$ 4.  The result  is that in all early systems of  law, into 
which the conception of  crime has entered, we find surviving 
rules regulating the exercise of  vengeance and fixing repara- 
tion, as well as rules establishing punishments.  Sometimes 
vengeance is still regarded as the remedy for murder ;  some- 
times the exercise of  vengeance is regulated by limiting or 
fixing its extent, as in such rules  as '  an eye  for an eye, 
and a  tooth  for a  tooth ' ; sometimes we  find  vengeance 
bought  off  by paying reparation ; sometimes reparation is 
paid  and  punishment  also  awarded ;  and  sometimes  we 
find  Criminal  Law  triumphant  and  punishment  alone 
meted out. 
$5. In the Welsh Law of  ' crime ' we come across all or 
most  of  these  remedies  existing side by side ; and unless 
we  bear in mind that the laws of  Hywel Dda were codified 
in an age when new and old ideas jostled against each other, 
we  will  be  unable  to appreciate  the  historical  value  of 
those laws. 
There is little or nothing in the whole of  the Welsh Law 
of crime peculiarly inciigenous to Wales : there is a counter- 
part  for  practically  everything we  find  there in  some  or 
other system  of  more or  less contemporary law, but here 
again the exceptional value of  the old Welsh Laws lies in 
the  fact that no  other legal  survivals give  such  a  vivid, 
clear, and concise view of  what the law was as do the so- 
called Codes of  Hywel Dda. CH.  11  INTENTION  7  I 
THE LAW  OF PUNISHMENT 
$ I.  BEFORE  considering the details of  the law of torts or 
crime we  have first to state what had been  established as 
recognized forms of  '  punishment ' for crimes in Wales in 
the time of  Hywel Dda, and what was the object or theory 
of  punishment. 
3 2. The Welsh Laws make no attempt to urge that the 
object  of  punishment  was  reformation.  The  theory  of 
punishment is a very simple one.  It is summed up in the 
simple aphorism : '  The law says that whoever shall break 
its commandments is to be punished.' 
That is to say, punishment was necessary  for the main- 
tenance of peace and order.  To us that would seem to be 
almost a platitude, but when we  consider how recent it is 
that that  principle  has  been  accepted,  and  how,  in  the 
matter  of  so-called  political  crime,  it  is  whittled  down 
under the influence of  an hysterical humanitarianism, credit 
must be given to the old Welsh lawyers for their grasp of 
an essential first principle. 
$3. In another matter the Welsh  Laws show the same 
grip  on  first principles.  It is beside  the purpose  here  to 
describe  the complexities and difficulties that exist in the 
English  Law  of  to-day  relative  to conspiracy  and  overt 
acts.  All  this  complicated  learning  is  absent  from  the 
Welsh  Laws : it is brushed  aside by the simple provision 
that there can be no punishment for intention or thought 
without act. 
The first test to be applied is always the act done.  Not 
that intention was left out of  consideration, when there was 
proof  of  an act having been  done.  It was  left  outside of 
consideration in the law of  reparation to a very large extent ; 
but  what  differentiated an act  for  which  reparation  was 
XI. 412. 
due from one for which punishment must be awarded was 
the intention with which the act was  done.  There might 
be  reparation  due, but no  punishment for '  error without 
deed '.I 
The classification as a  crime of  an act done was  deter- 
mined by the intention with which it  was done.  For example, 
when we deal with theft, we will see that the act of  taking 
the  property  of  another  was  theft,  surreption  (a lesser 
offence), or error  (which was  no  offence at all), according 
to whether the act of  taking was deliberate and dishonest, 
deliberate but not dishonest, or committed through mistake. 
Again, in the law  of  murder  we  shall see  that where  the 
act  of  killing  was  justified  as having  been  done  in  self- 
defence or with the consent of  the person  killed, the crimi- 
nality of  the act was wiped out ; and yet again in the law of 
accessaries or abetment we shall find a scientific determina- 
tion  of  the penalty  according  to the nature of  the act of 
abetment. 
The importance of  intention is also apparent, as already 
indicated,  in  the  differentiation  between  the  making  of 
reparation and punishment. 
The law provides that every act causing injury or insult 
-subject  to some few exceptions to be noted in due course- 
whether injury or insult were caused intentionally or not, 
was to be redressed ; that is to say, the person  injured in 
person or property was to be compensated by the payment 
of  reparation.  Over  and  above  this,  where  there  was 
intention-intention  being established and measured by the 
circumstances in which the act was committed-there  was 
a  penalty  or  punishment  payable  to the  King  as repre- 
sentative of  the peace of  the community. 
3 4.  The distinction between  and the coexistence  of  re- 
paration  and punishment  must  never  be  lost  sight  of  in 
Welsh  Criminal  Law.  Not  only  was  reparation  almost 
always payable, but where  penalties  were  attached to an 
act, those  penalties  were  generally  additional to and not 
in substitution for the reparation.  There was a coexistence 
of  injury to the individual or his kin with the breach of  the 
IX. 270;  XIV. 596, 648. THE LAW  OF PUNISHMENT  PARTVI 
King's  peace ; there was  not, as we  find  in modern  law, 
a  deprivation  of  the  individual's  right  to  compensation 
when the law punishes for a breach of  its peace. 
This  coexistence  of  reparation  and punishment  for  the 
same act colours  the law  of  procedure.  It explains why 
there could be both a civil action for theft, that is an action 
to recover stolen property, and a criminal action to secure 
the punishment  of  the thief. 
$ 5.  The  importance  of  intention  as  determining  the 
criminality  of  an act finds forcible  expression  in the law 
relative to persons incapable of  crime. 
Over  and  over  again  we  find  it asserted  that  certain 
people  could not be  punished for their acts ; but, though 
they could  not  be  punished,  they  or  their  kinsmen  must 
make good the damage done by them.  The act done must 
be repaired, but as the persons  committing the act could 
not in law have an intention, they were not to be punished. 
Youths under seven and idiots were never to be punished. 
Persons intoxicated were also exempt ; so too were persons 
committing  an  act  under  duress  or  compulsion;  and, 
according  to some  authorities,  those  who  were  deaf  and 
dumb, a rule also existing in Blfred's Laws, c. 14. 
Incomplete intention was also recognized in the rule that 
a  youth  between  seven  and  fourteen  could  be  punished 
only by a '  dirwy ' or fine, the liability for which fell upon 
the father, who was responsible for controlling a son in the 
exercise of  his intenti0n.l 
$6. Among the kinds of  punishment  recognized in the 
Welsh  Laws  the death penalty  naturally comes first.  It 
was confined to deliberate homicide, certain acts of  theft, 
treason, and, according to some authorities, arson. 
The death penalty was always by hanging. 
$ 7.  The second recognized form of  punishment seems to 
have become extinct by the time of  the codification.  We 
, 
see from the laws that, for theft and offences tried under 
the law  of theft, there was  a time when  certain criminals 
were  either handed  over  in bondage  to the person  whom 
they had injured, or were sold by the King into bondage. 
v. c. 200-2  ; XIV. 648, 662. 
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We  frequently  come  across  the  phrase  ' saleable  thief ', 
but it is  clear  from  the laws that the practice  of  selling 
a  criminal  into bondage  no  longer  existed.  The sentence 
was  still preserved,  but  what  happened  was  that a  man 
sentenced to be  a  saleable thief was  permitted  to redeem 
himself  by payment  of  his  sale worth,  that is £7,  failing 
to pay which he was not sold, but banished.l 
$8. The two common punishments in Welsh Law were 
the '  dirwy ' and the ' camlwrw ', both of  them fines.  The 
former was fixed at twelve kine or £3, and was the appro- 
priate penalty in cases of  theft absent, violence and fighting, 
and the latter at three kine or  180  pence, the appropriate 
penalty for the major portion of  other crimes. 
The '  camlwrw ' could be imposed  for all offences, how- 
ever  minute,  though  we  are  told  that,  inasmuch  as  no 
complaint could  be  admitted where  the subject-matter  of 
the offence was less than one penny, '  camlwrw ' could not 
be imposed for less than a penny. 
It could be imposed for disobedience to the King's orders, 
and for a host of  minor petty misdemeanours against the 
King's authority. 
Just  as in Roman Law penalties  could  be  doubled  and 
trebled, so a '  camlwrw ' could be single, double, or treble, 
according to the nature of  the offence, and we find also that 
a ' dirwy ' might be doubled, but never trebled.2 
3 9.  Mutilation  as a  punishment  is  mentioned,  but  it 
was confined to one or two cases only, and then only when 
the offender was a bondman previously convicted.  It was 
not  a  punishment which  could  be inflicted  on  a  freeman, 
nor upon a bondman for a first offence. 
$ 10.  Spoliation  or  forfeiture  of  movable  property  is 
also  mentioned,  principally  in  the Triads.  Forfeiture  of 
land was permissible  only in cases of  treason and murder 
by waylaying. 
5 11.  The punishment of  banishment is only once referred 
to as a substantive penalty, the occasion being where a man 
killed a kinsman. 
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It  was  a  punishment  commonly  applied  in  default  of 
'  dinvy ' or of  the redemption value of  a saleable thief, but 
it was not pertinent for failure to pay '  camlwrw '. 
A  person  banished  was  exiled  from  his  countryside. 
A picturesque account is given in the Triads, an expansion 
of  what is said elsewhere in the Venedotian Code. 
The true law was that a  man banished  must leave the 
country the next day, and was given a day for each '  cyinwd ' 
he had to traverse. 
S1.iould he return, he could, according to some authorities, 
be rebanished once, but only once.  On the second return, 
and, according to others, on the first return or  on  failure 
to remove himself  in the time fixed for doing so, the exile, 
if found nine paces within the territory from which he had 
been  banished, was to be executed,  and neither sanctuary 
nor relics protected him.  The only ground for exempting 
him from execution which he could claim was that he was 
returning along the high road to reconcile himself  with the 
King.l 
$ 12.  Somewhat similar to the punishment  of  exile was 
that of  food-forbiddance.  The penalty of  food-forbiddance 
could  be  passed  where  there  was  a  contempt  of  lawful 
summons,  or where  a  person  sentenced  to a  '  camlwrw ' 
failed to pay it. 
Food-forbiddance was  simply an edict  prohibiting every 
one from giving food  or shelter to the person  named ; it 
did not entail exile,  but was  a  legalized  boycott  effective 
until the offender submitted to law.  Any  one disobeying 
the edict became liable to a '  camlwrw ' for supporting the 
~ffender.~ 
$13.  Imprisonment for a term is nowhere mentioned in 
the Welsh Laws.  We know there were means of  restraining 
liberty in ancient Wales, for the porter of  the palace was 
a  jailor,  and the smith of  the Court made ' gyves ' ; but 
imprisonment for a term was not a penalty inflicted for any 
offence against the laws.  Imprisonment was permitted to 
secure a man arrested for an offence for whose  appearance 
security was not given, and as a punishment for disobedience 
V. C.  244 ; VIII. 196-8.  V. 60 ; XI. 398 ; XIV. 612-14. 
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to a lord's legal order, but not for an offence known to the 
older laws. 
In one  passage  of  the  XIVth  Book  we  are  told  that 
imprisonment could be imposed for theft in hand ; but the 
circumstances  of  the context make it clear that the word 
'  imprisonment'  is  either  an error  or a  later substitution 
for the death penalty.' 
$ 14. The last punishment mentioned is the forfeiture of 
status.  This was  confined  to treason  and some  cases  of 
theft.  It was additional to the substantive penalty. 
$ 15.  Mitigation  of  penalties  was permitted.  The King 
or lord had the prerogative of  mercy, and could remit any 
penalty,  or reduce  the '  camlwrw ' from  180  to 3  pence, 
but he could not transfer his right to recover the redemp- 
tion price of  a thief.2 
The rules of  the Welsh  Laws as to punishment  are, for 
the period, humane, and there is a well-balanced effort to 
apportion the penalty to the crime. 
$16.  The Irish Laws are, in many respects, comparable 
to the Welsh Laws in the matter of  punishment. 
Though  Ireland had  no  regular  courts, the idea of  the 
Icing's or Chief's peace existed, and we find the conception 
of  punishment for breach thereof in embryo. 
Those laws lay emphasis on the distinction between  an 
injury caused with intention and one caused inadvertently. 
On this point they go rather farther than the Welsh Laws 
in  making  intention punishable,  when  an act  other  than 
that intended  was  committed.  ' An  eric-fine ', it is said, 
' is due by a man when  he went  to do injury to a lawful 
man in his proper piace, and the injury intended was not 
inflicted ' ; but a distinction is drawn in the law of  Exemp- 
tions between injuries caused deliberately and those not so 
caused or done in lawful anger, the law permitting a reduc- 
tion  in  the reparation  payable  in  the latter case,  though 
in every case some reparation must be made. 
The Irish Laws are similar to the Welsh ones in regard 
to the persons  capable of crime.  There is the same rule 
relative to boys under seven and under fourteen : '  A boy 
XIV. 612-14,  622.  X. 330. ceases to be  a  fool and becomes sensible at seven, and of 
half  sense at fourteen',  and in  the Senchus M6r, clerics, 
women,  boys,  those incapable of  wounding, protecting, or 
forbidding  (that  is  acting  in  self-defence), imbeciles  and 
incapables were all exempt from punishment.  At the same 
time reparation must be paid by relatives,  though on this 
point it is said in the Book  of  Aicill  (111.  159)  that some 
authorities gave the uninstigated fool, committing a furious 
assault, over to chastisement. 
The actual punishments inflicted in Irish Law for crime 
as distinct  from  reparation  are not  clearly  stated.  The 
differentiation  was  in  embryo,  but  there  are  incidental 
references  to banishment  and punishments for  feeding  an 
outlaw, but nothing more. 
Communal  responsibility  for  reparation  is  fully  main- 
tained.' 
$17.  The early English Laws contain no theory of  punish- 
ment.  The conception of  crime was fully established, but 
there are very  distinct  traces left, up to and beyond  the 
time of  the Conquest, of  most acts being regarded as torts 
against individuals, and of  the communal responsibility of 
kinsmen to make reparation for murder, theft, and insult. 
The characteristic of  most penalties is compound : penal- 
ties  generally  consisting  of  '  b6t ' or  reparation  together 
with ' wite ' or fine. 
In so far as there  was  any theory  as to the object  of 
punishment  in  English  Law  it would  seem,  by the very 
savagery  of  some  of  its rules,  to have  been  to prevent 
crime by striking terror. 
We have, as in Wales, a system of  fines of  varying degrees, 
we have also almost  no trace of  punishment by imprison- 
ment ; but in the English provisions for death and mutila- 
tion we have regulations absent from the Welsh Law. 
The death penalty was common, and till Bthelstan's time 
it could  be  inflicted for the offence of  ' theft present ' on 
any  child  of  the  age  of  twelve.  Even  his  amendment, 
which raised the age to fifteen, did not apply to a fugitive 
or one evading capture or one guilty of  a second  offence. 
Bk.  of  Aicill,  111. 139, 157, 347 ; Senchus MBr, I. 179,  243. 
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This  continued to be  the law  till  a late period,  vide  e.g. 
Ecgberht's Excerpts, c. 96 : 
' Parvulus usque annos XV pro delicto corporali disciplina 
castigetur :  post  hanc vero  aetatem  quicquid  deliquerit  vel 
si furatur retribuat seu etiam secundum legem exsolvat.' 
In London, under the Judicia  Civitatis, c. I, the old age 
of twelve was maintained, and in the time of  Ine we see it 
was as low as ten. 
But it was in its provisions for mutilation that the early 
English Law revelled. 
The Laws of  Cnut were a conscious effort to mitigate the 
severity of  the ordinary punishments.  The second paragraph 
of his Secular Laws gives the keynote to what follows : 
' We  command that Christian men  be  not on  any account 
for  altogether too little condemned to death ; but rather let 
gentle punishment be  decreed for  the benefit  of  the people ; 
jet  not be destroyed for little God's handywork, and his own 
purchase which he dearly bought.' 
What  was  regarded  as '  gentle  punishment ' may  be 
inferred from cc. 30, 32. 
Under  c.  30  any one  twice  convicted  was  to have  his 
hands or his feet  or both cut off, according to the nature 
of  his  offence,  and  should  he  thereafter  ' have  wrought 
greater evil ', the law said '  let his eyes be put out and his 
ears and the upper lip be cut off,  or let him be scalped '. 
Under  c.  32  should  a  ' theow'  fail  in  an ordeal  he was 
branded for  the first  offence and executed for the second, 
while under c. 36 a perjurer was to lose his hands. 
In the laws of  Blfred, c. 25, and of  William the Conqueror, 
c. 17, emasculation was the penalty for violation, and there 
is  a  grim  humour  in  the Carta  Regis  of  the Conqueror, 
desirous of  straining the quality of  mercy by reducing the 
occasions on which the death penalty could be inflicted : 
' Interdicimus eciam ne  quis occidatur vel suspendatur pro 
aliqua causa, sed enerventur oculi et abscindantur pedes vel 
testiculi vel manus, ita quod truncus remaneat vivus in signum 
prodicionis et nequicie sua.' 
Perhaps the horrors of  the early English system of  punish- 
ments will be sufficiently indicated by reference to the pro- 
vision in Bthelstan's Law of  Witlanburh that a thief  when sentenced to death was to be broken on the wheel, and to 
the rule which Cnut abolished  and which is quoted in his 
laws thus : 
'  In the old law (where stolen property was found in a man's 
house) the child which lay in the cradle, though it had never 
tasted meat, was  held  by  the covetous to be  equally guilty 
as if  it had discretion.' 
Forfeiture of  property was  known  in the early  English 
Law :  it was  under  Cnut's Law the ordinary penalty  for 
a '  flymo ' or fugitive  (Secular Laws,  c.  13).  '  Wites ' or 
fines of  varying extent were common, which could be trebled 
and quadrupled, and the sale of  persons into slavery, even 
beyond the seas, finds occasional expression.  In such cases, 
however, it would seem that the sentence of  slavery could 
be  avoided as in Wales by the payment  of  the redemption 
value of  the person sentenced. 
Banishment, as distinct from slavery, does not  occur in 
the  early  English  Laws,  either  as  a  substantive or  an 
alternative penalty. 
$18.  In the numerous Germanic Laws we have much the 
same characteristics as in English Law ; but we need only 
here concern  ourselves with noting that those laws main- 
tained  the coexistence  of  reparation  and punishment.  It 
is perhaps sufficient to quote the Lex Baiuor., Tit. 11, wherein 
we find the idea of  reparation by slavery best expressed. 
After  saying  that  treason  was  the  one  irredeemable 
offence, it proceeds : 
'  Ceteras vero quascunque commiserit peccatas, usque habet 
substantiam componat secundum legem, si vero non habet ipse 
se in servitio deprimat et per singulos menses vel annos quan- 
tum lucrare  quiverit persolvat  cui  deliquit  donec  debitum 
universum restituat.' 
I11 
'  SARAAD ' OR  INSULT 
I. Dejhzition of '  saraad '. 
The first offence to consider is that of  '  saraad '.  Through- 
out the whole of  the Welsh Laws ' saraad ' remained a tort, 
and at no time is there any trace of  its growing into a crime. 
The term ' saraad ' means primarily an injury to honour 
or  insult,  and secondarily the reparation  payable  to the 
person  insulted.  It must  not  be confused with injury to 
life and limb, for which there was a separate and additional 
compensation. 
Every man and woman had a '  saraad ' value or honour- 
price,  which we have already described  in the chapter on 
the Worth of  Men  and Things,  and this honour-price  was 
the measure of  compensation payable to a person suffering 
insult. 
2. Acts causing '  saraad '. 
5 I.  Insult to a man consisted in striking, assaulting, or 
taking  from him by violence, i.e. theft  openly committed 
in  the presence  of  the owner  by threat, intimidation,  or 
force. 
In secret  theft  there was  no insult,  inasmuch  as there 
was no  show or use  of  intimidation or  force insulting the 
personal honour of  the man deprived of  his property. 
Striking included pulling a man's hair or beard, and the 
placing of  the hand, during the maliing of  a bargain, on the 
shoulder of  the other party instead of  in his outstretched 
hand, was likewise ' striking '. 
The  act  of  insult  was  additional  to any other  offence 
caused  by the act, e.g. when  a man was murdered  there 
was insult for the blow as well as h0micide.l 
§ 2.  In addition to these  acts, which were  insult to all 
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men,  a  number  of  other acts was  insult  to particular  in- 
dividuals. 
Insult to a  married man was  committed  by '  misuse  of 
his wife ' (which is defined as adultery, kissing, and caress- 
ing), by violation  of  any '  protection ' he was  authorized 
by custom to give to another, and also by the use of  rude 
words uttered by his wife to him.  Insult by adultery was 
compensated for both by the wife and her paramour. 
Insult to an official was likewise caused by violating the 
right of  protection granted to him. 
Insult to the King was caused by violating his '  protec- 
tion ', killing  his  messenger,  or  murdering  a  man  of  his 
when  in  conference  on  his  own  boundaries  with  another 
lord, if  such murder were committed by a man of  the other 
lord in the presence of  the lords and their hosts.  Violation 
of  the King's highway, which protected every one, is also 
mentioned  as an insult to the King, likewise the violation 
of  a woman within his dominions. 
$ 3.  Insult to a woman, married or unmarried, was caused 
by striking her,  by violation,  by kissing  or caressing her 
against her will, and by desertion by the man to whom she 
had  allied  herself  by  '  personal  bestowal '.  Kissing  and 
caressing  were  not  insult  to a  woman,  if  occurring while 
indulging in the game of  skipping, or during a carousal in 
honour of  the arrival of  some one from a distance. 
Violation  of  a  woman  of  easy virtue was  not  insult  to 
her;  it was  an offence,  but the woman  had  no  honour, 
insulted by the act, to be compensated for.  Other insults, 
however, to her involved the payment of  honour-price.  So 
also  no  honour-price,  other  than  a  contemptuous  penny, 
was payable to a woman voluntarily surrendering herself. 
$4.  Special  compensation  or  '  gowyn ' was  due  to  a 
married woman for her husband's adultery or for a beating 
administered without just  cause.  This insult is commonly 
called ' wynebwerth '. 
Just  cause for chastisement occurred when the wife gave 
away things  she was  not  entitled  to give,  when  she was 
discovered flirting with another man in a covert, and where 
she had been offensively rude to her husband. 
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The insults to the Queen  are specially mentioned,  and 
consisted  in  violation  of  her  protection,  striking her  and 
taking things  from her  by force.  These,  however,  as we 
have seen, were common to other persons as well. 
Fj  5.  The Welsh Laws give, in very great detail, the extent 
of the protection (nawd)  that could be granted by the King 
or an officer of  the Court :  the exact limits of  each one's 
protective area or precincts  are given,  a  breach  of  which 
was insult to the protector, but the protection affordable by 
a non-official  is not defined,  though  it would  seem it was 
similar to that in the Irish and English Laws, and covered 
the actual house and nine paces around. 
$ 6.  Special honour-price was payable also to the kinsmen 
of  a murdered man by the murderer, by one who despoiled 
the corpse or by one who struck the corpse with his foot. 
This was  always additional to and paid  before  the blood- 
fine. 
Special honour-price  or '  wynebwerth  was also payable 
to a judge, the correctness of  whose judgement was wrongly 
challenged. 
Notice must not be omitted, too, of  the fact that insult 
could  be  caused  by a  father chastising his  son  after the 
latter had attained the age of  fourteen. 
3. Necessity  of intention in insult. 
$ I.  For there to be  insult  there  must  be '  onset  and 
attack ', that is the act must be intentionally  committed 
and the person  insulted must  be cognizant of  the '  onset 
and attack '.  There  could  be  no insult, therefore,  in  an 
unintentional or accidental blow ; but if  such blow resulted 
in blood or a wound or a conspicuous scar, the injury had 
to be compensated for as an injury, and not as insult.  So, 
too, if  a man shot an arrow at another, and it transfixed 
two  men,  honour-price  was  payable  to the man  against 
whom the insult was directed, but not to the second man ; 
for, though the act was  illegal  and injury caused to him 
had to be compensated for, there was no insult to him, as 
there was no intention to insult him. 
$ 2.  Again, if two men were walking through a wood in 
single file, and the one in front let a branch swing back so 
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as to strike the one behind, causing him to lose the sight 
of an eye, no honour-price was payable, for the blow was 
unintentional;  but  the loss  of  the eye  had  to  be  com- 
pensated for, unless warning had been given, on the general 
principle that for every injury committed unwittingly there 
must be redress wittingly. 
5 3.  So there  could  be  no  honour-price  for  murder by 
poisoning,  for  the person  poisoned  was  not  cognizant  of 
' onset and attack ' ; nor was honour-price payable for an 
act accessory to murder, the onset and attack being by the 
murderer and not by the accessary.l 
4. Jz~stiJiable  alzd Pernzissible  insult. 
$ I.  But every  intentional  blow was  not  insult.  Some 
intentional blows are recognized as justifiable.  If  a  father 
gave his son, under the age of  fourteen, a slap in correcting 
him, there was no insult. 
The Anomalous  Laws also say that there was  no insult 
in a blow  in lawful  anger, which appears to mean a blow 
in self-defence.  In self-defence of  body or property a blow 
or injury might be inflicted if  the effect were similar to that 
which it was intended by the aggressor to inflict upon the 
person  acting in  self-defence, and the right  of  defence  of 
property allowed the killing of  any one found in the King's 
chamber at night without a light in his hand. 
Likewise honour-price was not paid where there was a fair 
open fight, though the injury or wound would have to be 
paid for if  one side only were injured.  If  both sides were 
injured the injuries compensated for each other. 
Honour-price  was  not  payable  also  if  an insult  were 
avenged.  Hence abuse for abuse wiped out the in~ult.~ 
$2. Certain permissible insults to the officers  of  the Court 
are mentioned, which display, as do so many other passages 
in the Laws, a strain of  not unconscious humour. 
The ' land-maer ' could not complain of  insult if  he were 
insulted by the servants of the Court when he got in their 
way while carrying drink or victuals for the hall from the 
kitchen or mead-cellar. 
'  V. C. 220;  D.C. 508,  598,  600;  IV. 2; V.  40,  44,  46; VIII. 210; 
X. 326, 382.  a  D. C.  442,  600;  X. 326, 362 ; XI. 408. 
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The keeper of  the door, if  he left his charge for the distance 
of the length of  his arnl and rod after the King had entered 
the hall, could claim no honour-price, as a reminder to him 
to keep within the circle of  his duties. 
The usher, if  he were rash enough  to seat himself  while 
in  Court,  also  exposed  himself  to insult,  as he  was  not 
allowed to sit in the presence of  the Court.  If  insulted, he 
received  a  farcical honour-price  of  a  sieve of  oats and an 
eggshell in North Wales, a sieve of  oats and an addled egg 
in  Dinefwr,  and a  bundle of  chaff  and an addled  egg  in 
Gwent. 
The dignity of  the chaplain of  the household, of  the judge 
of the palace,  and of  the medical  attendant of  the King 
could  be  offended  with  impunity  whenever  they  were 
intoxicated, '  for they know not when the King may need 
them '. 
$3. The rule  that it was  intention  that made  a  man 
liable to pay honour-price involved the conclusion that a boy 
under fourteen could not cause insult, though one passage 
limits the freedom to be rude to a child under seven.  Along 
with the irresponsible child was the irresponsible idiot.  At 
the same time they could not suffer insult, nor could a leper 
nor a dumb person, but injury to them entailed compensa- 
tion and perhaps even a '  dirwy '. 
Likewise a bondman had no honour-price, but injury to 
him  had to be paid  for  to his owner,  and adultery with 
a bondwoman, while not insult to her, was an injury to the 
lord for which  12d. was exacted, and if  the woman  died or 
became  enceinte  the  offender  had  to supply  another  in 
her place. 
$4. Insult being  dependent  upon intention there could 
be no insult where a man was killed or injured by the act 
of  an irresponsible  animal, by the falling  of  a  tree after 
warning, or by the bite of  a mad dog. 
$5. Two interesting cases occur where honour-price was 
payable for insult, in which there would have been neither 
honour-price nor blood-fine if  the person insulted had been 
killed. 
If  a person were falsely accused of  murder and did not 
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trouble to deny the charge, or if  a  person,  mulcted  in  a 
blood-fine,  failed  to pay the full amount due by him, he 
could be killed with impunity ;  but if  he were insulted,  without 
being killed, honour-price must be paid for the act of  insu1t.l 
5. Rate of  honour-price. 
$ I.  The rate of  reparation  for insult we  have  already 
stated in the Law of  the Worth of  Men  and Things.  We 
have also there noted that there could be augmentation in 
some cases. 
Honour-price  was  augmented  once,  twice,  or  thrice,  if 
a conspicuous scar were inflicted on the foot, hand, or face. 
It was trebled where a wife was abducted or violated, and 
doubled for adultery. 
$2. For insult caused to a wife the reparation was payable 
to the husband  and could  be augmented and diminished. 
In the case  of  a  kiss it was  reduced  to two-thirds,  while 
adultery increased it, the standard rate being for caressing. 
6. Recipient of  honour-price. 
5 I.  Generally speaking, the sufferer of  an insult received 
the honour-price. 
Exceptions to this are the case of  the Queen, two-thirds 
of  whose honour-price went to the King ; a bondman, who 
had no honour-price,  but whose  injury-value  went  to his 
lord ;  a  wife,  with  whom  adultery  was  committed,  the 
insult  there being  not  to her,  but  to her  husband ; and 
a cleric, his honour-price, fixed by the Church, going to the 
Church, though one authority gives in the latter case two- 
thirds to the Icing. 
5 2.  Where honour-price was payable for insult to a corpse, 
it is said that a third went to the widow, if  the deceased 
were married, the rest being added to and shared with the 
blood-fine, according to some authorities, and, according to 
others, paid to the relatives within four degrees. 
If  the murdered man were unmarried, it went, according 
to some  authorities, likewise to the whole '  galanas-kin ' ; 
but, according to others, to relatives in the fourth degree, 
or to the father, mother, brothers, and sisters. 
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The Venedotian  Code  limits the sharing to relatives  in 
the fourth degree,  while  conceding  that other authorities 
admitted the '  galanas-kin ' to a share.  In all cases where 
honour-price  was  payable  for  murder,  one-third  went  to 
the King as his exacting third. 
7.  Co~ztributors  to  lzo~zour-price. 
$ I. As regards payment of  honour-price, generally speak- 
ing, the offender paid it himself.  If  he were  a  bondman 
and he insulted  a  freeman,  the insult  could not  be com- 
pensated  for,  as  the  bondman  had  no  property.  The 
bondman was liable to have his right hand or foot cut off 
-one  of  the few cases of  mutilation mentioned in the Codes- 
unless the master redeemed him by paying the value of  the 
limb plus the honour-price. 
$ 2.  Even in the case of  murder, though it would seem 
that the kin might be responsible  to pay it, the Gwentian 
Code, p. 702, provided that no kinsman need pay honour- 
price if  the offender had property of  his own ;  and, if  he had 
not,  then it was  leviable  only  on  relatives  in the fourth 
degree. 
3 3.  It is possible  that custom  varied,  but the trend of 
authority  is to the effect that it was,  in  all cases except 
where murder was committed, the duty of  the offender to 
pay, and in cases  of  murder  it was  the duty of  relatives 
within the fourth degree to contribute. 
$ 4.  There could be no prosecution for insult, because it 
was not a crime.  Honour-price due, but not paid, could be 
recovered by a quasi-civil suit, which must be filed by the 
person insulted, the truth or falsity of the ground of  action 
being determined by compurgators. 
8. Honour-price in other laws. 
$ I.  In England, Ireland, and Scotland there was a law 
of  honour-price, but in none  of  them are its principles  so 
clearly asserted as in the Welsh Laws. 
As  we have already seen in Irish Law, the honour-price 
was termed ' eneclann '. 
Honour-price  was  in  Ireland  determined,  as in Wales, 
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price  suffered entire ' diminutio capitis ' for theft, treason, 
fratricide and secret murder, and partial for other offences, 
until he made reparation. 
Under  Irish  Law,  ' eneclann ' was  payable  for  personal 
insult, violation of  a virgin, attempted adultery, quarrelling 
in precincts, injuries to the body (in addition to compensa- 
tion), theft  of  a  woman  against  the will  of  the tribe  or 
husband, and satire. 
$2. It is, however,  in the law of  '  protection ' or '  pre- 
cincts ' that the Irish Laws throw a most interesting light 
on the Welsh Law of  '  nawd '. 
Every person in Ireland had a '  maighen ', a precinct or 
area of  protection, in which he had the right to insist on 
peace being kept.  The area of  the '  maighen ', said to have 
been  determined at a  convention  of  the men  of  Erin  at 
Siab Sliabh  Fuaid, varied  according to rank,  just  as the 
Welsh '  nawd ' of  officials varied, and was often fanciful. 
The object of  the ' maighen ' was to protect the right of 
the owner to quiet enjoyment thereof in extending the duty 
of  hospitality,  and  not  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  a 
fugitive. 
The violation  of  a '  maighen ' was  con~pensated  for  by 
a fraction of  the ' eneclann '.I 
$3. The Irish Laws are also of  interest as showing how 
the Irish capacity for meticulous calculations found ample 
scope, for they carried the idea of  insult much further than 
did the Welsh, e. g. in a case of  theft in a house the Brehons 
discovered no less than seven persons,  besides the owner, 
whose honour was offended by the act of  theft, and many 
crimes or torts entitled the victim to '  eneclann ' in addition 
to compensation for the loss occasioned. 
But  perhaps  as  throwing  some  light  on  the  persons 
entitled to share in '  eneclann ' the Irish Laws are of  most 
comparative value, for they definitely rule that '  eneclann ' 
did not concern the '  fine ', and it never ascended beyond 
the brother  of the person  insulted, and it descended  only 
among male lineal descendants. 
5 4.  In English  Law the law of  insult was in process of 
Ir. Laws, I. 67, 165-7,  171. 459 ; IV. 227, 299. 
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developing into a crime by the time of  Bthelberht (c. 2) 
and of  Hlothaire and Edric. 
There was  for insult  a  twofold '  b8t ' as reparation  to 
the person  insulted,  and a fine to the King, and in some 
cases even a third '  b8t ', where the insult was uttered on 
the land of  a third person. 
We  do  not,  however,  get  it clearly  enunciated  in  the 
English  Laws that the '  b6t ' for insult was  additional to 
the ' bBt ' for injury, where both insult and injury occurred 
together. 
$5. The English  Law  shows distinctly that the law  of 
precincts prevailed  there.  In fact the value of  such pro- 
visions  as  there  are  in  English  Law  relative  to insult 
is  mostly  in  connexion  with  the  law  of  precincts  or 
'  tOn '. 
In the Laws of  Ethelstan IV, c. 5, for example, for the 
King's  '  grith '  or  protection  a  definite  area  round  the 
palace was fixed as precincts.  In the Laws of  Bthelberht, 
cc. 8, 15,  and 17,  penalties for ' mund-byrch ', that is the 
breaking of  the peace in a third person's  precincts and for 
the breach of  a man's ' tan', are stated; while the breach 
of  the sanctity of  the premises of  a '  ceorl ', specially termed 
' edor-byrch ', is separately provided for in c. 27. 
In the Laws of  Hlothaire and Edric (cc. 11, 12, 13,  14) 
the utterance of  insults within, the commission of  offences 
upon, and the bloodyiilg of  the earth of, the ' flat ' (home- 
stead) of  a '  ceorl ' had to be compensated for by payment 
of  penalties both to the '  ceorl' offended and to the King 
In the Laws of  Blfred, cc. 36, 39, compensation was pro- 
vided  for as payable to all house owners, whether '  ceorl ' 
or six- or twelve-hynde men, for fighting on their respective 
' flats ', and in c. 40, which  more  or less  reproduces  Ine's 
Laws, c. 45,  for trespassing upon the '  burh ' of  any one. 
Similarly, we have numerous references to enhanced penal- 
ties for the breach of  the '  grith ' or ' frith ' in Church and 
palace,l while the VIIth Law of  Bthelred consists almost 
entirely  of  a  statement of  the law  of  precincts  as it had 
See, e. g. Bthelberht's Laws, c. 2 ; Dooms of  Ine, c. 6 ; 2Elfred's Laws, 
cc. 6, 7. 38 ; and Ethelstan's Laws, c. 5 ; Cnut's Eccles. Laws, cc. 2, 3 ; and 
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formerly stood, and then stood in Kent and in North and 
South Anglia. 
$ 6.  Full details  as to what  constituted  insult in early 
English Law are not apparent.  Personal abuse was insult, 
and that there was a correspondence with the Welsh Laws 
seems likely,  for we  find '  feas-fang ' or  pulling  a  man's 
hair entailing a special '  b6t ' of  50 '  sceatts ' in Ethelberht's 
Laws, a provision which also occurs in the Lex Frisionum 111, 
c. 40. 
The English Law treated adultery exactly as the Welsh 
Law did, viz. as a tort and not as a crime.  It was part of 
or cognate to insult.  The '  b6t ' payable, in so far as regards 
slaves, adultery with whom was a tort committed against 
the owner, is detailed in the Laws of  Bthelstan, cc. 10,  11, 
14,  and  16, as regards '  esnes ' in c.  85, and  as  regards 
freemen in c. 31,  also in Elfred's Laws, c. 10, and the Secular 
Laws of  Cnut, c. 51. 
The Laws of Bthelstan and the Conqueror fix the ' b6t ' 
as equivalent to the '  wergild ', with the additional penalty 
that the  offender  must  buy  a  new  wife  for  the injured 
husband. 
In the Laws of  Blfred, cc. 11,  18,  we  have similar pro- 
visions to those pertaining in the Welsh  Laws relative to 
insult by caressing, and to the right of  a woman  to com- 
purgate herself when charged therewith. 
The Laws of Cnut, however, make adultery a quasi-crime 
when  committed by a wife, and provide  that she forfeited 
all her property to her husband and had her ears and nose 
cut off  (c. 54). 
!j 7.  The fragments of  Scots Law are similar in character. 
Not  only is there, as already noticed,  in the ' Leges inter 
Brettos et Scottos ', a scale of  '  kelchyn ' or honour-price, 
but we find that where homicide occurred there was a special 
sum,  in  addition  to ' cro  or '  gallnes ', payable  to the 
owner  of  the precincts  in  which  the homicide  was  com- 
mitted.  This insult to protection  was valued higher than 
the '  kelchyn ' to the person. 
So, too, we find in the same Leges that in case of  homicide, 
at least  of  a  woman,  the '  kelchyn ' was  paid  separately 
from the ' cro ' and '  gallnes '.  The former  went  to the 
husband of  a free woman  or the lord of  a ' car1 ' woman, 
while the latter went to the woman's kin. 
The same rule regarding precincts occurs in the Laws of 
King David I : 
' Gif  wythin  gyrth  or  ony  place  quahar  the  pece  of  the 
King or of  the lord of  the tenement beis askyt ony man thruch 
il will lytis his neff  to stryk anothir . . . he  sal geyff  to the 
King 1111 ky, and to him  that he walde haf  strikyn a blow.' 
$8. Traces  of  the same law  are found  throughout  the 
German Codes, valuations being given for different insults. 
Adultery and immorality of  a woman  was insult to her 
husband,l  or  to the  relative^,^  and not  a  crime ;  undue 
familiarity by  caressing,  pinching,  &c., was  insult  to the 
~voman,~  to which in some laws * a '  wergild ' was added ; 
common  abuse  and  insult  also  entailed  compensation ; 
adultery with a slave was insult to the lord,6 compensated 
for at fixed prices. 
Insult by breach of  precincts of  the Church or palace is 
also frequently mentioned.' 
Lex Salica, Cod. I. 15 ; Lex Alamman., Tit. LI ; Lex Burgund. VIII, 
XXXVI, XLIV. 
a  Lex Sal., Cod. I, XXV;  Lex Alamman., Tit. LI ; Lex Langobard., 
CC.  184-9. 
Lex Sal., Cod. I, XX. 
4  Lex Frision. IX ; Additio Wulemar, &c. 
Lex Sal., Cod. I, 30, 75. 
Cod.  I,  25 ;  Lex  Sal. ;  Lex  Alamman.,  Tit. LXXXII ; and Lex 
Burgund., Tit. XXIV. 
e. g. Lex Alamman., Tit. XXIX, XXXI ; Lex Baiuor., 11, cc. 10, 11 
XI; Lex Burgund., Tit. XV,  XXV, CIII;  Lex Langobard.,  Ed. Roth., 
cc. 34, 40 ; Lex Saxon., c. 2 ; and Lex Angl. et Werion., c. 50. '  GALANAS ' OR  HOMICIDE 
I. Introductory. 
5 I.  Homicide is the first of  the three '  columns of  law '. 
It  is  of  particular  interest  not  simply  because  we  know 
that  the  same  view  of  killing  was  taken  by  nearly  all 
European peoples, but because in no legal survivals are the 
full ramifications  of  the law presented with quite the same 
completeness as they are in the Welsh Codes. 
5 2.  In its  inception  homicide  was  a  tort,  for  which 
vengeance was due, and we  see in the Welsh Law relating 
to it the full expansion of  the law of  reparation in lieu of 
vengeance and the beginnings  of  the idea that killing was 
a crime. 
At the time of  the redaction of  the laws the indiscriminate 
right of  vengeance had disappeared.  The amends for killing 
was payment of reparation, to which was added, in certain 
cases, punishment when the killing was deliberate. 
5 3.  Llywelyn ap Iorwerth or his son Daiydd is credited 
with having abolished the old law of  '  galanas ' in Wales, but 
its complete abolition did not take place until the Statute 
of  Wales was passed at Rhuddlan. 
In the interval between  Hywel Dda and Llywelyn there 
was  indubitably  a  development  of  the tendency  towards 
substituting the conception  of crime for tort in respect of 
killing, but the force of  customary ideas was strong enough 
to keep the conception of tort more alive in killing than in 
any other class of wrongdoing. 
z. Definition of '  galanas '. 
5 I.  Just  as the term '  saraad ' had a double meaning- 
the insult offered  and the compensation payable therefor ; 
so,  too,  the term ' galanas ' had  a  double  meaning-the 
killing of  a person  and the compensation which had to be 
paid  for  the killing,  estimated  according to the status of 
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the person killed, the amounts of  which, the blood-fine, have 
already been  stated in the chapter on  the Worth of  Men 
and Things. 
5 2.  Homicide is defined in the Dimetian Code, p. 404, in 
the  following  words :  ' Galanas  yw  llad dyn, Galanas  is 
the killing  of  a  man ' ; that is homicide  was  not  merely 
premeditated  murder,  but homicide  in any circumstances 
whatsoever, even accidental slaying, and though the defini- 
tion includes only men, the law applied equally to the slay- 
ing of  women. 
§ 3.  We must  not, however,  suppose that every  killing 
carried with it of  necessity the liability to make reparation, 
or that the reparation for all killing was the same. 
Brynmor-  Jones  in his  article on ' Foreign  Elements in 
Welsh Mediaeval Law ',l  implies that blood-fine was due for 
all killing at the time of  the Codes, and that mitigation of 
that rule is to be found only in the Anomalous Laws.  It is 
possible  that  originally  all  killing  dicl  cntail  vengeance ; 
but the mitigation of that rule, if  it were ever of  universal 
application  among  the  Cymry,  was  coincident  with  the 
growth of  the idea of reparation.  It is a mistake to suppose 
that, in the earliest  Welsh  Laws we  have, killing  always 
involved the payment of  blood-fine. 
There  are  very  distinct  references  to  the  fact  that  it 
did not. 
§ 4.  Though no express attempt is made in the Codes or 
laws to distinguish between  different  grades and kinds of 
killing, there is no doubt that such distinctions were recog- 
nized.  The laws recognized a distinction between what we 
may  term  justifiable  or  excusable  homicide,  accidental 
homicide,  and deliberate homicide  with  or without  aggra- 
vated circumstances.  They further recognized that certain 
persons  were  not  subject  to any penalty  for  killing,  e.g. 
persons of  unsound mind and children. 
§ 5.  Homicide committed in self-defence was not visited 
with any liability to reparation or penalty.  It is true that 
in  the Codes  the exercise  of  the right  of  self-defence is 
not mentioned ; but there is mention even in the Codes of 
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facts which  excused  homicide,  and the references  in  the 
Anomalous Laws are too detailed to lead us to suppose that 
the idea of  self-defence was altogether a  new  growth.  In 
fact  they  expressly  credit  the  excuse  of  self-defence  to 
Hywel Dda. 
According  to the Anomalous Laws, every one in Wales 
was entitled, in the exercise of  this right, to cause just  as 
much harm in defence as the person attacking and defended 
against  was  in  the act  of  perpetrating.  To avoid  being 
killed, killing was  justifiable;  to protect property the thief 
could be killed.  In the words of  the laws : 
' If  a person injure another, whatsoever injury it may  be, 
if  in  defence by the one injured, and the effect be similar to 
what was  attempted to be  inflicted on  himself, he is not  to 
make any reparation by law, nor to suffer punishment on the 
part of  the lord. . . . Every one is at liberty to make a defence 
in a similar mode and cause as he is attempted to be injured.  .  . . If  a person, in the defence of  himself or his property, kill 
another, lie is not to make reparation, if  in  sincerity he  can 
prove it to be  true that in  defending himself  or his property 
he committed the deed.' 
9 6.  We find also in the laws and Codes constant references 
to  what  are  termed  ' lawful  disturbances '  (thrwyf  cyf- 
reithiawl).  Where  a  person  was  wrongfully  kept  out  of 
possession  of  his '  tref  tadawc ', it  is  said he could  enter 
upon it and commit one of  the three lawful  disturbances, 
viz.  breaking a  plough  on the land, burning  a house  and 
killing  a  person  thereon.  Not  all  the references  contain 
the latter;  the Codes  themselves  mention  only  the two 
former,  but  the  Anomalous  Laws  frequently include  the 
killing  of  a  man.  This,  though  sometimes  presented  as 
a  case  of  justifiable  homicide, was  not really so.  Some of 
the references distinctly say that killing is not lawful, and 
that  the effect  of  killing  in  a  ' lawful  disturbance ' was 
something quite different  from  justification.  Such killing 
entitled the person, who had so killed another, to plead, as 
a reason for extending the limitation within which he might 
sue to recover his ' tref  tadawc ', the fact that he had com- 
mitted the offence, not by proving the offence itself-for  the 
law regarded  that as iniquitous-but  by proving  that he 
X. 362 ; XI. 408. 
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had made reparation after conviction.  If  he proved  that, 
the period of  limitation was  extended or rather limitation 
ceased to run from that date, a date on which he had made 
an effective assertion of  his right.l 
5 7.  Homicide was excusable also sometimes according to 
the circumstances in which the killing was committed, and 
sometimes owing to the incapacity of  the slayer to under- 
stand his act or owing to his status.  The former did not 
involve the payment  of  blood-fine ; the latter did, but in 
neither case could any penalty be imposed by the King. 
Homicide excusable according to circumstances included 
lawful executions, slaying in revenge for blood-fine due and 
not paid after demand in three courts, the murder of  a hus- 
band's concubine by the injured wife, the slaying of  outlaws 
who had not surrendered to law or had returned in defiance 
of  an edict of  banishment, the killing of  traitors and ferocious 
men, and the killing of  thieves prowling  about the King's 
chamber at nighL2 
Some of  these acts were excused because of  the provoca- 
tion offered, others because the person killed was outlawed 
or infringing the law himself. 
Every one  of  these  excuses  is mentioned  in  the Codes, 
and some  of  them are indistinguishable in  principle  from 
killing in self-defence. 
$ 8.  The Welsh Laws also frequently state that persons 
suffering under  certain disabilities  could  not  be  punished 
for their  acts.  Children  under  the age  of  fourteen  and 
idiots are so mentioned ; but, though it is true that they 
could not be punished  for  killing, those who were respon- 
sible for them, their kinsfolk, were liable to pay the blood- 
fine of  persons killed by them.  One exception even to this 
liability is mentioned, viz. when a person became mad and 
bit another, so causing death.  In  that case, probably because 
it was beyond the reasonable limits of  control which could 
be  exercised, the kinsfolk  were  not responsible for  blood- 
fine.3 
'  V. C. 178 ; D. C. 548 ; V.  76, 90 ; IX. 276, 304 ;  XIV. 580, 690, 738. 
'V.C. 226,  254;  D.C. 452, 462,  600,  614;  G.C. 778,  794;  V.  64; 
X. 316 ;  XI. 406. 
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$ g.  We also find that the liability of  a married woman 
for acts done by her  is sometimes excused  on the ground 
that she was under the dominion of  her husband, hut there 
was no excuse for a woman, whether married or not, for an 
act of  homicide. 
$10.  Persons  exempt  from  pnnishment,  by virtue  of 
status, were the Icing, a priest,  and a minstrel.  This was 
a  personal  privilege,  and none  of  these persons  could  be 
executed whatever crime they committed. 
$11.  As  regards  accidental  homicide  the  laws  are  in 
some particulars at variance. 
The most  interesting passage  dealing with death caused 
accidentally is in the Xth Book, p. 382.  It says that there 
is one inadvertency (a~zodezh)  and two advertencies  (odeu). 
The standard rule in regard to inadvertent acts was that 
for every injury committed unwittingly redress was to be 
made wittingly,l and the illustration given as to what was 
an '  inadvertent act ' is illuminating. 
If  a person, it is said, cast a stone over a house or cast 
a  weapon,  and it fell upon  the head  of  another, honour- 
price was not to be paid, for there was no insult to honour 
intended, but if  death ensued blood-line was  because  there 
was loss occasioned. 
The two advertencies are referred  to as:  (I) in what  a 
person may do for the good of  another, though harm may 
come to another thereby ; and (2)  where a person endeavours 
to save the life of  another, and who from that act should 
die.  That is to say, if, in endeavouring to save one person 
the death  of  another were  accidentally  caused,  or  if  the 
person,  whose life it was intended to save, were killed by 
the  act intended to save, no reparation  was  to be made. 
The act was deliberate, but the intention was good, and the 
result was accidental. 
But if any one did anything with a design to harm, and 
death ensued, blood-fine was paid. 
The principle  laid  down in this passage  was  that death 
caused intentionally had to be  compensated for ; if  death 
were caused accidentally, it had to be compensated for if  the 
IV. 2. 
act were a negligent  one, but not if  the act causing death 
were intended to benefit the person killed or another person. 
$12.  The view that accidental killing, if  caused through 
negligence, involved the payment of  blood-fine is supported 
by other auth0rities.l 
We get the same illustration elsewhere, that if  any one 
threw a thing and it rebounded and killed a person, blood- 
fine, though  not  honour-price, was  to be paid ;  and it  is 
provided, also, that if  a man felled a tree and in falling it 
killed  a  man,  blood-fine  was  to be  paid,  subject  to the 
qilalification  that where there was contributory  negligence 
by the person  killed,  e.g. by disregarding a  warning,  the 
man who felled the tree was free. 
So, too, if  a person shot an arrow in the direction of  one 
man  and  the  arrow  transfixed  two,  honour-price  for  the 
insult  and blood-fine were  to be  paid  for  the  first  man, 
but  only blood-fine for  the second,  he being  killed  by an 
act, which in so far as he was concerned, was not intentional, 
but negligent and accidental. 
One passage,  however,  indicates that there could  be no 
blood-fine  payable  for  accidental  death,  unless  the  act 
causing death were directed against the individual killed.  If 
it were  directed  against  one  person, and another perished 
against whom it was not directed, it is indicated that blood- 
fine might not be payable. 
If, says  the passage,  a  person  frightened  another  and 
death ensued  from the fright, an inquiry was  to be  made 
as to what the fright arose from, and, if  it were found that 
it  arose  from  an act  done  to something other  than  the 
person who died, there was no redress, but if  from an act 
done to the man who died, blood-fine was paid. 
We have, perhaps, in this passage an attempt to absolve 
a person from responsibility for results remote from the act 
causing them. 
The  coilclusion  to  be  drawn  from  these  authorities  is 
that negligence involved the payment  of  blood-fine, if  the 
result were directly attributable to the negligent act, unless 
there had been contributory negligence by the other side. 
D. C. 598, IV. 34; V. 42-4,  56; VIII. 210. 96  ' GALANAS  '  PART  VI 
$ 13.  The full blood-fine was not necessarily  payable for 
every accidental death.  It was not, for example, so payable 
in all cases where the death was  caused by the negligent 
control of  property. 
The  Gwentian  Code  provides  that  one-third  blood-fine 
was payable by the owner of  a weapon with whichmurder 
was  committed,  though  the  owner  was  guiltless  of  the 
death. 
The principle  was  that a  person  was  responsible  so to 
keep and guard his property that it did not cause death to 
another;  but, if  the act which  brought  the property into 
contact with the person  killed  thereby was not the act of 
the owner, the owner was not necessarily liable for the full 
reparation. 
We  have  another  illustration  of  this  rule  in  the  two 
Southern  Codes.  All  free  Welshmen  carried  spears,  but 
when  they  entered  the precincts  of  a court  they had to 
place their spears in '  lawful rest ' ; that is, the butt of  the 
spear had to be  so deeply  thrust into the ground that it 
could hardly be moved by both hands, or its point had to 
be buried in a  bush completely hiding it, or  it had to be 
placed  on top of  a bush as high as a man.  If  it were not 
placed in '  lawful rest ' and a man were accidentally killed 
by coming  into contact with it, the owner  paid  one-third 
blood-fine.l 
$14.  The  laws  are  at variance  apparently  as  to the 
liability of  a person for death caused by his animals. 
The original rule was that the owner was responsible for 
such  death, if  he  admitted  the animal  was  his,  and he 
could either resign  the animal or pay blood-fine.  At  any 
rate this was  the def  nite  rule  in respect  of  death caused 
by swine, but the Anomalous Laws say that blood-fine was 
not to be paid for the death caused by any animal or a mad 
dog, though the animal itself was to be surrendered to the 
King.2 
  here are in many early laws traces of  the execution  of 
animals for acts committed by them, and it is possible that 
D. C. 440 ; G. C. 784, 792. 
D. C. 576, 600 ; G. C. 718 ; IV. 46 ; VIII. 210 ; XIV. 624. 
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we  have in this rule of  surrender  of  the offending animal 
survivals of  a similar rule in more ancient Welsh society. 
$ 15. The law of  fire imposes  very strict restrictions on 
the manner in which it could be used.  This was due to the 
fact that  houses  were  made  of  wood,  and so  highly  in- 
flammable.  Negligent  use of  fire entailed the payment  of 
compensation  for  most  property  burnt  in  consequence : 
but this liability did not extend to the payment of  blood- 
fine for  a  person  killed  by  accidental  fires.  If, however, 
a  person  were  burnt  in  a  house  deliberately ignited,  the 
burner was liable for his blood-fine.  In the words  of  tile 
law, ' Galanas does  not  follow  fire,  but the hand  of  him 
who  burns.'  This is a  striking instance  of  the limitation 
of  responsibility,  in  case  of  negligence  or  accident,  to 
approximate resu1ts.l 
$ IG. We have already noticed that the law provided that 
death caused  by  an act  intended to save life was  not  to 
be  compensated  for.  With  grim  humour,  however,  it is 
laid  down that this did  not  protect  a  medical  man under 
whose  harids  a  patient  dicd.  The life  of  the doctor was 
not easy, for he was liable to make reparation if  his patient 
died, unless he had taken an indemnity beforehand." 
$17.  For murder or culpable homicide there was not only 
reparation  but punishment,  i.e. it was  a  crime as well  as 
a  tort.  Murder  was  divided  into two classes,  aggravated 
killing and non-aggravated killing. 
In the former was included waylaying or secret, planned, 
and concealed murder.  It is said not to include killing on 
a road or  other place without  preparation, hiding or con- 
ceal~nent,  but  if  a  person  were  killed  on  the  road  and 
taken or  dragged five  paces  out of  the road, i.e. 15 feet, 
or  killed  in  some  place  and  concealed,  that  constituted 
waylaying. 
Aggravated murder also included killing by secret means 
or  privily  by night,  killing  with  savage violence,  and by 
poison. 
Murder might also be aggravated by reason of  the status 
of the victim, e. g. the ' pencenedl '. 
V. C. 260 ; G. C.  688.  V. 56. 
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Non-aggravated  deliberate  killing  may  be  taken  to be 
ordinary open and sudden homicide, including what English 
Law calls manslaughter, in which the element of  guilt was 
not so pronounced as in wilful murder. 
This division into aggravated and non-aggravated murder 
is not  explicit in the Codes : it is, however, a  distinction 
deducible from the penalties accruing, and if  we do not bear 
it in mind we  will  be faced by apparent contradictions in 
the 1aw.l 
3. The levy  of  blood-Jine. 
(i) Introductory. 
$ I. We come now to the important question as to who 
paid the blood-fine of  a person killed. 
The broad  general  rule was  that, wherever  a  man was 
killed and blood-fine became due, it was paid by the relatives 
of  the slayer  to the relatives of  the slain, that is by and 
to people related  to the offender  or  victim in  ' galanas- 
degrees '  .2 
It mattered  not  whether  there  was  a  criminal penalty 
attached to the killing  or  not, the payment  of  blood-fine 
had always to be made, except where the ltilling was justified 
or excused by the circumstances. 
$ 2. The principles of the levy and distribution of  blood- 
fine are at first sight extraordinarily  complicated, and we 
can sympathize with the moan of  one of  the commentators 
who says that one  of  the three complexities of  the law is 
the sharing of  ' galanas ', ' for  it is difficult  to remember 
and redilce to rule '. 
This complexity is a very real one, especially so because 
the authorities are not uniform in all details. 
The language is  oftentimes involved, and, whenever  the 
commentators have tried to elucidate the system, they have 
only made matters more involved. 
Still, with  all  the apparent complexity, it is possible  to 
deduce the main principles, and, when we do so, the system 
takes upon  itself  a  comparatively understandable  appear- 
ance. 
V. C.  230;  D. C. 412,  436, 550,  594; IV. 22 ; X. 306-8;  XI. 404-8 
XIV. 628.  D. C. 408. 
$3. Let  us  at the very  beginning  rid  ourselves  of  the 
idea that the '  galanas-kin ' was  an organized body termed 
the '  cenedl'.  It was nothing of  the sort.  Each man had 
his own '  galanas-kin ', which could correspond with no one 
else's except his own full brother's.  A man's ' galanas-kin ', 
as already stated, was the body of  people related to him, 
both on the male and female side, in seven degrees. 
(ii) The murderer's share. 
$ I. The levy of  blood-fine was divided into two portions, 
the first being one-third of  the total, commonly denominated 
the '  murderer's  share ', the second being  two-thirds,  and 
spoken of  as the ' kinsmen's  share '.  That is the universal 
rule in all the Codes.  There is some variation  as to who 
contributed to the murderer's share.  All authorities agree 
that  the murderer,  his  father  and mother  did,  but they 
differ as to the apportionment inter se. 
Some  include  the brothers and sisters of  the murderer 
as contributories to this share, and some also include the 
children of  the murderer. 
$2. The oldest MS. states that the murderer's  share was 
subdivided into three portions ; the murderer paying one- 
third thereof  or one-ninth the whole blood-fine, his mother 
and father paying  one-third  in  the proportions  of  one  to 
two,  and his brothers and sisters the remaining  one-third 
in Iilie proportions, two shares by the brothers,  one share 
by the sisters, meaning thereby not that, if  there were three 
brothers  and  one  sister,  the  three  brothers  contributed 
two-thirds and the sister  one-third, but that each brother 
contributed twice as much as each sister. 
The children  of  the murderer  are not  included  by  this 
authority among the contributories. 
It proceeds  to say, and this  is  of  great  importance  as 
showing that the debt did not die with the murderer, that, 
if the murderer were dead, his share was made up half  by 
the father and mother  in the same proportions of  two to 
one inter se, and half by the brothers and sisters ; that, if 
the murderer alone were alive, he paid the whole murderer's 
share ; and, if  only some of  the contributors to this share 
existed, those existing were responsible for the share which 
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would have been assessed on the non-existing  person, had 
he existed, in the same proportions as were laid down for 
each one's original contribution. 
Thus,  supposing  the family  consisted  of  the murderer, 
his father, his mother, and onc brother and one sister, whose 
original  contributions to the murderer's share would have 
been  one-third,  two-ninths,  one-ninth,  two-ninths,  and 
one-ninth respectively ; then, if  the mother were dead, the 
murderer  would  pay  his own  one-third,  plus  one-third  of 
his mother's one-ninth, the father would pay his own two- 
ninths, plus  one-third  of  his  wife's  one-ninth,  the brother 
would pay his own two-ninths, plus two-thirds of  one-third 
of  his mother's one-ninth, and the sister her own one-ninth, 
plus  one-third  of  her  mother's  one-ninth ; or,  in  other 
words,  the  murderer's  share,  in  this  particular  case, 
would be  divided into 81  portions, of  which the murderer 
would pay 30, the father 21,  the brother 20, and the sister 10, 
as  against  the figures  murderer  27,  father  18,  mother  g, 
brother  18,  sister  g, payable if  the mother had been alive 
as well. 
The rule,  as we  see  from  this,  was  that a  woman  was 
grouped with her corresponding male relative and paid half 
of  what  he  did, and this rule runs through  every rule  of 
assessment in the other authorities. 
§ 3.  A similar rule as to the murderer's  share is given in 
the Dimetian  Code,  which  likewise includes  brothers  and 
sisters in, and expressly excludes children froni, the list of 
contributories.  No  lineal  descendant,  it  is  clearly  and 
emphatically stated, of  the murderer paid towards a blood- 
fine. 
3 4. The Venedotian Code, while in one passage asserting 
that the son of a murderer paid no share of  blood-fine, as 
the relationship of  the son to the father could not be fixed 
-though  a  father paid  a  share for  murder  by  his  son- 
in  another  passage  says  that  the  murderer's  share  was 
payable  as to two-thirds by  himself,  and as  to one-third 
by the father and mother in the proportions of  two to one. 
It further says that if  the murderer  had children  of  age, 
they  paid  one-third  of  their  father's  two-thirds,  the  son 
paying  twice  what  the  daughter  did.  It excludes  from 
mention the brothers and sisters altogether as contributories 
to the murderer's share. 
fj  5.  In another passage the Venedotian Code states that 
the Law of  Hywel Dda, still observed by some judges, was 
that the murderer's  share was  paid  by the murderer,  the 
father, mother, brothers, and sisters, the murderer paying 
eight shares, the father four, the mother  and brother two 
each, and the sister one, each with his or her offspring, the 
murderer paying as much as his two sons would do.  This 
Code,  it may be  added, like the Dimetian Code, included 
children of a murdered man among the recipients of  blood- 
fine. 
$6. The Gwentian  Code appears to be  silent  as to the 
apportionment  of  the  murderer's  share,  but  Titus  D.  I1 
and the Dimetian Code are supported by the IVth Book, in 
so far  as to include  brothers  and sisters  among the con- 
tributories.  That authority, besides including brothers and 
sisters,  included  the children  of  the murderer, and, after 
dividing the murderer's  one-third share of  the whole blood- 
fine into  63  shares,  made  the murderer  and his  children 
responsible for 21  in the shares of  14 and 7, the father and 
mother  for 21 in like shares, and the brothers and sisters 
for 21. 
$ 7.  We see, therefore, conflict between the authorities, 
first as to whether the liability to contribute descended to 
lineal descendants of  the murderer, secondly as to whether 
the brothers and sisters contributed to the murderer's share 
or were included as contributories to the kinsmen's  share, 
and thirdly as to whether the murderer paid two-thirds or 
one-third of  the murderer's share.= 
(iii) The kinsmen's share. 
$ I.  With reference to the kinsmen's  share-two-thirds  of 
the  whole  blood-fine-there  is  agreement  that two-thirds 
thereof  was  payable by the murderer's  paternal kinsmen, 
and one-third by the mother's kinsmen. 
There is, however, divergence on two points : (a) whether 
V. C.  220,  222,  224,  226,  228,  230,  232,  234,  D.  C.  408,  410; G. C. 
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brothers  and  sisters  were  included  in the list of  contri- 
butories,  and  (b) whether  sixth or  only fifth cousins were 
included among the contributing kinsmen. 
§ 2.  The common recognized rule followed in computing 
degrees of  relationship is to count upwards from and includ- 
ing  the person  whose  relations  it is  desired  to ascertain, 
generation by generation, up to and including the common 
ancestor,  hence  second  cousins  being  descended  from  a 
common  great-grandfather,  are  related  to  each  other  in 
the fourth degree, third cousins in the fifth degree, and so on. 
Another  method  adopted  is  to  ascend  generation  by 
generation from the person whose relations it is desired to 
ascertain  and,  having  reached  the  common  ancestor,  to 
continue counting downwards until the relation is reached. 
By this method  a  second  cousin  would  be  in the seventh 
degree,  and a  second  cousin  once  removed  in the eighth 
degree. 
Yet  another  method  is  similar  to the first  and second 
methods, except that the counting begins from the father of 
the person  whose relations it is desired to ascertain.  This 
method, as compared with the others, makes a difference of 
one or two degrees. 
In the Welsh Laws the second method is never adopted : 
the first is almost universally used,  the third in some rare 
instances, and the computation is  always made from  the 
murderer  or the murdered man as the case might be.  In 
folk-tales,  however,  Prof.  Rhys  indicates  that  at  times 
a combination of  the second and third is used. 
The differences that exist  in  stating where  the seventh 
degree ends in  the Welsh  Laws is sometimes attributable 
to the different method of  computation adopted. 
However, what we  are particularly  concerned with now 
is that descendants  of  any surviving person  in  a  definite 
degree  to the murderer  were  assessed  not  separately  but 
as part of the stock of  the living ascendant ; thus grandsons 
of  a person related  to the murderer in the fifth degree,  if 
their grandfather were alive, would pay a share of  a stock 
in  the fifth degree, if  the grandfather and father were dead 
they would pay as relatives in the seventh degree. 
5 3.  The oldest MS.  of  all says that the ltin's two-third 
share  was  payable  two-thirds  by  the  paternal  kinsmen, 
one-third  by the  maternal  up  to the  fifth  cousin,  but 
not  including  the  son  of  the  fifth  cousin,  each  grade 
paying  double what the grade below  paid,  males  in  each 
grade paying twice as much as females, repeating once more 
that brothers and sisters contributed not to the kinsmen's 
share, but to the murderer's share. 
The  Venedotian  Code,  as we  have already  noticed,  in- 
cluded brothers and sisters among the contributories to thc 
kinsmen's share, having excluded them from the murderer's 
share, and it imposed one-third of  the kinsmen's  share on 
the descendants of  every female ancestress up to the great- 
great - great - great - great - grandmother,  that  is  on  sixth 
cousins.  It provides further that, where any degree could 
not be traced, the amount, which would have fallen on the 
unascertained female kin, was to be paid for by the remain- 
ing female-ki11.l 
$4. The Dimetian Code is difficult to follow.  It states 
that there were nine grades of  relationship, viz. the father 
and mother, the grandfather, the great-grandfather, brothers 
and sisters, cousins, second, third, fourth, and fifthcousins. 
Though the reason of  this grading is difficult to follow, it is 
quite clear that, in computing degrees, the common ancestor 
and  the murderer  were  both  included,  so  a  sixth  cousin 
was not in the ' galanas-kin '.  Elsewhere the Code expressly 
says a fifth cousin pays blood-fine and a sixth does not. 
The first  passage  says  that each  grade  paid  twice  as 
much as the grade below it, and the inference is that, though 
fathers and mothers,  brothers  and sisters  contributed  to 
the murderer's share, they also contributed to the kinsmen's 
share.  This cannot possibly  be the intent of  the law, for, 
if it is, it means that the father and mother between them 
paid more than the murderer did, and likewise the brothers 
and sisters did, a most improbable conclusion. 
We  appear to have recognized  here, what  we  have not 
elsewhere, the possibility  of  an ascendant, other than the 
father, being alive when murder was committed, and being 
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responsible to pay a separate share from the share payable 
by his living descendants, that is that assessment was  on 
individuals and not on stocks. 
This is in  express contradiction to what follows, for the 
Code  says that  collateral  members  are included  in  each 
grade.  The word  '  collateral ' in  the Welsh  Laws  means 
relations other than lineal descendants or direct ascendants, 
so  a  brother  of  the murderer's  grandfather  would  be  a 
collateral of  the murderer, and, though a descendant of  the 
murderer's  great-grandfather,  he  would  not  be  assessed 
separately,  but  as  a  member  of  his  ascendant's  stock, 
paying a portion of  the amount levied on that stock.l 
9 5.  The  Anomalous  Laws  give  two  lists  of  the  con- 
tributories to the kinsmen's  share.  In the first only cousins 
are included down to the sixth cousin, the first cousin paying 
twice what the second cousin did, and so on ; and the father, 
brothers, and sisters, who were included in the contributories 
to the murderer's share, are excluded. 
In the second list, brothers are included in the contribu- 
tories,  the ultimate contributor  being  the fifth  cousin, the 
brother paying double what the first cousin did, and so on. 
With this the Gwentian Code agrees." 
§ 6.  It is impossible to reconcile these divergent versions, 
but it seems  as if  Titus D.  11. contains the original law. 
What frequently strikes one in the different versions of  the 
laws  is  that the ancient  Welsh  were  not  mathematicians. 
Over and over again when they try to divide and multiply 
and deal in fractions they come to grief.  They are capable 
of  laying  down  with  extraordinary  clarity a  broad  legal 
principle,  but  as  soon  as  a  mathematical  calculation  is 
required  they get  into trouble.  We have to bear  this in 
mind and try therefore to get back to general principles. 
If  we  do that we  can, I think, determine what the real 
rules of  apportionment were. 
(iv) General rules of  levy. 
§ I. These general rules appear to be as follows : 
(a)  The blood-fine  was  divided  into a  murderer's  one- 
third share and a kinsmen's two-thirds share. 
D. C. 410. 596.  % CC.  700-2  ; IV. 20 ; X. 314 
(b)  The contributories to the murderer's  share were, the 
murderer  himself  paying one-third thereof, his father and 
mother paying one-third in the proportion  of  two to one, 
his  brothers  and  sisters  paying  one-third,  each  brother 
paying double what each sister paid. 
(c)  Wherever any class of  contributory to the murderer's 
share was  missing,  the  survivors within  the list  of  con- 
tributories p~id  for him or her in the same proportions as 
they paid for the original contribution. 
(d) The children of the murderer did not contribute. 
(e)  The  kinsmen's share was payable two-thirds by paternal 
kinsmen  and one-third  by  the maternal  kinsmen.  If the 
father-kin  or  mother-kin  failed,  the  other  kin  was  not 
responsible to make good the deficiency. 
(f) The paternal kinsmen consisted of  : 
(I)  The grandfather and his lineal descendants, other 
than the father. 
(2) The great-grandfather  and his lineal  descendants, 
other than the grandfather and his stock. 
(3) The great-great-grandfather and his lineal  descen- 
dants, other than (2) and (I). 
(4) The  great-great-great-grandfather  and  his  lineal 
descendants, other than (3), (2)) and (I). 
(5) The  great-great-great-great-grandfather  and  his 
lineal  descendants,  other  than  (4),  (3),  (z), 
and (I). 
(g)  Each of  these five stocks, as a  stock, paid twice as 
much as the stock below it, and if  any stock were missing, 
the remaining stocks paid for it in the same proportion. 
(h) Within the stock itself, liability to contribute did not 
descend to a lower generation; thus, so long as the great- 
grandfather was  alive a  separate liability did not descend 
to the great-grandfather's  sons other than the grandfather. 
Descendants in the lifetime of an ascendant paid a quota 
to the ascendant's  liability,  that is,  so  long  as the pre- 
positus  of  a  stock was  alive  the quota were  assessed  per 
stirpes and not per capita.  When, however, the prepositus 
of  a  stock  was  dead, each  lineal  descendant  in the next 
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(i) In every grade a female, subject to the limitations to 
be  noted  hereafter,  paid  one-half  what  a  corresponding 
male paid. 
(j) Mutatis mutandis, the apportionment of  the maternal 
kindred's share followed the same rules. 
$2. We  must  not, however,  forget  the modification  of 
these rules provided in Titus D. 11, p. 232, where the mur- 
derer committed  murder  in territory of  which  he was  not 
a native. 
That  authority  says  that  if  an  innate  ' boneddig '  of 
Powys  had  settled  in  Gwynedd  or  vice  versa,  and  had 
become subject to a blood-fine within the dominion where 
he had settled, the body of  his kinsmen being in the ancestral 
country, all the relatives he might have within the dominion 
of  residence were collected together.  The murderer and his 
children and his father  and mother were then mulcted  in 
one-third,  and the remaining two-thirds  was levied, appa- 
rently per  capita, on  the whole  of  the  relatives  residing 
in  that  dominion,  without  distinction  of  paternal  and 
maternal kin. 
$ 3.  It is probable, too, that in actual practice the strict 
refinements  of  the law  were  not  adhered  to,  and that a 
murderer and his near relations contributed all they possessed 
and  then  indented  on  their  various  relatives  up  to the 
seventh degree for the balance, the mathematical calcula- 
tions of  the law being an attempt to describe how  among 
relatives  a  blood-fine should be  levied,  so that particular 
individuals should not be pressed unduly. 
4.  Distribution of  blood-jines. 
$ I. We may now turn to the ordinary rules of  distribution 
of  a blood-fine among the relatives of  a murdered man. 
The broad rule was that it was to be distributed among 
the relativcs of  the person  murdered  in  the  same  shares 
as they  would have  contributed  to  a  blood-fine due  by 
them. 
$ 2.  Before proceeding further we  must notice two points. 
The first is that before distribution the lord was entitled to 
deduct one-third  as his  exacting  share, leaving  only  two- 
thirds of  the original blood-fine to go to the kindred.  We 
have in this the inception of  the idea of  a breach of  the lord's 
peace, and the beginnings  of  the fine by the State for  an 
offence. 
5 3.  The second is that there was  an increment  to this 
blood-fine in respect of  insult done to a corpse. 
We have seen in dealing with insult  that, when  a  man 
was  killed, the insult to the honour  of  the dead man had 
to be  compensated  for  in addition  to the blood-fine.  It 
was the first payment which had to be made. This honour- 
price was payable, according to the best authorities, by the 
murderer and his relatives in four degrees, and not by the 
whole '  galanas-kin '. 
How was it  distributed ?  The murdered man to whom 
the honour-price was personally due was dead : hence who 
was entitled to it ?  The authorities are at variance on this. 
It is generally agreed that one-third went to the widow, if 
there were  one, and the remaining two-thirds,  or, if  there 
were no widow, all, to the relatives. 
Some authorities, however,  say that only relations  con- 
nected  within  four degrees were entitled to it, and others 
assert that it was attached to the corpus of  the blood-fine 
and distributed with it among the whole '  galanas-kin '.l 
$ 4.  Even on the question of  the lord's  exacting  third 
there is some ambiguity. 
In one passage the Venedotian Code appears to give one- 
third  of  the  murderer's  share  only,  i.e.  one-ninth of  the 
whole,  to the lord.  The language is  ambiguous, and the 
other authorities leave no doubt that the lord got a full third 
share when he was called in to exact.  We must not, how- 
ever, omit a reference in the VIth Book to the payment of 
two-thirds  to the lord  and one-third  to the ' uchelwr's ' 
when an ' uchelwr's ' man was killed.2 
§ 5.  In the distribution  of  blood-fine  we  have  exactly 
the same variations as we  found existing in regard to the 
apportionment of  the levy. 
Titus D. 11.  at one place says one-third of  one-third went 
to the father and mother, and one-third of  one-third to the 
'  V. C. 230-2  ; D. C.  408;  G. C.  634,  746 
V. C.  226-8,  230-2  ; D. C.  510; G. C.  694,  780 ;  VI. 100 ;  X. 328, 
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brothers and sisters, being silent as to the other one-third 
of  one-third and the two-thirds or kinsmen's share. 
Elsewhere it is very clear, and, after assigning one-third 
of  the whole to the lord as his exacting share, it provides 
that the remaining two-thirds was to be divided into three 
shares, one of which went to the father, mother, brothers, 
and sisters, and two to the kinsmen  (two-thirds thereof  to 
the paternal kin and one-third to the maternal kin), leaving 
it to the kinsmen  to divide inter se  as they thought fit up 
to the seventh degree. 
The Venedotian Code assigns, in one passage, one-third of 
one-third  to the lord, and two-thirds  of  one-third  to the 
father, mother,  and their  children,  and then  proceeds  to 
say two shares of  that two-thirds went  to the father, one 
share to the mother, and two shares to the children, some 
MSS. adding, '  to the children of  the murdered man '.  The 
texts are clearly corrupt here. 
The remaining two-thirds are allotted, one-third  to the 
mother-kin and two-thirds to the father-kin, without describ- 
ing how the share was divided inter se among the kinsmen. 
Elsewhere  it states  that  the  father,  mother,  brothers, 
sisters,  and their  offspring  (not the murdered  man's  off- 
spring)  obtained  one-third  of  the  blood-fine,  but  in  this 
passage there is no reference to the remaining one-third. 
The Dimetian Code provides that one-third of  the 'galanas ' 
was to go to the father, mother, brothers, and sisters, and 
the remaining one-third was distributed as in the Venedotian 
Code up to the fifth cousin, each grade receiving twice as 
much  as the grade  below.  It specifically  provides  that 
children of  the murdered man had no share in the ' galanas ', 
and it is silent as to the lord's exacting share, but provides 
for it elsewhere. 
In Domesday it is definitely said the King gets one-third.' 
5.  Miscellaneous  provisions  in tlze  levy  and  distribution  of 
blood-Jine. 
(i) Exemptions. 
In  the  levy  of  blood-fine,  idiots,  dumb  persons,  and 
minstrels  were  excluded  from  contribution,  and  likewise 
V.  C. 224-6, 230-2 ; D.  C.  408;  Domesday, s.n. Hereford. 
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they were  excluded  from  all  participation  in  blood-fines 
received. 
Clerics were also excluded, unless they had children. 
Women, as we have noted, were liable to contribute, but 
the rule was subject to two very important modifications 
Widows could receive no share of  their husband's  blood- 
fine, and no woman  could receive a share or was liable to 
contribute  if  she  were  childless,  past  the  age  of  child- 
bearing  (54),  and  swore  she  was  unlikely  to  have  any 
children ; that is to say a woman was liable not for herself, 
but  for  her  children, she  acting  as a conduit to pass the 
rights or liabilities on to her existing or possible children.' 
(ii) Miscellaneous. 
\Ve  must note also that where  a woman was murdered, 
blood-fine  due for her  was  payable  not  to her  husband's 
kinsmen, but to her own kinsmen ; that, according to the 
Gwentian  Code,  where  a  man was  commended  the ' pen- 
cenedl ' got  a  special  share, the  amount  of  which  is  not 
indicated, for a man of  kin to him, the father also receiving 
a penny, and an ' uchelwr ' got three or six kine for a free- 
man with him, if  killed. 
We  should  note,  too, that if  any of  the  kinsmen  were 
absent or too poor  to pay, the VIIIth Book  allowed the 
murderer  to pay his  amount, and recover  the same from 
the person responsible by an action for contribution, when- 
ever the latter returned or acquired pr~perty.~ 
6. Additional powers  of  levy. 
(i) The spear-penny or ' ceiniog baladr '. 
It might, and no doubt did, sometimes happen that the 
whole of  the blood-fine was irrecoverable from the kinsmen 
in the seventh degree.  At the best of  times the amount to 
be levied was considerable, and the kinsmen might be poor 
or  limited  in  numbers.  In that case  the  law  gave  the 
murderer two other modes of  raising the balance, the first 
of which was the levy of  the '  ceiniog baladr '. 
This could be levied from anybody related to the murderer 
in the eighth and ninth degrees. 
' V  C.  98,  206,  224, 226, 228,  232-4; D.  C.  410-12,  598; G.  C  702, 
780; X. 328. 
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When  this  additional  assistance  was  needed  by  the 
murderer  to make  up the blood-fine, he was  to proceed 
with the lord's servant, carrying a relic with him, and, should 
they meet any person said by the murderer to be related in 
those degrees to him, the murderer  demanded, by placing 
a cross in front of  him, the contribution of  a spear-penny. 
The person accosted had to pay or give a pledge or surety 
for payment, unless he swore on the relic that he was not 
descended  from  any ancestor common to himself  and the 
murderer. 
The '  ceiniog baladr ' could  not  be  levied  on women or 
clerics because they did not carry a spear, but, if  a woman 
killed a man, she was entitled to demand this aid. 
The levy of  a  spear-penny  had to be completed  within 
a year and a day, and could not be demanded subsequently, 
while the right to participate in the sharing of  a blood-fine 
did not accrue to any one liable to pay the spear-penny.' 
(ii) Blood-land. 
The power  to raise  funds to meet  a  blood-fine did not 
end here.  If  a man found, after exacting spear-money, that 
he was  still short  of  the sum needed,  he  could  then  fall 
back upon his interest in '  tir gwelyauc ' or other land. 
This was  one of  the lawful  necessities for which  a man 
could  alienate  ancestral  land,  but it would  seem  that it 
was  not  so much  a  right to sell as a  right to deliver  the 
land over to the relatives of  the murdered man. 
The  Venedotian  Code  says  that land  so  delivered  was 
designated blood-land  (waed-tir), and it seems that for the 
resignation of  land as '  waed-tir '  the consent of  all members 
of  the family  holding  jointly  was  necessary.  That land 
once resigned was irrecoverable, ' for peace was brought to 
the sons thereby as well as to the father.' 
It may be mentioned  that, though the person  resigning 
might become landless, he did not lose his status as a free- 
man, and that the land surrendered was divided, according 
to the Venedotian Code, among the kinsmen of  the murdered 
man as if  it were a blood-fine. 
Apparently it was thought by some that '  waed-tir ' was 
V. C.  98,  102,  224-6,  234; 6.  C.  702-4 ; V.  64  ; VI.  116  ; X.  328. 
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land on account of  which a person was killed, which, after 
his murder, went to his sons ; but the Codes repudiate that 
and assert that it was land surrendered to make up a blood- 
fine when all other sources had failed.  The idea that it was 
land on account of  which a man was killed survived in the 
Anomalous Laws, which assigned such land to the children 
of the murdered man. 
The Dimetian Code also permits the surrender of  land on 
the  failure  of  spear-money  to  meet  the blood-fine,  and 
allows  a  '  priodawr ' to surrender  without  his  son's  per- 
~nission. 
The Gwentian Code also refers to the power, and tells us 
that, where land was so surrendered, the revenue or 'geld' 
thereon  was  payable  by  the murderer,  as the land went 
free to the other side, but no crops were to be grown on such 
land,  except  clover,  vetches,  and thistles,  and the value 
of  a  cow  grazed  thereon  deteriorated.  The land carried 
a blood taint with it. 
Should the murderer afterwards become an officer of  the 
Court, and, as such, free from liability to pay '  geld ', the 
'  geld ' was recoverable from the land. 
A peculiar reference to ' waed-tir  is made in the Anoma- 
lous Laws.  It is there indicated that if  a man killed a person 
in revenge for the loss of  one of  his maternal kin, and in 
consequence had to surrender  his own land as '  waed-tir ', 
he  could  claim  land from  his  mother's  kinsmen,  proving 
in a claim therefor not the murder itself-for  a man could 
never  plead  his  own  crime-but  the  suit  for  ' galanas ' 
imposing upon him the penalty to pay.' 
(iii) ' Cyfarch cyfyll.' 
§ I. It  is obvious from what has been said that the recollec- 
tion of relationship was of  primary importance among Welsh 
people ; the land laws made it equally necessary, and this 
explains the great importance paid in Wales to genealogies. 
But, notwithstanding the importance of  such  recollection, 
it is clear that, under this far-extended communal liability, 
questions must arise at times as to whether, as a matter of 
'  V. C. 176-8  ; D.  C.  604  ; G.  C.  794 ; IX.  266,  304 ; X.  330 ; XI. 422 ; 
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fact, a particular person was or was not related in '  galanas ' 
degrees  to another.  To determine  this  question  a  pro- 
cedure is laid down for inquiry into the matter and deter- 
mination  of  the  question.  This  inquiry  was  known  as 
'  cyfarch cyfyll ', or inquiry as to stock, the very existence 
of  which  is  almost sufficient to dispose  of  the contention 
that Wales was divided into ' cenhedloedd ' of  men related 
to each other in fixed degrees. 
$2. An  interesting  comment  on  the  meaning  of  this 
phrase occurs in the Anomalous Laws, IV. 18-20  : 
' Some say ', says the passage, '  that "  cyfarch cyfyll" relates 
to a person divested of  everything (i.  e. a claim to land by ach 
ac edryf) ; others say it implies an oak cut down without per- 
mission on the "  tref tadawc "  of  a "  proidawr ",  and over which a 
mantle is spread to conceal it, lest it be seen and become a dis- 
grace to the "tref tadawc "  by being thus seen. The real meaning 
is this, that when  a relative refuses  the  murderer his  share 
of  "  galanas ", asking, " Whence is the stock in which  I am 
related to thee ? " it is necessary for the murderer to explain 
to him in what way he  is related, and to his having common 
relatives enough to testify to the truth of  his assertion, because 
common  relatives  are  proper  evidences  in  such  a  case,  for 
strangers are neither to connect  a person  with kinsmen, nor 
to separate him from kinsmen.' 
The meaning of  the hazard that '  cyfarch cyfyll ' related 
to an oak is inexplicable.  However, the real meaning  of 
the phrase in Welsh Law is clear. 
Affinity  was  proved  by the oath of the murderer,  sup- 
ported by common relatives, after the murderer had sought 
a  contribution  by placing  a  cross  in  front  of  his relative 
and had been refused he1p.l 
7.  The ~nu~der  of relatives. 
§ I.  In his '  Tribal System in Wales ', Dr. Seebohm has 
urged that there was in ancient Wales a rule that the law 
of ' galanas ' did not operate within the limits of  the ' cen- 
hedloedd ', composed of  relatives in fixed degrees. 
This contention will  be  found in  his ' Tribal System in 
Wales ', pp.  104-5,  and in  his '  Tribal Custom  in  Anglo- 
Saxon Law ', in the latter of  which he sums up as follows : 
' A  murder  within  the  wider  kindred  was  regarded  as  a 
family matter.  The murderer was  too near  of  blood  to be 
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slain.  No  atonement could be made for so unnatural a crime. 
There was  no  blood  fine  or "  galanas " within the  kindred. 
The murderer must be  exiled.' 
He supports the argument by comparative references  to 
other systems of  law. 
Fj  2.  As already explained, the view here taken is that the 
term '  cenedl ' does not  connote an  orgngzixed  community 
limited by degrees of  relationship, but that '  cenedl ' means 
a  tribe unlimited by degrees, and also those bodies of  men 
related to every individual in varying degrees of  relationship. 
Applied  to the law  of  homicide,  the view  taken here is 
that killing a kinsman was as much a tort as killing a non- 
kinsman.  Such tort had to be paid  for, but inasmuch as, 
in  the law  of  homicide, where  a  near  relative was  killed, 
the men who would have to contribute to a blood-fine would 
be the same as the persons entitled to receive it to a large 
extent, the law provided that compensation had to be paid 
to the relatives  of  the slain  by the murderer  alone.  He 
could not ask his relatives to pay themselves the blood-fine. 
It is maintained that the Welsh Laws establish that where 
a man  killed  his own brother or perhaps a relative of  his 
own  '  gwely ', he  himself  paid  the  full  blood-fine,  or  so 
much  as he was  able, to the relatives of  the person  slain, 
and that the Welsh Law does not establish or support the 
contention  that  there  was  any  kindred  system  limited 
by degrees  within  which  murder was  not  to be  compen- 
sated for. 
The point is of  importance, and we have to examine the 
Welsh authorities, as well as the alleged support from out- 
side, with care. 
§ 3.  As regards the Welsh Laws, neither the Venedotian 
nor the Dimetian Code has anything in them in the remotest 
way suggesting support to Dr. Seebohm's view.  The only 
reference to the Codes used by Dr. Seebohm is drawn from 
the  Triads  attached  to  the  Gwentian  Code,  G. C.  790, 
admittedly a late addition.  That reference runs : 
' Three  persons  hated  by  a " cenedl " . . . a person  who 
shall  kill  another  of  his  own  " cenedl " ;  since  the  living 
relative is not killed for the sake of  the dead kin, every one 
will hate to see him.' 
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This Triad is reproduced in the Triads of  Dyfnwal Moelmud 
with a very important difference : 
' Three objects of  detestation to a " cenedl " . . . one who 
shall kill a person of  his own "  cenedl ".' 
The Triad proceeds to say the persons hated are to be 
proclaimed,  and makes no mention of  the murderer  being 
freed from liability to pay blood-fine. 
In what appears to be an excerpt from the substantive 
part  of  the  Gwentian  Code,  p.  774,  the  rule  is  stated 
differently : 
' Whoever  shall kill  his  brother  (brawd), because  he  will 
not  share " tref  tadawc " with  him, with  such  a slayer  the 
"  cenedl "  is not to pay "  galanas ", but he is to pay "  galanas " 
to  the  relatives, and let  him  forfeit  the " tref  tadawc"  for 
ever.' 
The rule  is  stated in  similar  terms  in  the XIVth Book, 
p. 656 : 
' Three cases where the " cenedl " pays not "  galanas" with 
a relative ; where a man murders his brother because he will 
not share the " tref  y tad " with him. . . .' 
The  last-mentioned  authorities give  a  totally  different 
complexion  to the rule.  They  do  not  exempt  any  one 
from liability for murder within the ' galanas-kin ' ; they 
merely  assert that where a  man killed  his brother, whose 
'  galanas-kin ' must of  necessity be identical with his own, 
he  cannot  ask  the assistance  of  his  kinsmen  to pay  the 
blood-fine due to themselves. 
They  do  not  provide  that  any  one  killing  a  relative 
within  seven  or  nine  degrees  is free from  liability to pay 
blood-fine ; they establish, on the other hand, that fratricide 
involved a more serious penalty than murder of  a stranger, 
viz.  liability  to pay  the full  blood-fine  by  the murderer 
himself,  plus  the  forfeiture  of  ' tref  tadawc '.  There  is 
cothing outside the one Gwentian Triad to suggest that in 
default  the murderer  was  not  liable  to be  slain.  There 
could  naturally  be  no  feud  between  the kinsmen  of  the 
slain and the kinsmen  of  the slayer, for, where  they were 
brothers,  exactly  the same people  were  kinsmen  to both. 
What appears to have happened was that a man who killed 
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his own brother paid the blood-fine himself,  was deprived 
of all his property, and put out of  law. 
5 4.  Dr. Seebohm relies on certain outside instances1 
The first case mentioned was where Hethcyb, in the ' Song 
of Beowulf ', accidentally killed his own brother, Herebald, 
and the poet says : 
' It was a wrong, past compensation. .  . . Any way and every 
way  it was  inevitable that the  Etheling  must  quit  life  un- 
avenged. . . . He  (the father) could not possibly requite the 
feud upon  the man-slayer.' 
This authority appears merely  to show that no penalty 
could be exacted for an accidental death ; it does not seem 
to be  an authority for the proposition  that murder  of  a 
relative in seven degrees entailed no penalty. 
The next reference,  also from the ' Song of  Beowulf ', is 
in apparent contradiction to Dr. Seebohm's view. 
Eanmund,  a  paternal  relative  of  Beowulf,  murdered 
Heardred,  a  maternal relative  of  the latter.  Beowulf  did 
not take revenge, and Dr. Seebohm concludes, inasmuch as 
Beowulf  had  become  chief  of  his mother's  tribe,  that he 
could not avenge owing to kinship. 
The murder was not  within  a  kin, like the '  cenedl ' is 
represented to have been by Dr. Seebohm, for that alleged 
organized  '  cenedl '  traced  descent  through  males  only. 
Further, Eanmund and Beowulf did not belong to Heardred's 
male kin at all, and hence it was no business of  Beowulf's 
to avenge  the murder.  The murderer, Eanmund, was  as 
a  matter  of  fact,  killed  by  Weohstan,  another  paternal 
relative,  in  open  fight  without  a  feud  resulting,  perhaps 
because Eanmund had become a '  lawless exile ', and could 
be killed by any one because of  his crime. 
The next reference is from the Lex Ripuar., Tit. LXIX, 
which provides, among a people where communal responsi- 
bility  of  relatives had almost died out, that the murderer 
of one ' near in blood ' was  exiled  and his goods forfeited 
to the fisc.  The reference  does not establish the existence 
of  an organized kindred-group limited by degrees, and is in 
' Vide Tribal Custom in Anglo-Saxon Law, pp. 63, 66,  164,  176,  241-21 
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no way inconsistent with the view that the murderer must 
pay himself or be put out of  law. 
The next reference is to the Lex Alamman., Tit. XL. 
This provides that a murderer of  a father, uncle, brother, 
or maternal uncle, or his brother's  son, or uncle's  son, or 
mother, or sister, i.e. descendants of  one  or other  of  his 
two  grandfathers,  was  to be  deprived  of  all  his  goods. 
Surely it is a stretch of  this provision to say that the murder 
of  a relative went unpunished except by exile. 
The rule is in full accord with what it is maintained was 
the Welsh rule, that the murderer of  a near relative became 
himself, at least to the extent of  his possessions, responsible 
for the blood-fine. 
The reference on pp. 241-2  to the Guthaling Law, c. 164, 
provides  that where  a  man  slew his father,  son, brother, 
sister,  or  mother,  or  where  a  mother  slew her  child,  the 
slayer was debarred in perpetuity from inheritance, and the 
whole  of  his property was  forfeited  to the next of  kin  or 
the King.  Here again the rule is that the slayer, to the 
fullest  extent  he  could,  must  pay  the blood-fine  himself 
where the murdered person was a near relative. 
The last reference  is from the so-called  Leges  Hen. I, 
c. 75, which provides that a slayer of  any of  his ' parentes ' 
was to do penance, and then proceeds to  say that should any 
relative of  the deceased demand compensation, the murderer 
must pay according to the scale fixed by the '  wise men '. 
This reference again is in full accord with the Welsh rule 
that the slayer of a near relative must pay the full blood- 
fine or so much as could be exacted from his property, and 
that  relatives  were  not  to be  deprived  of  compensation 
merely because the murderer was also a relative. 
$5. We may here refer  to some other provisions on the 
subject unnoticed by Dr. Seebohm. 
The Anglo-Saxon  Laws nowhere suggest that compensa- 
tion was not payable for the murder of  a relative.  On the 
contrary the Dooms of  Ine, c. 76, appear to provide that com- 
pensation in such a case was termed the '  maegh-btit ', payable 
by the slayer to every one of  '  maegha '  (kinship)  to the slain, 
such '  maegh-b6t '  increasing exactly as did ordinary '  wergild'. 
In the Irish Laws  we have the same type of  provision 
as in the Welsh Laws. 
It is there provided  that a  dun-fort  in which fratricide 
was  committed  lost  its honour-price,  that  is  there  was 
violence  upon  the tribe, '  until  the man who  does it pay 
and do penance ', while in Heptads, V. 463, it is added that 
a  man  who  committed  ' fingail'  (tribe-murder)  lost  his 
tribal land. 
Among the Germanic tribes also there are some further 
references.  The provision in the Lex Frisionum, Tit. XIX, 
specifically  provides  for  payment  of  '  galanas'  for  the 
murder of  a brother : 
' Si quis fratrem suum occiderit solvat eum proxin~o  heredi, 
sive  filium  aut filiam  habuerit,  aut si neuter  horum  fuerit, 
solvat  patri  suo  vel  matri  suae  vel  fratri vel  etiam  sorori 
suae ; quod si nec una de his personis fuerit, solvat eum ad 
partem regis.' 
With  this  may  be  compared  the provision  in  the Lex 
Langobard. (Ed. Roth.), c. 163 : 
' Si quis in  mortem parentis sui insidiatus fuerit, id  est si 
frater  in  mortem  fratris sui aut barbanis, quod est patruus 
seu  consobrini  insidiatus  aut  consiliatur  fuerit,  et  ille  cui 
insidiatur filius non  dereliquerit non  sit illi heredes cuius de 
aninla tractavit nisi alii parentes proximi et si parentis alius 
proximus  aut  legitimus  non  habuerit  tunc  illi  curtis  regis 
succedat.  De  anima autem illius homicidae sit in potestatem 
regis  iudicare  quod  illi  placuerit ; res  vero  quas  homicida 
reliquerit parentes proximi et legitimi habeant, et si parentes 
non  habuerit tunc res ipsius curti regiae socientur.' 
Under  the same law  provision  is made  for  succession 
to the estate of  a  homicide  slaying his own  brother, and 
further enacts that, if the slain person left a son, composition 
was to be paid to him out of  the murderer's property, the 
murderer himself falling into the '  misericordia ' of  the King. 
This evidence appears to corroborate the view here taken 
of the Welsh Law. 
8.  Murders of  or by  men not possessed  of  recognized kinsme~z. 
(i) Non-Welshmen. 
9 I.  It was  a  rule of  Welsh  Law that no one except a 
Welshman  could  demand  assistance from  his  relatives as 
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of right, and consequently the right to share in compensa- 
tion  for injury to a  relative,  being  co-extensive with  the 
duty to give assistance, did not accrue to any one who was 
not Welsh. 
But it is quite inaccurate to assert  that non-Welshmen 
had no '  galanas-worth '.  The difference was this that the 
penalty, payable by a non-Welshman  murdering, was paid 
without the enforced assistance of  the murderer's relatives, 
and the penalty for slaying a non-Welshman  was paid  to 
persons other than the relatives. 
$2. For the murder of  a bondman or foreigner the mur- 
derer  paid  the '  legal  worth ' to the  master  or  overlord 
owning or to whom the bondman or foreigner belonged or 
was commended. 
If the foreigner were homeless, that is on a visit to Wales, 
he was under the King's protection, and his legal worth was 
paid to the King : if  he were a hostage, his legal worth was 
that of  the person on whose behalf  he had been  given  as 
a hostage, and if  either a bondman or a foreigner murdered 
a Cymro, his master or overlord paid the legal worth of  the 
victim and the murderer was hanged.l 
(ii) Sons of  Cyrnraesau by foreigners. 
$ I.  The application of  the law of  homicide to men who 
were only partly Welsh is of  considerable interest. 
The son of  a Welshwoman by a foreigner father had no 
paternal relatives on whom by law he could call for help ; 
but, just  as the son of  a Welshwoman,  given  in marriage 
to a foreigner, could demand land from his mother's family 
by virtue of ' mamwys ', so he could demand help from that 
family  up  to  the  fourth degree-not  let  it be  noted  up 
to the seventh degree-in  paying blood-fine  for a  murder 
committed by him. 
$2. Payment on his behalf  by such relatives was termed 
' gwartheg difach '.  ' Difach ' has  been  variously  trans- 
lated as ' di-fach ' (without surety) and  as ' dif-ach ' (of 
defective lineage).  Though  the former appears  to be the 
generally  accepted  signification,  the  latter  seems  to  be 
more  in  consonance  with  the causes  which  gave rise  to 
the law. 
$ 3.  All  Codes agree that the son of  a Welshwoman  by 
a  foreigner  was  subject  to the law  of  homicide ; he was 
' pro tanto ' a freeman, but, as he had no paternal kinsmen 
on  whom  he  could  call for  help, it was  provided  in  the 
Venedotian  Code  that the maternal relatives  were to pay 
two-thirds  and  the  murderer  and  his  father  one-third, 
while  in the Southern Codes the whole  mulct  fell  on  the 
mother's kinsmen in four degrees. 
If  he were murdered the compensation due for his  death 
was paid to the mother-kin,  the Venedotian Code limiting 
their share to two-thirds1 
(iii) Reputed sons. 
§ I.  Cognate to the position of  a son with a foreign father 
was the position of  a son not yet affiliated. 
Such a son was invariably on the privilege of  his mother's 
relatives, though one passage in the Anomalous Laws confines 
the liability of  the mother's  relatives  to pay blood-fine to 
the case of  a son of  a foreigner and Cymraes, at the same 
time indicating that distribution of  blood-fine received was 
made to them. 
$2.  In the  law  of  affiliation  we  saw  it provided  that 
a woman could affiliate her son to the alleged father by oath, 
and that the father or his kinsmen could reject him forth- 
with, accept forthwith, or delay acceptance or rejection for 
a year and a day. 
In the latter case the son was  reputed,  doubted, or  on 
sufferance (' cyswynfab, mab amheuedig '  or '  mab dioddef '). 
If the mother had made no attempt to swear her child, the 
child was on the privilege of  her kinsmen ; likewise if  her 
attempt  to  affiliate  had  been  repudiated  by  the  alleged 
father or his kinsmen.  If, however, the son were on suffer- 
ance  the reputed  father-kinsmen  were  responsible  to pay, 
and could not repudiate the son until they had paid.  They 
could  repudiate  after  payment  to avoid  liability for  any 
subsequent  offence.  The  reputed  father-kin  could  not, 
' V  C. 98,  208 ; D. C. 552 ; G. C.  750 ; IV.  12 ;  V. 64;  X. 326-8 ; 
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however,  claim  to share in  blood-fine  for  the murder  of 
a reputed son, who had not been accepted.  The blood-fine 
in that case went to the mother's kinsmen. 
5 3.  The murder of  or by a reputed son was  classed  as 
one of  the calamities of  kin. 
If, after the crime, the mother swore an oath of  affiliation 
declaring who  the father was,  the reputed  father and his 
kinsmen were not responsible ; the mother's kinsmen were. 
The test  of  liability in  all these cases was  whether  the 
mother  had  sworn  to the paternity or  not,  and whether 
the  alleged  father  had  repudiated  the  son  or  kept  the 
question in abeyance or not at the titne of  the cri1ne.l 
(iv) The son of a Cymro and a foreign woman. 
Connected  with the son of  a Cymraes and a foreigner is 
the case of  the son of  a Cymro and a foreign woman.  Such 
son was a Cymro, even if  illegitimate, but as he could  not 
call on his mother's  relatives for help,  the only assistance 
he could get was as to two-thirds of  a blood-fine from his 
father-kin, the remaining third he had to make up as best 
he could.2 
g.  The recovery of  blood-jne. 
§ I. We come next to the question as to how a blood-fine 
was recovered.  Undoubtedly, in the later law, it could be 
sued for as damages due on account of  tort.  Model plaints 
are given in the Anomalous Laws.  Such suits could be heard 
by the lord or one appointed by him, and must be disposed 
of  in  his life,  and were  cognizable  by the supreme Court 
alone. 
Trial was by jury of  compurgation. 
This was the law at the time of  Hywel Dda, but we  are 
told  that in  the time  of  Dyfnwal Moelmud  the ordinary 
procedure was by ordeal-a  more than doubtful a~sertion.~ 
3 2.  At the same time we get glimpses of  an earlier pro- 
cedure. 
In Titus D. 11, p. 222, we are told : 
'Whoever  shall have  murder  charged  upon  him,  let  the 
kindred pursue  him, and first the lord on  the  day on  which 
V.  C. 208-10 ; D.  C. 412 ; G. C. 602, 702, 776 ;  IV.  38 ; V.  40-2 ; 
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his man is killed or he hear thereof ; what he can get of  his 
spoil or that of  his kindred is to be without question to the 
lord :  if he get no spoil, then full "  galanas " ensues.' 
Again, in the Gwentian Code it is said, '  What the King 
&all  find  of  the property  of  the homicide  upon  the land 
belongs to him entirely ', and in the Venedotian and Dime- 
tian Codes, ' harrying spoliation ' was allowed for murder. 
The Codes also say that it was the duty of  the kinsmen 
to demand satisfaction and slay the slayer if  he gave none ; 
and we  are picturesquely informed  that the kin would  be 
excited to revenge by the wailing of  women, by the inquiry, 
'  Who  killed  this man ? ' and by seeing the dead body on 
the bier, or by looking on the murdered man's grave without 
atonement having been made. 
Here we  have  survivals of  the ancient  method.  There 
was no judicial procedure.  The injured kinsmen arose and 
pursued the murderer to avenge themselves upon him, and 
the lord joined in and harried and despoiled the murderer's 
property. 
§ 3. But, notwithstanding  these provisions, it is beyond 
doubt  that by the time of  Hywel  Dda the right  to take 
revenge  was  postponed  until after  the invocation  of  the 
Courts had been  made, finding given, and default made in 
payment.  We shall see in the Law of  Procedure that there 
was  a  regular  procedure  laid  down  for  such  suits in  the 
time of  Hywel Dda. 
The trial was by compurgators, whose adjudication was 
final and conclusive,  the accused charged being  acquitted 
if the jury compurgated him.l 
§ 4.  But if  the jury failed to exonerate, what happened ? 
First and foremost, in every case of  killing,  the blood-fine 
had to be levied and paid. 
Time was given, but not much, to get the blood-fine in. 
Till it was collected  and paid there was an unsettled feud 
which operated as  a bar to the evidence of  a man of  ' galanas- 
kin ' on the one side against a man of  '  galanas-kin ' on the 
other, or even of  a servant of  such a man.  There was a state 
of suspended hostilities between the kinsmen. 
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The Venedotian Code provides that the blood-fine must 
be  apportioned  among  the  persons  liable  to pay  within 
fourteen days of  the summons of  the lord directing its levy, 
and it was the duty of  the eldest son to point out the kinsmen 
liable. 
After that another fourteen days was allowed for assem- 
bling the responsible kinsmen and exacting payment.  The 
actual delivery of  the blood-fine was to be effected in three 
instalments, the first two consisting of  the delivery of  two- 
thirds  from  the  paternal  kinsmen,  and  the  last  of  the 
delivery of  the amount due by the maternal kin.  As  each 
payment  was made one hundred men of  the best standing 
among the kinsmen of  the murdered man swore to forgive- 
ness, and when the last payment was made oaths were taken 
for  peace,  and  thereupon  ' everlasting  concord  is  to  be 
established  on  that day, and perpetual  amnesty between 
the kinsmen '. 
Titus D.  I1  allows  fourteen  days for  each  lordship  in 
which the kinsmen responsible to pay resided.  The Gwen- 
tian Code lays it down  that complete blood-fine must  be 
paid  in fourteen days if  the kinsmen  of  both sides dwelt 
in the same country, with an extension of  fourteen days for 
each  country  in  which  the  kinsmen  dwelt,  if  scattered. 
Elsewhere it allows only a general period of  fourteen days. 
If  the blood-fine were paid, the kinsmen must rest satis- 
fied ; but, if  it were not, the old rule, ' an eye for an eye, 
and a tooth for a tooth', came into operation.  There was 
unsatisfied  bloodshed  between  the  kinsmen,  and the laws 
are laconically grim. 
' The iaw ', they say, '  permits revenge ' ; ' If  "  galanas " 
be not paid the slayer is to be delivered up to the "  cenedl " 
of  the slain ' ; ' Unless an answer come in nine days the law 
frees the avenging.' 
3 5.  The  blood-fine  had  to  be  paid  in  full  to  avoid 
vengeance.  One penny short entitled the offended kinsmen 
to slay in revenge, and what had already been paid was lost 
beyond hope of  recovery.  Even if  before  the payment of 
V.C. 160, 178, 226, 228, 230; D.C.440, 484; G.C.702, 776; IX..z76; 
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the blood-fine the slayer was killed  by a  man other than 
a kinsman of  the murdered man, the debt was not wiped 
out, it still had to be paid.l 
5 6.  Now  was this delivery of  the slayer to the kinsmen 
of the slain a true case of  vendetta ?  Apparently not.  It 
was  so originally ; but true vendetta implies  a  continued 
state  of  war  between  two  opposing  factions,  each  side 
killing a member of  the other side in revenge for the slaying 
of  one  of  its own  side.  Vendetta  does  not  confine  the 
exaction of revenge upon the slayer.  But the Welsh Laws 
of  Hywel Dda did.  Not only is it clear that it is the slayer 
who  was  to be  delivered  up  to be  slain,  but the  oldest 
MS.2 is very explicit : 
' Ny  deleyr llad nep  am  y gylyd  namen  llourud  nac  am 
ran or  alanas nac am peth arall.'  ' No  one is to be  killed on 
account  of another except the murderer, neither for  a share 
of  "  galanas " nor for any other thing.' 
That at any rate was the law of  Hywel Dda, and perhaps 
this  was  one  of  the  reforms  he  introduced,  limiting  the 
exercise of  revenge upon the actual slayer. 
There  is  no  doubt  that there  are some  indications of 
a  true  vendetta  being  carried  on.  For  instance,  in  the 
Gwentian Triads, some  MSS.  say that where  murder  was 
not denied or blood-fine paid no reparation was to be made 
for the slaying of  '  a man of  cenedl ', but other MSS.  say 
for  ' the slaying  of  the  man ', i.e. the murderer.  In the 
same Triads it is said that, though a lord and a '  pencenedl ' 
got  some share of  a  blood-fine, none  of  them were  to be 
killed in revenge  for non-payment, implying, perhaps, that 
men who were in law relatives might be killed in revenge ; 
and the Dimetian Code, while excluding clerics and others 
from all liability to contribute to or right to share in blood- 
fine, precludes the exercise of  vengeance upon them, again 
perhaps  implying  that  other  relatives  could  be  killed. 
However, the direct prohibition  shows that, whatever may 
have been the older custom, the codifiers definitely limited 
the right of vengeance upon the person of  the slayera3 
5 7.  The question  arises here  as to whether  there  was 
V. C. 226; D. C. 412, 600; G. C. 702, 776; V.  62. 
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any other method  whereby  kinsmen  could  absolve  them- 
selves from liability to pay blood-fine other than by handing 
the slayer over to be slain.  With tribal sentiment so strong 
it is almost the last thing we should expect to find, and yet 
it is clear from the laws that there was some right in the 
kinsmen to decline all responsibility. 
In the Venedotian Code, pp. 228, 230, it is said : 
' If  the  kinsmen  disown  the  murderer,  there  is  no  claim 
upon them, nor are they, unless the lord exact it, to pay;' 
and again : 
' If  the murderer pay his share he is not to be killed, although 
the kinsmen may not have paid their share, and so the kinsmen 
are not to be compelled although he may not have paid.' 
The later provisions  of  the XIVth Book, p.  656,  direct 
that the kinsmen are not to pay '  galanas ' where a murderer 
refused to conform to law with them or where he confessed 
to murder  without  a  previous  denial  and  submission  to 
compurgation. 
These provisions are at first sight difficult to understand. 
The Venedotian  Code is possibly  referring in the first case 
to a  case where alleged kinsmen repudiated the allegation 
that  the murderer  was  of  kin  to them,  but  the second 
is  inexplicable  except  on  the  assumption  that  kinsmen 
could refuse to pay if  they wished. 
The provisions of  the XIVth Book are more understand- 
able.  Relatives were responsible to support a relative only 
so long as he submitted to law ; and they had to be pro- 
tected against the possibility of  a man confessing to a crime 
he  had  never  committed,  and  thereby  imposing  on  his 
kinsmen  a  liability  which  it was  not  right  for  them to 
bear. 
The true solution, however,  of  these apparent difficulties 
appears to be that there was a tentative effort, comparable 
" 
to what, as we will see later, was  occuring in England at 
the same  time,  an  effort  to break  down  the  tribal  law 
imposing  liabilities  upon  kinsmen  in  murder  cases  by 
giving such kinsmen a right to repudiate responsibility.  It 
was  one  of  the steps taken  along the route which was to 
convert a tort into a crime. 
10.  Homicide as an ofence against the State. 
$ I.  What we  have said above shows that the primary 
conception  of  slaying  was  that it was  a  tort to be  com- 
pensated for, whether the slaying were deliberate or caused 
by negligence.  The idea that murder was an offence against 
the State, a crime, was gradually finding expression never- 
theless. 
&j  2. It found it first by insisting on the postponement of 
vengeance until the lord had been invoked to levy the blood- 
fine ; but,  even  when  recognition  of  the lord's  right  to 
intervene had got so far, the State had to step aside when 
retribution  was  to be  inflicted  for  failure  to satisfy  the 
kinsmen. 
5 3.  The conception, however, that slaying was  a  crime 
would not necessarily involve the abolition of  the idea that 
it  was  a  tort  as well.  There are numerous  instances  in 
modern  law where persons  injured  are entitled  to recover 
compensation in addition to the imposition by the State of 
a  penalty  upon  the offender.  French  Law in  particular 
maintains the differentiation and allows both remedies.  So 
also the abolition of  the idea that accidental slaying (at any 
rate if  it were  negligent)  must  be compensated for  is  no 
necessary  preliminary to the growth of  the idea that deli- 
berate slaying must be '  punished '. 
$4. If  we look at the Welsh Laws we shall find, not only 
in the Anomalous Laws but also in the Codes, very distinct 
traces of  the upspringing of  the idea that slaying, provided 
it were deliberate, must be punished, and also of  the idea 
that  the  penalty  might  vary  according  to whether  the 
circumstances  showed  the  deliberate  slaying  were  aggra- 
vated or not. 
We have already noticed that the Welsh Laws do appear 
to  distinguish  between  aggravated  and  non-aggravated 
deliberate slaying.  It found expression not only in the fact 
that the former required a double compurgation, but in the 
penalties to be imposed. 
For waylaying and other aggravated murders the blood- 
fine was doubled ; one blood-fine was paid to the kinsmen, 
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him  also  to '  harrying  spoliation ' and sometimes  loss  of 
patrimony. 
Over and over again we get an increased penalty referred 
to, and, though the penalty imposed is by no means uniform, 
there seems no doubt that aggravated murder, waylaying, 
murder with violence, murder by poisoning,  secret murder, 
and murder of  a  King, lord, or '  pencenedl ', were offences 
against the King's  peace as well as a tort. 
The Venedotian Code speaks of  the blood-fine and penance 
for killing with savage violence being double.  The Dimetian 
Code fixes,  for waylaying, a  twofold  mulct  (dirwy) to the 
King  and double blood-fine  to the kinsmen;  forfeiture of 
property  for  killing  a  lord  and  others ; elsewhere  death 
irredeemable  for waylaying if  caught, and, if  not  caught, 
a double mulct and double blood-fine ; and yet in another 
place of  a double mulct and double blood-fine for waylaying, 
murder by secret means or murder at night privily. 
In the Anomalous Laws there are several such references. 
Poisoning entailed a  double  blood-fine,  being  a '  ferocious 
act '--some  MSS.  here  mention waylaying-and  death  is 
said to be incurred in lieu of  one of  the blood-fines.  Again 
it is said that the blood-fine was  doubled for  waylaying, 
because  it was  violence  to kill  and theft  to conceal,  and 
'  that ', it is added, '  is the instance where spoliation  and 
hanging are due for murder '.  In a third passage, forfeiture 
is  allotted  for  waylaying,  but if  caught  the waylayer '  is 
to forfeit life more signally than a thief ', and in the XIVth 
Book we are repeatedly told that death was the punishment 
for violent murder.l 
9 5.  There  are other  cases  also  where  slaying  was  un- 
doubtedly a crime.  The legal worth of  an idiot under the 
King's protection was payable to the King, so also was the 
blood-fine of the Queen,  and though some authorities say 
the blood-fine for  a murdered priest  went to his kinsmen, 
others say it went  to the Church,  and yet  others  assign 
two-thirds to the King.2 
5 6.  The law of homicide seems, therefore, to show that 
'  V.  C. 230;  D. C 412, 436,  448,  550,  594 ; IV. 22 ; IX. 264;  X. 
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killing, deliberately or accidentally, if  there were negligence, 
was  originally  a  tort  and a  tort  only,  to be avenged  or 
for.  We see  an effort  to limit  the right  of 
vengeance, that is the abolition of  the vendetta, to  vengeance 
upon the body of  the slayer, and we see also the growth, 
without  abolishing the tortuous  conception of  the idea, of 
crime, entailing penalties over and above the compensation 
for the tort. 
The Welsh  Law of  homicide in the time of  Hywel Dda 
was, in fact, a composite one, containing in itself an attempt 
to regulate  the exercise  of  the old  right  of  vengeance  by 
postponing  it until  there  had  been  a  failure to pay  the 
fixed compensation and to reconcile the right of  vengeance 
with the newer idea that the guilty person, and the guilty 
person only, should be punished  by the King for a breach 
of  the King's Law. 
11. Murder in early English Law. 
5 I. The early English Laws have a number of  references 
to slaying, which  show  not  merely  that the essentials  of 
the law of  murder were  originally and contemporaneously 
with  the time of  Hywel  Dda, the same in England as in 
Wales, but that in matters of detail also the resemblance 
was frequently maintained. 
$2. We  must  not,  however,  expect  to find  complete 
parallels in all matters, and this for two reasons.  Homicide, 
as we have noticed in Wales, was intimately bound up with 
kinship. 
In England the communal tie, based  on kinship,  broke 
down much earlier than it did in Wales, and the growth of 
the  centralized  power,  progressing  as it did more rapidly 
there, led to the substitution of murder as a crime for murder 
as a tort more easily. 
5 3.  The second reason why we must not expect to find 
complete parallels in the laws of the two countries is that, 
as already pointed  out elsewhere,  the early English Laws 
were  not a  codification of  custom like the laws of Hywel 
Dda, but a  series of enactments amending custom in par- 
ticular points.  What we get, therefore, in English Law, is 
not a full statement of the customary law relating to killing, 128  ' GALANAS  '  PART VI 
but fragmentary alterations effected in that custom  from 
time to time by legislative enactment. 
Nevertheless  we  do  find many parallels,  and it will  be 
well to refer to these in much the same order as has been 
adopted in explaining the Welsh Law. 
$ 4.  No more than in Welsh Law do we  get  an express 
division of  killing into grades or kinds, but that all killing 
was not on the same basis is clear. 
Slaying in self-defence, as an excusable act, is not men- 
tioned in the English Laws, but, inasmuch as the justifiable 
slaying  in  defence  of  another  is,  we  may  fairly  assume 
that English Law did permit slaying in self-defence. 
The provision  referred  to occurs in the laws of  Blfred, 
composed at much the same time as Hywel Dda's Laws. 
Under  Elfred's Laws,  c.  42,  it was  no offence to slay 
a man attacking the slayer's lord, or his servant or his born 
kinsman, subject  always to the exception  that there was 
no  justification  for  slaying  one's  own  lord,  even  if  the 
latter were attacking the kinsman of  his vassal. 
Provocation as an excuse for slaying is mentioned in the 
early  English  Laws  also.  Under  the  Laws  of  Wihtraed, 
c. 25,  Ine, c. 35, and Edward the Confessor, c. 36, it was 
made permissible to slay an escaping thief, and in the Laws 
of  Elfred, c. 42, a man might fight ' orwige ', if  he discovered 
another committing adultery with his wife, daughter, sister, 
or mother.  Similar is the  rule  reproduced  in  the Laws 
of  the Conqueror, c. 35. 
5 5. Excusable homicide, excusable on the ground of  the 
offender's capacity or status, is also referred  to. 
We  need  not  do  more  than  note  that  the laws  pro- 
gressively exempted children under seven, ten, and twelve, 
and it is of interest to note the law relative to priests, who 
were exempt from execution under the Welsh Law. 
The English  Law  on  the subject  appears  to have  been 
much the same ; but the Laws of  Elfred suggest that that 
exemption was partly done away with, for by cl. 21, it was 
provided that if a priest were guilty of  slaying, everything 
in his house  was  to be  given  up at once, the bishop was 
then  to secularize  the priest,  and he was  to be  given  up 
from the minster  (?  for  vengeance),  unless  the lord  were 
prepared to compound for his ' wer '. 
We get a more complete statement of  murder by and of 
clerics in Cnut's  Eccles. Laws, cc. 2, 5, 39, and 41, and it 
appears that there was  little if  any difference in  liability 
between a cleric and a non-cleric. 
$ 6.  As  regards  accidental killing, Elfred's Laws, c. 13, 
provide  that if  a person  killed another ' unlawfully ' while 
engaged in a common work, apparently of  cutting down a 
tree, the kindred  of  the slain  man  were  to have the tree 
within thirty days.  The passage  is obscure,  but it seems 
to refer to one of those cases where an inanimate cause of 
death, viz.  the falling  tree, was  regarded  as the criminal, 
and was handed  over  to the kindred to wreak  vengeance 
upon at the expiration of  the same term of  thirty days as 
was  applicable in  the case  of  a  person  committing wilful 
murder and not compensating for it. 
We  have  also  a  parallel  to the Welsh  Laws  as regards 
responsibility  for animals causing death in Elfred's Laws. 
After reciting the Jewish  Law that a goring ox was  to be 
stoned  to  death, c.  24  of  those  laws  provided  that if  a 
'  neat ' wounded a man, the neat was to be given up to the 
person injured or the wound compensated for. 
§ 7.  We have a further parallel in the liability of  a man 
with whose weapon killing was committed. 
According to the Law  of  Ethelberht, cc. 18, 19,  a man 
furnishing  a  weapon  to another,  where  there  was  strife, 
paid a '  b8t '  of  6s., even if  no harm resulted ; and if  robbery 
or  slaying  by  the  borrower  ensued,  the  lender  paid  6s. 
or 30s. 
In the Laws of  Elfred a person lending another a weapon 
to kill with, was liable to pay part of  the '  wergild ' of  the 
slain-one-third,  plus a  wite  or  fine,  if  the principal  and 
the owner of  the weapon did not  agree among themselves 
as to the apportionment of  the '  wergild '. 
$8. Elsewhere also we get provisions  similar to those in 
Welsh Law relative to the lawful rests of  spears. 
In the Laws of  Elfred, c. 36, it was  provided  that '  if 
a man have a spear over his shoulder, and any man stake 
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himself upon it, he shall pay the "  wer "  without the "  wite ". 
If he stake himself before his face, let him pay the "  wer ". 
If he be  accused  of  wilfulness in  the deed,  let  him  clear 
himself  according  to the "  wite " ' ; and in  the Laws of 
Cnut,  c.  76,  a  man  was  rendered  liable  for  his  weapon 
unless  he could  show the deed  was  not  done by his  will, 
control, counsel, or cognizance. 
5 g.  In connexion with the levy and distribution of  ' wer- 
gild '  ( =galartas)  the  English  Laws  have  little  to  say. 
Sufficient exists  in those  laws, however,  to establish  that 
the system was similar, if  not identical. 
It is quite clear  that under English  Law  the levy and 
distribution  of  ' wergild ' was  a  liability and right  of  the 
relatives  of  the murderer or murdered man, and that the 
right to share in and the liability to contribute to '  wergild ' 
were coextensive. 
The so-called Leges Hen. I, c. 75, $ 8, make this clear : 
'  Si quis hujusmodi faciat homicidum, parentes ejus tantum 
werae reddat, quantum pro ea reciperent, si occideretur.' 
What the exact liability of  the kinsmen was is not  ex- 
pressed  clearly.  The Laws  of  Ethelberht, c.  30,  would 
appear  to suggest  that, in  the  earliest  days in Kent, the 
liability of  kinsmen was limited to  making good any  deficiency 
in  the '  wergild ' due  after  the  whole  of  the murderer's 
money and other chattels had been exhausted.  The same 
laws  (cc. 22-3)  provide also that, if  the slayer gave up his 
land, his kinsmen had to pay half  the '  leod ' or '  wergild ', 
again suggesting that the liability of  the kinsmen did not 
operate until the murderer had no further resources. 
The  Dooms  of  Ine  (A. D.  688-725)  deal in  this matter 
only with the division of the ' wergild ' due for a foreigner 
who was killed.  Two-thirds of  his '  wergild ' went to the 
King,  one-third  to his  son  or kinsmen,  but if  he had  no 
kinsmen,  half went  to the King  and half  to his  ' gesith ' 
or host. 
5 10.  There are provisions in the Laws of  Blfred dealing 
with the postponement of  revenge  (see infra) which  show 
that notice had to be given  to kinsmen, but they do not 
touch on the question of the rate of  levy and distribution. 
We have, however,  in c.  8 of  those  laws  an interesting 
provision  dealing with  the murder  of  the child  of  a  nun, 
an exceptional case specially dealt with, from which we can 
infer  that  the  general  principles  in  ordinary  cases  were 
similar to those prevalent in Wales. 
That  clause  provided  that  where  a  nun's  child  was 
murdered,  the share, which would  otherwise have gone to 
the  maternal  kindred,  was  to go  to  the  King,  and  the 
paternal  kin  of  the  deceased  was  to obtain the  ordinary 
paternal  kin's  share.  This  is  clear  evidence  that  both 
paternal  and maternal kin  participated  in '  wergild ', and 
that these shares were separable. 
Again,  under  clause  g  of  those  laws  the '  wergild ' of 
a foetus was assessed at half that of  a living person, accord- 
ing '  to the wer of  the father's kin '. 
Other provisions confirm this.  We have in clauses 27, 28, 
a  provision  comparable  to  the  case  of  a  foreign  son  of 
a Cymraes.  The case is not one of  a foreigner's  son by an 
Englishwoman, but of  a man who had no paternal relatives 
left, while having maternal ones.  The rule  then  applied 
recalls the Welsh rule applicable to a foreigner's son : 
' If a  man,  kinless  of  paternal  relatives,  fight  and  slay 
a man, and then, if  he have maternal relatives, let them pay 
one-third of the "  wer ", his guild-brethren one-third (guild- 
brethren being an artificial creation not known to Welsh Law), 
and for one-third let him flee.  If he have no maternal relatives, 
let his guild-brethren pay one-half, and for half  let him flee.' 
Here we have indicated once more the separate liability 
of  the maternal kinsmen  and the paternal  kinsmen.  We 
have,  moreover,  the indication that the murderer's  share 
was  separate, and a  rule which  throws light on  the effect 
of  kinsmen repudiating liability, for this provision  suggests 
that it was only where the murderer himself  failed to pay 
his share that he could be slain in revenge. 
Clause 28  shows that the ' wergild ' was  divided  among 
those  liable  to contribute.  This  again  is  established .by 
inference.  The clause deals with the case of  a man killed, 
who  had  no relatives,  and says  that in  such  a  case  the 
' wergild ' went  half  to the  King,  and half  to deceased's 
' ge-gildan '. 
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In clause 13 of  the Dooms of  Edward and Guthruni we 
have reference to security being given for the payment of 
'  wergild ' by eight  of  the paternal  kin  and  four  of  the 
maternal kin, pointing still more definitely to the liability 
of  these kinsmen in the same ratio of  two-thirds and one- 
third as in the Welsh Laws. 
We  likewise  get  in  the  same  section  reference  to the 
'  healsfang ' ( =  saltaad) of the murdered man  as belonging 
to  the  children,  brothers,  and  paternal  uncles.  ' That 
money  belongs  to no  kinsman  except  to those  who  are 
within the knee.' 
The  Laws  of  Edrnund  (A. D.  940-6)  are  of  particular 
value, for we  have there a definite enactment attempting, 
without  destroying the principle  of  the payment  of  com- 
pensation for tort, to break up the liability of  the kinsmen 
to contribute. 
' If  any one ', runs clause I, ' henceforth slay any man, it 
is ordained that he himself  bear the " faethe"  (feud) unless 
with  the  aid  of  his  friends,  and  within  twelve months, he 
compensate it with the full "  wer ". . . . But if  the kinsmen 
forsake him and will not pay for him, then 1  will that all the 
kin  be  "  un-fall " except the perpetrator,  if  afterwards they 
do not give him either food or protection.' 
The  Dooms  of  Church-Grith  of  Ethelred  (A.D.  IOI~), 
which  deal  with  Church  matters,  contain  two  clauses l 
relative to slaying by clerics, who were divided into ordinary 
clerics  and monks.  They also illustrate the point  of  the 
responsibility  of  kinsmen to contribute to the levy : 
' If  any  one  charge  one  in  holy  orders with " faeththe " 
and say  that he  was  a perpetrator  or advisor  of  homicide, 
let  hini clear himself  with  his  kinsmen, who  must  bear  the 
"  faeththe " with him, or make " b6t " for it. . .  .' 
' No  minster monk  may demand nor pay "  faeththe b6t ", 
for he forsakes his law of  kin who submits to monastic law.' 
The same provision  is repeated  in  Cnut's Ecclesiastical 
Laws of  Winchester, c. 5 (A. D.  1016-35). 
In the Secular Laws, cc. 40, 57, we find '  wergild '  being 
made payable to the kinsmen of  the man murdered unless 
cleared  by  compurgation,  and the  King  standing in  the 
place of  a kinsman to a stranger. 
IX. 23,  25. 
The Laws of  the Confessor, cc.  12,  15, even in breaking 
through  the old  kin-duties  and in laying special stress on 
the  ' manbote ' payable  to  the  King,  retained  a  small 
portion of  the ' wergild ' for the relatives of  the murdered 
man ; and in the Laws of  the Conqueror, cc. 7, g,  a man 
convicted  of  murder had  still to pay,  in  addition  to the 
criminal penalty of  ' manbote ' to the lord, a ' wergild ' to 
the relatives, half  of  which went  to the widow and half  to 
the children and blood relations of  the slain man. 
$11. It is,  however,  in  the regulations  regarding  the 
recovery  of the '  wergild ' that the English Laws are most 
interesting.  The account given in those laws is even more 
minute than in the Welsh  Laws, and when we place them 
side by side, we see that they were identical in practically 
every particular. 
In the Law of  Ethelberht, cc. 22, 23, it is provided that 
the '  leodgild ' must be paid in forty days :  in the Laws of 
Ine, c. 74, which in this particular deals only with theows, 
the lord of  a ' theow ', being a murderer, must redeem him 
or  hand  him  over  to  the  murdered  man's  kinsmen,  or 
failing that, enfranchise him, so as to give the slayer's kins- 
men a chance to redeem him. 
Failing redemption by them, the offender must be delivered 
over to the kinsmen of  the slain. 
In  Blfred's Laws, c. 42, we get a detailed procedure showing 
the first step towards regulating the exercise of  revenge : 
' We command that the man who knows his foe to be home- 
setting  fight  not  before  he  demand  justice  of  him.  If  he 
have such  power  that he  can beset  his foe  and besiege him 
within, let him keep him within seven days, and attack him 
not, if  he  will  remain  within.  And  then  after  seven  days, 
if  he  will  surrender and deliver up his weapons, let him  be 
kept  safe for  thirty days, and let notice of  him  be  given  to 
his kinsmen and his friends. . . . If  he  will not deliver up his 
weapons, then he may attack him.' 
With this may be compared c. 5, wherein it is provided 
that a man obtaining sanctuary was to be kept under the 
protection  of  the  Church  for  thirty  days,  during  which 
notice was to be given to the kinsmen of  the offender. 
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prescribed  to enable a  slayer to get  into communication 
with  his  kinsmen  in  order  to find  the ' wergild ' before 
vengeance could be executed. 
The same period  of  thirty days appears also in  Cnut's 
Laws, cc. 39, 41. 
In the thirteenth  clause of  the Dooms  of  Edward  and 
Guthrum we  have convincing  evidence of  the identity of 
English and Welsh Law : 
' If  any one be  slain let him be paid for  according to his 
birth.  It is  right  that  the  slayer  after  he  has  given  wed 
(surety) for the "  wer "  find in addition a "  wer-borh " (sureties 
for  payment) according  as  shall  belong  thereto,  that is  to 
a  12-hynde  man's  "  wer ", 12  men  are necessary  as "  wer- 
borh ", 8 of  the paternal kin, 4 of  the maternal kin.  When 
that is  done,  then let  the Icing's  protection  be  established, 
that is they all of  either kindred with their hands in common 
upon  one  weapon  engage  to  the mediator  that  the  Icing's 
"  mund " shall stand.  In 21  days from that day let 120s. be 
paid  as "  healsfang " ( =  sarand). 
' In 21 days from  the day that the "  healsfang " is paid, 
let the "  man-bote " be paid, in 21  days from this the "  fight- 
wite " (fine for  breach  of  peace), in  21 days from  this the 
"  frum-gyld " (first instalment) of  the "  wer ", and so forth, 
till it be fully paid within the time the "  witan "  have appointed. 
After this they may depart with love, if  they desire to have 
full friendship.' 
With this reconciliation  we  may compare the like pro- 
vision in Eric's Zealand Law, c. 111. 27 : 
' And  he who has taken  the "  bote " shall swear  that he 
will never avenge the deed for which he has taken the "  bote ", 
neither  by counsel nor  by deed, neither  upon  the born  nor 
the unborn, and therewith  shall they be  reconciled, and lay 
their hands together and kiss each other.' 
Almost  identical  are  the  provisions  in  the  Laws  of 
Edmund, c. 7 : 
The "  witan " shall appease "  faehthe ".  First, according 
to folc-right  the slayer  shall give pledge  to his "  forespeca " 
(i. e.  his  advocatus  representing  him  in  negotiations),  and 
the "  forespeca " to the kinsmen,  that the slayer will make 
"  b8t " to the kinsmen.  Then after that it is requisite  that 
security be given to the slayer's "  forespeca " that the slayer 
may,  in  peace,  draw  nigh  and  himself  give  pledge  for  the 
"  wer ".  When  he  has  given  pledge  for this,  then  let  him 
find thereto a "  wer-borh " ; when that is done, let the King's 
"  mund " be  levied;  within  21  days from  that day let  the 
"  halsfang"  be  paid;  21  days from  that  the " manbBt ", 
and 21  days from that the "  frum-gild " of  the "  wer ".' 
§ 12.  It  will be noticed that this quotation omits reference 
to the kin.  The reason is that it was King Edmund who 
first attempted in England, so far as we can see, to confine 
the penalty to the actual slayer, just  as we have suggested 
an attempt was inade about the same timesby Hywel Dda 
in Wales. 
We have already quoted part of  clause I of  Edmund's 
Laws allowing kinsmen to forsake a  slayer, and that same 
clause  concludes by limiting  the exercise  of  the right  of 
vengeance upon the body of  the murderer : 
' If  any one  of  the other Itindred  take vengeance  on  any 
other man, except on  the real perpetrator, let him be foe to 
the Icing, and to his friends and forfeit all that he owns.' 
§ 13.  The same effort  was made on the Continent, and 
wc shall not be far wrong in ascribing the general movement 
to the Church. 
The movement  had its setbacks every now  and again, 
but that it was a determined policy continued through many 
centuries is undoubted. 
We may refer to one such setback, inade perhaps under 
Danish influences. 
In the Treaty between  Ethelred  and Olaf  Tryggvason 
we  find  the old  vendetta  explicitly  recognized,  with  this 
change that it was partly a  matter of  territory as well  as 
kinship. 
In clause 6 it is provided : 
' If  over eight be killed there is "  frith-breach ".  Then, if 
in a "  burh " it happen, let the inhabitants of  the "  burh " 
go  and get  the  murderers  living  or  dead,  or  their  nearest 
relations, head for head.' 
$14.  The Laws of  the Confessor tried to break down the 
old system of  kin vengeance in a new way.  They fixed the 
' wergilds ' or ' b6ts ', but directed that they were  to be 
paid to the King or lord or baron of  the man slain, but even 
so some portion was reserved for the relatives. 
These laws provided that the murderer was to be brought 
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the ville  or hundred was  penalized 46 marks for non-pro- 
duction in lieu of  '  wergild ', of  which 40 were to go to the 
King and 6 only to the relatives of  the man slain, and the 
latter 6 were repayable to the ville or hundred if  they found 
the murderer within a year. 
This, coupled with the provision that charges of  murder 
were to be decided (c. 16)  by the ordeal of  fire and water 
instead of by compurgation, and with the provision  (c. 17) 
that a murderer's land was not to be forfeited, attacked the 
old system, already weakened by the decay of  tribal feeling, 
so effectually that it never  reaIly  recovered  in  England, 
and  the transformation  from  tort  to crime  was  effected 
quickly. 
Nevertheless,  lingering traces continued  for  some  time, 
and we find marks of  it in the Leges Henry I. 
By the time of  Edward I the law of  ' wergild ' was dead 
in  England.  As  already  noted,  Llywelyn  ap Iorwerth  is 
said to have put an end to it in Wales.  In the Statute of 
Rhuddlan,  Edward  I used  the old  communal connexions 
by imposing on the coroner the duty, in cases of  suspected 
murder, of  inquiring into and enrolling the Welshery  (i.  e. 
the kinsmen), paternal  as well  as maternal  of  the slain, 
and by imposing  on  such  persons  the duty of  presenting 
the fact of  manslaughter, giving them also the right to sue 
for  murder  by appeal.  He also  used  the communal con- 
nexion  of  the slayer by providing  that the appellees,  on 
being  summoned, were  to be  replevied  on  the security of 
six pledges. 
12.  Murder in the Brelzon Laws. 
§ I.  The right to demand reparation for murder survived 
in Ireland to the sixteenth century, for in 1554 the Earl of 
Icildare received  an ' eric-fine ' of  340 cows on account  of 
the death of  his foster-brother, Robert Nugent,  under the 
Brehon Law. 
3 2.  The Senchus M6r  appears to state that there were 
three stages in the growth of  the law of  murder, viz. '  venge- 
ance ' (' It  is  the  strengthening  of  Paganism  if  an  evil 
deed be avenged '), the death penalty for deliberate murder 
(' It is evil to kill by a foul deed.  I pronounce  the judge- 
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merit  of death ; of  death for his crime to every one who 
kills '),  and reparation.' 
The Brehon Laws show that at the time of  St. Patrick's 
mission the payment of  ' coirbh-fine ' ( =galanas) was fully 
established as the reparation for murder and killing, and in 
the  song,  ' It is  the  strengthening  of  Paganism ',  they 
credited the introduction of  the death penalty, which they 
found so difficult  to reconcile  with  Christian  teaching,  to 
the  influence  of  the  Church  putting  into  operation  the 
principles of  the Mosaic Law. 
§ 3.  The  Irish  Laws  draw  a  very  decided  distinction 
a  between  intentional  and accidental  killing.  ' Coirbhfine ' 
was payable for both, and in fact it appears to have been 
due for mere intention to kill without killing following ; but, 
whereas  the law  of  the Church  was  that  death was  the 
penalty for deliberate mllrder, the customary law prevailed 
and limited the death penalty to cases of  intentional murder 
when the ' coirbhfine ' was not paid, introducing outlawry 
as the penalty for unintentional killing  where satisfaction 
was not made.  The song already referred to says : 
' Let every one die who kills a human being, 
Who inflicts any wound intentionally 
Of  which  any person  dies,' 
and the gloss thereon runs 
' No  one  is  put  to  death  nowadays  for  his  intentional 
crimes so long as the " eric-fine " is obtained ; and wherever 
" eric-fine " is not obtained he  is put to death for his inten- 
tional  crimes,  and  placed  on  the  sea  for  his  unintentional 
crimes.' 
The later  Corus  Bescna  states,  obviously  under the in- 
fluence of the Church, that all malice aforethought involved 
the death penalty. 
§ 4.  We get also,  as in  the Welsh  Laws,  the same dis- 
tinction  between  accidental  and  negligent  slaying ;  the 
former was, under the later  Irish  Laws,3 not compensated 
for.  '  Accidental shedding of  blood ', it is said, '  is exempt ' ; 
and some of the instances recall  the illustrations given in 
the Welsh Laws. 
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Exemption was  granted where  blood  was  shed through 
the rebounding  of  a  chip  of  wood,  the flying  of  a  piece 
from the flesh  fork,  the backward  sway  of  a  branch  of 
a tree, the rebound of  a flail from the ground, the casting 
of  a horse's shoe, the rebound of  metal in a forge, and the 
ricochet  of  one stone from another. 
But it is particularly in the rules relative to the liability 
of  kinsmen  to assist  that the distinction  is most  clearly 
drawn (vide infra). 
$ 5.  So, too, as in Welsh Law there was exemption owing 
to the incapacity of the slayer to commit  crime, or owing 
to provocation  or the like.  Shedding of  blood  entailed no 
penalty  if  it were  caused  by  a  fool,  by  a  physician,  by 
a person  enforcing his contract, in defence  of  his chief, in 
battle, or by the first wife, '  through just jealousy  from an 
adultress who  goes  over her head ', or if  the person  slain 
were  an outlaw.  Reduction  was  also  allowed  where  the 
killing was caused in ' lawful anger '.I 
§ 6.  Similarly,  we  find  that  for  aggravated  deliberate 
homicide  the  reparation  was  increased.  There  was  an 
increased  fine,  a  double  fine,  for  secret  murder  or  pre- 
meditated murder, and this is  contrasted with  the single 
full fine for  deliberate homicide  when not aggravated, for 
the single  full  fine  was  levied  for  death caused  ' through 
scaring for the purpose of  killing '. 
The Senchus  M6r  states there  were  three death levies, 
viz. for an act of  inadvertence, secret murder, and an assault 
of  anger, and that every act of  neglect  was  a  fault.  We 
have,  therefore,  a  clear  distinction  between  negligence, 
deliberate homicide, and slaying under provocati~n.~ 
$7. The  definition  of  secret  murder  is  practically  the 
same as in the Welsh Laws.  It consisted in the conceal- 
ment of  the body or commission in a place where the body 
was  not likely to be discovered, e.g. a  mountain  or wild 
place, unless the slayer disclosed the fact of  slaying before 
the discovery of  the body. 
§ 8.  We have also the right of  self-defence indicated, and 
Heptads, V.  143, 237. 
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the right to slay an outlaw.  In the former case the Book 
of Aicill (111. 137,  385, 465) allowed a partial exemption- 
in one place a total exemption if  a thief  were seen and were 
not known and could not be seized except by killing him- 
and in the latter a total exemption. 
Jealousy  of  a  wife  also  exempted  her  for  ltilling,l  also 
slaying  one  attacking with  a  l~nife,~  and the doctrine  is 
well  summed up in  111. 537, ' The great "  eric-fine " and 
that for compensation  are not to be avoided if  defence be 
not made for one whom necessity protects.' 
These resemblances are important, for without sufficient 
justification  it has often been  asserted that in Celtic Law 
all slaying,  whether  accidental or  deliberate, carried with 
it the liability to pay compensation. 
$ g.  In regard to levy there are numerous points of  resem- 
blance.  The Council of  Cashel  (A. D.  1172)  provided  that 
no cleric related to a homicide was to contribute anything 
to the ' eric-fine ', and that the ' eric-fine ' payable for the 
murder  of  a  priest  went  to the latter's  tribe.  We  have 
also the further resemblance that in the reparation payable 
not only was body-fine payable, but honour-fine.3 
§ 10.  In one  important point  there was  a  marked  dis- 
tinction  between  the  Irish  and  Welsh  Laws.  The latter 
creates no communal liability to assist an offender, except 
in blood-fine and honour-price, but the former imposes that 
liability upon tribesmen in all offences. 
§ 11.  The Irish Laws help us in focussing attention upon 
the principles of  the Welsh Law of  liability for blood-fine. 
We have already stated that the Irish Laws of  succession 
gave the right  of  succession to four groups in order, and 
that these four groups may possibly  be coincident with the 
Welsh groupings in degrees.  If  that be so, there is a curious 
parallel  with  the  Welsh  Laws,  but  we  cannot  press  the 
identification. 
The Irish Laws seem at times to vary in their rules as to 
liability. 
The tract ' Do breitheamhnus for na huile chin do ni gach 
cintach ' states  that  there  are  seven  divisions  upon  the 
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crime of every criminal, viz, himself and chattels, his father, 
his brother, his '  geilfine ' relations,  the chief  of  the '  geil- 
fine ', if no chief his bed, raiment, and food, and the King, 
and adds that every  family was  liable  to pay,  after  the 
evasion of  the criminal, in the proportions in which it would 
divide his property. 
They  clearly  place  the liability  for  all  offences  except 
killing, which fell on the family as well, upon the criminal 
first, then upon his relatives if  he defaulted ; but in murder 
kinsmen  were  at once  liable  except  that in ' unnecessary 
killing ' the family  had  the choice  whether  to hand  the 
criminal  over  and take his  land,  or  give  up his  land  in 
satisfaction. 
Later in the same tract we get the division of  blood-fine 
received,  which  probably  represents  also  the proportions 
of  levy. 
They are difficult  to understand, but there were  seven 
parts, distributed on different grades of  relations. 
$ 12.  In the tract ' Ted an fearann  a  cintaib ', the rule 
is  stated  that  for  every  unnecessary  crime  the  criminal 
could be surrendered, but for necessary crime the criminal's 
land must  be  surrendered  by  the tribe before  they  could 
hand him over.  The distinction between  ' necessary ' and 
' unnecessary ' was  that between negligent, but accidental, 
and deliberate. 
In the Senchus M6r, 111. 69, we get the rule stated perhaps 
more clearly : 
' For every crime of  necessity, except killing, a man  shall 
pay  "  eric-fine " for  it  himself  till  his  cattle  and  land  are 
spent : what  then remains the tribe pays in  such proportion 
as they divide his property.' 
Necessity  was  a  crime of  inadvertence and unnecessary 
profit ; non-necessity  was  intentional  crime,  and such  as 
was not deserved by the injured party.  In case of  necessary 
killing  the ' eric-fine ' was  paid  by  the tribe in  the pro- 
portions in which they divided property ; for every unneces- 
sary crime, homicide,  or otherwise, the criminal was given 
up himself  as well  as his cattle and land.  The man paid 
first, then his son, then his father, then each family in order 
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of  proximity  of  relationship to himself  until full payment 
was made. 
The Book of  Aicill, 111. 342, sums up the rule in ordinary 
offences, other than murder, in the aphorism, '  Cach cin co 
cinta~h  ', every crime  to the  criminal,  that  is  so long  as 
a criminal was in the territory it was not lawful to sue his 
next of  kin or his kinsmen sureties, but to sue him accord- 
ing to his rank or distrain on him. 
$13.  That, therefore,  was  the general rule, that for  all 
offences  except  killing  the  murderer  paid  first,  then  his 
kinsmen  were responsible ; for murder all were liable from 
the  start,  subject  to the  proviso  that  whcre  there  was 
deliberate murder the kinsmen could resign the criminal. 
The exact limits of  relations liable were the brother, the 
'  geilfine ',  the  ' diarbhfine ',  and  ' iarfine ' in  ascending 
order,  with  an ultimate  power,  according  to the Senchus 
Mar, to indent on gossips, sons-in-law, foster fathers, mutual 
friends, and ' on all the best of  the fine and the people not 
of  the fine '.' 
The details of  the Welsh Law are different, but the general 
principles were the same. 
13. The Law of  Hom,icide elsezolzere. 
3 I. The law of  reparation for murder was general among 
all  European  races.  It is  twice  mentioned  in  the Iliad,2 
and Tacitus in  his  Germania  refers  to the Germanic  rule 
thus : 
' In  their  resentments they  are  not  implacable.  Injuries 
are adjusted  by a settled measure of  compensation ; atone- 
ment is made for homicide by a certain amount of  cattle, and 
by that satisfaction the whole family is appeased.' 
$ 2. It existed among the Scandinavian and the Germanic 
tribes everywhere, but all we can attempt to do here is to 
point out some resemblances to Welsh Law. 
$3. We have seen that in the Scots Law the same system 
prevailed.  We may add that even so late as the Assize of 
William,  c.  15,  the rule  prevailed.  It  is  there  definitely 
stated that the slaying of  a thief was permissible,  and that 
'  Ir. Laws, I. 239, 259, 261, 263, 265 ; IV. 241-5  ; 111. 489. 
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if the kin  of  the thief  took vengeance,  such kin  must be 
regarded  as breakers  of  the King's  peace  to be  punished, 
and even if the King remitted punishment on them, the kin 
of the man on whom vengeance had been taken were still 
entitled to '  tak vengeance oi them that slew thar kyn '. 
$ 4.  In regard  to the Germanic Laws it will  suffice  to 
take a few provisions from some of  the Codes. 
The Lex  Salica  is interesting as showing how  the sum 
was collected (Codex I, Tit. LVIII).  It provides that the 
slayer, having paid  as much as he could  pay and finding 
himself  still short  of  the necessary  funds, had to produce 
a  jury  of  twelve  men  to swear  he had no more  property 
either above or below  ground.  He was  then to enter his 
own  enclosure  and  gather  earth  from  the  four  corners, 
proceed with it to the boundary line of  his precincts, and, 
still looking  inwards  towards his  own  premises,  to throw 
the dust collected  over  his  shoulders upon  him  who  was 
most nearly related to him. 
If  his father and brother had already contributed, he was 
to throw the earth on the nearest  three relatives,  both of 
his mother-kin and his father-kin.  It is important to note 
here that the liability went through female ascent, and the 
other Codices add that, if  the mother had contributed, the 
earth was to be thrown over her sister and that sister's sons. 
All these relatives were bound to contribute to the extent 
of  their ability, the richer paying for the poorer, but if  they 
were  all unable  to find the necessary  amount, the culprit 
had  to be  produced  by  those  who  stood  surety  for  his 
appearance in  four  courts,  and if  he  could  then find  no 
security to pay the '  wergild ', he had to make satisfaction 
with his life. 
Here we get a similar, though not identical, rule to that 
prevailing in Welsh Law. 
$ 5.  The same law (Tit. LXII) throws further light on the 
division of  the '  wergild '.  Where a man was slain his sons 
collected  half the '  wergild ', the other half  was  collected 
by the nearest relations both on the father and mother side, 
and  they  divided  their  half  among  themselves,  no  ratio 
being mentioned.  If there were no near relations the fisc 
collected  and annexed  the sum.  In a  later  addition  by 
Childibert,  Tit.  CI,  half  the '  wergild ' went  to the  son, 
and the rest apparently to the three nearest relatives of  the 
father-kin and mother-kin. 
$ 6.  In regard to slaves the rule was simple.  The lord of 
the slayer paid the '  wergild ' of  a slave killed io the lord 
of the victim (Tit. XXXV) :  if  the victim were a freeman 
the slave was delivered over to the '  parentes ' to be slain, 
and the lord paid half  the '  wergild ' in additi0n.l 
What the exact limitation  of  the '  parentilla ' liable to 
contribute was is nowhere explained in the Germanic Laws. 
$7. The Lex  Salica  (Tit. CIII) also  imposed  a  heavier 
~enalty  for slaying in a wood or other hidden place.  This, 
comparable to the Welsh '  waylaying ', was  termed '  creu 
beba ', and in other Germanic Laws is identical with '  mor- 
dritum ' or deliberate murder. 
In the Decretio Childiberti  11, c. 5, slaying deliberately 
without  cause was  made punishable  with  death and irre- 
deemable  by  the  payment  of  '  wergild '.  Even  if  the 
relatives  of  the slain  were prepared  to accept  ' wergild ', 
the  relatives  of  the  slayer  were  prohibited  from  aiding 
him, for as the law said, '  it is just that he who knows how 
to kill, should learn to die '. 
In the Lex Frision., Tit. CXX, 'mordrito' was  satisfied 
by a ninefold  ' wergild '.  Likewise, in the Lex  Saxonurn, 
c.  19, and  the  Lex  Angli.  et  Werion.,  which,  however, 
added that accidental  death  entailed  only a  single '  wer- 
gild '. 
$ 8.  In the Capitulaire A quis granense, c. 32  (A. D.  802), 
the taking of  revenge  was  prohibited  altogether.  Parties 
were  allowed  to  receive  '  wergilds ',  but  were  debarred 
from revenge,  and this rule,  it may be  remarked, applied 
equally to persons slaying near relatives as to those slaying 
strangers. 
In the  Capitulaire  Exercitati,  circa  A. D.  810,  c.  g, the 
pursuit  of  relatives  of  the  slayer was  strictly  forbidden, 
and an attempt made to limit responsibility to the slayer 
alone ; and in the Capitulaire Ludovic, c. 7, the slayer was 
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made responsible for the payment of  ' wergild ' for slaying, 
' ex levi causa aut sine causa ' alone. 
We see in the latter provisions an attempt to break down 
communal liability. 
The Lex Salica provides a simple ceremony for effecting 
that purpose.  By Tit. LX, Cod.  I, a  person, desiring  to 
break  ' parentilla ' ties,  broke  four  alder-wands  on  his 
head and cast them on to the ground in public court, saying 
he wished to sever himself from all oaths, inheritances, and 
reckonings with his ' parentilla ', and thereafter should any 
of  his kin be killed or die, he had no part in the '  wergild ' 
or inheritance, and likewise his kindred had no right in his. 
The same thing occurred  among the Scandinavians ; see 
Asega Buch VI, c. g. 
$ g.  We need only refer now to justification  for murder. 
On  this  matter  there  are  nulnerous  provisions,  but  it is 
enough  to mention  where  they are to be  found  in  part : 
Lex Salica LXVIII, Les Baiuor. VIII, Lex Burgund. XXIX, 
LXVIII, CIII, Lex  Frision. V (Ed. Roth.), cc. 32, 33, 212 ; 
and  to  say that  adultery, theft  by  night,  and  outlawry 
justified  slaying. 
What has been  said,  though  it by  no  means  gives  the 
whole Germanic Law, suffices to show a general resemblance 
to Welsh Law, which is all that is required here. 
THEFT AND SURREPTION 
I. I~ztroductory. 
$ I.  It has already been stated that it appears that the 
offence,  which ceased to be regarded as a tort and came to 
be regarded as a crime first in early communities, was the 
offence of  theft. 
It had in Wales at the time of  Hywel Dda ceased entirely 
to be a tort, it had become definitely and finally a crime; 
but  its old  character  as  a  tort,  nevertheless,  left  traces, 
particularly in procedure.  The law of  procedure in a trial 
for theft is described in detail elsewhere, and it suffices to 
say here that the old  character of  tort left its impression 
on  procedure  in  the ' oath of  the absolver ',  in  the fact 
that no one could prosecute for theft except the owner  of 
the  stolen  property,  and in  the  fact  that actions,  where 
the property was discovered, partook of  the nature of  suits 
to recover property. 
$2.  The early transformation  of  theft from  a tort into 
a crime was  not  confined to Wales :  it was  not  so trans- 
formed in Ireland, but it was elsewhere. 
Theft was one of  the ' three columns of  criminal law ' in 
Wales, and a considerable portion  of  the Codes and of  the 
Anomalous Laws is devoted to statements of  the law per- 
taining to the subject. 
Over  and over  again  it is  impressed  in the Codes that 
a  knowledge  of  the law  on  this  subject  was  one  of  the 
prime qualifications of  a judge, and when we see the quantity 
of  material  there is,  treating not  only  of  the substantive 
law  but of the procedure at trial, we  can well understand 
why its apparent complexity struck all who had anything 
to do with it. 
$ 3.  The  crime  of  theft  was  particularly  abhorrent  to 
early  communities,  and in the Welsh  Codes  this  attitude finds frequent expression.  So serious was it considered that 
the law laid it down that, in no circumstances whatsoever, 
could the crime be compensated  for.  We might compare, 
passim, the rule in  the Scots Assize  of  William  11, which 
provided that a person convicted of  theft 
' Hastily he  sal be  hangyt.  Alsua lefful it is to na man to 
take redempcioun for thyft eftur dome gevyn of  wattir or  of 
batel.' 
Once  a  charge  was  levied  it had to be carried to final 
disposal.  Neither  the  lord  nor  the  complainant  himself 
could  withdraw  or  compromise  the complaint  or  receive 
back the stolen property without trial, or let the thief  go. 
Nor  could  the lord  substitute  for  the extreme penalty, 
once passed, any lesser punishment. 
A  withdrawal  by  the complainant,  after  he  had  given 
sureties to prosecute,  was  to be  punished  with  a  fine  of 
three kine.l 
Surreption was, however,  compromisable before suit, but 
if  a  complaint were filed it could  only be withdrawn with 
the consent of  the lord. 
$4. Not  only were  the punishments  severe, but a  con- 
viction for theft carried with it civil disabilities.  The word 
of  a  thief  could  never  be  accepted  in  testimony  against 
another.  He could  never  be  a  compurgator,  nor  occupy 
any post  of  honour  among his  kinsmen,  and ' a  fortiori ' 
he  was  rendered  incapable  for  life  of  exercising  judicial 
 function^.^ 
2. Dejnition of  theft and cognate ofences. 
$ I.  But all that we would nowadays include in the defini- 
tion of  theft was not theft in Welsh Law.  The Welsh Laws 
draw a distinction between theft, violence, surreption, and 
error. 
$2. The essential features of  theft were secrecy, denial, 
intention  to  appropriate,  and  movement  of  the  thing 
stolen. 
All  of  these ingredients had to be present  before  theft 
V. C. 76; D. C. 438,  448;  G. C. 790;  V. 80, VI. 1x2,  120, IX. 258, 
264. XI. 346, XIV. 624. 
D. C. 422, 596 ; X. 326, XI. 406, 410. 
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could be constituted, and we have, in the law of  theft, an 
illustration of  the underlying characteristic of  Welsh criminal 
law that a thing done secretly was more infamous than a 
thing done openly. 
The definitions given in the Codes of  the offence of  theft 
and its cognates do not, perhaps, fulfil all the requirements 
of a scientific definition. 
The Venedotian Code, p.  254,  says, ' "theft " was every- 
thing  that  was  denied  of  what  shall  have  been  taken ; 
surreption,  everything taken  in  absence  and not  denied ; 
" treis ",  or  violence,  or  robbery,  everything  taken  in 
presence  and against  consent ; and error, everything  that 
was taken in mistake for another.' 
The Dimetian  Code  describes  theft  as moving  from  its 
place the thing that shall be stolen, and elsewhere as every- 
thing taken in absence and denied ; surreption, that which 
is taken in absence and not denied ; '  treis ', that which is 
taken in presence and against the owner's will;  and inad- 
vertence,  the taking  of  a  thing instead of  another  thing. 
A similar definition is given in the Anomalous Laws1 
In the latter there is one passage to the effect that some 
judges  held  that there was  no such offence as surreption, 
and that if  a thing were taken in the absence of  the owner, 
it was theft, if  in the presence of  the owner, '  treis ' ; but 
the  commentator  himself  disagrees  with  this  view,  and 
says that the correct law was that a thing taken in absence 
and not denied constituted surrepti~n.~ 
Elsewhere,  the same  commentator  says  that '  error  is 
a  thing done instead of  another, that is in seeking to do 
good  to do harm, for instance, taking another man's  pro- 
perty  in  place  of  one's  own,  for  which  act  there  is  no 
penalty '.3 
§ 3.  There  is  no  intention  here  of  giving  a  complete 
scientific definition of  theft, but the outstanding points in 
the Welsh Law may be noted. 
There could be no theft where  a man, under a mistake, 
took  away another man's property in the bona  fide belief 
' D. C. 404, 614-16;  XIV. 672. 
XIV. 728.  a  XIV. 596, that  the  property  taken  was  his  own,  provided  he  was 
prepared on ascertaining his mistake to restore the property. 
Such an act was error or inadvertence, and was no offence. 
There could also be no theft where a man took away another's 
property and diverted it temporarily to his own use, without 
any intention of  detaining it as his own.  Doing so without 
consent of  the owner, or, if  taken with consent, exceeding 
the limits of  the owner's permission as to use, was an offence, 
but it was an offence of  surreption, and not of  theft. 
There could also be no theft if  the property were stolen 
in the presence of  the owner with every intention of  retain- 
ing the property stolen and of  denying the commission of 
the act.  The act was open and not secret, and, therefore, 
though it was an offence, it was  an offence of  ' treis ' and 
not  of  theft.  Theft  was  the secret  removal  of  another's 
property with intention of  appropriating and denying com- 
mission of  the act. 
The act of  theft or of  '  treis ' might be aggravated by the 
commission of  an act of  savage violence or a ferocious act 
(Jgynzigrwydd).  That signified rendering the property stolen 
useless  to both the perpetrator  of  the offence  and to the 
owner.  Such an act involved a higher penalty. 
We  must  note,  however,  that  '  treis '  does  not  mean 
simply '  robbery '.  ' Treis ' was the use or show of  physical 
force or violence : if  that show accompanied a stealing, the 
act was dealt with in law, not as theft, but as '  treis '. 
Hence there could be ' treis ' not only in stealing, but in 
depriving a man of  his life or his  liberty, his land, or his 
movables, and also in freeing a man  from custody.  Like- 
wise  the use  of  '  ffyrnigrwydd ' could  accompany murder, 
burning, stealing, or any other act, and invariably involved 
an enhanced pena1ty.l 
§ 4.  We have next to notice a very marked line drawn- 
a line drawn in other laws also--both  in respect to procedure 
and penalty, between what was known  as '  theft present ' 
and ' theft absent ' (' lledrad  cynhyrchawl ' and '  Iledrad 
angynyrchawl ').  The terms constantly recur in the laws 
and a clear understanding of their meaning is essential. 
V. C. 254, 260;  D. C. 594,  614-16;  XI. 410. 
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Where a thief was discovered with the stolen property in 
his  possession,  and that property  was  produced  in  court, 
the theft was said to be a ' theft present ' ; where the thief 
was not discovered with the property in his possession, and 
it was  not  produced  in  court,  it was  said  to be  a  theft 
absent. 
If a  man  were  seen  driving  stolen  animals  in  front  of 
him,  or  if  stolen  property  were  discovered  in  the  same 
enclosure  as himself  and under  his control, or if  he were 
seen to throw the stolen goods on the ground, or if  he were 
seen  carrying  them,  he  was  said, however,  to be  guilty 
of '  theft present '.I 
§ 5.  The law recognized certain excusable thefts, that is, 
thefts for which no penalty could be imposed.  There was the 
case of  the '  necessitous ' thief and the case of  the wife acting 
under the domination of  her husband.  These excuses are 
dealt with in considering punishments awardable for theft. 
Likewise,  the law  recognized  excusable  surreptions,  for 
which the only liability was to make compensation  to the 
owner. 
A  person seizing a horse in order to hasten to warn the 
countryside  of  the approach  of  a  foraying  enemy,  or  to 
fetch a  priest  or a  doctor  to see  a  person ' in  extremis ', 
was guilty of  no offence.  The ' surreption ' was justifiable. 
So, too, if  two persons held property in common, and one 
used it and expended it for his own benefit, he committed 
no offence, unless the other co-sharer had placed an interdict 
against  sole  user  by  the  procedure  of  placing  a  cross 
against it. 
The seizing  of  a  mare in  order to facilitate  the capture 
of its colt, which  was  trespassing  and causing  damage to 
corn or a meadow, is also referred to as a justifiable surrep- 
tion, and, of  course, the seizing  of  any animal under the 
law of  cattle trespass was permi~sible.~ 
S 6.  On the other hand, there were definite offences which 
were not theft, but which were to be prosecuted as theft. 
The Dimetian  Code includes building  on  another man's 
D. C. 612 ; IX. 212, XIV. Goo, 676, 722. 
a  V. C. 328;  D. C. 602 ; IX. 230-8,  X. 390,  XIV.  582, 600,  640.  670. land, felling his timber and ploughing  his fields ;  but the 
Venedotian  and  Gwentian  Codes  regard  these  acts  as 
surreptions,  and  in  reality  they  were  acts  of  trespass. 
Building  on  waste  land,  ploughing  a  clearing,  waste,  or 
wood, without the lord's  permission,  were also prosecuted 
as theft.  The removal of  the '  pentanfaen ', the stones of 
a kiln, &c., without the lord's permission, were also treated 
as theft. 
The  fact that these  acts were  treated  as theft  means, 
however, only this, that the procedure applicable to a trial 
for  theft  was,  '  mutatis mutandis ',  applied  thereto,  and 
that such acts were regarded as crimes.' 
3. Punishments. 
$ I.  Inasmuch as theft had become a crime and a crime 
only,  the  only  penalty  imposable,  on  conviction,  was 
punishment by the lord or King. 
In awarding punishment, the first question was whether 
the theft was '  present ' or ' absent '. 
$2. If  it were  present,  the punishment  awardable was 
practically the same throughout  the Codes and commen- 
taries. 
For the purpose of  punishment, theft present was divided 
into two  classes,  according as to whether  its legal  value 
exceeded or did not exceed four legal pence. 
If the  theft  present  exceeded  fourpence  in  value,  the 
punishment was death ; if  it were less, the convict became 
a '  saleable thief '. 
The Dimetian Code inflicts the death penalty in all cases 
of stealing  animals,  other than  dogs  and birds ; but the 
Venedotian  Code,  while  referring  to  this  as the  view  of 
some authorities, says it is safer to confine the death penalty 
to cases exceeding fourpence in value. 
One humane authority expresses what after all was only 
a  pious  aspiration.  ' Sound  law  is  not  answerable  for 
hanging  a  person  for fourpence, there can be no hanging 
but for EIOO.' 
tj 3.  Not every one, however, even guilty of  theft present 
V.  C. 196; D. C.  444; G. C. 764. 
e.g.  V.  C. 252 ; D. C. 462,  602 ; XI. 408. 
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to the value of  fourpence was liable to be hanged.  It was 
prima  facie  a  penalty  reserved  for  a  freeman.  It could 
not be inflicted upon a bondman for a first offence ; probably 
not so much out of  a consideration of  mercy, as out of  con- 
sideration for the master, who would be deprived of  a valu- 
able property if  his bondman were executed. 
If  a bondman committed theft he was punished  for the 
first  oflence with a fine of  IOS., for the second with a fine 
of  LI,  and for the third offence he had to sacrifice a limb, 
one of  the very few cases in Welsh Law where mutilation 
was inflicted on any one for crime.  Thereafter he became 
a '  notorious  thief ' (Zleidr  cyhoeddog), and had to be  dealt 
with as if  he were a freeman convicted of  crime, that is he 
became liable to the death penalty, though even here some 
authorities say there was to be another limb amputated and 
no death penalty. 
The same penalty was inflicted  upon  a foreigner,  unless 
he were a fugitive, when he became liable to death ; and it 
was the duty of  a lord to defend his bondman or foreigner 
and redeem him when convicted, provided always that the 
theft was committed while under his dominion.  If  the lord 
would not redeem him, he could redeem himself, and there- 
after he  became  free  of  his  lord,  assuming  the status of 
a King's foreigner. 
A youth under fourteen also could not be executed ; his 
fa.ther, however, made good the theft ; nor could a tonsured 
clerk, but, in his case, as he was sheltering under the privilege 
of  his  orders,  he  was  regarded  so far  as a  fugitive  from 
justice,  that the lord was  entitled to forfeit his property, 
and he  was  handed  over  to the  Church  for punishment. 
That  punishment  involved  degradation  from  orders,  so 
a  second  theft  by him  rendered  him  liable  to the  same 
penalties as a layman. 
So, too, a necessitous  thief  was exempt from  execution, 
that  is  a  man  who,  while  in  want,  had  traversed  three 
'  trefs ' and had called on nine houses in each ' tref ', with- 
out obtaining hospitality, to relieve him.  If  he then stole 
eatables, not exceeding 5s. in value, he could not be executed, 
but he had to make good his depredations. This exemption is extended in the Venedotian Code only 
to a foreigner from beyond the sea, or who spoke a different 
language to that of the country, and in one passage of  the 
Anomalous Laws to a foreigner cast ashore from his ship. 
A married woman was also exempt if  she had committed 
theft  jointly  with  her  husband-this  on  the ground  that 
a wife was under the ' dominating rod ' of  her husband, but 
a woman committing theft on her own account was liable. 
In that  case,  however,  if  the woman  were  married,  the 
husband  had to make good  the stolen  property,  and his 
house and all that was therein was forfeited. 
The  form  of  defence  a  married  woman  charged  with 
'  theft  present ' was  entitled  to make  was  limited  to an 
' arddelw ' of  an ' arwaesaf ' (q.  v. under Procedure).  She 
could  not  claim  the  ' arddelw ' of  birth  and  rearing  or 
custody  before  loss.  If  her  defence  was  that the alleged 
stolen property was her own, she had to call her husband 
as her ' arwaesaf ' or guarantor, and he could  then plead 
the other ' arddelw ', asserting that the property was his. 
A  pregnant  woman could not be executed, and the lord 
had, in every case where a woman  was liable to death, to 
satisfy himself  whether  she was  pregnant  or  not, without 
the woman  raising  the question.  He was  responsible  to 
see that two lives were not taken for one theft.l 
5 4.  In addition to the exemption of  particular people 
from execution, the theft of  certain things, no matter what 
their value, did not involve the death penalty. 
The list is a lengthy one, and includes a tame fowl, dogs, 
birds  of  any  description,  garden  or  field  herbs,  a  wild 
animal out of  an enclosed park, a  tree or wood not to be 
used  for building,  or  one  unworked  on.  For these goods, 
if stolen, the penalty was a ' camlwrw ' of  180  pence. 
The  stealing  of  a  king's  hart  was  punishable  with  a 
' dirwy ' only, and in this and in the low penalty for stealing 
animals from a  park, we  see that the game laws of  early 
Wales were not severea2 
$ 5.  We have also to mention the peculiar provision that 
' e. g. V. C. 104, 254-6  ; D. C. 462, 5 12.  596 ; V. 60,  XIV. 668. 
e.g.V.C. 256; D.C.462.496;  G.C. 730-2. 
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if a  thief 'were parted, after arrest and before  judgement, 
from the property  alleged  to have  been  stolen, and that 
property were consumed before trial, the thief  could in no 
circumstances be executed.  The reason was that the theft 
ceased to be '  present ', and so could not be sworn to, and 
the accused  was  so  deprived  of  the power  of  raising  an 
'  arddelw '. 
Similar was  the.  rule  if  the stolen  property were  left in 
the accused's hands, and it was destroyed by another.  If 
the  thief  himself  destroyed  the  property,  he  derived  no 
benefit  thereby ;  but  if  some  one  else  did,  the  original 
thief  could not  be proceeded  against.  The destroyer was 
punishable  either as a thief  or the liberator of  a thief, but 
we  are  expressly  told  that  the  destroyer  could  not  be 
punished with death, ' as it is not right to execute any one 
for theft without property being found in his hand '.l 
$ 6.  Spoliation, i. e. seizure and forfeiture of  all property 
of  a thief, was never inflicted where the death penalty was 
imposed, unless the thief  were a fugitive or were convicted 
of  a double offence.  In the latter case he was hanged for 
one offence and despoiled for the other. 
A thief's house was not forfeit if  he were discovered, and 
even  if  he were  not discovered, the forfeiture was  limited 
to his own property in the house. 
Forfeiture, however, was  applied  to any house wherein 
stolen goods were hidden. 
$7. In a  case  of  theft  absent, trial for  which  was  by 
compurgators, the sentence of  death could never be inflicted, 
even where the jury failed to compurgate the ac~used.~ 
It has  been  asserted  that  the  institution  of  compur- 
gation  encouraged  perjury,  because  the  kinsmen  felt 
bound  to acquit a  fellow  kinsman in jeopardy  of  his life. 
A  careful  consideration  of  the laws  leaves  no  room  for 
doubt that compurgators were never in that quandary, for 
in no circumstances could  a man be executed without the 
stolen  property  being  found  in  his  possession,  and com- 
purgators  were  not  called  to exculpate  a  man  found  in 
possession of stolen property. 
Ix.  228, XIV. 616, 670. 722.  V. C. 252 ; XIV. 668-70,  &c. 5 8.  The  ordinary  penalty  for  ' theft  absent ' was  a 
'  dirwy ' of  ,&-reduced  to ;EI  if  a bondman stole less than 
a penny's worth-the  same penalty being exacted whether 
there was failure of  compurgators to exonerate or admission 
by the accused. 
It made no Qfference whether the charge was supported 
by the '  lliw ' of  an informer (q.  v. under Procedure), or was 
based on suspicion because the accused resisted search. 
Sometimes the ' dirwy ' is stated to be £7, but where £7 
is mentioned, it is in special circumstances. 
In addition to the ' dirwy ' which went to the lord, the 
convict had to recoup the claimant for his loss. 
No  doubt  the Venedotian  Code,  p.  242,  does say that 
some  authorities assert  death was  the penalty  where  the 
thief failed to pay the ' dirwy '  imposed, that is as a punish- 
ment in  default,  but  it asserts  expressly  as the true law 
that the penalty was £7, and that no one could be put to 
death on whom no stolen property was found. 
The model plaint in the XIIth Book for theft absent also 
demands a  fine  of £7, ' on  account  of  its not  being  theft 
in hand '. 
In one passage of  the Anomalous Laws there is an expres- 
sion which might, at first sight, be construed as an authority 
for the proposition that the death penalty could be inflicted 
for ' theft absent '. 
It runs : 
' Whatever it may be, whether in hand or absent, if  against 
consent, where swearing to the stolen property is appropriate, 
unless shields be had against the swearing, execution follows.' 
It proceeds, however : 
' Where  a  raith  shall pertain  for  theft,  if  the  raith  fail, 
a " dirwy " is due, however small the worth of  the thing.' 
Now  there  could  be  no  swearing  to  stolen  property, 
unless it were present ; '  shields ' were ordinarily used only 
in  actions for  theft present,  and a '  raith ' was  used  only 
in cases  of  theft  absent, except  where there was '  dogn- 
fanag' or a ' tafodiog ' statement of  a co-thief  (q.  v. under 
Procedure), in both  of  which  cases  special penalties were 
imposed. 
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This  one  authority is  no  authority  for  the proposition 
prporting to be made in it, and it is safe to assert that 
the death penalty was  not  and could  not be imposed for 
theft absent. 
The ordinary penalty, as said, was  a '  dirwy ' of  £3  or 
£7, and such was the penalty fixed where the accused had 
declined the ' oath of the absolver ', or where an ' arddelw ' 
of  custody of  guests had failed.' 
$ g.  The  only  cases  where  a  heavier  penalty  than  a 
'  dirwy ' was  exacted  for theft  absent  was  where  there 
was a  conviction  on proceedings instituted through ' dogn- 
fanag' or  the ' tafodiog ' statement  of  a  thief  sentenced 
to death (q.v. under Procedure).  In those cases  the con- 
vict  became  a '  saleable thief ', i. e.  he had to pay £7  or 
undergo bani~hment.~ 
§ 10.  Banishment  was  awardable  in  default  for  non- 
payment of '  dirwy ' unless security for payment were given, 
and it was also imposed wherever a man was sentenced to be 
a saleable thief in theft  present when the  thief could not redeem 
himself.  It was not imposed as a substantive punishment. 
If  a person banished in lieu of  ' dirwy ' returned without 
permission, he was liable to be sentenced as a saleable thief. 
If  in lieu of  that he was again banished and again returned, 
he  was  liable  to death, under  the law  of  Bleddyn,  who 
substituted that penalty for the penalty of  amputation  of 
a limb ordained in the law of  Hywel. 
If  a person were sentenced to banishment  in lieu of  the 
redemption value of  a  saleable thief, he became  liable,  if 
he returned without permission, to be e~ecuted.~ 
8 11.  The death penalty was also imposed on a saleable 
thief who could redeem himself, but refused to do so, though 
one authority states that in such a case the person in con- 
tempt  was  imprisoned  and  his  property  forfeited.  The 
death penalty was also inflicted on a  person  sentenced  to 
banishment  who did not vacate the country in the period 
fixed by law. 
Even here the death penalty was not imposed if  some one 
e.g. V. C. 242-6 ; D. C. 424, 432. 462 ; XIV. 600. 
a  V. C. 246; D. C. 418, 462 ; XIV. 616, &c. 
e. g. V. C. 242 ; IX. 226, XIV. 668. redeemed him, and the period  of  exile was limited  to the 
duration of  the life of  the lord. 
Further,  should  any  thief,  exiled  for  failure  to pay  a 
'  dirwy ', return, he  could  escape the enhanced penalty of 
banishment  if  he  were  able  to find  a  surety to pay  the 
equivalent fine of  £7. 
A  fugitive thief, however, that is, a thief  who fled from 
justice,  and in  respect  of  whom  two  captors swore  they 
had sought him at his own house in vain for three nights 
and had eventually caught  him when  fleeing, was  hanged 
outright.  - 
He was  not  even  allowed  to compurgate  himself.  It 
was a case where,  as the law says, '  notoriety hangs ', and 
the death penalty was inflicted  not so much for the theft, 
as because the fugitive had put himself  outside 1aw.l 
§ 12.  We  may now  deal  briefly  with  the penalties  for 
allied offences. 
For ' treis ', absent or present, the penalty was £3, doubled 
if  the act occurred in Church  or Court : there could be no 
death penalty for ' treis ', as the crime was  open  and not 
secret.  If  there were '  ffyrnigrwydd', i. e. if  the thief  ren- 
dered the stolen property useless, the penalty was double that 
of  theft ; death and forfeiture in the case of  goods present, 
and in the case of  goods absent the offender became a sale- 
able thief of  double value. 
For surreption the penalty was ordinarily 180 pence, but 
if  the subject  of  surreption  was  a  horse,  the fine was L3, 
plus 4 pence for mounting and 4 pence for every '  randir ' 
traversed, the latter going to the owner as compensation. 
There  could  be  no  proceedings  or conviction  for  error. 
The owner must demand his goods back without legal pro- 
ceeding,  and if  he  were  met  with  a  refusal,  the person 
refusing became  guilty  of  either  theft  or surreption.  No 
person who had refused restoration could plead error." 
4. Receiving  stolen property. 
$ I.  The law deals very fully with the reception of  stolen 
property. 
V.  C.  244;  D.  C. 600 ; IX.  226-8,  XIV.  616,  &c. 
+.g.  V.  C.  222,  2.54,  260, 262 ; D.  C.  432,  462 ; G.  C. 708,  778. 
We have seen how  under ' theft present ' the person  in 
possession was treated as a thief, and, in the law of  procedure, 
we shall see how he could hand on the charge to another by 
pleading  the ' arddelw ' of  an '  arwaesaf ',  but  over  and 
above this very effective provision  the law  contains other 
provisions. 
§ 2. The most striking of  these is the case of  the '  hundred 
recurrences ' (cylzyryn canastyr)  . 
The rule was a very ancient one, and finds a place in the 
Codes as well as in the commentaries. 
The rule provided that any person, through whose hand 
any part of  a  stolen animal passed  or any part of  a hart 
killed by the King's  hunting dogs and stolen, or any part 
of  a  carcase  of  an animal killed  by wolves  or  wild  dogs, 
removed  against  the  owner's  will,  could  be  proceeded 
against up to the hundredth hand receiving it, whether he 
received it by gift, purchase, or otherwise. 
The mere possession, however bona fide, was no defence. 
The possession was prosecuted  as theft absent, and it was 
punishable with a fine varying from 180 pence to £3. 
To guard, however, against a false charge, no complainant 
could recover the value of  any of  the property from a person 
subject to a charge of  '  cyhyryn canastyr '.' 
§ 3.  So also it was an offence if  any one found property 
and did  not  disclose its whereabouts, as soon as he ascer- 
tained  the owner  was  inquiring  about it.  Such  a  person 
was liable to pay the full value of  the pr~perty.~ 
$4. Likewise any one, however innocently, who permitted 
his house  to be used  as a  receptacle  for  stolen  property, 
rendered his house and all in it, except a deposit belonging 
to another, subject to f~rfeiture.~ 
5. Miscellaneous allied  ofences. 
Removal of  boundary stones and the like were punished 
with  a  ' camlwrw '.  Killing  a  horse,  which  was  tried  as 
theft  absent, entailed a  double ' dirwy ', and the removal 
of  the carcase of  another man's animal was also dealt with 
as theft absent, and punished with a single ' dirwy '.4 
V.C.  246;  D.C.  448;  G.C. 782.  XI.  412. 
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5 I.  We have noticed  that in the Welsh  Laws the con- 
ception that theft was a crime had developed fully by the 
time of  Hywel Dda, while traces were still retained of  the 
conception that it was a tort. 
The  change  in  conception  was  not  fully  achieved  in 
Roman Law, for Gaius classified ' theft ' as a civil wrong, 
and even in modern  French  Law the double character  of 
theft  as both a  crime and a  tort is maintained,  for  that 
law  allows,  not  only  a  criminal prosecution,  but  also  an 
action in tort by the owner. 
$2. In Irish Law theft remained a tort always : in early 
English Law it developed into a crime as early as it did in 
Wales. 
Neither the Irish Law nor the early English Law appears 
to have made any effort to define theft, nor is there any 
conscious division apparent between theft, on the one hand, 
and surreption or error on the other. 
There is  a  division  in English  Law  of  theft,  according 
to the number of  men taking part in the act ; it was theft 
say the Dooms of  Ine, c. 12,  up to seven men, thence up to 
thirty-five a '  hloth ', and thereafter a '  here '. 
3 3.  The characteristic of  Welsh  Law in its division  of 
theft into ' theft present ' and ' theft  absent ' was present 
in Roman, Irish, Scots, and English Law.  In Roman Law, 
e.g.  detection  in ' furto manifesto ' involved,  in the case 
of  a freeman, corporal punishment  or delivery of  the thief 
into the bondage of  the owner of  the property, and in the 
case of  a slave, corporal punishment and death. 
Moreover, as we  shall see in the chapters on  Procedure, 
the procedure  in  actions of  theft  in English  Law had so 
many points of  contact with the Welsh provisions that we 
are safe in  assuming  that the  general  juridical  ideas  on 
the matter were very similar in both systems. 
$ 4.  Irish Law has not much to say about theft.  It would 
appear  from  the  Senchus  M6r  (I. 157) and the  Book  of 
Aicill  (111.  139)  that the ordinary penalty  for  theft  was, 
in addition to the restoration of  the property, a  ' dire-fine ' 
payable  to the owner  of  the property,  that is  in  essence 
a pnalty for insult to the owner, recoverable as any other 
civil damages.  It is mixed up in the law  of  ' stay ' with 
civil claims, and the procedure for recovery by distress was 
identical with that applicable to other civil claims. 
In the assessment  of  the '  dire-fine ' the Irish Laws are 
extraordinarily complicated.  Starting with the conception 
that theft was  a tort, the Brehons proceeded  to consider 
whose honour had been injured by theft in a house.  They 
discovered  that not  merely  was  the  owner  of  the house 
and  property  affected,  but  all  sorts  and  conditions  of 
people who had rights of  hospitality  and the like in such 
house,  with  the  result  that  a  ' dire-fine'  was  due  for 
theft, not  merely  to the  owner,  but  to the  tribal  chief, 
and hosts  of  relatives  and retainers  of  the house  owner 
as well. 
Another  peculiarity  of  the  Irish  Law  of  theft was  that 
the responsibility of  a kinsman of  a thief  for his theft was 
not abolished. 
It is true that the Book  of  Aicill  (111.  343) lays down 
the proposition, '  Every crime to the criminal ', and that 
for theft the next of  kin or surety could not be sued ;  but it 
asserts that that rule only applied while the criminal was 
in the country ;  and if  he had fled the country, leaving no 
' seds ' therein on which distress could be made, the next of 
kin  or  the thief's  surety could  be sued.  This liability of 
kinsmen  to compensate  for the theft of  a fellow-kinsman 
crops up constantly in the Irish Laws. 
§ 5.  The early English Laws are much closer in resem- 
blance to the Welsh ones.  Like the Welsh Laws they deal 
largely  with  theft, and they are almost  plaintive in their 
denunciations  of  the prevalence of  theft and the inability 
of those in authority to cope with it. 
The earliest laws we have, those of  Bthelberht of  Kent, 
disclose  theft  partly  as a  tort and partly as a  crime, for 
in cc. g and 28 we have a penalty laid down of  a threefold 
b8t for theft from a freeman and in a dwelling, coupled in 
the former  case with  a '  wite ' and forfeiture  of  chattels. 
The  general penalty  was  a  bht, i.e.  compensation,  but it 
was  multiplied  two-,  three-,  or  ninefold  (cc. 4,  g, 28,  88, 98), and, as noted, in certain cases it carried a '  wite ' or 
fine payable to the King. 
In the Laws of  Wihtraed of  Kent, c. 26  (A.D. 690-726), 
we have it provided also that if a freeman were discovered 
with  stolen goods on him, i.e. a case of  theft present, the 
King was to have power to award punishment, the appro- 
priate punishmcnts  being  death, slavery beyond  the seas, 
or the levy of  the criminal's legal worth by way of  redemp- 
tion. 
In fact, throughout the whole of  the early English Laws 
we  have the amount  of  the penalty frequently  stated, so 
showing that theft was becoming a crime.  The conception 
of  theft as a tort, coincident with its conception as a crime, 
continued for a long time.  Even the idea of  the communal 
responsibility  of  kinsmen  for  theft  endured  until  a  late 
period.  We find, for example, in the Laws of  King Edward 
(A.D. 901-24),  C.  9, a  provision  that '  if  any one  through 
a  charge  of  theft  forfeit  his  freedom and deliver  himself 
up, and his kindred forsake him, and he know not who shall 
make b6t  for him, let him  be worthy of  the theow-work, 
which thereto belongs,  and let the "  wer " abate from the 
kindred '. 
Another  interesting  illustration  of  this  communal  re- 
sponsibility  in theft is to be found in c. 11  of  Athelstan's 
Laws, which provided that ' he who shall pray off  a criminal 
charge from a slain thief  should go with three others, two 
of  the paternal, and the third of  the maternal kin, and give 
oath that they knew of  no theft by their kinsman '. 
We  have  already  noticed  the responsibility  of  children 
for crimes and of  a household for the offence of  the head 
of  a  family,  which  points  also  to the  survival  of  com- 
munal responsibility for theft.  The conception of  theft as 
a  tort died much more hardly in  England  than it appears 
to have done in Wales. 
We find also in English Law, as in the Welsh, that there 
was  a  division  of  theft according to the magnitude of  the 
theft, where the theft was theft present  (hand haebbende). 
In the Judicia Civitatis Lundoniae (temp. Athelstan), c. I, 
it is  provided  that ' no  thief  is to be  spared  for  over  12 
CH. v  THEFT  IN ENGLISH  LAW  161 
pence ', and in the Ordinance of  Greatanlea, c. I (A. D. gq), 
the figure was fixed at  -8  pence,  but the division indicated 
is not so completely developed as it was in Wales. 
In the matter of  punishment the English Laws provided 
~onstantly  changing penalties in  marked contradistinction 
to  the  Welsh  Laws,  and  the  severity  of  these  penalties 
shows the wide prevalence of  the offence in early England. 
As  we  have  seen,  Ethelberht  fixed  the penalty  at a 
multiple  b6t, plus  a  ' wite ' and forfeiture  of  chattels in 
some  cases.  In  Wihtraed's  Laws,  c.  26,  the  penalties 
included death, slavery beyond the seas, and full ' wergild '. 
In the Wessex Laws of  Ine (A. D.  688-725),  the penalty 
where a  thief  stole without knowledge  of  his  family, was, 
according to one  section  (c. 7), to be  60s. ' wite ', but if 
his wife and children were cognizant of  the theft, the whole 
family was to be sold into slavery ; while in another section 
(c.  12)  it was  said that a  thief  caught with goods  in  his 
possession was  to be  slain  or  redeemed,  according  to his 
' wer '.  We have here the same distinction as in the Welsh 
Laws, whereby ' theft absent ' entailed a lesser penalty than 
'  theft present '. 
The same laws provided  (cc. 18, 37) that where the thief 
was a ' ceorl ' and a notorious thief, he was to have his feet 
and hands cut off. 
The Laws of  Edward, c. g (A. D. 901-z4),  provide slavery 
as  the penalty for  theft,  and  the Laws  of  Blfred, c.  6, 
' angylde ' (i.  e.  the single value  of  the property), '  wite ' 
and amputation of  the hand, redeemable according to ' wer ', 
where  the  theft  was  in  church.  The  Judicia  Civitatis 
Lundoniae, cc. I, 4, imposed the death penalty, restoration 
of the property or its value, and forfeiture of  a quarter of 
his property (the remainder going to the widow and '  gegil- 
dan '),  if  no  defence  were  raised ; and, if  a  defence  were 
raised and the ordeal went against the accused, with death. 
unless redeemed by his kinsmen or lord on payment of  the 
' wer ' and value of  the stolen property.  In case of  a second 
conviction, the thief  was to be broken on the wheel. 
The  Laws  of  Ethelred  (A.D.  978-1016)  provide  that 
thieves, being ' theowmen ' (c. 2), were  to be branded  for 
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the first offence, and slain for the second ; while for freemen 
(c. 4)) death was  the penalty if  the accused failed  at the 
ordeal, or, according to another section  (c. I), double bbt 
and '  wer ' with death for the second offence. 
Under the Laws of Cnut, a notorious thief  was outlawed 
(c. 26), and housebreaking and theft present were ' bbtless ' 
(cc. 2, 26, 65), and punishable with death.  In c. 77, Cnut 
changed the law whereby the who1.e  household dwelling in 
a  house  containing  stolen  property was  executed  or  sold 
into slavery, and limited the liability to the thief alone. 
We see there the final victory of  the conception of  theft 
as a crime. 
tj 6. We may conclude that, in spite of  certain minor differ- 
ences, the similarity between  the Welsh  and English  law 
of  theft  was  pronounced,  and that both started from the 
same general juridical  ideas as prevailed  in  the  Brehon~c 
Laws.  In this particular offence the Welsh  Laws  appear 
to have  progressed  a  little more rapidly  towards  modern 
conceptions than did the English law, just  as the English 
law, after the Conquest, in  the matter  of  murder, antici- 
pated the Welsh law in its approach to present day ideas. 
$7. The fragments  of  Scots  law  we  have  indicate  a 
similar view  of  the law  of  theft.  We have the same dis- 
tinction  between  theft  present  and theft  absent,  e. g.  in 
the Assize  of  King  William  a  separate penalty  was  pre- 
scribed for theft in hand. 
Generally, punishments were, so far as we can see, similar. 
The old  rule  making a  convicted  thief  saleable obviously 
existed, for by c.  16  of  the Assize of  David  I, the sale  of 
thieves was forbidden, and we have the same or a similar 
rule  apportioning  punishment  according  to the  value  of 
the thing stolen.  On this point c. 13  of  the Assize of  King. 
\Villiam  runs : 
' Of  byrthynsik, that is to say of  the thyft of  a calf  or  of 
a ram or how mekil as a Inan may ber on  his bak, thar is no 
court to be haldyn, bot he  that is lord of  the land quhar the 
theyff  is  tane  on  suilk maner sal haf  the scheip or  the  calf 
to the forfelt.  And  the theyff  aw  to be  weil  dungyn on  his 
er to be  schorn. . . . Na  man  aw  to be  hangyt for les price 
than twa scheip of  the quhilkis ekane is worth 16 pence.' 
$8 To  enumerate  the  resemblances  in  the  Germanic 
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Laws would take too much space.  It suffices to note briefly 
some of the resemblances, which show sufficiently that the 
pneral law was the same. 
The Lex Frision., Tit. VIII, drew the same distinction as 
the Welsh  Laws  did  between  theft  and '  treis ', and the 
Lex  Ripuar., c. 45, regarded  the possession  of  stolen pro- 
perty  as  equivalent  to theft.  The  Lex  Salica  provided 
endless  grades  of  punishments  for  the  theft  of  animals 
according to species-pigs,  cows, sheep, goats, dogs, birds, 
bees,  horses,  &c.-and  according  to quantities,  age,  and 
place where stolen, and also according to whether the theft 
were present or absent,l while a distinction was drawn also 
between the theft and surreption of  a horse.2 
Similar rules occur in the Lex Baiuor., Tit. IX, the Lex 
Burgund., Tit. LXX, the Lex  Frision.,  Tit.  111, the Lex 
Langobard.  (Ed.  Roth.), c. 281  et seq., the  Lex  Saxon., 
Tit. 11, cc. 29-36,  and the Lex Angl. et Werion., cc. 35-9. 
A  distinction  is  also  drawn  between  thefts by freemen 
and  thefts by the unfree,  in  both  cases  the punishment 
varying according to value.  In  the case of  slaves the general 
penalty  for the first offence was  scourging, for the second 
mutilation, and sometimes even for a first ~ffence.~ 
Ploughing and sowing on another man's land were dealt 
with  as theft,4 and sometimes  as an in~ult,~  likewise also 
slaying an animal ~ecretly.~ 
In the Lex Burgund., Tit. XLVIII, we have reproduced 
the old English law that the wife and children over  ten of 
a  thief  were  to be  sold  into slavery:  in  the same  law, 
Tit. LXXI, the harbouring  of  a  thief  was  dealt  with  as 
theft, and we  might  note the resemblance to the English 
law found in the Capitulaire of  Charlemagne (A. D. 779), C.  23, 
in the  view taken that mutilation was a mercifulsentence com- 
pared with death.  A thief was not to be put to death for a first 
offence, he was to be blinded ; for his second offence his nose 
was to be cut off, and for his third he was to be executed. 
' Tit. 11, 111, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, XXII, XXVII, and XXXVIII. 
Cod. I, Tit. XXIII. 
a  Lex  Salica, Tit. XI,  XI1 ;  Leges  Alamman.  Extravagantes ;  Lex 
Baiuor., Tit. 11, IX  ; Lex Burgund., Tit. IV; and Lex Ripuar., Tit. XVIII. 
'Tit. XXVII. Lex Salica. 
'  Lex ~aiuor.;  Tit. XIV, XVII.  Lex Baiuor., IX. g. CH. VI  USE OF  FIRE 
FIRE OR  ARSON 
I. Introductory. 
5 I.  In early Wales fire played an important part in the 
social life of  the people,  and the law  relating to it is  of 
importance  more  as illustrative  of  social  conditions  than 
from any peculiarity in the unlawful use of  it as an offence. 
5 2. The centre of  social life was the hearth-stone.  Ancient 
Welsh homesteads,  even  the King's  palace, were made of 
I  wood, with  pent-houses  or  adjuncts of  the same material, 
apparently thatched with straw or broom, or, in some cases, 
with sods.  In the centre of  the house, between the middle 
pillars  supporting the roof, lay the fireplace.  At the back 
of  the fireplace stood the fireback stone, the '  pentanfaen ', 
and once it had been placed in position  it was  an  offence 
to remove it. 
The house  itself  might  be  destroyed,  the owners might 
desert  the  site and go  to another part of  the country or 
seek other lands in the scattered acres of  the tribe to culti- 
vate, but the '  pentanfaen ' was never  removed.  It stood 
as a perpetual sign that the site where it stood was the site 
of  an occupied homestead,  which  no one else was  allowed 
to take possession of  in such a way as to prevent the original 
occupiers recovering it, if  they so willed. 
So long as the homestead was occupied the fire was never 
allowed to go out.  Every evening the embers were raked 
low, and a sod of  peat or of  earth was placed  on top.  In 
the morning the sod was removed, and the embers, which 
had been kept glowing under the peat, were supplied with 
new fuel for the day's use. 
We see, therefore, why the law of  fire was regarded with 
homicide and theft as one of  the three columns of  law. 
5 3.  The law of  fire brings before  us the village smithy, 
situated a few paces from all other habitations, roofed over 
shingle, broom, tiles or sods, the village bath, and the 
general kiln. 
Many proprietors had their own kilns, but some hamlets 
had  a  common  one,  and  no  hamlet  was  complete  with- 
out one. 
The kiln  or '  odyn ' was placed  in a kiln-house, in front 
of  the fireplace  in which  there was  an excavation.  This 
was  covered  with  lathes of  wood  a  little distance apart, 
and over the lathes straw was spread.  On top of  the straw 
corn was placed, and above the straw corn was heaped to 
dry  before  being  hulled  and ground  for  meal.  This  was 
the '  odyn ' of  the Welsh Laws. 
2.  Use of fire  as a tort or crime. 
I.  In the use  of  fire  the law  laid  down  strict  rules, 
because of  the dangers involved in its negligent or criminal 
use, and it is in the different  rules relating to the use  of 
fire  that  we  have  an  indication  of  tort  developing  into 
crime. 
Originally all damage caused by fire, whether accidentally 
or deliberately, was a tort for which compensation was paid. 
In North Wales it is apparent that burning, conceived of  as 
a crime, had not become accepted in the time of  Hywel Dda. 
The Venedotian Code provides no penalty for burning ; what 
it does is to provide for the payment of  damages. 
In both north and south the invariable rule was that every 
burner paid for the damage which he caused, and if  there 
were abettors they paid a portion of  the damages.  But in 
North Wales there is nothing to indicate that an incendiary 
was liable for anything e1se.l 
5 2.  Many  minute regulations  occur  in  the  Venedotian 
Code as to the use of  fire, the breach of  which was some- 
times criminal. 
It was an offence of  surreption to remove fire from another 
man's  house  without  permission,  and the person  doing so 
was fined a ' camlwrw ', paying also for the damage caused 
by  such  fire.  He  was  entitled, in  order  to avoid  being 
mulcted in damages, to show, if  he could, that the damage 
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was caused not by that part of  the fire which he removed, 
but by the actual fire from which he had taken a portion. 
If a person lent fire to another, the lender was not respon- 
sible for damage caused, if  he took the trouble to satisfy 
himself it was needed for a lawful purpose, but if  he did not 
take that precaution he had to pay one-third of  the damage 
caused. 
So too, if  any one borrowed a house with fire in it and 
rekindled it three times, he became responsible for all damage 
caused by the fire to the house or anything else ; and if 
any one lit a fire in  another's house he was responsible for 
all damage caused within three days and nights thereafter.l 
$3. Property deposited  with  any one had to be strictly 
guarded against fire.  Any one allowing a deposit in his charge 
to be  burnt paid  for  it, and the rule applied specially to 
weaving women who let webs or bales of  yarn, entrusted to 
them, get burnt.  But no one was responsible  for damages 
caused to the person of  another by fire, unless he had done 
something  to bring  the fire  into direct  contact  with  the 
sufferer ; and hence was born the rule that '  galanas did not 
follow  fire '  unless  caused  deliberately,  in  which  case  it 
followed the hand that caused the fire 
§ 4.  One provision of  interest brings vividly before us the 
herds of  pigs  which  wandered about the villages,  and the 
responsibility  of  their  owners  for  them.  If  swine  entered 
a  house,  and scattered the fire  about, burning the house 
down, the owner  of  the herd paid  for all damage done, if 
they escaped ; but he paid nothing if  the pigs were destroyed 
in the fire they had caused.  There was then, says the Code, 
' an equation between them, as being two irrational things,' 
for which there was no redress3 
5 5.  In North Wales if  any one caused a fire he was respon- 
sible to pay for all damage, no matter how far the fire spread. 
Some MSS. confine the liability to the house actually burnt ; 
and, if  a  fire arose accidentally in  one man's house,  they 
limit liability to damage caused to the adjacent houses on 
each side, provided  that these two houses were  separated 
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from other houses by a space.  If  the fire crossed that space 
it became  an uncontrollable fire  for  which  no reparation 
was to be made.l 
5 6.  In order to avoid damage from kilns strict regulations 
as to their use existed. 
No one could make a kiln on another's land.  If  he did 
he was fined three kine, payable to the King, and the owner 
of the land was entitled to four pence for land-breach and 
all  the  materials  used  in  the  kiln.  Here,  however,  the 
criminal action lay not in using the fire but in trespassing. 
If  any one dried corn on some one else's kiln he had to pay 
for all damage caused by the fire in the next three days and 
nights,  and if  the owner  of  the kiln  lit it and lent it to 
another  he  was  responsible  for  one-third  of  the  damage 
unless  he  took  security  from  the borrower  to indemnify 
him.  So too, if  any  one borrowed a kiln and lit a fire and then 
handed it on to a third person to use it, it was his duty to 
protect himself by taking an indemnity for keeping the fire 
safe and for its extinguishment when done with ; if  he did 
take security or, if before handing the kiln over, he put out 
his own fire, he ceased to be responsible, and the new user 
became entirely responsible. 
Any one using a kiln had to see the fire was put out when 
done with.  If  he failed to do so, the layer of  the fire and the 
kindler each paid half  the damage caused, and, if  any one 
left  a fire smouldering in a  kiln  and another person  came 
along  and rekindled  it, the  damage was  divided  equally 
between them.z 
§ 7.  In certain circumstances no damages for loss by fire 
was paid at all. 
The first instance illustrates the freedom to burn heath. 
That  could  be  done  in  North  Wales  in  March,  in  South 
Wales  from  the middle  of  March  to the middle  of  April, 
provided it was waste land on which there were no habita- 
tions.  No  reparation was  payable  for  damage caused  by 
such fires, but if  the heath were burnt at any other time, 
damage was paid for. 
V. C. 258 ; D. C.  414; G. C. 688;  XIV. 576. 
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A fire caused by a spark from a village  smithy was not 
to be  compensated  for  if  the  smithy were  covered  with 
shingles, brooms, tiles, Gr  sods, and if  it were not within seven 
fathoms or nine paces from any house.  A spark, however, 
from a smithy setting fire to property in another village had 
to be paid for.  A fire arising from the village bath had not 
to be paid  for, provided  it was  lit  at the same distance 
from houses, and the damage did not arise in another ' tref '. 
Likewise  was  the rule  where  the fire  originated from  the 
village kiln.' 
5 8.  These minute provisions,  occurring in  all the Codes 
and commentaries,  provide  the law  for  reparation  in  all 
cases, accidental on  deliberate ; but it is clear that in South 
Wales deliberate burning had not only to be compensated 
for but was  punishable with  a  criminal penalty.  That is 
to say, arson was beginning to find a place in the law of  crime 
in South Wales.  When  this happened  it is impossible  to 
say, but inasmuch  as in  Domesday  it was  punishable  in 
Arcenfeld  with  a  fine of 2os., it probably arose some time 
before the eleventh century. 
The Dimetian  Code  and the XIVth  Book  both  define 
arson as a crime.  The former defines it as '  the putting fire 
to the thing  that shall be burnt ', and the latter  as ' the 
thrusting of  the brand into the building that is to be burnt '. 
The essence of  arson as a crime was the actual application 
of  a flame to property with the intention of  burning it so 
as to cause loss or damage. 
The Dimetian  Code gives definite penalties.  If  any one 
were caught in the act of stealthily burning a house he was 
to be executed ; if  he  were  charged  for  any other act of 
deliberate burning, he became on conviction a saleable thief." 
3. Fire in other contenzPorary systems. 
$ I.  There are few  references  to arson in  early English 
law, but what there are show clearly that deliberate burning 
was regarded as a crime to which a criminal penalty attached ; 
the original idea that it was a tort surviving, however, in the 
provision that damages caused must be paid for. 
V. C. 258,  260 ; D. C. 446 ;  G.  C.  780 ; IX. 262. 
DD.  C.  404-6,  614  ; XIV.  710. 
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It will  be  noticed,  however, that in so far as the early 
English Laws are concerned, there is no mention of  accidental 
burning ; but that fact, in view of  the fragmentary nature 
of the English Laws, is insufficient  to justify  a  conclusion 
that damages were not to be paid for by the person respon- 
sible for an accidental fire. 
In the Ordinances of  Athelstan, c. 6, incendiaries were to 
be tried  by the triple ordeal,  and if  found guilty were  to 
be imprisoned for 120 days, fined a '  wite ' of  £6, and placed 
in '  borh ' for the future.  Under Cnut's Secular Laws, c. 65, 
arson was  made punishable with  death, the same penalty 
as was  provided  by the XI1 Tables  of  Rome ; and it is 
expressly said that it was ' bbtless ', that is a matter not to 
be settled by the mere payment of  damages. 
$2. The Irish Laws are silent, but the Scots Law have a few 
rules comparable to the Welsh ones. 
In the Leges Quatuor Burgorum it appears that it had 
become necessary, when  towns grew,  to limit the liability 
for accidental fire, showing inferentially that the older rule 
coincided  with  the Welsh  one  whereby all fire had to be 
paid for : 
' Gif  that fyr passis out of  ony mannis hous quhar thruch 
hapnis  mony  housis  be  brynt  to  the  nychtburis,  na  greyff 
nor  na dystroblens sal be  done ti1 hym mar than he  has for 
sorow and hevines has he in such foroutyn mar.' 
In the Collecta,  p. 387,  5 13,  however, we  have  a  rule 
identical with the Welsh rule operative in the country : 
' Giff  fyr pass  thru ony place and findis ethekris and over- 
takis ane other manis coi-ne outher in  barne yard or in  felde 
standande he  sall mende the scath that lychtyt the fyr.' 
In the Leges of  the Four Boroughs we  have practically 
the same rule re kilns as in Wales : 
' Kycht sua it is of  hyin that  brynnis ane mannis kyll bot 
he  sal tyne his service.  And  quhasa has lent his kyll ti1 ony 
mail and it brynnis, he that it to was lent is heldyn to restore 
it in sic ply as he it borowyt.  Bot an he hyryt it for pennys, 
and it bryn, he  that it hyryt aw nocht to makna mendis for it 
bot the hyre.' 
$ 3.  In the Germanic Laws there is not much mention of 
arson. 170  FIRE  OR  ARSON  PART  VI 
Under the Lex Salica, Codex I, Tit. CXVI, if  fire were 
caused  by chance  to  a  place  where  men  were  sleeping, 
compensation had to be paid to the men, apparently for the 
disturbance to their honour ; and if  any one were burnt '  wer- 
gild ' was paid.  Sums are fixed also for damages by fire to 
wattle huts and corn sheds, and in the same title  )f Codex 11, 
juries of  compurgation were provided for where a Romanus 
was charged with burning. 
Under the Lex Alamman., Tit. LXXXIII, damage by fire 
had to be made good, and in addition there was a fine varying 
from  40s.  to rzs., halved  if  the property  belonged  to an 
unfree man ; but a slave causing fire had his eyes put out 
and his hands and feet amputated. 
Under the Lex Baiuor., Tit. I,  the rules were identical as 
regards Church property burnt by night, so also in the Lex 
Ripuar., Tit. XVII, except that there was honour price or 
' hreavunti ' to every  one  within  the building  burnt,  or 
' wergilds ' if  burnt by deliberate arson. 
Under the Lex Burgund., Tit. XLI, crops burnt by negli- 
gence had to be paid for unless the fire were carried by the 
wind ; and under  the  Lex  Frision.,  Tit. VII, all  fires, if 
deliberate, had to be compensated for by double value, and 
if any one were burnt to death in a house there was a nine- 
fold ' wergild '. 
Similar rules occur in the Lex Langobard., Ed. Roth., cc. 
146-9,  and the Lex Angl. et Werion., c. 43. 
Under the Lex Saxon., 11. 68, the penalty for deliberate 
burning of  a house by night was death, and in the Capitulare 
Saxon., c. 5,  we have an echo of  the 'lawful disturbances ' 
by fire.  It provided  that if  a person refused to do justice 
and disobeyed the order of  the King to appear, and he could 
not be forced to appear otherwise, it was permissible to burn 
his house down.  For other burnings the penalty was 120s. 
We see in these provisions the gradual growth of the idea 
that arson was a crime, competing with and slowly displacing 
the older conception that it was a tort. 
The rules spring from exactly the same set of  ideas as did 
the Welsh Laws. 
VII 
THE LAW  OF ACCESSORIES 
I. Accessory acts. 
tj I.  The Welsh Laws speak of  nine accessories to each of 
the three columns of  law-homicide,  theft, and burning. 
tj 2.  The  nine  accessory  acts  in  homicide,  or,  to use 
modern  legal  phraseology,  the acts of  abetment  are said 
to be : 
First Group : 
I. Tongue  reddening  or  informing  the  murderer where  the 
person may be  whom he wishes to kill. 
2.  Giving counsel to the murderer to kill. 
3. Plotting  against  the  person  killed  or  consenting  to  his 
murder. 
Second Group : 
4.  Spying on or pointing out to the murderer the person whom 
he  wishes to kill. 
5. Associating with the murderer when he  wishes to kill. 
6. Coming  with  the  murderer  into  the  '  tref ' wherein  the 
person  to be  killed may be. 
Third Group : 
7.  Assisting  the  murderer  in  killing  or  holding  the  victim 
while bein? killed. 
8. Detaining  orvkeeping the  victim  until  the  arrival  of  the 
murderer. 
g. Looking on at the killing and suffering it to be done. 
Some of  these acts would  in some systems of  modern  law 
be just  as much murder as the act of  the principal, but the 
Welsh Laws confined homicide to the person who inflicted 
the fatal blow or performed the fatal deed.l 
tj 3.  The nine accessory acts in  theft are defined in very 
much the same terms in all the Codes as follows : 
I. Pointing  out  or  informing  the  thief  of  the  thing  to  be 
stolen or suggesting the obtaining of  a particular article 
bv theft. 
2.  ~onientin~  to or agreeing with the thief to commit theft. 
V. C. 218-20;  D. C. 406; G. C. 686-8 ; IX. 258, 260, X. 344. 3. Giving provision to the thief. 
4.  Going  with  the  thief  to  steal, or  carrying provisions  for 
him when going to steal. 
5. Helping the thief to break into the place where the property 
to be  stolen was,  or  to break  down  the  fence  of  such 
place. 
6. Advising  the  thief,  or  carrying  or  removing  the  stolen 
property or receiving it. 
7.  Travelling by day and night with the thief  after the theft. 
8.  Receiving a share of  the stolen property. 
g.  Concealing  the  thing  stolen, or  receiving  something from 
the thief  for not disclosing the offence. 
Here again the accessory acts include acts which in some 
systems of  modern law would be classed as theft, but once 
more the Welsh  Laws confined  the offence of  theft to the 
actual removal of  the pr0perty.l 
5 4.  The nine accessories to arson are likewise stated in 
much the same form in all the authorities, thus : 
I. Giving counsel to burn or  to go  and burn a house. 
2.  Consenting or agreeing to burning. 
3. Going  to the place  to be  burnt  for  the purpose of  burn- 
ing it. 
4.  Carrying the fuel. 
5. Procuring the tinder. 
6.  Striking the fire. 
7.  Giving the fire to the person who shall burn it. 
8. Fanning the fire till it kindles. 
g. Seeing the burning and allowing it. 
Once more the list includes acts which  in  some systems 
of  modern  law  would  be  classed  as principal  acts in the 
offence, and yet once  more the Welsh  Laws  confined  the 
principal act to the actual application of  the brand.2 
5 5. An accessory act is defined generically in the Dimetian 
Code as ' a cause  through which  the act is committed by 
consent, and therefore consent constitutes the accessory act, 
whether the act be by sight, words, or deed less than the 
principal's  '.3 
$ 6.  The first point to note in regard to the Welsh law of 
abetment is this, that there was  no like law  applicable  to 
anything other  than homicide,  theft,  and burning.  It is 
V. C. 238-40  ; D. C. 416 ; G. C. 690 ; IX. 262-4,  X. 344. 
a  V. C. 256 ; D. C. 404, 412-14  ; G. C. 688 ; IX. 262, X. 346. 
a  D. C. 404. 
even doubted specifically in the XIVth Book if  there could 
be  accessories  to '  treis '.  This principle  was  maintained 
in the Statute of Rhuddlan, which dealt with accessories to 
theft or robbery, manslaughter or murder, and arson alone. 
It must also be noted that there could  be no abetment 
without intention ;  and that, unless  the act  abetted were 
itself  a  wrong,  were  committed,  and the perpetrator were 
proceeded against, there could be no act accessory to it. 
Consequently, there was no accessory  act to an accident, 
e. g. accidental burning, to the theft of  a dog or fowl (which 
was  not ' theft ' in law), to a  justifiable  surreption, to the 
slaying of a  person  by an animal;  and, inasmuch  as the 
crime of  murder entailed loss of  blood  in its original  con- 
ception, there could be no accessory act to murder by poison. 
In the latter case the preparation of  poison for the purpose 
of  administering it was a substantive offence involving death 
or banishment.' 
$ 7.  A  consideration  of  these  acts of  abetment shows a 
distinctly scientific classification. 
The  accessory  acts  to  murder  consist  of  three  groups 
according  as  to whether  the  act  was  one  of  conspiracy, 
assistance before the actual crime, or assistance during the 
actual commission of  the crime. 
The  accessory  acts  to  arson  correspond  to  the  same 
tripartite division. 
The accessory  acts to theft  at first  sight  appear to be 
divided  into  acts  of  conspiracy,  assistance  immediately 
before the theft, assistance during the theft, and assistance 
after the theft., 
The last two apparent divisions are, however, in reality 
only one, for the simple reason that the offence of  theft was 
not completed until the act of  removal was completed.  If 
we bear that in mind we find the tripartite division idelltical 
in all cases. 
2. Abetment-tortuous  or  criminal. 
5 I.  We have stated that the Welsh law did not appear 
to recognize  any abetment  of  an accidental act ; and, in 
D. C. 604; IV. 22, IX. 260, XIV. 616, 706-8,  710-12. the case of  slaying, we have seen that blood-fine was payable 
for both  negligent  and  deliberate  killing,  the latter also 
carrying with it a criminal penalty. 
The nature  of  the penalty  incurred  for  abetment  was 
a fine,  a '  camlwrw ' or a ' dirwy ':  It was a single, double, 
or triple ' camlwrw ' according to the group into which the 
abetting act fell, provided  there was no fighting.  If  there 
were fighting there was a ' dirwy ', though some authorities 
assign a ' dirwy ' as penalty in all cases. 
The majority of  the authorities assert that the fine on an 
accessary to murder went to the King ; but there are one 
or two passages which assign it to the relatives in addition 
to the blood-fine. 
The fact that the majority assign the penalty to the King, 
coupled with the fact  that there could  be no abetment of 
homicide,  unless  the  homicide  were  a  crime, establishes 
beyond question that in homicide the act of  abetment was 
not a tort but a crime.l 
$2. The penalty for an act accessory to theft-which  was 
itself a crime and not a tort at the time of  the redaction- 
was  a  ' dirwy ', with  banishment  in  default,  power  being 
reserved to the lord to reduce the '  dirwy ' to three pence. 
The penalty  in  the case  of  a  ferocious  act was  a  double 
' dirwy '.  Abetment of  theft was, therefore, clearly a crime.2 
5 3. The penalty for an act accessory to arson varies.  In 
North Wales, where as we have seen arson had not developed 
into a  crime,  there was  no  criminal  penalty  at all.  The 
abettor was liable to pay the whole of  the damage caused or 
contribute a  share of  one-third.  In South Wales, on the 
other ha-nd, where deriberate arson was a  crime, involving 
both reparation  and penalty, an abettor was responsible to 
contribute one half the reparation and to pay a ' camlwrw ' 
or '  dirwy ' for his act  .3 
3.  The origin of  accessory acts in Welsh law. 
$ I.  In a very illuminating article by the late Sir J. Bryn- 
mor-  Jones, entitled '  Foreign Elements in Welsh Mediaeval 
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Law ' (Trans. Cymmrod. Society,  1916-17),  the view  was 
held that the development of  the law of  abetment in Wales 
was subsequent to the tenth century, and that in that law 
'  we  have the  speculation  of  some  lawyer  as  to possible 
causes of  connivance by persons with the principal  perpe- 
trator of  a crime '.  That is to say, the writer was of  opinion 
that the law of  abetment formed no part of  the original law 
of Hywel  Dda, though he held that the Welsh law was an 
indigenous growth.  Prof. Lloyd appears to hold the same 
view. 
2. It is impossible to deal here with all the arguments 
advanced, but it should be pointed out that the conclusion 
seems to be weakened by the fact that some of  the arguments 
are not based on accurately stated facts. 
The most important of  the grounds advanced runs : 
' I can find in the Anglo-Saxon Laws or the Brehon Laws 
no  such  scheme  of  accessory  acts  and  forbearances  as  are 
developed in the Welsh  Codes.' 
It is correct  that, if  the passage  in  Horne's  Mirror  of 
Justice,  admittedly a dubious compilation, be omitted from 
consideration, there is practically nothing in the early Anglo- 
Saxon Laws dealing with abetment.  The passage runs : 
' The  nine  accessories  are  those  who  command, conceal, 
allow by consent, who see it, who help, who be parties to the 
gain, who  know  thereof, and  do  not  hinder  by  forbidding, 
who knowingly receive, who are in force.' 
$ 3.  The Teutonic  Laws  generally  are also  deficient in 
rules  regarding accessories.  There is trace of  an incipient 
law of  abetment in the Lex Burgund., Tit. 11, an inducer of 
murder paying one-third '  wergild ' if  the murderer escaped. 
The  law  appears  to  have  been  extended  by  Wulemar 
(ten$.  Charlemagne) to theft, but the provisions  are rudi- 
mentary and make no attempt at any classification similar 
to that in the Welsh Laws.  In the Leges Langobard. (Ed. 
Roth.), cc. I, 10, 11, we find also mention of  accessories to 
treason  and  murder,  fragmentary  and  undeveloped  in 
nature. 
5 4.  The idea of  abetment was nevertheless not a new one. 
It was  recognized in  Rome in the lost Lex Pompeia (circa 17~  THE LAW  OF ACCESSORIES  PART VI 
B.  C.  52) in regard to murder, and Gaius definitely mentions 
accessories to theft.  It should be no matter of  surprise if 
the earliest Welsh Laws did provide for abetment. 
$ 5.  It is, however, inaccurate to assert that there was no 
scheme of  accessory acts in the Irish Laws. There is a scheme 
in those laws, which, though not stated in the same form as in 
the Welsh Laws, has many striking resemblances to the latter. 
The most  important  passage  occurs in  the oldest  Irish 
authority we have-the  Senchus M6r, I. 241.  Paraphrased, 
the provision runs : 
There are four lookers-on with the Fieni : 
I. A  looker-on who  incurs full fine  is a man  who  instigates 
and accompanies and exults at his deed in the territory, 
but who has riot inflicted the wound with his own hand. 
2.  A looker-on, who incurs half fine, is he who does not insti- 
gate, does not wound, but does all the other acts. 
3. A  looker-on, who  incurs quarter  fine, is  one  who  accom- 
panies only and does not prohibit and does not save. 
4.  A  looker-on, who  is  exempt, is  one  who  brings  against 
them all his strength and resources. 
The  last  provision  recalls  vividly  the Welsh  provision 
that,  though  there  was  no  direct  penalty  for  failure  to 
render assistance, yet an innocent bystander, seeing a murder 
committed, who did not interfere to prevent it, had to prove 
he was not an accessary by IOO  ' compurgators ', and if  he 
failed he was liable to a  '  camlwrw ' ; while if  persons, in 
the  company  of  the  murderer  and  murdered  man,  saw 
a blow struck and did not interfere to prevent a second or a 
third blow being struck, they became liable to a '  dirwy '.l 
In spite of  the different form of  expression  the resern- 
blances between  the Irish  provisions  and the Welsh  Laws 
is remarkable.  There is a  tripartite division  of  accessory 
acts (the fourth looker-on is of course not an abettor) ; and 
in the division, the same elements of  conspiracy, participat- 
ing before,  and participating during the commission of  the 
act, though differently  handled, occur as in the Welsh Laws, 
and there is a  difference in the penalties incurred, just  as 
we have seen there was in the Welsh Laws, according to the 
nature of  the accessory act. 
a  V-  H, XI. M, 
The Book of  Aicill also deals with accessaries.  On p. IOI 
it gives the law as to the fines payable by an accessary ; 
011  p. 103  it states that if  a person find a concealed body and 
does not give information immediately he is a ' looker-on ', 
others saying he is fined for ' complicity ' ; and on p.  115, 
instigation is dealt  with where murder was  committed  by 
a gang.  If  a man, it is provided, led out a host by force or 
through their ignorance to kill, the leader, whether the host 
were  arrested  or not, paid  the full  seven ' cumhals ' due ; 
but, if  the host were led out by consent and were arrested, 
then the compensation  was  divided thus :  one-third upon 
the leader ' on account of  his instigation ', and two-thirds 
upon the  whole host, the leader paying out of  that two-thirds 
a share equal to that of  every other person in the host. 
Here again we have a clear recognition of  instigation as 
an act of  abetment over and above the actual offence. 
On p.  123, a ' daer ' man looking on was mulcted in the 
equivalent of  his own ' eric-fine '. 
Again, on  p.  99,  the Book  of  Aicill imposed  a  double 
penalty on every one concerned in a secret murder, including 
the  ' looker-on '.  In two  other  passages  it  defined  the 
liability of  an instigator and the relatives of  an instigator, 
showing beyond question that the Irish lawyers had a full 
conception  of  the  difference  between  abetment  and  the 
principal act. 
' A  sensible man ', it says (111.  157)) ' who  incites a fool 
to strike is not a criminal as regards the striking, but is criminal 
as regards paying the fine ; the fool is criminal re the striking, 
but is free of  the crime.' 
Again, 111.  117  : 
' It is the liability of a kinsman of  an instigator to be sued 
for  the crime of  the instigator, and it is not the liability of 
the kinsmen of  those who have instigated to be  sued for the 
crime of  the instigator, but the crime to be  charged  against 
him is that of  a participator.' 
Abetment by provisioning is also clearly dealt with in the 
Book  of  Aicill, 111.  409, ' As  to a  man  who  violates  the 
King's laws, his crimes are adjudged on the seven houses in 
which  he  gets  beds,'  that is  on people  who  have  fed or 
maintained him before or after the crime. 
305-1.2  N 178  THE LAW  OF ACCESSORIES  PART VI 
§ 6.  It is not possible  here to deal with  the remaining 
arguments,  but there does not  seem  sufficient  ground  for 
holding that abetment in Welsh law was a recent growth. 
It would seem to be an indigenous conception shared with 
the Irish of  an early period. 
It is certainly remarkable that the tortuous or  criminal 
nature of  abetment of  fire varied in the localities, North and 
South Wales, where the act of  incendiarism likewise varied ; 
suggesting most strongly that the conception of  '  abetment ' 
was  coincident  with  the recognition  of  burning  as a  tort 
or as a crime. 
VIII 
OTHER  OFFENCES 
I.  Assault. 
$1. There are many offences in the Welsh Laws which 
can be dealt with under the common heading of  assault. 
In all assault there was '  insult ', and there might also be 
'  injury '. 
We have already given, in the Chapter on the Worth of 
Men  and  Things, the  compensation  payable  for  injuries, 
which  had  to  be  paid  whether  the  injury  were  caused 
negligently  or deliberately.  There was no exemption from 
that liability even on account of  minority. 
5 2.  The causing of  injury was  primarily  a  tort, but it 
might also be a crime. 
It  could  be  excused  if  the injury were  caused  in  self- 
defence, or inadvertently in an attempt to do good, or by 
the  contributory  negligence  of  the  person  injured;  the 
standard  instance,  in  the latter case,  being  where  one  of 
two men, passing in single file through a wood, was injured 
by the springing back of  a branch of  a tree pushed aside by 
the leading  man.  If  the latter gave no warning he was 
responsible  for the injury caused ; if  he gave warning he 
was not, for the person injured contributed by his negligence 
in disregarding the warning.l 
9 3.  The Welsh  Laws  do not regard  a  common  assault 
as a crime ; the only remedy was to recover ' honour-price '. 
The later laws do mention ' a buffet  in anger ' as entailing 
a fine of  2s.  added to honour-price,  but this was  not the 
original law.2 
5 4. '  Ymladd' or fighting was a crime and a tort. '  Ymladd ' 
consisted  in  an encounter  resulting  in  blows  from  which 
one  side  or  the other  received  an injury.  If  there  were 
blows without injury it was not '  ymladd', and if  there were 
1 V. 46, X. 362, 382.  XI. 448. 
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mutual blows, whether resulting in injury or not, no honour- 
price  was  payable,  as  each  party  suffered  insult  which 
compensated one for the other. 
But all injuries caused by either side had to be compen- 
sated for according to the fixed standard, and if  there were 
a difference in valuation between the injuries sustained by 
each side, the one inflicting  the greater injury made good 
the difference. 
Over  and above  the compensation  payable  for  injuries 
caused,  all persons  fighting,  from  the tarliest  times, were 
subject for bloodying the earth or for causing injury to a 
fine, doubled if  the fight took place in Court or Church. 
In the latter case the ' dirwy ' went to the Church, in all 
other cases to the King.  Fighting was, therefore, a  crime 
as well  as a tort.  Under early English law the offence of 
fighting in Church or Court was punishable with death or 
forfeiture  of  all  property  (Ethelred's Laws,  VII.  9,  and 
Cnut's Laws, c.  GO).^ 
$5. Closely  allied  to fighting was the offence of  ' cyrch 
cyhoeddog ' or public attack.  For this offence, which was 
of  the nature of  rioting with violence, it was necessary that 
there should be nine aggressors acting in concert to attack 
an individual.  It was a crime whether injury were caused 
or not, but there must be an overt  act of  attack, and the 
penalty for it appears to have been the same as for fighting.' 
It bears some resemblance to the English Law of  '  hloth ' 
and 'here' mentioned in Ine's Laws, cc. 14, 34, and Elfred's 
Laws, cc. 29, 30, 31. 
A ' hloth ' was an association of  seven to thirty-five men 
for  the commission  of  any crime,  and  a  '  here ' was  an 
association of  over thirty-five men for a like purpose. 
Under  English  law  the actual member  of  a  ' hloth ' or 
a '  here '  who slew an unoffending person paid the '  wergild ' 
of  the person slain, each member of the association paying 
in addition a '  hloth-b6t ' varying from 30s. to ~zos.,  accord- 
ing to the status of  the person killed ; but if  it could not 
be  determined  who  actually struck  the  fatal blow,  each 
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member  of  the  gang  paid  a  proportionate  share  of  the 
wergild ' plus the '  hloth-b6t '. 
g 6. Another  act  of assault is specifically mentioned  as 
a  crime,  viz,  the cutting of  a  man's  hair  while  he  was 
asleep or pulling him by the hair.  Such an assault involved 
not merely the ordinary reparation for insult, but a special 
and a criminal penalty of  a ' dirwy '.  The offence 
is  also  specially  mentioned as ' feax-fang ' in  the English 
laws.' 
g 7.  A further allied  crime was  ' terfysg ' or tumult  or 
without injury, wrangling, or brawling in Coilrt  or 
Church.  ' Saraad ' was payable, and in addition a '  caml\vrw ' 
to the lord.  It was rather in the nature of  an aggravated 
contempt of  the lord or Church, or a breach of  precin~ts.~ 
$ 8.  In all the Germanic Codes assault was not a crime, 
but  was  insult, e. g.  see  Lex Alamman., Tit. LVIII, Lex 
Baiuor., Tit. IV, V, VI, VIII, and Lex Burgund., Tit. V. 
Likewise in Irish Law injuries had to be compensated for 
and there was no criminal fine.  The amount varied according 
to whether the injury were caused by design or inad~ertence.~ 
The Book of  Aicill, 111. 169  et seq., devotes several pages 
to considering  exemptions from  or reductions of  the com- 
pensation payable due to the most minute causes.  Many of 
them appear ludicrous, but some of  them  nevertheless  are 
of interest :  e,  g. servants engaged in lawful work were not 
responsible for injuries caused accidentally ; builders were 
not liable for purely fortuitous accidents to casual passers-by, 
if there were no reason to suspect danger, and persons cutting 
down  trees escaped  liability, if  they gave warning before- 
hand. 
The law is, in fact, a full statement in a primitive cast 
of the law of  justification or excuse for injury, showing that, 
at a very early stage, the Irish Laws had passed beyond the 
conception that all injury, however caused, must be paid for. 
Speaking  generally,  the  principles  of  all  the  tribes  of 
Western  Europe correspond with those apparent in  Welsh 
Law. 
,I)V.C.~I~;D.C.SOS;G.C.~O~;IV.~~.  VI. 114, X. 360-2. 
See Beok of  Aicill,  TI$. 3+7,  awl Sepchus BfBr,  I. 139, 141, 147. 182  OTHER  OFFENCES  PART  VI 
2. Treason. 
$ I. Treason is defined in the Triads of  Dyfnwal Moelmud 
with some minuteness, but such definition was obviously of 
later origin than Hywel Dda's time. 
Treason is not defined in the Welsh Laws any more than 
it is defined  in early English  Law, and there is no reason 
to suppose that it meant anything but infidelity or treachery 
to the immediate superior. 
It  was punishable by irredeemable death and loss of  land, 
to which  the  Triads  alone  add  attainder  of  blood  and 
reduction of  the family of  the offender to bondage. 
A  traitor not arrested was  outlawed, and could be slain 
with impunity by any one.  His '  tref  y tad ' was forfeited, 
but  reconciliation  was  allowed  on  payment  of  double 
' dirwy ' and  blood-fine,  and  should  the  traitor  receive 
absolution, after a pilgrimage to Rome, his patrimony was 
rest0red.l 
5 2. In English law treason was left vague until the reign 
of  Edward I11 ; when, owing to the abuse of  the law, an 
effort  was  made in  the Statute of  Treason  to define  the 
offence.  That  effort was  not  very  successful,  and  the 
English law of  treason has been constantly expanded under 
the stress of  political needs. 
In the early English Laws the offence is mentioned four 
timesI2 in  all of  which  cases it is identified  with  plotting 
against  the King's  life,  the  offence  being  established  by 
a  triple ordeal and punishable with  death and forfeiture. 
Beyond that the English Laws have nothing to say. 
$3. Treason is dealt with at considerable length in the 
Lex Baiuor., Tit. 11, but all the numerous illustrations of 
the crime resolve themselves into infidelity to the lord.  It 
was the one irredeemable offence, punished with death and 
forfeiture.  It is, however, in the Lex Langobard. (Ed. Roth.), 
cc.  1-9,  that the most complete law of  treason appears to 
exist, but it is so detailed  as to bear little resemblance to 
the provisions of  the Welsh Laws. 
' V. C.  254 ; D. C. 448, 550; V. 46, XI. 404-8,  XIV. 624. 
Allfred's  Laws, c. 4 ; athelred's Ordinance of  1008,  V, c. 50, and VI, 
c  37 ; Cnut's Secular Laws, cc. 58, 65 ; and Athelstan's Laws, c. 4. 
3. Ofences  re women. 
5 I.  Offences in regard to women were adultery and rape. 
The former was not a crime, but a tort, and has been suffi- 
ciently dealt with under ' insult ' and the law relating to 
women.  As we have seen, it partook of  the same nature as 
in English law, which has not up to the present been altered. 
$ 2. Rape is defined as ' seduction without consent ', and 
it bears the characteristics of  both tort and crime. 
The  offence  involved  the payment  of  honour-price  for 
insult  to honour,  the honour-price  being  payable,  if  the 
woman were married, to the husband, either with half or full 
augmentation, but there was an exception to this payment 
in the case of  a woman of  easy virtue, who  had no honour 
which could be insulted by rape. 
In addition to honour-price, the person guilty of  rape was 
liable  to  pay  ' amobyr ' (except  where  the  woman  was 
married, ' amobyr ' being  payable  only  once), '  agweddi ', 
'  cowyll ', and ' wynebwerth ', the accumulation  of  which 
came to a very considerable sum. 
These mulcts were all due because the act was a tort, and 
represented  the damages sustained  by the woman  or her 
relatives or her lord. 
That the act was a crime also is clearly established from 
the fact that there were criminal penalties due. 
A ' dirwy ' was  payable, variously  stated as £7  and £3, 
and as ' a silver rod and a gold cup with a gold cover on it, 
similar to that payable to  the King for "  saraad" '. In default 
of payment two authorities assert that, if  the victim were 
a maid, the offender was mutilated, but this penalty, if  ever 
enforced, was a later introduction, for we are expressly told 
it did not prevail in Hywel's Law.l 
§ 3.  There is little in the early English  laws relative to 
rape.  The distinction between it and adultery is not clearly 
drawn, because both were torts, and rape was not at first 
established  as a crime.  In the laws of  King Wlfred, cc. 10, 
11, compensation for adultery was payable to the husband 
according to his status, and for insults to women according 
V. C. 92, 100,  102, 104  ; D. C. 434, 442, 510, 520, 526, 528 ; G. C. 74% 
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to the  woman's ' wer ', i. e., the offence was a tort.  Rape on 
a female slave was paid for by '  b6t '  and punished by '  wite ' 
of  60s., and it was only in the case of  a ' theow ' that there 
was any other penalty.  A '  theow ' was liable to mutilation 
(c. 25). 
According to Cnut's Law, c. 54, a married woman guilty 
of  adultery had her nose  and ears cut off-quite  possibly 
an introduction from Scandinavian sources-and  there was 
' bat ' and '  wer ' for rape (c. 53),  which was a less serious 
matter than marriage within the prohibited degrees, which 
was punished with ' b8t ', ' wite ', and ' wer ' (c. 52). 
It was  not  really  until  the Conqueror's  time  that rape 
assumed  the distinct  character  of  a  crime in English law. 
By sections 12 and 18  of  his Laws adultery became punish- 
able by the payment of  the woman's '  wer ' to her husband, 
and rape by the mutilation of  the offender. 
§ 4.  In the Germanic Laws rape was sometimes a crime, 
entailing varying  fines  according  to  the circumstances in 
which it was committed ; in some cases death being inflicted 
if  the victim were a free-born maid. 
This was  the rule under the Lex Salica, but in the Lex 
Alamman., Pactus 111, c. 30, the offence seems to have been 
still regarded as a tort as there were fixed payments ordered 
by way of  compensation. 
So too was the case with the Lex Frision., Tit. IX, while 
the Lex Burgund., Tit. XXXIII, provided ' coilpositio ' and 
fine, with death for a slave. 
In the Lex Baiuor., Tit. VIII, the offence was satisfied by 
the payment  of  ' conpositio ' varying  according  to rank, 
and in the earlier laws the rape of  a maid was punishable by 
a fine payable to the fisc, which was extended later to cover 
the case of  a widow also. 
4.  I'o?zgue Wound (Gweli-tafod). 
$ I.  An  offence in  regard  to which  we  find  periodical 
references in  the VCTelsh Laws  is that of  ' tongue-wound ', 
or the use of  insulting language. 
§ 2.  The use of  insulting language to a private individual 
was not a criminal offence against the State : such language 
was dealt with as ' insult ', for which compensation was due. 
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It was  a  crime when  used  towards certain officers, and in 
those cases the penalty was additional to the honour-price 
due.  Rude language to the King was tongue-wound,  and 
was  punished with  a  double '  camlwrw ' :  it was  also  an 
offence to insult a judge on the judgement-seat  or the Court 
priest during the three great festivals of  the Church or while 
engaged in reading or writing for the King. 
Tongue-wound  was  also  caused  by  breaking  silence  in 
Court, falsely challenging the judgement  of  the judge, and 
it was  tongue-wound  to the Church  to  brawl  within  its 
precincts  or  the precincts of  the churchyard.  The punish- 
ment in all cases was a ' camlwrw '.I 
5.  La~$d-trespass. 
§ I.  The references to land-trespass in  the Welsh  Laws 
are not many, but such as there are are stringent. 
Trespass as a crime consisted not in  going  on  another's 
land,  for  there was  no  law  to prohibit  that, provided  no 
damage was done.  If  damage were done, it had to be paid 
for as a tort.  The crime of  land-trespass consisted in using 
another person's land in a way derogatory to his title.  The 
law provided penalties for such trespasses. 
$ 2. The acts of  criminal trespass were such as are common 
to all agricultural communities. 
First was building on another's land, entailing a penalty 
of  three kine, the building being forfeited to the land-owner, 
subject  to the right  to remove  wooden  materials  within 
nine days, if no damage were caused to crops in removing. 
If  the wood were used from the land occupied, there was 
an additional penalty of  4 pence, and if  the building were 
made in defiance  of  an interdict, the building went  to the 
King. 
$ 3.  The second  act  was  ploughing  on  another's  land. 
This  was  punished by a fine  of  4 pence for  breaking the 
soil, 4 pence for moving the plough, and I penny for every 
furrow ploughed.  In addition, the ploughman forfeited the 
worth of  his right foot, the driver that of  his left hand, and 
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defiance  of  interdict.  Ploughing  a  highway  or boundary 
ditch was punished with a fine of  10s. 
$ 4.  Making a kiln on another's land was punished with 
a fine of  three kine, and 4 pence was paid to the landowner 
for  ground-breach, the landowner  also  being  entitled  to 
the kiln. 
$ 5.  Squatting  on  another's  land  without  permission 
entailed, if  continued over three days and nights, forfeiture 
of  all movables on the land to  the owner.  Digging another's 
land to conceal anything therein was punished with a like 
fine  of  4 pence for  ground-breach, and everything hidden 
went to the landlord. 
$ 6.  Similarly, the setting of  a  snare on  another's  land 
involved  4 pence  penalty  for  ground-breach,  a  fine  of 
three kine payable  to the King, and the captured animal 
was taken by the owner of  the land. 
$ 7.  Stacking  trees  or  stones  on  another's  land  was 
prohibited, but the only penalty was compulsory removal. 
$ 8.  Cutting  timber on  another's  land, except where  it 
was free timber, was punished by a '  camlwrw '  and a charge 
of  one penny for every double ox-load removed. 
$ g.  Appropriation of  common land was not criminal : as 
we have seen acquisition of  priodolder rights arose from con- 
tinued appropriation, but a co-sharer could not appropriate 
all kinds of  common land at  will.  Any one clearing common 
woodland for his own use was to surrender similar woodland 
or old field land of  his own ; if  he had none to surrender, he 
could cultivate the cleared land for four years, after which 
it was  shared.  Similarly, building  on  joint  land made it 
incumbent  on  the encroacher  to allot  to his  co-owner  a 
similar site or to admit him to a share in the building, on 
payment  of  a  proportionate  share of  the cost  of  building 
and the labour expended. 
These  penalties  were,  of  course,  not  criminal  or  tor- 
tuous penalties :  they were merely restrictions on the right 
to appropriate applicable where appropriation might enure 
to the loss of  other co-sharers.' 
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6.  Perjury. 
$ I.  Perjury was neither  a  tort nor  a  crime,  but a  sin, 
which it was left to the Church to deal with by spiritual pains 
and penances.  This was also the rule in English law, under 
the Laws of  Blfred, c. I. 
$ 2.  False accusations were, however, punished by fine, as 
they were under Edgar's Laws, c. 4, and Cnut's Secular Laws, 
c. 16, under which the penalty was loss of  the tongue. 
$ 3.  In Scotland  under  the Assize  of  David  I, c.  32, 
perjury was looked on partly as a sin punishable by excom- 
munication, partly as a crime punishable by '  8 ky amendis 
to the King '. 
$4.  In the Lex  Salica, Tit. XLVIII, and Lex  Frision., 
Tit. X, it was regarded  as a crime punishable with fine or 
amputation of  the hand, and this characteristic was fairly 
general in the Germanic Laws. 
V. C.  180, 196, 288;  D. C.  550,  552,  554,  586, 600-4;  G. C. 764-6, 
794 ; V. 48, 84-6,  VI. I 16, IX. 268, XI. 432, XIV. 692. CH. IX  SURETYSHIP  189 
PREVENTION OF CRIME 
$ I.  WITH the growth of  the conception of  crime, came 
regulations of  the central authority to prevent crime. 
The growth of such regulations was naturally retarded- 
we may almost say they were unnecessary-in  communities 
where the tie of  relationship entailed responsibility  for the 
misdeeds  of  a  relation.  Such  tie  itself  operated  to some 
extent to prevent  the commission of  wrong.  Regulations 
aimed  at preventing  crime  grew  more  rapidly  where  the 
tie of  kinship was weakened  or was weakening. 
$2.  In Wales  there  are  definite  traces  of  a  system  of 
suretyship to keep the peace, which was grafted on the law 
of  suretyship to abide law. 
In all cases  of  litigation, parties  gave sureties to abide 
law.  In  criminal suits such sureties were termed ' gorfodog ', 
and their liability was enforced by distress. 
$ 3.  This system was  adapted  to prevent crime by the 
demand for sureties before  crime was committed ; and so 
we find in the laws the term '  gorfodogaeth ' applied some- 
times  to sureties  taken  to abide  law,  and sometimes  to 
sureties taken to prevent the commission of  crime.  In the 
former  case  the '  gorfodog ' gave  surety  to produce  the 
accused and to pay the penalty which might be adjudicated 
on the person charged, and even to pay the penalty in order 
to avoid banishment or other penalty in default, when the 
penalty had been  adjudicated.  Such suretyship could be 
given for any penalty other than that of  death or one affect- 
ing the person of  the convict. 
The ' gorfodog ' could cover himself by taking sureties or 
pledges from the person for whom he was standing surety, 
and he could base  an action thereon  to recover any sums 
paid by him ; but no '  gorfodog ' could  recover sums paid 
by him  unless  he had  so covered  himself.  The formality 
of  grasping  hands  was  employed  as in  the case  of  civil 
sureties. 
The liability of  a '  gorfodog ' enured for a year and a day : 
he  could  also claim  that amount of  time within which  to 
make amends or discover an absconding accused. 
The person for whom security was given remained in the 
custody of  the surety.l 
3 4.  It was on this that '  gorfodogaeth ' to maintain peace 
was grafted ; but it appears that it grew up much later than 
the time of  Hywel  Dda, for we  have no mention  of  it in 
the Codes.  The power  to exact security for the mainten- 
ance of  the peace vested, under the later laws, in the terri- 
torial lord, who could act on complaint or on his own motion. 
A  complaint could  be instituted wherever  a  person  had 
been threatened, and the complaint was sufficiently supported 
if  the person complaining swore on the relics to the threat. 
Without complaint also the lord could  demand security 
from anybody threatening another, if  the threat were sworn 
to ; from a person who had been  injured and did not seek 
his legal remedy for the injury ; and from any stranger who 
had been in the lordship for three days without commenda- 
tion to a '  breyr '. 
It appears that where a person had stood surety for the 
maintenance of  peace, his liability ended when he produced 
the person, breaking the peace, to be dealt with by law. 
The system of  '  gorfodogaeth ' was obviously embryonic 
and  of  late introduction, because  the tie  of  relationship 
was strong in Wales, and was, generally speaking, as effective 
as any artificial scheme would have been in securing peace.2 
5 5.  In England the tie of  relationship as involving re- 
sponsibilities broke down much earlier than in Wales. 
In the beginning  it would  seem  that, as in  Wales,  the 
system of  suretyship to keep the peace was grafted on the 
prevailing system of  suretyship to abide law.  In Ine's Laws, 
c. 62, we have the latter system described thus : 
' When a man is charged with an offence, and is compelled 
to give pledge, but has not himself  aught to give for pledges, 
then goes another man and gives his pledge for him.' 
V. C. 134-8  ; D. C. 430 ; G. C. 708 ; XIV. 644, 660.  x.  388, XIV. 630. 190  PREVENTION  OF  CRIME  PART VI 
In Athelstan's  Ordinance of  Greatanlea, c. 2, we see the 
next step, the kin being forced to find sureties and a lord : 
' We  have ordained respecting those lordless men  of  whom 
no law can be got that the kindred be  commanded that they 
reconcile him to " folc-right " and find him a lord in the "  folc- 
mote " :  if  he be not commended he  is a thief, who may be 
slain as a " flyma " (fugitive).' 
This was followed by placing every man in a '  frith-gild ' 
of  '  gegildan ',  an  association  of  neighbours  to maintain 
peace and order and to indemnify members for loss. 
That is to say, the rule became that every man must be 
placed in a permanent surety-union (borh) or be outlawed. 
In the Laws of  Edgar (A. D. 9.58-75), c. 6, it was provided : 
'  Every man  is to have a "  borh ", who  is to hold him  to 
every justice, and if  any one do wrong, let the "  borh " bear 
that which he ought to bear.  If  he  be  a thief  and he  catch 
him in  twelve months, let him give him  up to justice and be 
repaid what he has paid.' 
In the Ordinance of  Woodstock,l c. 3, the duty of  a free- 
man  having  a  '  borh ' was  again  insisted  upon.  Cnut 
directed that all men were to belong to a ' tithing ', if  they 
wished to be entitled to ' lad ' or ' wer ', and that all were 
to be in '  borh ' for pleas and peace.  Those who were not 
were regarded as outlaw, and liable to be seized and slain. 
In the Laws  of  the Confessor, c.  20,  a  drastic revision 
took place, and it was provided that every man was to have 
nine  others responsible  for  him, forming with himself  the 
'  tenmanne-tale ', liable to produce each other for crime or 
pay damages caused by any one of  them.  This association, 
apparently an extension  of  the ' ge-gildan ', also replaced 
the defunct kin-association for purposes of  compurgation. 
The rule was reproduced in the Conqueror's Carta, c. 14  : 
' Omnis homo, qui voluerit se teneri pro libero sit in plegio, 
ut plegius eum habeat ad iusticiam si quid offenderit.' 
and c. 25 of  the Leges : 
' Omnis qui sibi vult iusticiam exhiberi vel se pro legali et 
iusticiabili haberi, sit in francplegio.' 
The wide  divergence  in  this  particular  between  Welsh 
and English  Law  was  due  entirely  to the fact  that  the 
Laws of  athelred, A. D.  978-106.  Laws, cc. zo, 25, 33. 
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mutual responsibility  of  kinsmen lasted so much longer in 
Wales,  and,  even  after the Edwardian  Conquest,  the old 
Welsh  kin-tie was used  instead of  the '  tenmanne-tale ' or 
' tithing ' to secure the observance of  the peace. 
5 6.  The  system  of  ' gorfodogaeth ' was  not  the  only 
measure available in Wales to prevent crime. 
The  most  important  preventive  regulation  was  that 
directed towards  checking theft, particularly cattle lifting. 
If the tracks of a thief  were followed as far as a house, it 
was the duty of the owner thereof  to show where they had 
gone afterwards.  If  he did not his house became forfeited, 
and if  he had no property he was banished.l 
A  similar  provision  was  introduced  into  the  treaty 
between  the  West  Saxons  and  the  Wealhas  Dunseatas, 
which  provided  for  the tracking of  stolen cattle either  in 
Wales or England, when lifted from the other side of  the 
Wye.  A  similar  rule  existed  in  Athelstan's  Laws,  IV.  2, 
the Jud.  Civ.  Lundon.,  c.  8, and Edgar's  Laws, cc. 2-5, 
under  which  the discovery  of  tracks,  leading  to a  man's 
house and not going beyond, stood in the place of  an accusa- 
tion without oath, which the accused could only free himself 
from by compurgation. 
The same law prevailed among the Germanic tribes2 
5 7.  It was a cardinal rule also of  Welsh Law that every 
one must arrest and detain a known  thief.  Failure to do 
so, or releasing  a  thief  once  caught,  rendered the person 
doing so liable to ' dirwy ' or the value of  the thief.  This 
was  similar  to the rule  in  Ine's  Laws,  c.  36,  Athelstan's 
Ordinance, c. I, and the Jud. Civ. Lundon., cc. 2, 3. 
The performance of  this duty was encouraged by a system 
of rewards.  The defence of  property on land against theft 
entitled  the defender to one-third  the value of  a  cow  or 
a horse,  and one-fifth  of  other property.  In all cases,  in 
later law, a tithe of  the property recavered was paid to the 
informer who led to its discovery." 
' v.  c.  244. 
'  Vzde Lex Salica, Tit. XXXVII ; Lex Ripuar., cc. 33,47 ; Gundebald's 
Laws,  cc.  IG,  73, 95, App. I ; Waitz, cc. 156,  158, 159 ; Sohm. Proc. 3, 
56 ff., 97 ff. ; and the Lex Burgund., Tit. XVI. 
V. C. 244; D. C. ~IG,  572 ; G. C. 708 ; X. 328, 388, XIV. 644. 192  PREVENTION  OF  CRIME  PART VI 
In English  Law, in the time  of  Wihtraed,  the  rescuer 
received half  the property, in the time of  Ine (c. 28)) IOS., 
but in the time  of  Athelstan,  both in  the Fragment  on 
Forfangs and in  the Jud.  Civ. Lundon., c. 7, the amount 
was fixed at one-twelfth the stolen property. 
5 8.  The Welsh Laws have no regulations making a host 
responsible for his guests.  The Brehon Laws have, though 
the exact liability is not  defined, and in England l a host 
was liable for the acts of  his guest after three nights.  The 
review of  the criminal law of  Wales appears to justify  the 
conclusion that, notwithstanding some differences in detail, 
the law in Wales was essentially the same as it was through- 
out Europe. 
Hlothaire and Edric's  Laws, c.  15 ; Cnut's Laws, c. 28 ; William 1's 
Laws, c. 48, &c. 
PART  VII 
THE COURTS  AND JUDICIARY INTRODUCTORY 
$ I.  A  JUDICIAL  system is  only  found in  a  community 
well advanced upon the road of  civilization ; it is not found 
in a primitive community, and the development  of  courts, 
pleadings, and the like is a fair test of  the progress  made 
by a  race.  Put briefly,  the steps in judicial  development 
may be indicated thus : first, no courts at all, each person 
being  left to obtain  justice  as he best  can, the period  of 
vengeance ; then the appointment of  arbitrators to suggest 
a basis for settlement, and thereby mitigate the effects of 
vengeance, but without power to enforce their suggestions, 
the  sanction  for  enforcement  being  customary  opinion, 
operating through ' distress ' ; then popular  courts of  the 
tribe  or  community ; then  regal  or  baronial  courts  with 
the sanction of  authority behind to enforce their findings, 
but  circumscribed  in  action  by  an  elaborate  and  rigid 
system  of  technicalities ;  then  an  equitable  jurisdiction 
tending to become almost as rigid as the legal  one it was 
intended to simplify ; and finally, the sweeping away of  the 
cumbersome technicalities  and the establishment  of  what 
we  may call the modern-day courts. 
$ 2.  In medieval  times  most  countries, but not  all,  in 
Europe had reached the stage of  possessing popular or regal 
courts with  a  complex system of  procedure and pleading. 
Equitable  jurisdiction  had hardly arisen on  the one  hand, 
and, on the other, there were  countries like Ireland, which 
had  developed  a  system  of  law,  without  courts to put it 
into force. 
§ 3.  In the Wales of  the tenth century a judicial  system 
was  fully  established,  though  the courts  were  not  fully 
seised of  jurisdiction  in all matters which nowadays would 
be  regarded  as falling  within  the functions  of  tribunals. 
The  study of  this  system  and  a  comparison  of  it  with 
0 2 contemporary  ones  is  not  the  least  interesting  in  the 
Welsh Laws. 
The existence of  courts among the ' Cymric '  peoples at as 
early a date as the sixth century is testified to by Gildas ; 
he remarks on the fact, as if  it were an unusual one, that 
the Welsh  people  possessed judges.  In Ireland, as it has 
been said, there were none ; in England the judicial  system 
was  only  in  embryo,  and the  comparative  superiority  of 
Welsh  Law in  this particular may be  due to the Roman 
occupation  of  Britain.  The temptation  is to ascribe it to 
that cause, but, if  we study the systems side by side, we are 
struck at once by the fact that the Welsh  judicial  system 
has very little in common with the Roman one ; in fact the 
points of contact are negligible. 
The Welsh system has every appearance of  an indigenous 
development  of  elements  derived  from  a  more  remote 
period,  as those elements,  though not  the particular form 
of  development  in  its entirety,  are to be  found  in  other 
systems of  law. 
$4. The Triads of  Dyfnwal Moelmud have many passages 
in  which  the importance  of  a  judicial  system  is  insisted 
upon, but in  their exaltation of  a  judicature  they do not 
stand alone ; the more ancient Codes and the commentaries 
thereon  give  utterance  to much  the same class  of  senti- 
ment. 
Over and over again we are told that courts are a universal 
need,  that  a  presiding  judge  is  an essential  of  law  and 
justice,  that every one within the land is subject to them, 
and that there can be no adjudication without a judge,  so 
much so that even if  a suit were compromised, the compro- 
mise  had  to be  made  a  judgement  of  court  before  the 
litigation could terminate.' 
E.g.  U.  C. 614 ; G.  C.  780 ; VII.  200, X. 328, 386, XI.  400,  428. 
THE ECCLESIASTICAL  COURTS 
$ I.  THERE  were two distinct classes of  courts in Wales- 
the ecclesiastical and the secular. 
It was  characteristic  of  the  Medieval  Church  that  it 
demanded not  only jurisdiction  over its priests and others 
engaged in religious offices and avocations, but over all the 
people of  the realm in matters which it considered partook 
of  a  religious  character.  It  claimed,  and  succeeded  in 
enforcing its claim in many countries, to exclusive jurisdic- 
tion  in  such  matters  as  marriage,  testaments,  intestate 
succession, and the like, and, when  it succeeded  in estab- 
lishing its exclusive jurisdiction,  it used it to give to those 
matters what  it considered  to be a  purely  Christian  com- 
plexion.  It did its utmost to crush out of  existence the old 
customary rules, which  it regarded, rightly or  wrongly,  as 
pagan, and to mould all laws regarding them into an eccle- 
siastical and canonical form.  Frequently it was forced to 
compromise, but it never lost sight of  its ultimate aim. 
§ 2.  In doing so the Church did much for the advance- 
ment of  legal  science ; it did much  for  the benefit  of  the 
people ;  it  did  something,  perhaps,  for  morals ;  at the 
same time its operations were not an unmixed blessing, and 
it is impossible at times not to feel regret at the ruthlessness 
with which it struck at many excellent provisions of  ancient 
custom. 
5 3.  Few  things  are  more  striking in  Welsh  Law  and 
history  than  the  intensity  of  the  struggle  between  the 
Prince  and  the  Church  for  the  control  of  the  judicial 
machinery ; not  the least  important  of  the factors which 
contributed  to the last chapter in the tragedy of  the last 
Llywelyn  was  his  fight  for  the supremacy  of  the secular 
courts in matters of  intestate succession and of  the disposal 
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him  the  whole  force  of  the  Church  under  Archbishop 
Peckham,  who  anathematized  and  excommunicated  him, 
and, when  he  fell,  prohibited  his  burial  according  to the 
rites  of  the  Church  to which  the  dead  prince  had  been 
a faithful and a munificent son. 
$ 4.  In Wales  the Church  had  not  the same extensive 
jurisdiction  that it had  in  England.  Its jurisdiction  was 
twofold, baronial and ecclesiastical. 
$5. On the baronial side the Courts of  the Abbot and the 
Bishop had jurisdiction  in certain matters over laics hold- 
ing land under  the Abbot  and Bishop.  This jurisdiction 
was conferred upon the Church by Hywel Dda, as part and 
parcel of  his scheme for granting or confirming jurisdiction 
to the local lords ; it was conferred upon them not as being 
clerics,  but  as being  territorial  magnates,  and they  were 
bound,  in  exercising  that  jurisdiction,  to administer  the 
ordinary ' Cymric ' common law. 
It appears, further, that the King did not entrust to these 
clerical-baronial  courts any jurisdiction  in  respect  to the 
more  serious  forms  of  crime.  He  reserved  for  his  own 
court jurisdiction  in  all homicide cases arising on Church- 
lands ; he  likewise reserved  jurisdiction  in  all  theft  cases 
occurring  on  abbey-,  bishop-,  or hospital-land,  where  the 
offender was a laic ; all offences punishable by ' dirwy ' and 
' camlwrw ', which included practically every offence known 
to law, committed by a layman on abbey-land ; all offences, 
by whomsoever  committed, on highways  passing  through 
Church-lands;  all  cases  of  ' ymladd '  on  hospital-land, 
according  to the Venedotian  Code, and, according  to the 
Dimetian Code, when committed by men  under homage to 
an abbot or a bishop. 
What was  left, therefore, to the clerical-baronial  courts 
was  homage  and suit  from  laics  holding  land  under  the 
Church,  some  minor  criminal  offences  committed  by laics 
on  such land, and cases  of  a  civil  nature arising  on  such 
land, in which  lay-tenants of  the Church were  concerned ; 
but even in respect  to matters of  a  civil nature the King 
reserved to himself the right to ' amobyr ', ' ebediw ', dues 
by  way  of  military service, suit and homage for land held 
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by  the Church,  and questions of  title to land which  the 
Church or a cleric claimed to hold by grant from the Crown. 
The ecclesiastical courts had no jurisdiction  of  any kind 
or description in respect to laymen not resident on or giving 
rise to a cause of  action on Church-lands.  They were not 
permitted,  as  in  England,  to  appropriate  to  themselves 
exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction  in matters which  they 
claimed  were  of  an  ecclesiastical  nature.  One  clerical 
authority,  reciting  the  points  in  which  the  Church  had 
exclusive jurisdiction,  only lays claim  to matters of  tithe, 
offerings, funeral dues, communion charges, despoiling  the 
altar or sacrilege, insult to a priest or violence to a cleric. 
That was the utmost he could claim under  ' Cymric ' Law ; 
and it is not without interest that the only mention of  the 
jurisdiction  of  the Church, in respect to the vexed question 
of  marriage, is to be found in a transcript  of  the fifteenth 
century, where the word ' priodas ' is substituted for com- 
munion fees. 
Over  lay tenants of  the Church  committing  an offence 
outside Church-lands, the Church had no jurisdiction;  nor 
had it any jurisdiction  in  a  suit  of  a  civil  nature on  the 
ground that one of  the parties was a tenant of  the Church. 
All cases between a lay tenant of  the Church and a layman 
of  another  lordship were  dealt  with  by the court  of  the 
lordship  where  the defendant  resided  or where  the cause 
of  action ar0se.l 
5 6.  On  the purely  eccelesiastical  side,  abbots, bishops, 
and  the  hospital  orders  were  empowered  to  deal  with 
breaches of  their own capitular regulations by members of 
their respective communities, provided that those capitular 
regulations were not in conflict with the King's laws.  This 
jurisdiction was domestic, and was confined entirely to the 
members of  a religious house infringing a regulation  of  the 
house or order. 
In other matters the laws  recognized  the Synod of  the 
Church,  constituted according  to the Church's  own  rules. 
The Venedotian Code confers no jurisdiction  on the Church 
in respect to offences committed by clerics, but the fact that 
V. C. 170 ; D. C. 478,  ;so; IV.  8,  10,  V.  84,  IX. 232,  X. 332,  364-6. it enumerates offences, committed on Church-lands by laics, 
as being under the King's jurisdiction, implies that offences 
committed by clerics fell under the jurisdiction of  the Church. 
Other  authorities,  including  the Dimetian  Code,  confer 
on  ecclesiastical  courts exclusive  jurisdiction  in regard  to 
offences committed by clerics, and if  a criminal complaint 
were instituted in a secular court against a cleric, his religious 
superior had the right to transfer it for disposal. 
In a  charge  of  theft  one  of  the  defences  open  to an 
accused person found in possession of  stolen property was 
an assertion  that he had obtained  the property bona fide 
from a third person, who,  thereupon,  had to answer  for  it 
as an ' arwaesaf ' or ' warrantor '.  The naming of  a cleric 
as a  warrantor was  prohibited  as, if  it were  allowed,  the 
cleric might thereby become subject to a charge of  theft in 
a secular c0urt.l 
$7.  Notwithstanding,  however,  the conferment  on  the 
Church of  jurisdiction  over clerics, it appears that no cleric 
could  be  absolved  from  making  reparation  to a  layman 
injured by him ; the Church had to administer the ordinary 
common law, where amends were ordained as the ordinary 
remedy ; but in place of  secular punishment, where punish- 
ment was awardable in secular law, the Church could decree 
its own puni~hment.~ 
$ 8.  Offences  against  the person  of  a  cleric,  including 
nuns, were  generally  triable by the Church  courts.  That 
was the case in all cases involving insult, injury, and other 
offences, escept tongue wound ; but if  the offence resulted 
in the death of  a cleric, the offender was punishable as any 
other person committing homicide was, viz. by payment of 
honour-price and of  blood-fine, to which the Church might, 
if  it willed, add spiritual penalties of  its own.  We may refer, 
as illustrative of  this jurisdiction for offences against clerics, 
to an entry in the Index to the Llyfr Goch Asaph, where 
reference  is made to the '  submissio  Eignon  ap Cadwgan 
Ddu  Domino  Episcopo  et  Howelo  ap  Hova  cleric0  pro 
injuria dicto Howelo illata 
V. C.  170 ; D. C. 478 ; V.  48, XI. 404.  VX.  216. 
3V.C.~8,52;  D.C.3j6,476,53o;V.48. 
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§ g.  In regard to civil actions between laymen and clerics, 
the Church courts had no special jurisdiction.  Clerics, like 
other people, were subject to the ordinary courts with this 
modification, that no cleric holding land by grant from the 
King and no member of  an abbey community could be sued 
in the ' Cymwd' Court.  Such a suit must be instituted in 
the King's court, though one authority says a joint  court 
was  constituted  where  the dispute was  between  an abbot 
and a secular lord. 
The reason why  the first class  of  suit was  heard in the 
King's supreme court was that the grant of  the King was 
in question ; the reason  for the second was that the abbot 
was  a  territorial magnate, subject  to the King's  supreme 
court, and not to the ' Cymwd '  Court.  Inasmuch as pro- 
fessed  religious  men  on  submission  to the abbot  became 
civilly  dead, and could  neither sue nor  be sued, nor  incur 
any personal  obligation,  being  merged  into  the person  of 
the abbot by  their  submission to him,  any claim  against 
a monk must be made against the abbot. 
Conversely, claims of  s  monk must be prosecuted by the 
abbot not in the ' Cymwd ' Court, but in the King's c0urt.l 
5 10.  If  a layman sued a monk or abbey in the ' Cymwd ' 
Court, and that court  enforced  attendance  by  process  of 
attachment or  gave  judgement,  its proceedings  could  be 
treated  as a  nullity,  and the judge  assuming  jurisdictioil 
could be punished by the King's court. 
Subject  to this,  which  only  affected  venue  of  trial,  a 
dispute  of  a  civil  nature between  a  cleric or a  layman of 
the Church was tried in the court to whose jurisdiction  the 
defendant  belonged,  and should  that court  happen  to be 
the court of  the abbot or bishop, it sat as a baronial  and 
not  as an ecclesiastical  court,  administering the ordinary 
common law of  the land.2 
11.  In the Surveys  and Records we  have mention  of 
two bishop's courts only.  In the proceedings Quo Warranto 
of the reign  of  Edward 111, we  find the Bishop of  Bangor 
claiming  jurisdiction  in  the whole  of  his  territories,  but 
specially  excepting Crown  pleas  in  which  Church  tenants 
' IV. 10, X. 318-20,  XI. 396, 404-6.  :  IV. 8, X. 366. were  concerned,  and  brought  against  others  residing  in 
episcopal territory. 
In the Black  Book  of  St. David's  frequent  reference  is 
made to the High  Court  at Lawhaden for  the disposal of 
difficult cases, but even there we find local popular courts 
functioning in ordinary cases. 
The Abbot  of  Conway  and  the  Priory  of  St. John  of 
Jerusalem  in Anglesea claimed the right, as of  old, to hold 
courts,  but the extent of  the jurisdiction  claimed  by the 
latter was limited. 
THE COURTS  OF THE ' MAERDREF'  AND 
THE ' CYMWD ' 
I. Court of  the '  Maerdref '. 
5 I.  The Court  of  the ' Maerdref ' had  a  very  limited 
scope.  It had jurisdiction  over  the tenants of  the King's 
' maerdref ' or personal demesne only. 
§ 2.  The '  maerdref ' was under the control and manage- 
ment  of  the ' land-maer ', a minor officer by ' custom and 
usage ', who was always unfree, and whose principal duties 
were to regulate cultivation within the demesne, look after 
the  palace jail,  and be  responsible for  the ordinary daily 
supplies for the court. 
3 3.  In addition to his executive duties he was the judge 
of  the ' Maerdref ' Court, and, as such, was empowered  to 
entertain  all  plaints  emanating from  the tenants  and  to 
dispose of  all cases summarily.  His jurisdiction  extended 
to  suits relating to the ' tref-lands ' and to cases  of  theft 
and fighting arising among the tenants.  He was responsible 
to  collect  all  fines  imposed  on  the tenants,  and  was  re- 
munerated by a special fee of  2s. per cause heard.l 
2. The Court of  the '  Cymwd '. 
5 I. The principal court of  original jurisdiction  was  the 
Court of  the ' Cymwd '.  The laws distinctly say that these 
courts were  established  by Hywel Dda, but that does not 
mean  there was  no  judiciary  before  his  time.  It merely 
means  that he  organized  and  systematized,  or  tried  to 
organize  and  systematize,  the  whole  of  the  judiciary  in 
Wales. 
§ 2.  The exact constitution of  the courts before his time 
was  probably  tribal and territorial,  but what  Hywel  Dda 
did  was  to  grant  to  the  lords  jurisdiction  within  their 
lordships,  to be exercised through  the ' Cymwd ' Courts- 
' E.  g. V. C. 46, 60, 62, 64,  102,  192-4 ; D. C.  392 ; G. C. 668, 684. reserving to the royal court jurisdiction over certain specified 
matters  throughout  the  royal  territories  and jurisdiction 
over  the royal  ' cymwds ' of  which  the King was  lord- 
and to create a kind of  appellate jurisdiction  to the royal 
court from the Courts of  the ' Cymwd '.' 
5 3.  It appears also that in some cases where a lordship 
extended over more than one ' cymwd ', the local lord set 
up  courts  imitating  the  royal  court,  exercising  similar 
jurisdiction  to the royal  court  within  his  own  territories. 
There is, consequently, at times a certain amount of  con- 
fusion ; but the principle  was  that  the court  of  original 
jurisdiction  was the Court of  the ' Cymwd ', exercising such 
jurisdiction  in  the name  of  the lord,  and subject  lo the 
royal court, or, where the local  lord  had set up a  similar 
court, to the lord's court, which was in practice independent 
of  the royal court. 
The situation was,  in  fact, very much like what it was 
in France and on the great feudal estates of  the Marches. 
§ 4.  Traces of some of  these courts of  ' lords ' are to be 
found in  the proceedings  Quo Warranto instituted  in  the 
reign of  Edward I11 (Appendix XIII). 
§ 5. The judiciary  of  the Courts of  the ' Cymwd ' was 
constituted  on  different  lines  in  North  Wales  and  South 
Wales. 
In Gwynedd  and Powys  the judges  were  trained  men, 
selected for the post by the King or lord, while  in South 
Wales every owner of  land, being an ' uchelwr ', was a judge 
within his own ' cymwd ' by virtue of  his privilege of  land.' 
The latter represented, no doubt, the older system, when 
courts were tribal and territorial, and we have two interest- 
ing pieces of  evidence showing how courts were constituted. 
In the  Privileges  of  Arfon,  in  the rules  regarding  the 
settlement of  boundary  suits, the adjudicators were  land- 
owners of  ' trefs ' in the ' cymwd ', other than of  the ' trefs ' 
actually  litigating.  In the  Black  Book  of  St.  David's 
reference is made to the courts at Ystrad Towi, where it is 
said that if  there were a suit in any one of  the five villatae 
in Ystrad Towi, then it was decided by the landowners in 
the other four ; but if  all the villatae were involved in the 
suit it must go to Llanteulu or Llangadoc for disposal. 
The principle,  therefore, was that all the landholders  of 
a ' cymwd ' could sit in judgement  except the landholders 
of the ville to which parties belonged. 
§ 6.  There were  definite bars on the exercise  of  judicial 
functions in  all  courts.  Persons  who  were  deaf,  blind, 
leprous, maimed, insane, or stammerers, or who had been 
convicted of  theft, were excluded.  No person interested in 
a case could adjudicate, and, if  he were a suitor in a court 
of which he was official judge  in  North Wales, a specially 
appointed judge was deputed to hear the case. 
In South Wales  judges  by privilege  of  land must  hold 
ancestral land, and not  land granted by the King or lord, 
out of  his personal estate, or bond-land.  Loss of  privileged 
land entailed the loss of  judicial functions.  A cleric, owning 
privileged  land,  could  sit  on  the  bench,  but  could  not 
pronounce judgement, as he was incapable of  entering into 
a ' mutual pledge '.I 
5 7.  Every landowner  in  the ' cymwd ' in  South Wales 
had the right to sit on the bench.  The opinion of  a two- 
third majority prevailed, and that opinion was pronounced 
by one  of  their  number  appointed therefor by the bench. 
He alone was  designated the ' judge ', but the judgement 
which he pronounced was the judgement of  the court." 
5 8.  We have, in this differentiation, evidence that in the 
time  of  Hywel  Dda  the  judicial  system  was  in  a  state 
of flux. 
It  would seem that in North Wales, Powys, and Gwynedd 
alike, where the royal power was greater than in the south, 
and where authority was always more respected, the popular 
or tribal courts had become definitely King's courts, but in 
South Wales  the assumption  of  jurisdiction  by  the lords 
had not succeeded in ousting the tribal element.  Hywel Dda 
appears in South Wales to have introduced a compromise, 
making the '  Cymwd  Court the court of  the lord, in which 
IV. 8,  X. 322,  ,332,  364. 
D. C. 404,  468,  478. 
D. C.  370,  478;  X. 344, XI. 396-8,  406.  422. 
'  D. C.  470;  VI. 126, XI.  414,  420. judgement  was  given  by  the  leading  landholders  of  the 
countryside, and not by selected judges. 
§ g.  One of  the causes for the change which was taking 
place, and which Hywel Dda tried to stabilize, is indicated 
in  the Welsh  Laws,  viz.  the disinclination  of  the landed 
judges  themselves  to sit, while  unwilling  to surrender  the 
privilege  of  sitting ;  for  we  find  a  provision  made to the 
effect that if  the judges by privilege of  land did not attend 
court,  their  attendance  could  be  enforced  by writ, with 
sureties for appearance, or by a warrant of  arrest.  Failure 
to obey  the writ  was  punishable with  a  ' camlwrw ', and 
should judges in attendance decline to adjudicate, the King 
was empowered to detain them in custody till better counsels 
prevailed and they did adjudicate.' 
§ 10.  The Courts of the ' Cymwd ' had a  regular  staff : 
the ' maer ' and '  canghellor ', who summoned the court and 
received plaints, an usher and a priest, who acted as a kind 
of  clerk of  court. 
The ' Cymwd ' Court always sat within the limits of  the 
' cymwd ', and, if  possible,  on  the site where the cause of 
action arose. 
It was  presided  over  by the lord  or  his representative, 
the Rhaglaw, who did not, however,  exercise  any judicial 
 function^.^ 
5 11. The court had jurisdiction  in all matters, civil and 
criminal,  arising within the ' cymwd ', e.g. suits for  parti- 
tion  of  land  in  the ' cymwd ',  which  were  not  specially 
reserved  for  the King's court, and over all  cases reserved 
for  the King's  court  specially  delegated  to  the '  Cymwd ' 
Comt for trial. 
In criminal matters jurisdiction extended over all persons 
committing  an  offence  within  the  ' cymwd ',  whether  a 
native  thereof  or  a  stranger having  property  therein,  no 
matter where arrested, if  he  could  be extradited ; should 
a  stranger,  however,  have  no  property  in  the ' cymwd ' 
wherein he committed an offence and be arrested in another 
' cymwd ', he was to be  sent  for  trial to his '  cymwd ' of 
origin, if extraditable thereto, and in every case fines levied 
D. C.  470 ; X, 362.  D  C. 404. 
on a stranger in a ' cymwd ',  where he had no property, were 
transmitted to the '  rhaglaw ' of  his native '  cymwd '.' 
5 12.  It must be remarked, however, that there was no 
law  of  extradition between  lordship and lordship ; a man 
was  only  extraditable from ' cymwd ' to ' cymwd ' in the 
same lordship,  and, consequently, if  a  criminal  escaped  to 
another lordship, he could not be tried in that lordship or 
be extradited to his own.2 
This, of  course, was a common feature in all countries in 
medieval times, and the evil was not finally got rid of until 
local  baronial  courts were  abolished,  and the King's  writ 
given currency throughout the whole realm. 
The system in Wales  was  not  free from  defects, but it 
was no worse than in other countries at the time.  Hywel 
Dda's scheme was an act of  statesmanship.  He maintained 
throughout Wales the tribal courts of  the '  cymwd ', making 
them finally and definitely King's  courts in the north, and 
giving recognition to the territorial courts in the south by 
maintaining the local leaders as judges. 
V.C. 62 ; G. C.  648 ; V. 50-2,  IX.  250, X.  372, XI.  428, 430, XIV. 580. 
VI. 112. THE ROYAL  SUPREME  COURT 
5 I.  IN  all  the Codes  we  get  frequent  mention  of  the 
King's  supreme court, but we  are left  very  much  in  the 
dark on points of  detail.  We have to rely to a large extent 
on what the commentators say, and we  cannot always be 
certain that the jurisdiction  vested in  the royal courts, in 
particular matters, was  exercised  by  them  as early as the 
tenth century. 
§ 2.  It appears that there were  three  distinct  supreme 
courts of  kings in Wales, one at Aberffraw, one at Dinefwr, 
and one at Mathrafal, corresponding with the three ancient 
divisions of  Wales.  The Dimetian Code omits Mat11rafal.l 
In practice  there  was  a  supreme royal  court  wherever 
there was a king, and every lord, who was capable of  doing 
so, set up his own quasi-royal court. 
$3. But however many royal courts there might  be  at 
any particular moment, inasmuch as the King at Aberffraw 
had a  theoretical  supremacy over  all Wales,  so the royal 
'  llys ' at Aberffraw  had  a  theoretical  supremacy  over  all 
others, the effective  exercise  of  which  varied  according to 
the extent  to which  the King  could  enforce his  political 
supremacy. 
3 4.  In constitution the supreme courts or their baronial 
imitations,  which  were  encroaching  on  the one  hand  on 
the ' Cymwd ' Courts, and on the other on the royal court, 
were the same throughout Wales.  There was the judge  of 
the court,  a  specially  trained  lawyer  with  a  subordinate 
staff identical with what existed in the '  Cymwd ' Courts. 
The landholders, who in  the ' Cymwd ' Courts of  South 
Wales were judges,  had no judicial  functions in the royal 
courts. 
5 5.  These courts had three separate jurisdictions : exclu- 
D. C. 468 ; X. 380. 
sive jurisdiction over  matters arising  within  the precincts 
of  the palace ;  original jurisdiction  throughout the  royal 
territories in matters from which the '  Cymwd ' Courts were 
precluded ; and a  kind  of  appellate jurisdiction  from  all 
subordinate courts. 
g 6.  The presiding judicial  officer was the Judge  of  the 
Court, one of  the twenty-four principal officers of  State. 
He held  his  land  free  without ' ebediw ', received  free 
support and clothing, was  provided  with his equipage  by 
the King, had a high place in the table of  precedence,  was 
entitled to access to the King when he willed, was invested 
with  the insignia  of  a  throw-board  and gold  ring  by the 
King  and  Queen,  and  was  remunerated  by  many  per- 
quisites  and a  fixed  scale of  fees for  each  case  heard  by 
him.  In certain matters  the  court  was  strengthened  by 
the inclusion  of  counsellors, with  whom  the  judge  con- 
sulted, and ultimately gave judgement  in accordance with 
their views. 
§ 7.  On the domestic side the royal court adjudicated on 
all  matters  arising  within  the  precincts  of  the  court  or 
palace,  and on  all disputes  between  court  officers.  Such 
cases were disposed of  free of  charge. 
The judge  also inducted officials into office, was respon- 
sible  for  the  issue  of  summons  and  proclamations,  and 
examined all candidates for judicial office.' 
5 8. On the original side the court had jurisdiction through- 
out the whole of  the King's dominions, and had, in theory, 
jurisdiction over all subordinate territorial lords. 
It had exclusive jurisdiction  in the following matters on 
the original side : 
I. Plaints  against territorial lords by  subjects of  such lords, 
but not plaints by lords against subjects, which were cognizable 
in  the lord's own court. 
2.  Disputes relating to land between 
(i) different  lordships,  whether  the  lordships  were  the 
King's or held under him by lay or cleric barons ; 
(ii) the Church and a territorial lord ; 
(iii) different ' cymwds ' or ' cantrefs ' ; 
(iv) different clerical institutions in regard to boundaries. In such cases the Court was strengthened by the inclusion 
of  ' wise  men ' from all the canghellorships in  the King's 
dominions summoned ad hoc. 
3. Disputes  regarding  land,  in  which the claimant  asserted 
that he or  his ancestors had obtained the land by direct  deed 
of  grant from the King or lord, and that he had been dispossessed 
illegally ; and all claims in which the claimant sued to recover 
land from which he alleged he had been dispossessed by another, 
under  colour of  a deed of  grant by the King ; i.e. all claims 
to land in which the validity of  the King's grant was questioned. 
4. All suits between lords holding under the same King. 
5. All plaints  in  which  defendants were resident in different 
lordships, the one court to which all parties were subject being 
the King's court ; all plaints for land by ' ach ac edryf ' by any 
one basing title on relationship  beyond  the fourth degree, and 
all claims for the reconciliation of  blood-feuds. 
6. Actions against the King's officials for oppression and cor- 
ruption. 
7.  All  cases where  the ' Cymwd ' Court  could  not  be  relied 
on to be  fair, owing to the judge's  interest in the case.l 
5 g.  On the appellate side the royal court entertained all 
cases in which there had been '  mutual pledging ' between 
the judge  and party in the lower court, the judge  in such 
case giving judgement  according to the ' books of  the law '. 
Should there be conflicting views in the ' books of  the law ' 
on the point under appeal, the judge  of  the court was  to 
have the assistance of  specially summoned canonists, whose 
decision,  based  on canon  law, was  to be promulgated  by 
the judge of  the court.2 
THE RAITH  OF COUNTRY 
s I.  IN the Triads of  Dyfnwal  Moelmud  an elaborate 
account  of  what is there termed  a  ' raith of  country ' is 
given.  They assert that wherever a  person was oppressed 
by King or lord, he had the right to call on his ' pencenedl ' 
to ' agitate the country ' for a ' raith of  country ' ; where- 
upon a body, consisting of  300 or 50 men, must be assembled 
together at  the instance of  the '  pencenedl ', and their finding 
must be bowed to at once by the King. 
This account has been  used  in describing the functions 
of  the supposed nine-generation ' cenedl '. 
Nowhere outside the Triads is this '  agitation '  mentioned, 
and the whole procedure must be put down as a fiction. 
$2.  The term ' raith of  country ' is used,  outside  the 
Triads,  in  the  Dimetian  Code  only  on  three  occasions 
(PP. 400-2,  480). 
An allied term, ' dedfryd wlad ' or '  verdict of  country ', 
is to be found in the same Code,l and on some occasions in 
the Anomalous Laws. 
The first-mentioned  term is used simply in the sense of 
a jury  of  compurgators drawn from the neighbours rather 
than from Itinsmen, as had been the more ancient system. 
The second term is used in the sense of  the decision of 
a  bench  of  land-holding judges  in  a  '  Cymwd ' Court in 
certain suits : suits against '  arrogance ', suits complaining 
of oppression by the local lord, and certain suits on loans 
and regarding land. 
It is also applied in a generic sense, in some passages in 
the Anomalous Laws, to any decision of  a court. 
In the VIth, XIth, and XIVth Books reference is made 
to the right of a freeman to bring a ' plaint of  oppression ' in the '  Cymwd ' Court against his lord or his lord's official, 
and to his inherent right of  protection by the court. 
That  right  of  suit  for  protection  against  oppression  is 
sufficiently remarkable without importing into it the fancied 
'  agitation of  country ' by a ' pencenedl ' portrayed  in  the 
Triads.' 
VI. 126, X. 328, 334, 356, 392-8,  XI. 404-8,  41% 426, 446, XIV. 654. 
COURTS  IN EARLY ENGLISH LAW AND 
IN ROMAN LAW 
3 I.  IT  would occupy far too large a space to consider, in 
anything  like  detail,  the judicial  system in  early English 
Law  and in  Roman  Law, and all  that can  be  attempted 
here is the briefest of outlines, from which the main points 
of  resemblance and difference in comparison with the Welsh 
Law can be gzthered. 
3 2.  Like Wales, England had two classes of  courts, the 
ecclesiastical and the secular courts. 
Not  much  is  said in  the early English  Laws  as to the 
scope  of  ecclesiastical  jurisdiction.  Such  courts naturally 
grew  up only when  the land was  Christianized, and they 
were extended in the time of  the Confessor and the Con- 
queror. 
In these later times,  such  courts had,  as in  Wales,  es- 
clusive jurisdiction  over the lay tenants of  the Church, at 
any rate in respect  of  disputes  arising  out  of  land.  The 
Laws of  the Confessor, c. 4, lay down the rule thus : 
' Quicunque  de  ecclesia  tenuerit  veI  in  feudo  ecclesiae 
manserit  alicubi  extra  curiam  ecclesiasticam non  placitabit, 
si in  aliquo forisfactum habuerit,  donec quod  absit in curia 
ecclesiastica de recto defecerit.' 
They  also  had  exclusive  jurisdiction  over  all  clerics 
charged  with offences, and there was a  constant tendency 
to extend this jurisdiction to include tenants of the Church. 
The Church further claimed and exercised jurisdiction, to 
the exclusion  of  the secular courts, in matters which were 
regarded  as of a religious nature, such as marriage, legiti- 
macy, wills,  and intestate succession ; matters which  the 
Welsh Laws at no time left to the ecclesiastical courts. 
England also possessed courts comparable to the courts 
of  the  ' maerdrefs '  in  the  local  manorial  courts.  The English  manors,  like  the  Welsh  ' maerdrefs ',  consisted 
mainly of  serfs holding under a customary tenure, and all 
cases arising out of  the conditions of  tenure were cognizable 
by the manorial courts.  There was this material difference, 
however,  that  whereas  in  England  the  manorial  courts 
covered  practically the whole of  the country, the jurisdic- 
tion of  the court of  the ' maerdref ' in Wales was limited in 
extent. 
This was  due to the fact that in England the majority 
of  the cultivators of  the soil were serfs, while in Wales the 
serf  population formed but a small percentage. 
In the matter of  other jurisdictions  England  had  also 
local territorial courts and supreme royal courts, while the 
baronial  families  in  time  esta1)lished their  own  courts  in 
imitation of  the royal court, usurping, on the one hand, the 
functions  of  the popular  courts  and  encroaching, on  the 
other hand, upon the sphere of  the royal court. 
§ 3. Originally a11 Germanic peoples entrusted the adminis- 
tration of  law to local popular assemblies having jurisdiction 
over a more or less defined area. 
This court or popular assembly, arbitrating according to 
customary rules, was  termed the '  gem8t ' or ' methal ' in 
England,  the  'thing '  in  Scandinavian  lands,  and  the 
' mahl '  among  the  Franks.  It  corresponded,  in  many 
particulars,  to the ' Cymwd ' Court of  Wales, and, just  as 
the latter had jurisdiction  over a '  cymwd ', so the former 
generally had jurisdiction  over an area. 
It was a  tribal court  with  a  territorial limit, becoming, 
or  tending to become,  exclusively territorial  as the tribal 
idea waned.  The area became in Anglo-Saxon Law identified 
with the Hundred, the latter area being apparently organized 
by Elfred the Great,  who  amalgamated existing district 
courts into a regular series of  hundred courts. 
5 4.  In the earliest English Law there is very little refer- 
ence  to  any  courts.  The  Kentish  Law  of  Ethelberht 
(A. D. 600) has no mention of any kind of  judicial administra- 
tion.  Justice  was then not of  the King, but of  the tribe 
enforcing  arbitration.  The only mention  in the Laws  of 
Hlothaire and Edric (c. A. D. 675) is in c. 8, which  ordained 
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that, when a man sued, the defendant  was to give surety 
and '  do him  such  right  as the Kentish  judges  may pre- 
scribe ', going  on  in  the next  section  to state that, after 
sureties had  been  furnished,  the parties were  to seek  an 
arbitrator  to settle  the case,  indicating  thereby  that  the 
'  gem6t ' merely  enforced  attendance in  order  to  compel 
parties  to settle a dispute by reference  to a selected arbi- 
trator, who would  apply custom to the matter in dispute, 
under the surveillance of  the '  gem6t '. 
The Laws of Wihtraed throw little light on the administra- 
tion of justice, beyond letting us know that the local ' gemBt ' 
was presided over by the King's reeve, showing that there 
was a beginning of  a recognition that justice was a concern 
of  the King. 
The  earliest  laws  of  Wessex,  those  of  Ine,  c.  22,  also 
afford us very little information, but we are told that a suit 
might be brought before a  shireman or other judge. 
The Laws of Blfred show us the ' gem6t ' presided over 
by the King's reeve, and as he appears to have organized 
the hundred  court  throughout England, we  seem  to have 
the conception  established  that justice  emanated from the 
King, and was to be administered locally under the superin- 
tendence of  his officers, not yet judicial but executive. 
The Laws of Edward, c. 8, are of  this much importance 
that,  by the provision  that  the '  gem6t ' must  assemble 
every four weeks, we  see that the securing of opportunities 
for justice had become definitely a function of  the King. 
We can see, therefore, albeit dimly, signs of  a haphazard 
administration  of  justice  by  selected  arbitrators,  sub- 
mission to whom was enforced by the will of  the '  gemBt ' 
or popular assembly, growing gradually into popular courts, 
forced  to  act  by  royal  authority, presided  over  by  the 
King's executive representative, and administering not only 
custom but royal laws.  This continued to be  the general 
feature of  the judicial  administration until the coming  of 
the Normans. 
5 5.  In addition, however, to the local courts there was 
a  supreme  royal  court.  The tenor of  early English  Law 
(see,  e. g., Edgar's  Secular  Ordinance,  c.  2,  and  Cnut's Secular Law, c. 17) was to force the local tribunals to adjudi- 
cate.  Resort to the royal court is constantly refused, and 
the people are forced back to the courts of  the hundred for 
arbitration and  compromise ; and  the  idea that the  administra- 
tion of  justice, apart from the establishment of  facilities to 
obtain it, was a function of  the King, hardly gained currency 
among the Germanic  peoples  or  in  England until  Charle- 
magne  and the Angevins  respectively  brought  into  being 
the  idea  of  the  King's  equity  as  a  mode  of  remedying 
injustice. 
The position of  the hundred court as a court of  original 
jurisdiction, and the prohibition  upon  seeking justice  from 
the  King are sufficiently  illustrated  by  Cnut's  Laws  and 
c. 43 of  the Confessor's Laws : ' Nemo querelam ad regem 
deferat nisi ei ius defecerit in hundred0 vel in comitatu.' 
We  find  constantly  in  the  fragments  of  English  Law, 
whose value is enhanced by the fact that they are spread 
over a period  of  some 400 years, indications of  conflicting 
considerations on the part of  the King. 
There was an intense disinclination to interfere with the 
administration of  custom  and law;  as far  as possible  it 
was  left  in  the hands  of  the ' gem6ts ', especially  on  the 
civil side.  On the other hand, it is obvious that there was 
some disinclination on the part of  the ' gem6ts ' to administer 
justice, and we find the King forcing them to do so.  What 
the King seems to have been constantly striving at was the 
enforcement  of  peace  and order ; administration  of  civil 
justice  by local popular tribunals with few changes in civil 
law ;  and  the  enforcement  of  a  rigorous  criminal  law, 
especially in the matter of  theft, through the popular courts, 
under the supervision of  royal executive officers. 
Exactly the same considerations  operated in  the Welsh 
Law, with the result that the King, to some extent against 
his will, was  forced to centralize authority in the interests 
of  order. 
§ 6.  The conflict, which we  noticed  between  the popular 
and baronial courts in Wales, had its counterpart in Europe 
and England.  As baronial power grew there was the same 
encroachment  both  on  kingly  and  popular  power.  The 
period was one of  flux and indecision.  The welter of  con- 
fusion that ensued in the matter of  jurisdiction  makes the 
elucidation of  anything like definite lines in Europe hopeless. 
The  earliest  record  on  the Continent  of  the growth  of 
baronial  jurisdiction  appears  to  be  the  case  of  Bishop 
Hinamar of  Laon, who, in  A. D. 868, set up, or tried  to set 
up, his own court at the expense of  the popular courts.  His 
example was quickly followed, owing to the absence of  any 
permanent  central  authority,  until we  find  that, in  the 
tenth  and  eleventh  centuries  and  long  afterwards,  it  is 
impossible  to extricate the ancient  tribal  courts from  the 
baronial ones.  In fact, Europe was, for a time, devoid of 
any true judicial  system.  Courts existed ; they adminis- 
tered a complex varying law, based partly on custom which 
it was  impossible  to flout, partly on  the arbitrary will  of 
the lord, with, in criminal law, the most rigorous penalties. 
The sole sanction behind the courts was the strong hand of 
him who controlled them. 
Efforts were made from  time to time to check  this, but 
to no effect.  The evil commenced early, and we find occa- 
sional  prohibitions  of  resort  to  courts,  which  included 
voluntary  arbitration, other  than  those  presided  over  by 
the judices  appointed by the supreme ru1er.l 
In England the central authority was more fortunate than 
in Europe.  It  was gradually consolidating itself ; and there 
are  few  signs  of  local  baronial  courts in  England  in  the 
ninth to the eleventh century. 
Under Ethelstan  the Unready there was a hopeless collapse 
of  the  central  authority, and something not  far removed 
from social anarchy ensued.  The period, however, of  this 
disorganizatioil was not long enough to permit of  the growth 
of  baronial  courts to any wide  extent, and England  was 
saved from the anarchy that prevailed in Europe by foreign 
conquest, rapidly achieved.  The new centralized authority 
of  Sweyn  and Cnut  arrested  the  tendency  towards  con- 
fusion, and Cnut endeavoured to consolidate the system of 
Blfred the Great. 
§ 7.  It was an entirely new  factor which resulted in the 
Growth of  baronial jurisdiction in England. 
See, e. g., Lex Alamman., XLI. With  the coming  of  the Norman  there was  a  gradual 
elimination  of  the idea of  popular  justice.  Law became, 
like the land, a royal prerogative ; but the actual administra- 
tion of  justice was a matter in respect to which the Normans 
had little interest.  It was removed,  by a series of  grants 
of  private jurisdiction  made to feudal supporters and the 
Church, from royal hands; the grants being  made  not by 
the Witan but by royal writ.  The Normans and Angevins 
consolidated  the grip  of  the King  on  the land, but  they 
left justice  to be administered according to the will of  the 
feudal lord. 
It would  carry us  too  far  to trace the struggle which 
ensued :  the  effort  to introduce  order  and  to  lay  down 
some general principles of  justice  in the Magna Carta, the 
attempt of  Edward I to restore royal jurisdiction, especially 
by means of  his land laws, the confusion of  the Wars of  the 
Roses, and the eventual establishment of  order, and the real 
creation of  the English judicial system under the Tudors. 
$8. In Wales  there was  a  somewhat  similar  tendency. 
In Gwynedd  it is  obvious  that  before  Hywel's  time  the 
House  of  Cunedda  had established  kingly  justice :  in the 
south, popular courts maintained  their  independence more 
successfully, but in both the lords were creating their own 
courts.  It was  one  of  the merits  of  Hywel  Dda's  Laws 
that  they  recognized  existing  facts  and  attempted  to 
stabilize  those  facts by a  system  of  judicature,  with  the 
underlying principle  that all courts were  under  the King 
and exercised  jurisdiction  by grant from him.  The effort 
was a statesmanlike one.  It is possible that it would have 
succeeded but for the fatal application of  the law of  division 
of  landed estates to the kingly territory, thereby weakening 
the central authority, and for the long drawn-out struggle 
against  the Normans,  who  in  Wales,  perhaps  more  than 
anywhere else, manifested their contempt for popular law. 
From 1284 onwards the confusion in justice, the inextric- 
able jumble of  the courts of  the Lords Marchers, the absence 
both of  popular and royal courts, is a melancholy and strik- 
ing contrast to the law of  Hywel;  and it was not until the 
Tudors ascended the throne that order and method was once 
more restored to the administration of  justice  in Wales. 
$ 9.  We have  only  to consider very  briefly  the Roman 
system of  courts to show that Hywel's  organization  owed 
little to it. 
As in  all  early societies,  the XI1 Tables show us that, 
in Rome, the judicial  system grew up from the submission 
of disputes to arbitration.  We find in the XI1 Tables that 
the stage of  voluntary submission had so far been  passed 
that the magistrate could summon and enforce the appear- 
ance of  parties before him.  Parties were,  however, not in 
the first instance bound to leave the dispute to be settled 
by the magistrate, and men could ' agree with their adver- 
saries in the way ', and it was  only when  they could not 
agree that the magistrate stepped in as an arbitrator, being 
guided in his arbitration by strict rule. 
This primitive system, having points of  contact with all 
early European systems, did not survive long.  The period 
of '  legis actiones ' was  supplanted by the period  of  ' for- 
mularies '.  The  formular  system  recognized  two  State 
officials,  the  magstrate  and  the  judex.  The  magistrate 
enforced appearance before himself and heard the pleadings. 
The pleadings  he  reduced  to a  statement  of  the facts in 
issue in the form of  formulae.  The formulae were submitted 
to  the  trained  '  judex ', who  was  incapable  of  straying 
outside the formulae submitted to him.  He  gave his decision 
on the formulae, after reference to the opinions of  permitted 
jurisconsults,  and his  decision was  remitted to the magis- 
trate, who pronounced  judgement  accordingly. 
Eventually,  with  the third period  of  Roman  Law,  the 
magisterial and judicial functions were consolidated in the 
hands of  one and the same person. 
There were  no  ecclesiastical  courts, and all courts were 
State courts presided over by a State official.  There is no 
trace of  popular tribal customary  courts :  the justice  was 
the justice  of  the XI1 Tables, as expanded  by the juris- 
consults.  There  is  no  trace  of  kingly  justice  or  baronial 
justice,  and there was no conflict of  jurisdictions.  The law 
emanated from the XI1 Tables, and it was administered by 
State courts acting through an appointed judicial hierarchy, 
a totally different  conception to that which  was  the basis 
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THE TRAINING AND REMUNERATION  OF 
JUDGES 
$ I.  FEW  things are more remarkable in the old Welsh 
Laws than the careful provisions  made for the training of 
official  judges,  and the aphorisms regarding  the conduct 
and character of  judges. 
The Codes contain a number of  ' proof-books ', or series 
of  points  in  law,  something of  the nature of  examination 
papers,  and we  have frequent  references  to the fact  that 
judges  should have a  thorough  knowledge  of  these proof- 
books, of  the three columns of  law, and of  the law relating 
to wild and tame. 
In the preface to the Venedotian  Code,  it is said  that 
Hywel  Dda and the wise men  with  him  denounced  their 
malediction on the judge who undertook a judicial  function, 
and on the lord who invested him, without knowing the three 
columns of  law  and all pertaining  to them  necessary  and 
customary in a community. 
$2. The Code also provided  for a systematic training of 
judicial aspirants.  An  aspirant was placed under a skilled 
teacher for training, at the end of  which he was tested in 
his knowledge of  the proof-books,  and, if  then found com- 
petent, he  was  recommended  to the  judge  of  the court. 
That official subjected him  to a further examination, and, 
if  he were  satisfied, he could recommend him to the lord, 
who was then at liberty to invest the candidate with judicial 
functions.  On admission to office he paid the judge  of  the 
court a fee of  2s.l 
In the Dimetian  Code  the method  of  training is  dealt 
with in more detail.  A candidate had to attend courts in 
session, listening to the judges, asking questions, and learn- 
ing the laws, usages, and institutions of  the land.  He had 
V. C.  2, 216. 
to listen to the statements of  claims and replies and to be 
with the judges  considering and giving their decisions.  He 
was to continue in this for at least a year ; and, when passed 
as competent,  the king's  chaplain dined him in  the com- 
pany of  the twelve  principal  officers of  the court.  After 
dinner  he  was  sworn  never  to deliver  wrong  judgement 
knowingly  through  entreaty, worth, love,  or  hatred.  He 
was  then  taken to the King,  who  installed him  in  office, 
granting him also his insignia of  office. 
Without  training, examination  in  the three columns  of 
law,  the worth  of  animals,  the law  of  land  and soil,  of 
debtor  and surety, lawful customs and the books  of  law, 
he could not be admitted to a judicial career.l 
$3. A judgeship  was not an hereditary office, but could 
be acquired only by systematic training.  This, of  course, 
did not apply to judges in Dinefwr by privilege of  land.2 
A  thousand  years  have  not  improved  upon  the  ideas 
underlying this scheme of  instruction. 
9 4.  In the Triads there are many fine expositions of  the 
duties of  a judge, but these are of  more recent origin.  They 
do not stand alone, however. 
' Whoever would be a judge, let him learn acutely, enquire 
humbly, listen fully, let him retain in memory, let him speak 
mildly, let him judge  mercifully,' 
is a theme repeated over and over again, and embodies the 
'  Cymric ' conception of  what a judge  should be. 
' Whoever  knows  not  the law  cannot practise it ', says 
the Dimetian Code, but ' no one is a judge  through learn- 
ing ' only, he needs more.  '  Though a person may always 
learn, he will not be a judge,  unless there be wisdom in his 
heart ', and wisdom  without  learning was  just  as incom- 
plete. 
Love of justice  and honesty were to be the keynotes of 
a judge's  conduct : 
' Love honesty and hate wrong, and that for the love and 
fear of  God, and contempt of  life.' 
' Judgement  is perverted by  the fear of  the powerful, the 
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' An  iniquitous judge  reduces  a  country  to  poverty  and 
a transgressing judge  corrupts the world.' 
' The fear of  God and unconcern as to life ' 
were the only sure safeguards. 
Patience  in  listening,  the protection  of  the weak,  and 
the giving of  security to the suitor are all inculcated ; and 
at times the laws rise  to exalted poetry in discoursing  on 
the functions of  a judge. 
' When  the tongue  shall be  adjudging ', says the XIth 
Book, ' the soul trembles ', and the final exhortation in the 
Gwentian  Code  is  one  of  the most  striking  and beautiful 
passages among the many in these old laws. 
' Listen thou judge ', it runs, ' listen thou judge, who givest 
judgements :  let not the worth of  a penny weigh  more with 
thee  than  thy  God;  judge  not  wrongly  for  worth,  but 
righteously for the sake of  God.  Little is it to be  wondered 
at that there should be  doubting in  a temporal court, since 
they change like an elemental gale : whoever, notwithstanding, 
shall love security shall be safe from stumbling in the righteous 
service of  the  Lord  Jesus  Christ, which  is the  glory  of  the 
Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.  Amen.' 
To  that  conception  and advice  nothing  can  be  added, 
and it stands as a fine memorial to what the ancient Welsh 
thought that law should be.l 
$5. We have  noted  that in  South Wales  the office  of 
judgeship in the '  Cymwd ' Courts depended on the judges 
being  the free possessors  of  free land ;  they were  accord- 
ingly not stipendiary.  We have also noticed that the judge 
of  the court was remunerated by the provision of  free land 
and perquisites  from the palace. 
Accordingly,  he  was  above  the need  of  exaction,  and 
the scale  of  what  we  may  term  court-fees  is  extremely 
moderate. 
All  cases,  the  subject-matter  of  which  was  less  than 
4  pence  in  value,  were  heard  free  of  charge :  for  other 
cases, exceeding 4 pence, there was a maximum of  4 pence 
paid in fees, or, according to some authorities, there was an 
ad valorem fee of  10  per cent.  This did not apply to land- 
suits, re  which  one authority says they were  to be  heard 
free, suits re boundaries, homicide, fighting, ' saraad ', and 
theft, where the court-fees were fixed at a flat rate of  2s. 
All cases where a lord claimed '  ebediw ', or which involved 
penalty  of  ' camlwrw ' only,  or  contempt,  were  heard 
\~ithout  charge. 
The court-fees were payable to the judge or judges hearing 
the case,  and under the law of  Hywel it was the plaintiff 
who  paid, but Bleddyn  of  Powys placed  the liability  on 
the shoulders of  the unsuccessful  litigant. 
Security for the payment of  fees was always taken before 
judgement  was  pronounced, and a  person  failing  to give 
security was  non-suited.  The proper  time for  demanding 
security was after the recapitulation of  pleadings1 
1  V. C. 62,  156 ;  D. C.  368,  370,  468 ;  G. C.  646-8  ;  V.  70,  VI. 108, 
VIII. 198, IX. 248, 304, X. 328,  334, 344, XIV. 580, 654, 732, 742. 
' D. C. 372. 440, 486, 592, 614 ; G. C. 786, 790-6;  VIII. 206, X. 346-8, 
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VIII 
THE CHALLENGE  OF JUDGES 
5 I.  IN order  to  secure  the  proper  administration  of 
justice, the law provided for the right of  litigants to challenge 
the judge. 
5 2.  The Vth and VIIth Books, with a few other occasional 
references,  appear to provide for a challenge before judge- 
ment, in order to secure that there should be an independent 
and unbiassed judge in the case ; the other authorities only for 
a challenge after judgement  by the procedure of  '  mutual 
pledging '. 
Challenge  before  judgement  is  almost  unknown  in  the 
earlier Codes, and, in some  of  the authorities allowing  it, 
there are obvious signs of  a  confusion  between it and the 
challenge by mutual pledge. 
Challenge before  judgement  was  permitted by the later 
authorities on three grounds : 
(i) That  the  judge  had  shown  partiality either before  the 
commencement of  the suit or during the hearing. 
(ii) That the judge  was  interested in  the  subject-matter of 
the case, and 
(iii) That the judge  had accepted a fee not allowed  by law, 
or had appeared in  some former proceeding in the suit 
as a pleader. 
The judge could not, before judgement, be objected to on 
any other ground.  The proper time for such an objection 
was prior to the arrangement of  parties and departure of 
the judges  to consider their judgement. 
If  the judge were challenged on the ground of  partiality, 
the objection could be disposed of  by the oath of  the judge 
challenged.  Challenge on any other ground could  be sup- 
ported by the production  of  proof. 
It is also stated that any member of  a bench could object 
to any other member thereof  sitting in judgement  on the 
ground  of  partiality.  The  judge  so  objected  to  could 
counter-assert that the judge  challenging him was partial. 
Where a judge was so challenged by a fellow-judge or by 
a party on any ground other than partiality, the question 
was submitted to the remaining members of  the bench for 
decision;  and, if  they adjudicated that the challenge was 
justified, the judge challenged was removed from the judge- 
ment-seat in that cause, and, if  they adjudicated it was not, 
he was allowed to sit and give his opinion. 
If  the challenge were not disposed of, and the challenged 
judge  sat in judgement, or if  the challenge were successful 
and the  judge  still took part in the  judgement,  the lord 
was bound to give relief  against the judgement.l 
$3. The procedure of  '  mutual pledging ' is one which is 
found in many European systems of  law ; but nowhere is it 
explained in such detail as it is in the old Welsh Laws. 
Before, however, considering its exact place in the develop- 
ment of  judicial  procedure and its linking on to appeal, it 
will  be as well  to describe when  and how  mutual pledges 
(ymwystlaw)  were taken. 
After  judgement  had  been  delivered  in  a  case,  it was 
open to a litigant to challenge its correctness by impugning 
the competency of  the judge.  This was done by entering 
into mutual pledge  with the judge.  If  the court deciding 
the case contained both the judge of  the court and the judge 
of  the  ' cymwd ',  the  challenge  was  with  the  presiding 
judge ; if  it  were a court of  land-holding judges, the challenge 
was made with the pronouncer  of  the joint  judgement. 
Each  side,  i.e. the challenger  and the judge,  deposited 
pledges in the hand of  the King or lord, the one denying 
the correctness of  the judgement, the other supporting it ; 
and in Wales the decision was referred  to a specially con- 
stituted  court, acting as a  kind  of  court  of  appeal.  The 
challenger  or  the  judge,  whoever  was  unsuccessful,  was 
punished. 
If  there were no challenge, the judgement stood ;  and, even 
if it were manifestly wrong in law, a party claiming pro- 
perty was  entitled to immediate possession and, if  land, to 
investiture. 
$4. Mutual pledging was confined strictly to judgements, 
D.  C. 478; V. 70; VII. 144, 146, 148; IX. 212;  X. 348, 354. 
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hence it was not permissible  to challenge a judge  making 
a statement as a ' tafodiog ' (q.  v.) as to the nature of  a judge- 
ment he  had previously  delivered,  nor  was  it permissible 
to challenge a judge  acting as an advocate, nor could there 
be mutual pledging before judgement.  Any one challenging 
a  judge  by  mutual  pledge  before  judgement  was  fined 
180 pence. 
fj 5.  The proper time for challenging was before the judge 
vacated the judgement-seat  and  before  he  began  to hear 
another case. 
Once  the judge  had risen, without  his judgement  being 
challenged, the suitor lost his right to challenge, unless the 
judge  of his own accord thereafter consented to enter into 
a mutual pledge. 
So too, where  challenged,  the  rule was  that  the judge 
must accept the challenge immediately, and give his counter- 
pledge, and should he leave his seat without doing so, he could 
not repent subsequently, come back, and offer a pledge. 
If  he refused  or  omitted  to give  a  counter-pledge,  his 
judgement  automatically  fell  to  the  ground,  whether  it 
were right or wrong, and he became liable to a ' camlwrw ' 
of  three kine payable to the King ; and if  there were any 
hesitation on his part, the challenger was entitled to place 
his own pledge in the hand of the lord, as proof that he had 
offered a  pledge,  against  which  the judge  would  give  no 
counter-pledge. 
The Gwentian Code, instead of  demanding an immediate 
counter-pledge,  allowed the judge  forty days within which 
to decide whether he would mutually pledge or rescind his 
judgement;  and the Dimetian Code provided  that, if  there 
were no '  book of  the law ' in  court  at the time of  judge- 
ment, the judge  might either give a counter-pledge,  accept 
the challenge, or take time to reconsider.  Should he accept 
the challenge or take time, he was liable to pay a ' camlwrw ' 
for having given a careless judgement,  and the new judge- 
ment he might give, whether confirmatory of  the old or not, 
was  liable to challenge  on  delivery.  These provisions  are 
exceptional to the general rule that the judge must take up 
the challenge at once. 
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5 6.  The only exceptions to the rule that a challenge by 
a  suitor  must  be  immediate was  where  a  '  void ' judge- 
ment was delivered, that is where judgement was given '  in 
absentia', or out of  hearing of  parties, or before  conclusion 
of hearing,  or by a person  not qualified  as a judge,  or by 
the presiding judge without concurrence of  other judges,  or 
where  the judgement  was  induced  through  oppression  of 
the King, the judge  or men  of  the court, or through their 
preventing  the party aggrieved from making  a  pledge,  or 
where the lorcl reiused to accept a pledge tendered. 
If a judgement were given ' in absentia ', whether absence 
were due to contempt or not, the unsuccessful  litigant had 
the right to challenge in a year and a day if  he were resident 
within  the jurisdiction  of  the court,  and if  he  were  not, 
within a year and a day from the date on which he entered 
that jurisdiction.  In all other cases a  challenge might be 
made within a year and a day next ensuing. 
5 7.  If the decision were that of  a bench of  land-holding 
judges,  the presiding  judge,  before  entering  into mutual 
pledge, was entitled to consult his colleagues as to whether 
to  take  up  the challenge  or  not.  The  consultation  and 
decision had to be prompt, and should the bench decide to 
withdraw from its judgement, the presiding judge was fined 
a ' camlwrw '. 
5 8.  No  one  was  permitted  to  challenge  a  judgement 
except an actual party to the case, and any one else doing so 
was liaMe to be fined a ' camlwrw '.  The one exception to 
this rule was where a ' void ' judgement was given, in which 
case the heir of  an aggrieved suitor stepped into his place, 
and could challenge in the same period of  a year and a day 
as the deceased. 
One  authority in  the Anomalous  Laws  also allows  any 
member  of  a  bench,  disagreeing  with  the  maiority,  to 
challenge the judgement pronounced by the presiding judge. 
§ 9.  There were certain persons also who were debarred 
from challenging.  The  King  could  not  challenge,  as he 
could be no party io a suit,l and clerics in orders or attached 
to a  religious  institution,  and, as such, not  liable  to the 
' He was represented by tile steward. 
Q  2 jurisdiction of  the ' cymwd ' courts, could not.  The remedy 
of  the latter was  to oppose the judgement  in fifteen  days 
by quoting better authority; and the procedure then followed 
was  identical  with  what  supervened  upon  the deposit  of 
a mutual pledge, viz. the case was transferred  to a  special 
court. 
5 10.  A  judgement  could  be  challenged  either  on  the 
ground that the party aggrieved had appealed to the Law 
of  Hywel and the judge  had applied  the Law of  Bleddyn 
or vice versa, or on the broad general ground that the judge- 
ment was opposed to written authority and law. 
The first  is interesting,  as it illustrates that, in Wales, 
parties were  entitled  to choose which  custom  they would 
follow, the Law of  Hywel or the Law of  Bleddyn, should 
there  be  a  difference  between  them,  though  it  may  be 
remarked  parenthetically  that  the Law  of  Bleddyn  had 
nothing  like  the same  sanctity attached to it as had  the 
Law of  Hywel. 
5 11. Whenever a judgement  was  challenged, it became 
a ' dubious ' judgement, until reversed or confirmed, that is 
to say it could not be executed.  In the interval, if the suit 
were for land and soil, the successful litigant was not entitled 
to investiture. 
If  the judgement  were '  void ', and execution  had been 
taken out before the expiry of  the year and a day within 
which the party aggrieved could challenge it, the judge was 
to restore the property to the challenger immediately.  The 
latter then held the property in  trust until the challenged 
decision was adjudicated upon.  If  he lost, he restored the 
property, if  he won he retained it; and, if  it had not been 
restored  to him  in  the interval, the judge  was  bound  to 
recover it for him from the person to whom he had adjudi- 
cated it. 
5 12.  When a party challenged  a judgement, he had not 
merely  to maintain that the judgement  was  inaccurate in 
law :  he had to assert that he was in a position to produce 
a better judgement  than that delivered. 
The law allowed this to be done in two ways, either by 
reference  to written authority, in which  the point in issue 
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had already been  decided in a method different to that in 
which the judge  in the case was deciding it, or, according 
to the Venedotian  Code  and some  other  authorities,  by 
pointing  out  a  judge  who would  give a  better judgement 
in his favour. 
No one could challenge without quoting the authority he 
intended  to set up against  the judge,  ' for  none  can dis- 
credit the decision in opposition to the pledge of  the judge 
unless he can provide a decision in written law more worthy 
of credit '. 
The authorities,  which  assert  that  the  challenger  must 
base  his  challenge  on  written  authority, provide  that he 
had to name and recite his authority there and then, and 
those  which  state he  was  to mention  a  judge,  similarly 
provide  that  the  judge  relied  on  was  to  be  nominated 
forthwith. 
We are not  told what  constituted '  written  authority ', 
but  the  term  apparently  meant  the  Codes,  an entry  in 
a proof  book, or a commentary by a recognized jurisconsult 
of  whose labours the Anonlalous Laws are survivals. 
§ 13.  As soon as the pledges were placed i11 the hands of 
the lord, the latter called for the written or judicial authority 
relied  on  by  the challenger.  The written  authority was 
read  out, or the nominated judge  gave his decision.  The 
challenged  judge  replied,  supporting his  judgement,  if  he 
could, by reference to authority.  The respective  conten- 
tions were  reduced  to writing, the pledges  were  deposited 
with the judge of  the supreme court, and a date, ordinarily 
within  fifteen  days, was  fixed  for  a  decision  on the con- 
tentions. 
The Dimetian Laws, which assert that the challenge must 
be  supported by ' written  authority ', state that the case 
was  submitted to a special court of  experienced canonists, 
who  decided  on  the written  contentions  without  hearing 
Parties ; the Anomalous Laws, which allow a challenge by 
quoting a judge  as authority, refer the case to the judge of 
the court or, in his absence, to a judge specially nominated 
by the lord or King; while one authority appears to allow 
a  reference to a  special  judge,  with  a  further  appeal  to a  court  of  canonists.  Possibly  all modes were in fmce in 
different places and at different times. 
In every case the judgement  given on the opposing con- 
tentions was final and binding, and was not liable to further 
challenge by mutual pledge. 
$ 14.  The law  provides  definite  penalties for  the loser, 
whether he were judge or challenger.  The judge, if  he lost, 
was  liable  to '  lose  his  tongue ' for  having  pronounced  a 
wrong judgement.  This meant he was mulcted in the legal 
worth  of  his  tongue,  that is  120  kine  and  120  pieces  of 
silver in  Gwynedd,  or £42 in South Wales.  He was  also, 
if  a judge by office, deprived of  such office;  but if  he were 
a judge by privilege of  land, he could not be deprived of  his 
privilege of  judgeship so long as he held his land. 
If  a wrong judgement were given by a bench, each member 
thereof  contributed equally to the mulct. 
If  the challenger proved to be wrong, his challenge was 
an insult to the judge, to whom he had to pay honour-price 
without augmentation, and either a '  camlwrw ' or the worth 
of  his tongue to the King.  If the challenger relied on another 
judge,  whose counter-judgement was overruled, that other 
judge  paid  honour-price  and '  camlwrw ',  and lost  office, 
while  a  pleader  pledging  and  losir~g  was  debarred  from 
pleading in perpetuity.l 
$ 15.  Allied with the procedure of  mutual pledging is the 
provision  that if  a  judge  gave a  wrong judgement,  which 
passed unchallenged, and afterwards in a similar case gave 
a  correct  judgement,  he  was  liable  to pay  a  ' calmwrw ' 
for  his first  wrong  judgement-a  very  effective  provision 
for the maintenance of  the rule of  '  stare decisis '.2 
$ 16.  It may be added that if  a judge  based his decision 
on  a 'written  authority', he was  not  to be  blamed if  he 
agreed on challenge that it was incorrect, provided  he did 
not give his counter-pledge in support.  He could withdraw 
at once, and the authority was thereafter held ' condemned '. 
$ 17.  The penalties  for  inaccurate  judgements  and in- 
'  V.  C.  28,218,  310 ;  D. C.  308, 370,172,374, 400,402, 458,4708 472. 4740 
476,478,504,590 ; G. C. 644, 698 ; Anom. Laws, 36, 38, 122, 124, 198, 248, 
250. 308.  320,  350,  352,  354,  358.  360. 372, 406. 410, 414. 416. 654, 656) 
728, 730.  D. C.  474. 
correct challenges appear excessively severe.  111  fact many 
penalties in ancient law, e. g. the blood-fine payable, appear 
so  extravagantly  high  as to be outside  the possibility  of 
payment by any one ; but we must bear in mind that the 
stated are simply the maximum liability to which 
a  person  in  fault rendered  himself  liable,  and that it was 
by  no  means  compulsory  that  the  maximum  penalty 
should  be imposed.  In practice compensation was  arrived 
at by  compromise, and when  a  person  became  liable  to 
a  penalty  he  fell  into  ' misericordia '  of  the  lord,  who 
decreed  what punishment  within  the maximum  should  be 
levied. 
$18.  The system of  mutual pledging was not confined to 
Wales.  In the Senchus M8r, 1. 25, and the Book of  Aicill, 
111.305, it is said '  Cach breithemain a baegul ', i.  e. a Brehon 
was punishable for his neglect by a reduction of  his honour- 
price and degradation from his office, and was liable to an 
eric-fine for  a  false judgement,  wherein  he was  impugned. 
The fine varied according to whether the inaccurate award 
was  malicious  or  inadvertent,  and according  to whether 
it  was  adhered  to  or  not.  In the  Heptadsl  a  false 
judgement  is treated  as a  matter which caused  calamities 
to a  nation,  and as bringing  failure of  harvest  and pro- 
ducing diseases, while physical  blemishes fell on the offend- 
ing  Brehon.  Famine  could  be  avoided  if  the  Brehons 
guarded against giving false judgements,  and all these evils 
resulted likewise wherever a ' Brehon dare not give a pledge 
in defence of  his judgement '. 
$ 19.  We have references also to the system in the early 
English Laws, though such references are concerned more 
with the penalties imposed  on  an unfair  judge  than with 
the actual proffer of  a gauge. 
In the Laws of  Edgar, 11. 3, there is the following rule : 
' Let  the  judge  who  judges  wrong  to another pay  to  the 
King  120s. as b6t, unless  he  dare  to  prove  on  oath  that 
he  knew  not  more  rightly,  and  let  him  forfeit  for ever  his 
thaneship.' 
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which shows the practice was common among both Danes 
and Saxons. 
The same law is indicated in the Laws of  the Conqueror, 
c. 39, which practically reproduced the provisions of  Edgar's 
Laws : 
' Qui vero falsum iudicium fecerit, vel  iniustitiam  foverit, 
odio vel amore vel pecunia, sit in regis forisfacto de XL solid., 
nisi purgare se possit quod melius iudicare nescivit et insuper 
libertatem si habuit amittat illam nisi a rege eam redemerit.' 
$ 20.  We have traces of  the same law in the Germanic 
Codes.  In  the  provisions  De  Rachineburgiis,  the  Lex 
Salica  (Cod.  I, Tit.  LVII) provided  that  a  suitor  could 
demand judgement,  and if  it were refused the judges were 
fined.  On delivery of  judgement  the party aggrieved could 
challenge it, and if  he proved the judgement  were against 
law, the judge  was  fined  15s. :  the other Codices provide 
the corollary  that if  the challenge  failed  the unsuccessful 
objector was himself  fined 15s. 
The  same  rule,  with  varying  fines,  occurs  also  in  the 
Lex Alamman., Tit. XLI, in  Pippin's  Capitulare (' Incerti 
Anni '),  c. 7, in the Lex Baiuor., Tit. 11, c. 17, and in the 
Lex Burgund., Tit. XC. 
ADVOCACY 
$ I.  ADVOCACY  was a recognized profession in the early 
Welsh Laws.  An advocate could and must be employed in 
most  cases, and there are some regulations with reference 
to the conduct of  counsel which show that the bar of  that 
day differed but little from the bar of  to-day. 
$ 2.  No  advocate was needed in a case whose valuation 
was less  than 5s. or whose subject-matter was an animal. 
Some authorities add land-suits, but they apparently mean 
cases where the land in suit was worth less than 5s.  The 
general rule was  that advocates must be  employed  where 
the value of  the suit was 5s. or over, or where land or status 
was in dispute. 
In criminal  cases two authorities  say that no  advocate 
could  appear if  the person  charged  was  in danger  of  life, 
body, or limb.  These authorities are alone in ascribing this 
peculiarity of  English Law to Welsh Law.  The arrangement 
of  the court provides for an advocate in all cases ; and it is 
expressly  said that advocates can appear in homicide and 
theft cases, and the only bar, under the Dimetian Code, to 
the employment of  counsel was where a defendant produced 
a warrantor to take over the responsibility for answering. 
No judge, being a party to a case, could plead in his own 
behalf  or  engage  counsel.  Should a  judge  be a  party to 
a case, the lord appointed an advocate for him. 
§ 3.  The functions of  an advocate ended with the delivery 
of judgement,  and he could  not  enter into mutual pledge 
with  the  judge.  That  right  was  confined  to  the  party 
aggrieved. 
5 4.  A provision  in advance of  the English Law, which 
adopted  the  practice  quite  recently,  was  that  which 
authorized  the  lord  to appoint  an  advocate  for  women, 
stammerers,  mutes,  or  persons  ignorant  of  Welsh.  An 234  ADVOCACY  PART  VII 
advocate  nominated  for  this  purpose  could  not  refuse 
to act. 
§ 5.  Ordinarily speaking, an advocate only appeared with 
his  client,  and could  not  represent  an absent  client.  To 
this there were  exceptions.  He could  appear if  his client 
were  on  pilgrimage to Rome  or  the Sacred Sepulchre,  or 
were bedridden and unable to attend court, or was in prison 
or absent in the King's army or service :  but in these cases 
proceedings were suspended until the incapacity ended, and 
the advocate seems  only  to have appeared  to obtain the 
legal postponement. 
3 6.  Another marked provision was that nothing said by 
a party to his detriment could be used  against him unless 
ratified by his counsel. 
7.  The legal profession was closed to clerics, lepers, and 
deaf  persons,  otherwise it was open to all.  A party could 
object to the appearance  of  a  particular  advocate on  the 
opposite side, if  he had already undertaken not  to oppose 
in  the  cause,  but  there  was  no  other  valid  ground  for 
objection. 
$8. Counsel, having once appeared, could not leave the 
court until the close of the case,  under  penalty  of  losing 
the case. 
He must  appear at each  and every hearing, and be in 
his  place  when  the judge  took  his  seat.  Should  he  die 
between two hearings, a new one could be appointed. 
An advocate could approach the judges  during the hear- 
ing, but could not address the Court without permission  of 
the judge. 
9.  An advocate was required to speak clearly, and the 
advice given in the XIVth Book is as applicable to-day as 
it was then : 
'  Three  things which  a pleader or  an  advocate should do : 
to speak in  a moderate tone, so that he be not too loud, nor 
too low, lest he  offend ; . . . it is not right  for  any one, in 
seeking his errand, to offend  the person of  whom  the errand 
is  to be  obtained, nor his judge ; for he who is to listen will 
not be  pleased with what  shall be  spoken to him adverse to 
his feeling ; . . . the  second thing which  he  ought to study 
is,  that  he  be  not  passionate  overmuch, nor  too  conceited, 
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and that he  be not overbearing, nor too loquacious, nor over 
serious,  nor  over  merry,  nor  too  frowning,  nor  too  much 
given to laugh. . . .' 
Unfortunately, the third piece of  advice, which may have 
been as refreshing, is irrevocably 1ost.l 
$ 10.  In the Germanic and English Laws nothing is said 
about advocacy as a profession.  In the Irish Laws every 
one taking out distress must be accompanied by an advocate, 
if  only to avoid the pitfalls that the intricate law on the 
subject provided.  The profession  was closed to strangers, 
bondmen, and landless men, and no one of  the lower classes 
could plead on his own behalf against one of  superior rank : 
he must  be represented  by an advocate equal in  rank  to 
the defendant, and no person could take distress unless '  he 
be skilled in every department of  legal science 
V. C.  166 ; D  C. 446,482 ; G.  C. 786 ; IV. 4 ;  V. 70,72,86 ; VI. 98 ; IX. 
212. 214, 250; x.  388 ;  XI. 420; XIV. 614, 646, 724, 732.734. 
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PRE-CURIAL  SURVIVALS THE LAW  OF DISTRESS IN IRELAND 
$ I. WE have already stated that in Ireland there was no 
system  of  judicature :  the  Irish  Laws preserved  more  or 
less  intact  the  more  ancient  method  of  adjudication  by 
reference to selected  arbitrators, which  was the first mode 
of  settling  disputes  supervening  upon  the  period  in  the 
history of  mankind, when he who had been wronged must 
seek his remedy by the use of  his own strong hand. 
What happened was that the growing social sense of  men 
forced  disputants  to settle  their  disputes by reference to 
unbiased  arbitrators.  The  reference,  though  in  fact 
imposed  upon  disputants by public  opinion,  was  in form 
voluntary, and its voluntary form left traces in all judicial 
systems long after judicatures  were established. 
The  power  to  arbitrate  developed  in  some  lands  into 
a  perquisite  of  a  separate legal  caste, sometimes claiming 
religious origin, like the Levites of  Israel, the Brahmins of 
India, and the Brehons of  Ireland :  in others it was left in 
the  hands  of  members  of  a  popular  assembly  like  the 
'  gembts ' of  the Saxons, which, as time went on, developed 
into courts, as we know  them, by the King or other cen- 
tralized  authority becoming  the source  of  law  and  using 
them as instruments to maintain peace and order. 
$ 2.  The system of  settlement  of  disputes before  courts 
arose left its traces, effective traces, in Wales ; but, before 
we  can  properly  understand  the  provisions  there  are  in 
the  Welsh  Laws  preserving  these traces,  we  must  sketch 
briefly  the mode  of  procedure  in  Ireland,  where  the  old 
system  was  maintained  for  generations  after it had been 
relegated into the background in other countries. 
9 3.  The Irish Laws disclose to us an hereditary  skilled 
caste of  lawyers, the Brehons, who acted, not as judges in 
any sense of  the word, but as arbitrators.  They gave their 240  THE  IRISH  LAW  OF DISTRESS  PART VIII 
award  on  a  subject  in  dispute  submitted  to  them,  not 
according to any general equitable ideas, but according to 
a  strict customary law which  they themselves expounded 
and were the repositories of. 
$4. We have  seen that early  custom  placed  on  every- 
thing a legal value, and that that legal value was the measure 
of  compensation payable by a person  infringing a right or 
doing a wrong to the person  or persons injured by his act. 
The legal value was a debt due by the injurer to the injured. 
When  persons  were  injured or  had any other claim  for 
a debt they brought the defendant, by the method  to be 
described, before a Brehon  of  the countryside.  He heard 
parties  and  assessed  the  damage  according  to the  legal 
value which custom ordained  attached to it, and directed 
that that damage should be paid. 
$5. The greater part of  the Irish  Laws is taken up in 
considering what was the measure of  damage, and how the 
measure  was  to be  calculated, in  all sorts of  conceivable 
cases, many of  which had no practical application and were 
merely employed as illustrative. 
The Brehon,  in  assessing damages,  heard  not  only  the 
claim,  but  counter-claims  and  '  exemptions ',  such,  for 
instance, as the effect  of  contributory negligence or other 
matter  urged  in reduction  of  damages.  He made up an 
account  and struck  a  balance  between  parties,  and that 
balance was the amount which was due to the claimant. 
$6.  The  Brehon  had  no  authority  to  command  the 
appearance of  parties before him, nor to cause his  award 
to be executed ; he had, in fact, no executive arm. 
Appearance before him and satisfaction of  his award were 
enforced by what is known as the '  law of  distress '.  The 
law of  distress could be put into operation, without resort- 
ing  to a  Brehon  at all, by  the  claimant  distraining  and 
having the claim satisfied by the defendant ; but once it was 
put  into operation,  either  the claim  must  be  satisfied  or 
reference must be made to a Brehon to determine what, if 
any, amount was due ; and, when the award was made, the 
amount must be paid, or, if  it were not, the claimant could 
resort to the law of  distress to recover it. 
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$7. The law of  distress was  a substitute for the law of 
vengeance,  and operated to secure, not only satisfaction of 
claims, but an adjudication upon disputed claims. 
Behind the law of  distress there was no ' sanction ' other 
than the  fear  of  spiritual penalties  or  the reprobation  of 
public opinion, but the effectiveness of  the ' sanction ' was 
sufficient to allow the Iaw  to operate through  many cen- 
turies.  It only brolte down, as any other law would break 
down,  by  persons  ignoring  or  defying  the  ' sanction' 
behind it. 
$ 8. What was this law in Ireland, and how did it operate ? 
If  a  person  had  a  claim  against  another, whether  for 
injury received  or  other  debt  due,  he  proceeded  to giv~ 
notice of  his claim to the opposite side, and, if  it were a debt 
secured by a surety, to the surety.  Notice was given orally 
if  the debtor were a man of  ordinary status, but, if  he were 
of  high status, the creditor proceeded to his house, sat down 
in front of  it, and announced his intention of  fasting until 
the claim was satisfied, with the intention of  bringing down, 
upon  the person  fasted  on,  spiritual penalties  in case the 
faster died.l 
The latter method was identical with the Hindu practice 
of  sitting ' dharna '. 
The claimant stated what his claim was, and the debtor 
must at once take action in one of  the methods appropriate 
in law.  He could, in the first place, satisfy the claim there 
and then, in which case the matter was settled at once.  He 
could undertake to pay the claim in a fixed time, in which 
case he either gave a surety, who would not evade payment, 
or a pledge in the form of  some property of  his own, ensuring 
payment.  He might repudiate the claim either in part or 
in toto ', in which case the claimant was entitled to distrain 
at once in the presence  of  an advocate ; that is, he could 
seize by force some property of  the defendant as a pledge 
out of  which he could recoup himself, or, if  the distress were 
effected before an award, the defendant, while repudiating 
the claim,  might  give a pledge  (gell) to the claimant that 
he would, within a fixed period, '  try the right to distress 
Senchus M6r, I. 113. 1x7, 1x9. 
3054.2  R by law', that is, submit the whole dispute to the arbitra- 
ment of  the local Brehon. 
The Senchus M8r, I. 119, is most insistent on the duty of 
a person fasted upon to give a pledge 
' The just rule ', it says, ' of  stopping each fasting with the 
Fieni is to give the security of  a good surety or a pledge of 
the pledges in the house of  the person who is fasted upon.' 
tj 9.  The  Irish  Laws  divide  pledges  into  two  classes, 
according to the nature of  the debt or claim made-pledges 
liable to a stay (anadh) and pledges which were ' immediate '. 
The period of  ' anadh ' varied from  a day upwards, but 
every pledge  given  to ' try the right  to distress ' became 
' immediate ' if  resort was not had to law. 
A  pledge  with a  stay upon it was, after being  formally 
seized or delivered to the creditor, immediately restored to 
the debtor, who held it during the period  of  stay, subject 
to the lien of  the creditor upon it for his claim, the debtor 
furnishing a surety for the safe keeping of  the pledge. 
Within the period  of  stay, the debtor could redeem his 
pledge  by paying  the claim  or resort  to law ' to try the 
right  to distress ' in  cases  where  no  award  had  already 
been made.  If  he did neither, the creditor was entitled, at 
the end  of  such period,  to demand delivery  of  the pledge 
or to seize it by force and remove it to a ' green ' or pound, 
which might be the precincts of  his own house or a regular 
pound (of which there were many kinds), cstablished by the 
local  chieftain, notice  being  given to the debtor as to the 
locality of  the pound in which the pledge was placed. 
In cases where the pledge was '  immediate ', the creditor 
removed it at once to the '  green ' or pound. 
To use  the words of  the law, from  the time the pledge 
was placed in pound onwards, '  the condition of  the distress 
arises upon the pledge ; expense of  feeding, tending,  and 
forfeiture  shall  accumulate  upon  it ' ; that is to say, the 
cost of  feeding and tending, calculated according to a fixed 
scale, was added to the amount of  the claim, and the pledge 
entered on a period of  forfeiture by incremental stages. 
If  the debtor had  given  a  pledge  ' to try the right  to 
distress ', and did not  do so, the period  of  forfeiture com- 
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menced  at once ; otherwise,  if  he  did  resort  to law,  the 
of  forfeiture did not  begin  to run until the award 
was given. 
In some cases the pledge was forfeited immediately and 
entirely on the expiry of  a fixed time, in others the property 
in it passed bit by bit in fractional shares to the creditor; 
and once the period  of  forfeiture had expired, whether as 
affecting the whole or part of the pledge,  the right of  the 
debtor  to  redeem  the  pledge  or  its  forfeited  part  was 
exhausted. 
It was, it may be remarked, a remedy enforceable  only 
by or against freemen, and could not be resorted to by or 
against a labourer, '  fuidhir ' tenant, or other person under 
a superior. 
In their case action had to be taken through the superior, 
who,  if  the inferior were  a  debtor, was  entitled  to give  a 
pledge  for  payment.  Similarly,  foreigners,  at  any  rate 
under Urradhus Law, could  only proceed  or be proceeded 
against through a ' native '. 
We might also add that, in the Irish Law, the tribal bond 
was so close that a kinsman could be proceeded  against for 
a debt exactly as he could for contribution to a levy for tort. 
In this, Irish  Law differed  from  all other  laws  as they 
survived.  Other laws confine kin-liability to murder, or, in 
a  few  cases,  to other  crimes;  the  Irish  Law,  subject  to 
certain regulations, made the kin liable for all debts arising 
out of  contract or tort, and accordingly permitted distress 
on  a  kinsman  for  a contract-debt.  This law, the law  of 
' kin cogus ', was entirely absent from the Welsh  Laws of 
Hywel Dda.l 
10.  The above is but a brief outline of  the law of  distress 
in  Ireland.  It was  complicated  in  the  Brehon  Laws  by 
intricate provisions  as to the pounds  to which  particular 
pledges could be taken ; priority of  claims or ' limitations ' 
upon  the debtor,  e.g. the right  to free  quarters  of  third 
persons or the right of user of third persons in the pledge ; 
exemption  of certain cattle (nimhe) and goods from being 
pledged ; penalties attached to accidents occurring to cattle 
'  Senchus M6r, I. 79, 8;-7,  97,  103, roj, 107,  209;  11  11. 
R  2 distrained  on ; penalties for neglect  and irregularities and 
innumerable  other  matters,  each  one  of  which  could  be 
taken  into  account  in  order  to diminish  or  increase  the 
debt or to extend or limit the period of  f0rfeiture.l 
With these complications this is not  the place to deal ; 
they were  preserved  in  Irish  Law  long  after all traces  of 
them had disappeared in other laws. 
5 11.  There  is  one  subject,  however,  which  must  be 
noticed  briefly,  that is, the value of  a pledge which  could 
be seized, for we have comparable provisions thereto in the 
Welsh Laws. 
A pledge might equal the debt, plus increments attaching 
to it, or it might be in deficiency or excess of  it. 
If  the pledge  equalled  the debts and increments, then, 
with its entire forfeiture to the creditor, the whole liability 
was wiped  out;  if  its value were less, the creditor, on its 
forfeiture, was entitled to put the law of  distress into opera- 
tion once more to recover the balance ; if  it exceeded  the 
debt, plus increments, the value by which it was in excess 
must  be  restored  to the debtor, ' unless  the act  of  God 
shall have overtaken the pledge '. 
Then, if  no surety had been given for its restoration, the 
debtor  suffered  the  loss ;  if  surety  had  been  given  the 
creditor made good  the loss or paid  one-half  the value of 
the pledge. 
We  may now  turn to  the survivals in  Welsh  Law  of 
a similar law of  distress. 
Senchus MBr,  IT. 3,  15,  39, 49,  87, &c. 
THE LAW  OF DISTRESS  IN WALES 
5 I.  THE  Welsh Laws, although providing for courts and 
for an elaborate procedure in trials, preserved, in more cases 
than one, effective traces of  pre-curial procedure,  in origin 
of the same nature as the Irish Law of  Distress. 
It is significant that the enforcement of  rights without the 
intervention of  courts left traces in the three most important 
branches of  the law, homicide, theft, and suretyship. 
$ 2.  The procedure in homicide was a simple one, which 
we have already traced : it was the simple law of  vengeance, 
where the strong hand killed him who had killed. 
9 3.  In theft, the pre-curial procedure which survived was 
an advance on the law of  vengeance ; he from whom things 
had been stolen could not steal in return, but he could seek 
his remedy without troubling the courts, if  he so desired. 
That remedy is known as the law of  the absolver's oath, 
the ' llw gweilydd '.' 
It is perhaps significant that the remedy is not mentioned 
in the Venedotian Code, and only incidentally in the Triads 
attached to the other Codes, while there are frequent refer- 
ences to it in the Anomalous Laws.  That fact appears to 
point  to  the  conclusion  that  the  codifiers  attempted  to 
abolish  the  system,  but  custom  was  too  strong,  and  it 
maintained its existence for centuries. 
Briefly  put, the procedure was  for  the owner  of  stolen 
property to go  to the suspected  thief  with  a  cross in his 
hand, which he stuck in the ground in front of  the suspect, 
and, with sacred relics, to demand of  him an oath that he 
was not concerned with the theft. 
The oath could not be demanded from a bishop,  a lord, 
one  who  was  deaf  and  dumb,  one  who  spoke  a  foreign 
tongue, or a pregnant woman, nor could it be demanded at 
Such is Mr.  Owen's translation,  the primary meaning of  'gweilydd' 
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the door of  the church or the churchyard gate, or, to use the 
picturesque  language  of  the laws,  while  the suspect  was 
crossing '  a  bridge  made  of  one  tree'.  Otherwise, if  the 
oath were demanded, the person  challenged was bound  to 
take it immediately, if  theft  were involved.  The form of  the 
oath taken was that he 
' had  caused neither loss nor  want  to the claimant, that he 
had not travelled by day or by night with the property, and 
had  received  neither  part  nor  share in  it, and  that he  was 
innocent both of  the crime and of  being an accessary to it.' 
The suspect was absolutely free if  he took the oath, and 
no proceeding  could thereafter be instituted against him. 
If  he  admitted  the  challenge  was  true,  provided  he 
delivered over the property, no further action was taken. 
If he did not admit the charge and refused to take the 
oath, he was bound to make compensation for the property 
stolen,  and when  this  procedure  was  joined  on,  in  later 
days, to a regular  court procedure, the refusal to take the 
oath was  sufficient ground on which  to found a  charge of 
theft and to secure the conviction of  the suspect. 
The use of  the absolver's oath was not confined to theft ; 
we  find  occasional  references  to it in the case  of  debt, a 
debtor absolving himself  from liability if  he swore he had 
not the wherewithal to pay, and in the case of  an allegation 
that the suspect had killed a bondman or an animal belong- 
ing to the challenger.' 
In debt cases the procedure was a preliminary to taking 
action against the surety ; in the case of  killing a bondman 
or an animal the refusal  was  sufficient  ground  on  which 
to sue. 
9 4.  In dealing  with  the law  of  surety and debtor we 
have seen that, when two persons entered into a bargain, 
the vendor gave a surety guaranteeing title and soundness, 
and the vendee a surety for payment.  In demanding and 
enforcing payment  the law  maintained  the old  pre-curial 
procedure, which must be exhausted before the help of  the 
courts could be invoked. 
It was the duty of  the creditor to demand payment  in 
' D. C.  400-2  ; G. C. 784;  IV. 4, IX. 226, 266.  X. 302-8,  XIV. 602-4. 
664, 680, 712, 716, 718. 
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the first instance from the debtor on due date, and he had 
no right to seek payment from the surety unless the debtor 
failed  to  pay when  demand  was  made.  If  the  debtor 
failed or refused  to pay, the creditor was  entitled to turn 
to the surety and demand that he should compel the debtor 
to pay or pay himself. 
It was  the duty of  the surety then to go to the debtor 
on  three  separate  occasions  and  demand  satisfaction  at 
intervals of  15,  30, and 50 days in the case of  ' dead ' pro- 
perty, and 15,  10,  and 5 in  the case  of  '  live ' property, 
after which  the surety was  entitled to and must  enforce 
payment.  If  he  could  not  or  would  not  he  must  pay 
himself .' 
9 5.  The laws give us, at different times, three methods 
employed by the surety to enforce payment, (a) the use of 
a  quasi-moral  suasion,  (b)  the use  of  physical  force,  and 
(c)  the employment of  the procedure of  the cross. 
The  use  of  the  ancient  quasi-moral  or  superstitious 
suasion has not left many traces in the Welsh Laws.  The 
practice of  '  sitting dharna ' in front of  the debtor's house, 
which we have already mentioned, has left one trace in the 
Venedotian Code, p. 130.  That law says : 
' If  a surety and a debtor meet on a bridge of  one tree, the 
latter must  not  refuse  doing  one  of  three  things, either  to 
pay, or give a pledge, or go  to law.  He is not  to move his 
foot until he  do one of  those things.' 
Here we have a quasi-moral suasion applied ; the surety 
sat down in front of  the debtor, and the debtor could not 
pass him unless and until he made satisfaction. 
It is expressed in another form in another passage of  the 
Code, p. 112 : 
' If  a person give surety to another for anything, it is right 
for him  (the debtor) to release the surety by one of  the three 
means  which  release  a surety, either by  paying for  him,  or 
by giving a pledge, or by denying surety (i.  e. by legal defence 
in  suit).' 
We have here the three modes of  enforcing payment in 
terms of  the duty of  the debtor. 
The use  of physical  force in enforcement  of  payment  is 
V. C. 116, 122; D.C. 426; VIII. 184, X. 342. expressed  most  vigorously  in  the Xth Book,  p.  344.  It 
was a rule of Welsh Law-what  we may call the Welsh Law 
of insolvency-that  a man was capable of  paying his debts 
if he had more than one garment.  That was all he could 
keep  back from those to whom  he  owed money,  and the 
Xth Book says : 
' If  a surety shall meet the debtor (after triple demand), let 
him  despoil the debtor of  his clothes, with the exception of 
the  garment next  his  skin, and let  him  continue  to  do  so, 
until he shall get payment of  the whole from him.' 
That expresses the duty of  the surety in figurative lan- 
guage,  to strip the clothes  off  the back  of  the debtor till 
he did  pay.  It is expressed in  the XIVth Book, p. 714, 
in other terms in a passage which shows that, as time went 
on, the use of  physical force was supplemented by the inter- 
dict of  the cross. 
' In the law of  Hywel Dda a surety was to urge his surety- 
ship by force, and no  one  could be  a surety except such as 
enforced  it willingly  or  unwillingly,  and  that was  difficult, 
for  some  could  not  do  that.  So  it was  enacted afterwards 
that a surety and everybody should enforce it by a cross and 
punishment for it, if  broken, which is 180 pence.' 
In this latter procedure  the surety went with a wooden 
cross,  taken  from the lord,  and planted it in front of  the 
debtor's  house.  That  cross  the debtor must  obey  or  be 
mulcted in a penalty if  he failed to do so. 
5 6.  The enforcement of  a debt by force introduces us to 
the law of  pledge  (gwystl), for  it was  by obtaining  or seiz- 
ing  a  pledge  that  a  surety took  effective  steps  towards 
obtaining payment without resort to Court. 
The exaction of  a pledge was a duty and privilege of  the 
surety and not of  the creditor, whose rights to enforce were 
limited to a demand upon the surety.  If  he exacted a pledge 
from  the defendant, the surety was  free  from  all  further 
responsibility,  and the creditor was fined three kine.  The 
reason why it was left to the surety was that it was within 
his option to demand a pledge or pay himself. 
The surety could,  if  he liked,  give  a  pledge  out of  his 
own property, and, if  he did, the creditor must accept it ; but 
the former would naturally prefer to obtain property of  the 
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debtor as a  pledge.  In order  to do so he had to make 
a triple demand, and then, if  the debtor refused  or failed 
and the creditor insisted  on  action,  the surety could  and 
must  take forcible  action,  either  in  the presence  of  the 
debtor or otherwise. 
The forcible seizure of the debtor's property against his 
will might result in trouble.  Nevertheless, the surety must 
take the risk.  He must  seize some  property  or  other of 
the debtor's, and hand it over as security for the debt, and 
' if  there be  obstruction to giving a pledge, the surety must 
accompany the pledge when seized, together with the creditor, 
to a place of safety, and he  himself  is to receive the first (or 
first three) stick blow : if he  do not do this, let him pay the 
debt himself.' 
He was not required to be aggressive ; but he must protect 
the property seized,  and if  assaulted, he had the right  to 
demand compensation for insult and injury. 
The law  also  gave  the surety the right  to pursue  the 
debtor even into sanctuary.  Sanctuary would  protect  no 
debtor, and he could be dragged out of  it by force and made 
to pay. 
No doubt a power of  this sort was open to abuse, unless 
guarded against.  By the time of  Hywel Dda it is obvious 
that, if  the debtor denied the debt absolutely, the forcible 
action  of  the surety was  suspended ;  the creditor  must 
then  seek  his  remedy  by  suit,  and  the  attachment  was 
postponed  until judgement  was obtained ; but even before 
that time there were regulations as to what could be seized 
and what was to be done with property when seized.  We 
can see particularly the limitations placed by custom upon 
forcible seizure by comparing the rules regulating property 
so seized and property given in pledge vo1untarily.l 
5 7.  The rules relating to what could be seized are very 
minute and exact.  They may be stated briefly thus : 
I. The pledge, whether seized  or  given voluntarily, must  be 
a ' legal ' pledge, that is, must be worth one-third more 
than the demand, and ordinarily should not exceed that 
value. 
V.  C.  118,  120-2,  138  ; D.  C.  426-8 ; V. 66,  VI.  110,  VIII. 184,  X. 
332,  XIV.  632,  660. 2. The  pledge  was  ordinarily to be  movable property.  The 
laws speak of  the three ' gwanas ' or supports of  a pledge, 
the  hand, the  arm, and  the shoulder, or sometimes the 
hand, the shoulder, and its final place of  deposit ; signify- 
ing that the property must be of  such a nature as to be 
easily lifted and carried. 
3. The pledge, whether it were  the surety's or  debtor's pro- 
perty, must be property belonging solely to the pledgor : 
that is joint  property could not be pledged. 
4.  Certain specified property could not be pledged. 
5.  If, on  the occasion of  the first attachment, property of  less 
value  than  a  legal  pledge  were  obtained,  the  surety 
must go  day by day and exact more until the full legal 
pledge was made up.l 
It must  not be supposed  that in  the laws,  as we  have 
them, either the codifiers or the commentators enunciated 
broad propositions.  We imagine that, if  they had had to 
state rules in that form at all, they would have been horrified 
at the idea of  enunciating more than three.  Their minds 
ran constantly in the direction  of  forcing everything they 
possibly could into Triadic form, but nevertheless these rules 
are to be found in the laws.  The laws give us a series of 
pictures, showing how  they worked  in practice, and what 
the limitations on each rule were. 
5 8.  To take the first, that the pledge  must  be  worth 
one-third more than the demand, and ordinarily should not 
exceed that amount. 
Suppose, for instance, the pledge seized and given to the 
creditor  exceeded  the legal  value.  Was  the  creditor  to 
refuse it, and, if  it were lost while in his possession, was he 
to restore the difference ? 
Certainly not :  he was  at full liberty to accept it ; but 
the remedy of  the debtor, if  it were lost, depended entirely 
on whether he had been  a willing and consenting party to 
the particular pledge being taken or not. 
The  Venedotian  Code,  p.  120,  tells  us,  in  a  series  of 
illustrations, what happened. 
If  the  debtor  permitted  the  surety  to give  in  pledge 
property worth £1 for a debt of  a penny, and the pledge were 
lost before it was redeemed, all the creditor was responsible 
V. C.  118; V. 68, VI. 110-12,  VIII. 198, X. 332, XVI. 632. 
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for was  to restore a halfpenny, which was in law the one- 
third of  a legal penny.  The creditor was bound to preserve 
the property till maturity of  the pledge ; if  he lost it, his 
debt was considered to be paid, and he had to restore one- 
third of  the legal value, which  was the measure by which 
the legal pledge had to exceed the value of  the debt.  If  the 
debtor were  foolish  enough  to permit  the surety to seize 
something worth more than one-third in excess of  the debt, 
he  accepted  the risk  of  losing  the difference if  the pledge 
were lost. 
The very  same principle  applied  where  the pledge  was 
not redeemed at maturity.  The pledge lapsed to the creditor 
if not  redeemed, the one-third in excess of  the debt going 
to him.  So, if  in the specific case mentioned, the pledge, 
really worth £1,  lapsed, the debtor, because he had agreed 
to its being pledged, could not claim the difference between 
£1 and one and one-third pence.  He had himself  ' debased 
the privilege of  his pledge ', and by consenting to the pledge 
had fixed its value at one and one-third pence. 
If,  however,  the  surety  seized  property  against  the 
debtor's  will  and gave it in pledge,  the creditor  was  still 
entitled  to accept it.  ' It is lawful ', says the Code, ' for 
the creditor  to receive  what  is  given  him,  whatever  its 
amount, in pledge '-but,  if  he lost it, his debt was wiped 
out and he restored to the surety one-third the amount of 
the debt, that is the amount of  the difference between the 
value of  the '  legal pledge ', which should have been seized, 
and the debt, but the surety had to make good to the debtor 
the difference in value between the debt and the real value 
of the pledge,  because he had seized a pledge exceeding in 
value what he was entitled to seize. 
But suppose  the surety came down  on  the debtor and 
found he had no property worth one and one-third times the 
value of  the debt, but had property worth, say, twenty or 
one  hundred  times  its value,  which  the  debtor  was  not 
prepared to give in pledge. 
The surety could hardly seize it, as he ran the risk  of 
having to indemnify the debtor if it were lost or forfeited, 
and yet he  could  not refuse  to find  a  pledge  because he 252  THE  M'ELSH  LAW  OF DISTRESS  PARTVIII 
was bound to give the creditor one.  He might, of  course, 
give property of  his own in pledge, but he would prefer to 
get something from the debtor. 
Now  one of  the characteristics of  the Welsh Laws is that 
they do try to find some means of  meeting most ordinary 
contingencies  without  violating  the basic  principle  of  the 
law. 
This was too obvious a contingency to be overlooked, and 
the Venedotian Code tells us what was to be done in those 
circumstances by employing another illustration. 
It says that if  there were a surety for 12 pence, and the 
time for payment fell due, and the debtor had only a horse 
worth £1 or £10,  and the debtor refused to pay on demand 
or give the horse in pledge, the surety was not to seize the 
horse.  He was to proceed at once, with the creditor, to the 
lord and explain to him how matters stood.  The lord was 
thereupon to authorize the surety to seize the horse,  ' to 
give a great pledge in lieu of  a small matter, lest the creditor 
suffer loss '.  When the horse was seized and given in pledge 
in  these  circumstances,  its  value,  while  it  remained  in 
pledge, was one and one-third times the debt due only. 
§ g.  Let us turn now  to the second  rule  that property 
must ordinarily be easily movable. 
This rule was subject to two limitations.  The first was 
that the creditor could waive the right and accept in pledge 
property which  was not easily movable. 
The second limitation was that if  the debt were of  such 
magnitude that the debtor or surety could not find a small 
article one and one-third times the value of  the debt, they 
could proffer an immovable pledge ; the test of  immobility 
being  not  whether  it were land or  anything falling under 
the present-day English  definition of  immovable property, 
but whether it was a thing which the creditor could carry 
on his shoulder and move in whatever direction he wished 
to move it.' 
§ 10.  The third rule that property pledged should not be 
joint  property, was also subject to two likitations. 
In the law relating to women we saw property of  a husband 
Iv. 6, x.  332, 
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and wife was  joint.  The law,  however,  provided  that if 
a lzusband or wife gave away any of  their joint  property in 
pledge, neither could nullify the pledge. 
The other limitation was that if  a surety came down on 
the debtor and found he had only joint  property, he was 
entitled to claim  partition through  the lord,  whose  order 
directing partition was abso1ute.l 
g 11. We cannot fully explain the fourth rule, that certain 
property could not be pledged, without going a little further 
and considering  what  power  a  creditor had in respect  to 
a pledge in his possession, how long he was to keep it, and 
what happened to the property at the expiry of  the period 
during which he must keep it.  We get only fragmentary 
indications in the Codes :  to some extent they seem con- 
tradictory, and the exact significance of  terms used are not 
explained. 
We have  already referred  to the three '  supports ' of  a 
pledge, the last of  which was that a creditor was to deposit 
the pledge  in  a  place  of  safe keeping,  and, if  the pledge 
were  lost,  his  debt was  wiped  out and he had to refund 
one-third the value of  the debt. 
Now we find in the laws definite, though apparently con- 
tradictory,  rules  fixing  a  period  during  which  a  creditor 
must  keep the pledge  in his  custody, providing  for lapse, 
and prohibiting the use of  the pledge by the creditor.  What, 
however, is beyond doubt can be reduced to the following 
rules : 
(i) The pledge  was to be kept by the creditor for some 
period or other, during which the property in it continued 
to be the debtor's. 
This period is stated to be ordinarily nine days, but the 
period  might  be  fixed  by  contract,  and  the  Anomalous 
Laws, in one passage, fix a period of  one year and one day if 
the property were the surety's, unless there was a contract 
reducing the period, and, in another, abolish all periods of 
retention if  the surety gave a pledge of  his own and declined 
to take action against the debior. 
For some articles a period of  one year and one day was 
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immutably  fixed,  viz.  gold,  vessels  of  gold,  a  lorica,  and 
a cuirass.  A harp, a  yew  pail,  and a  plume  taken  from 
the debtor against his will need not be kept for more than 
nine  days, but, as the debtor  could  always demand  their 
restoration  or  an  equivalent  from  the  surety within one 
year  and a  day,  they were  to all  intents  and  purposes 
excluded from seizure. 
A pledge given  for satisfaction  of  damages to corn  had 
to be kept till the calends of  winter, to enable the person 
responsible to make the damage good out of  his own corn. 
Certain articles had also to be kept indefinitely, viz. a filel- 
axe, a coulter, and a cauldron, a provision which also made 
these articles in practice unattachable.' 
(ii) The creditor was not allowed to use the article pledged 
during the currency of  such period, lest it should deteriorate. 
If  he did use it he lost all rights in the pledge and could 
not recover his debt.  An exception was made in the case 
of  a milch-cow, a harp, and a chess-board, as they did not 
deteriorate with use.2 
(iii) The  debtor  was  entitled,  at any  time  during  the 
currency of  the period of  pledge, to redeem it by paying the 
legal pledge value, i. e. one and one-third times the amount 
of  the debt.3 
(iv) If  he failed to redeem the pledge in that period  the 
property in it lapsed to the creditor, if  the creditor offered 
it  on  due  date  to the  debtor  and  the  latter  refused  to 
redeem it.4 
(v) Certain articles could not lapse, and were, therefore, 
not fit subjects for a pledge. 
These  were  ecclesiastical  paraphernalia,  a  milch-cow, if 
pledged for silver by any one other than a surety, a harp, 
a yew-pail, a plume to the extent noted, a coulter, a cauldron, 
a fuel-axe, and oxen engaged in co-tillage.5 
The property mentioned as non-lapseable,  and, therefore 
in  practice,  non-pledgeable,  forms  a  miscellaneous  collec- 
tion ; but because of  the light thrown on social conditions 
V. C. 128, 330; G. C. 726; VIII. 198, X. 340, XIV. 632, 640. 
VIII. 198, IX. 304, XIV. 640. 
VIII. 198, XIV. 590.  XIV. 634, 702. 
V. C. 320 ; G. C. 726, VIII. 198, X. 340, XIV. 632. 
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it is  worth while pausing  a  moment  to consider  why  this 
heterogeneous list was exempt from attachment for debt. 
We can understand  quite easily why ecclesiastical para- 
phernalia, which  were  dedicated to divine  services,  could 
not be forfeited for a secular debt ; we can also understand 
why oxen engaged in co-tillage could not be diverted from 
the joint  enterprise so as to delay or endanger the ploughing, 
but what were the reasons underlying the other exemptions ? 
The reason  given  for not  pledging  a  milch-cow is  that 
Hywel Dda provided that it could not lapse, but that does 
not answer the question why it could not lapse.  Cattle formed 
the principal  article of  wealth  among the ancient Welsh, 
it seems that the reason for exemption was that milch- 
cattle were necessary for  the  sustenance of  the tribesmen 
who lived largely on cheese, milk, and butter. 
The harp and the cauldron were exempt, as they were the 
hall-marks of  freedom, the indispensables of  the freeman. 
The yew-pail (bayol) is a misreading for fuel-axe (bwyall), 
and there is no difficulty in understanding why a fuel-axe 
was exempt in a country of  forests.  The coulter, the indis- 
pensable part of  a plough, was exempt for obvious reasons. 
The  plume  (@to)  appears  to  be  a  misreading  for  the 
domestic milking-can (fiol), which was exempted because it 
was an indispensable article for dairy people. 
$12.  The fifth rule, viz. that a surety must find pledges 
for the full value of  the debt, there was  no limitation to. 
The  surety  was  liable,  subject  to the modifications  con- 
sidered in the law  of  suretyship, for the whole debt, and 
must secure a pledge to cover it. 
$ I3  We have merely  to consider  one more point  con- 
nected  with  pledges,  seized forcibly  or  given  voluntarily, 
viz. whether a pledge, when handed over to a creditor, had 
to be secured by a further surety guaranteeing title. 
There was nothing to prevent such security being given, 
but it was not essential. 
The  Venedotian  Code  says a  pledge  handed  over  by a 
Surety without  security for  title was  a  good  one,  and, in 
case of default, lapsed to the creditor.  The lord secured the 
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could not give an insecure pledge for the simple reason that 
he might have to find another. 
Suretyship, however, could be demanded from an owner 
of  a pledge giving it voluntarily. 
$14.  One passage in the Venedotian Code is of  very great 
interest as showing the transition  from the period  of  pre- 
curial distress to the period when distress was to be resorted 
to only after permission of the Court was obtained. 
It provides that where the debt was denied, or the debtor 
refused  to go  to law  to determine  whether  the creditor 
could distrain, or the alleged surety denied he was surety 
and refused to distrain, the creditor must go to law.  If  he 
refused to do so, the surety was ips0 facto  freed from the 
claim. 
This indicates that the codifiers introduced  a  rule  that 
the pre-curial  distress was  not  to be  put  into  operation 
until  decree  was  obtained.  In  other  words  the  extra- 
judicial  law of distress was converted into a law of  execu- 
tion by the simple process of  suspending the right to distrain 
until permission  of  the Court was obtained.' 
v. c. 120-8; x.  332. 
THE LAW  OF DISTRESS  IN THE GERMANIC 
AND OTHER  CODES 
$ I. THIS  system of  distress before judgement  prevailed 
in other systems of  law as well. 
5 2. In Roman Law one of  the principal actions was the 
' pignoriscapio '--the  seizure  of  a  pledge,  an  action  of 
identical origin. 
5 3.  In English Law the same system prevailed under the 
title of  ' taking nams ', i.e, the impounding of  cattle belong- 
ing to the debtor, forcing the latter to an action of  replevin 
for recovery  of  the  goods  seized.  The  procedure  upon 
taking ' nams ' was so complicated and had to be so strictly 
observed that it became dangerous to resort to it. 
Blackstone says : 
' Tlle  many particulars wllicll  attend the  taking of  a  dis- 
tress used foraerly to make it a hazardous kind of  proceeding, 
for if  any  one  irregularity  were  committed, it  vitiated  the 
whole.' 
In a  modified  form the taking of  ' nams ' before judge- 
ment existed till recent days in English Law, for the whole 
of the English Law of ' distress for rent ' is ' extra-judicial ' 
and pre-curial in origin. 
S 4.  The early Scots Law retained very definite traces of 
distress for debt before decree.  The procedure  for seizing 
' nams ' for debt  is  regulated  in  the Leges  Quatuor Bur- 
gorum, cc. 32, 33, 34, and in the Assize  of  King William, 
c. 27 ; and it was not definitely abolished as a right until 
the  reign  of  Alexander  11,  under  whose  Statute, c.  7, a 
Penalty was imposed on persons attaching before judgement, 
the goods attached being also restored to the owner.  That 
the prohibition  was not completely  effectual  appears from 
the fact that it was renewed in the Act Parl. Robert I,  c. 8. 
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§ 5.  In the Germanic  Codes  the older  system  has  left 
many traces. 
A very full account, similar in many points to the Welsh 
rules,  occurs in the Lex Bmgund., Tit. XIX, under which 
the debtor was to be thrice warned  to pay, and if  he did 
not, the surety was either to pay one-third over the debt, 
or compel payment by force, seize a pledge and accompany 
it home. 
In the Lex Salica, Codes I, Tit. LXXIII, we find a rule 
prohibiting distress before decree : 
' Si  quis  debitorem  suum  per  ignorantiam  sine  judice 
pignoraverit  antcquam  eum  "  nesti  canthe  chigio " hoc  est 
accusante, et debitum pcrdat et insuper si male pignoraverit 
cum  lege  conponat, hoc  est capitale reddat  et  solidos  XV. 
culp. jud.' 
Titles L and LI show also that, in actions on suretyship 
and for return of  goods, a demand had first to be made at 
the debtor's house, and it was only on refusal (which added 
to the sum claimable) that resort  could  be had to court; 
but if  resort  were  not had to court  and the creditor pro- 
ceeded  to  distrain  before  judgement,  he  was  mulcted  in 
a fine. 
The Lex Alamman., Tit. LXXXIX, also the Lex Frision. 
(Additio Sapientum), Tit. VIII, prohibited  the seizing of 
a slave as a pledge,  and if  a slave were seized and caused 
damage, he was  not responsible  therefor.  If  given volun- 
tarily, he was.  This seems to point to a permission to seize 
other kinds of  pledges. 
The Lex Baiuor., Tit. XIII, prohibited all seizures under 
penalty  of  double  value  and  restoration  except  under 
judicial  order,  and  similar  prohibitions  occur  in  the Lex 
Saxon., c. 25. 
The Lex  Langobard.l shows  unmistakably  that distress 
before judgement  prevailed  among  the Lombards  at the 
time  of  the redaction.  It was  provided  that  a  creditor 
must summon his debtor to pay three times, and he was 
then, if  not paid, entitled to distrain on certain property : 
' Si quis debitorern habens appellet eum seinel, bis et usque 
tertio,  et  si  debitum  non  reddederit  aut  non  conposuerit, 
' Ed  Roth., cc  2 $5-5  I. and Ed. Luit ,  c  I 5. 
tune debeat pignerare  in  his rebus, quibus pignerare lecitum 
est.' 
Distraint  without  thrice  calling  for  payment  involved 
a loss of  claim ; and it was impermissible to attach horses, 
pigs, cows, or oxen without the King's  order.  That order 
was obtained, as a matter of course, without resort to court, 
if  the  attaching  creditor  complained  to  the  ' sculdahis ' 
that the debtor had no other property. 
5 6.  We see, therefore, that all early laws were based on 
the same principle, and that in those countries where courts 
were established the right to distrain, from being  a private 
right of vindication, became a law of  execution, carried out 
after sanction obtained from court. 
In Ireland it remained a private right always ; in Wales 
we see the right surviving and put into force  except where 
the  debtor  or  surety  denied  liability,  in  which  case  the 
courts were resorted to, and it was only much later in the 
history of the European peoples that all attachments before 
judgement  were prohibited, even when the debtor did not 
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$ r. THE  law of  distress, which became a law of  execution 
in  Wales  by postponing the right  of  the person  aggrieved 
to resort  to distress until he had obtaiced the permission 
of  the court after adjudication, applied to the recovery of 
movable property  or  of  compensatio~l  for  breach  of  con- 
tract, tort, or the lilte. 
It did not, and could not, apply to land in its entirety. 
We have, however, three surviva!~  of  a pre-curial procedure 
regarding claims to land in the old Welsh Laws, that relating 
to ' dadanhudd ', which by the time of  Hywel Dda had been 
amalgamated  with  judicial  procedure,  that  relating  to 
'  lawful disturbances ', and that relating to the settlement 
of  boundaries. 
The first two subjects are dealt with  elsewhere, but we 
may deal with the settlement of  boundary disputes here. 
9 2.  The law of  adjusting boundary disputes was anterior 
to the existence of  courts ; but by the time the laws were 
redacted, it had been brought partly into line with the fact 
that a judiciary  existed, by arranging, not for an adjudica- 
tion on boundaries by the court, but by providing that the 
old  machinery  should  be  put  into  operation  only  in  the 
presence of  the court. 
Side  by  side  with  the retention  of  the old  method  of 
delimiting boundaries under the supervision  of  the courts, 
the courts extended their jurisdiction  by the inlposition of 
penalties for infractions of  boundaries. 
5 3. This chapter in the Welsh Laws is  of  great interest. 
In dealing with  the  social  organization  of  Wales  we  saw 
how tribes and ' gwelys ' occupied territories or areas, and, 
by  a  system  of  continued  occupation,  acquired  exclusive 
occupancy or ' priodolder ' rights. 
Now it is obvious that some system of  boundary demarca- 
tion was necessary when different units might at any time 
claim the same area belonged to them. 
The Gwentian  Code, p.  764, has an artificial system of 
fixing a  kind  of  neutral zone  between  occupied  areas.  It 
says  that  between  ' erws '  belonging  to  different  people 
there must be two furrows unoccupied, between two ' ran- 
dirs ' 4 feet, between ' trefs ' 13  fathoms.  The IXth Book, 
p. 268, alters the last two to 3 and 5  feet respectively,  and 
7 and g feet as the neutral zone between '  cantrefs ' and 
' cymwds '. 
These  are  no  doubt  artificial  and imaginary;  but  the 
prevalence  of  boundary marks appears from  the frequent 
references to boundary stones, crosses, and the like. 
§ 4.  In  the law, as redacted, breaches of  boundaries became 
offences  punishable by a fine, by the payment of  their legal 
worth, and by the liability to remove them. 
The breach of  boundaries  between '  trefs ' was punished 
with  a  severe penalty.  If  a  boundary  of  that sort  were 
breached  by ploughmen, the oxen, the plough, and every- 
thing belonging to it were forfeited to the King.  The driver 
was mulcted in the worth of  his left liand, the ploughman 
in that of  his right foot, and they had to restore the boundary 
jointly.' 
Giraldus Ca~nbrensis  remarlis on the frequency of  encroach- 
ing on boundaries prevalent in Wales, but his strictures are 
rather overdrawn when we  remember  that the conception 
of private property in land was foreign to Celtic legal ideas. 
Occupation,  developing  later  into  a  right  to  exclusive 
occupation by prescription, did exist ; but private property 
in that which was free to all, if  unoccupied, was one of  the 
keynotes of  the land system of  Wales, which a half-Norman 
like Giraldus could not understand. 
§ 5.  The penal provisions we  have mentioned, enforced 
by the courts, were later and of  a different character from 
the demarcation of  boundaries of  areas subject to occupation 
(gwarchadu), in  which  the  old  pre-curial  procedure  con- 
tinued long after courts were established. 
§ 6.  There were, in Welsh Law, what were called ' stays 
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of  boundaries '  (argae  terfyfz),  and  no  one  could,  under 
colour  of  claiming  demarcation  and adjustment  of  boun- 
daries, claim  possession  of  land  which  extended  beyond 
these stays.  If any one did so, he lost his claim altogether, 
and  where  areas were  in  dispute  extending  beyond  such 
stays, they had to be dealt with, not as boundary disputes, 
but as claims for the recovery of  land. 
The most important ' stay ' was the ' stay ' cf  a '  randir '. 
The meaning of  this was that no one could claim a demarca- 
tion  of  boundary  which,  if  successful,  would  involve  the 
transfer to the claimant of  a whole ' randir ' claimed to be 
in the possession of  the other side. 
Another ' stay ' was a river.  Large and impetuous rivers 
were invariably boundaries, and no one could claim, under 
colour  of  demarcation,  to extend  his  occupation  beyond 
a river. 
It is here, perhaps,  interesting to note an introduct~on 
into the Welsh Laws attempted by two of  the commentators, 
who,  dealing with  alluvion,  a matter on  which  the Codes 
are silent, assert that an island  in  a river belongs  to the 
owner  of  the  nearest  bank, and if  it be equidistant from 
both banks, it is shared equally by the two riparian owners, 
except  where  one ' occupation ' has  preceded  another,  in 
which case title goes by priority of  occupation. 
The matter is of  interest as showing how the commentators 
sought  to harmonize  the provisions  of  Roman  Law with 
indigenous Celtic principles. 
A third stay was a building, a kiln or a barn, and though 
a  building  might  in  part  have  been  erected  on  land  en- 
croached  upon,  a  claim  to demarcate  boundaries was  not 
the appropriate means to employ in  order to get rid of  it. 
The reason will be obvious as we pr0ceed.l 
5 7.  The word '  stay ', however, in respect to boundaries 
is used in another sense as well, to describe not merely the 
points beyond  which  a boundary could  not be carried by 
demarcation, but to indicate who was not entitled to point 
out  a boundary which  he  claimed  was  his.  In this sense 
' D  C. 536 ;  G  C. 762, 774 ; V.  52, 76; VII.  148; IX.  296; X. 336 ; 
XI. 402 ; XIT'.  740. 
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the three stays of  boundaries are frequently asserted to be 
status, occupation, and priodolder right. 
This  brings  us  to  the ancient  method  of  demarcation 
which survived intact into the time of  Hywel Dda. 
tj  8.  What happened when  any one desired to have his 
boundaries fixed  was  this.  The person  aggrieved  applied 
to the lord for demarcation.  Notice was issued to the other 
side, and an order made for the boundaries to be demarcated. 
The parties  assembled  on the ground in  dispute with  the 
judge of the court in attendance. 
The boundary was  then  indicated, not  by any judge  or 
officer  of  the court,  nor  even  by  proof  of  witnesses,  nor 
ordinarily by any independent person, but by one or other 
of the parties and by him alone.  That party indicated the 
boundary  who  had  the preferential right to do so, and if 
neither  had  any preferential  right  superior  to the other, 
there was  a special method of  demarcating in  which  both 
participated.  The court had nothing to do with it, and the 
judge was only there to see some formalities were observed. 
With one exception, it was the invariable rule that that 
one of  the parties who had the highest  status was entitled 
to point  out what the boundary was.  The solitary excep- 
tion was in Arfon, where the freemen preserved  their own 
boundaries, and, in dispute with their neighbours of  adjoining 
'cantrefs',  it was the right of  the men of  Arfon to indicate 
where the boundary line lay, and, where two ' maenols ' in 
Arfon  were  at issue  between  themselves,  men  appointed 
from the other seven demarcated the boundary without out- 
side intervention and without even the presence of  the judge. 
A  dispute regarding boundaries might arise between the 
King and the Church, between the Church and a territorial 
lord,  between  two  different  Church  foundations,  between 
the King or lord and a free ' maenol ', between a free official 
and one without office, between ' cantrefs ', '  cymwds ', and 
' trefs ', between a ' priodawr ' and a ' non-priodawr ', and 
between  free and unfree  men.  In every case  the man or 
Party who had the highest status laid down the boundary 
line, and what he laid down could not be disputed by the 
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In the Vth Book we are told that the status of  the Church 
in this matter was superior to all others.  This was a pious 
aspiration  of  a  clerical  commentator,  which  no  one  else 
agreed with. 
Other  authorities gave the superior status to the King. 
A bishop or abbot, possessed of  a crozier and a gospel, came 
next to the King and before any territorial lord. 
Of  course  it might  and frequently did happen  that the 
contesting parties had equal status.  The preferential right 
to demarcate was then accorded to the party who had the 
longest occupation of landabuttingon the disputed boundary. 
The man on whose abutting land  there was  a building, 
such as a house, a kiln, or a barn, or who had land under 
cultivation, was deemed to have a longer ' occupation ' than 
a man who did not possess a building  on his side or who 
had not ploughed his land. 
Between churches of  equal status the head of  the institu- 
tion first inducted had the longest ' occupation '. 
In demarcating, the person entitled to demarcate, whether 
by superior status or longer  occupation,  entered upon the 
land in the presence of  the other party, the ' gwrdas ' of the 
country and the judge of  the court, carrying relics with him. 
He stood first at one  end, where  the two  lands met,  and 
swore on the relics that that was the point of  junction.  He 
then traversed the whole of  the line which he asserted was 
the boundary,  stopping at the end of  every nine paces  to 
repeat  the oath, finally  swearing  to the accuracy  of  the 
whole line at the other end. 
That  was  the universal  method  adopted whenever  one 
party  had  the  preferential  right  to  demarcate,  and  his 
demarcation was final and binding between the parties. 
Wherever  the King  was  a party to the dispute, he did 
not  appear himself.  It was  the duty of  the ' maer ' and 
'  canghellor ' to maintain his  boundaries  and to swear  to 
them in his place.  If  an abbot or a bishop were a party, he 
was represented by a habited monk. 
If  parties were  co-equal in  status and  occupation,  the 
ordinary rule was that the oldest men belonging to the two 
parties,  one  taken  from  each  side,  demarcated.  Each 
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indicated  what  was  the boundary  according  to his  con- 
tention, swearing in  the same way  as if  he had the pre- 
ferential and sole right  to demarcate,  and whatever  land 
might  lie  between  the two  lines  so indicated  was  shared 
equally between them. 
Three passages, however, say that before persons equal in 
status and occupation could demarcate, the elders, twenty- 
four of the ' cantref ', denominated '  dadferwyr '  or restorers, 
were to indicate the boundary, if  they could;  and it was 
only when they expressed their inability to do so that the 
parties were allowed to demarcate.  One late authority says 
the elders were  to decide  which  was  the right  boundary, 
after the parties had shown their demarcations, and if  they 
failed, then and then only was there to be equal sharing. 
These provisions probably represent some local variations 
on the general rule. 
If  the dispute,  however,  were  between  two '  cy~nwds  ', 
both the Southern Codes say that the ' maer ', ' canghellor ', 
and ' ringyll ' of the King, and not  the oldest  men  from 
each side: hemarked. 
Likewise, where two ecclesiastical  communities, equal in 
status and occupation, were  at issue,  a  monk  from  each 
swore to the line, and any area lying between the lines so 
shown was divided equally. 
If, in cases of equal status and occupation, only one side 
were  prepared to swear on the relics, then the line to which 
the other  swore  was  accepted,  and if  neither  side  would 
swear to the line, the King stepped in and took the land in 
dispute as a part of  his waste.' 
In all  this  the judge  had  no  function.  He was  there 
simply to record the result and to decide any point of law, 
extraneous  to  the  demarcation,  which  might  arise.  He 
received 2s. for his duties, and 10s. were paid to the King. 
We have to add that the King could  at any time have 
the boundaries between two ' trefs ' demarcated for his own 
information.  The procedure then adopted was the same. 
$ 9.  We see in this procedure an old  method of  decision 
' V. C. 106, 196;  D. C. 368,454, 536, 538; G. C. 762, 764.774; V. 40,76. 
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surviving, dating from before the introduction of  courts, and 
we can see also how the courts first crept in in such disputes, 
laying thereby the foundations for a future assumption of 
jurisdiction in the decision of  boundary disputes. 
3 10.  In other contemporary systems there appears to be 
little mention of  the settlement of  boundary disputes by any 
special procedure, and only two references have been found. 
The  Lex  Alamman.  (Hlothair's  Constitutions),  Tit. 
LXXXVIII, contains a provision comparable in some ways 
to  the Welsh  system.  That  law  provided  that  if  there 
were  a dispute  about boundaries  between  two families  or 
tribes  (inter has  genealogias), each  side  was  required  to 
indicate the boundary line  relied  upon by it.  Thereupon 
a champion from each side was chosen, and the two repre- 
sentatives fought for the mastery within the area in dispute. 
The contention was submitted to ordeal by battle, and the 
family  whose  champion  won  was  accorded  the land, the 
possession of  which was secured to them by heavy fines in 
case of  subsequent breach. 
The Lex Baiuor., Tit. XII, made a breach of  boundaries, 
if  committed  by a freeman, a tort to be satisfied by ' con- 
positio ', and if  by a slave, a crime, punishable by flogging. 
It contains  an  interesting  provision  for  settlement  of 
boundary  disputes, recalling  the Welsh  Law  of  boundary 
marks. 
' Quotienscumque de  terminis  fuerit  orta contentio signa 
quae  antiquitus  constituta  sunt,  oportet  inquirere  id  est 
agere  terrae,  quem  propter  fines  fundorum  antiqui  tunc 
apparuerint  fuisset  ingestum  lapides  etiam  quas  propter 
judiciuln  terminorurn  notis  evidentibus  sculptis  vel  con- 
stituerint esse defixos.  Si haec signa defuerint tunc in arbori- 
bus  notis,  quas decorvos vocant  convenit  observare, si illas 
quae antiquitus probant incisae.' 
It proceeds that if  the boundaries  are unknown, the old 
boundaries  are  to  be  inspected,  and  against  them  long 
possession is not to avail, and concludes with  a provision 
identical with that contained in the Lcx Alammanorum. 
We  have,  therefore,  clear  proof  that the Welsh  system 
was also in use among some, at any rate, of  the Germanic 
tribes, and that it was not entirely confined to Wales. 
PART IX 
THE  LAW  OF PROCEDURE THE ENFORCEMENT  OF JURISDICTION 
IN describing  the procedure  in  trials  before  courts we 
have, first of  all, to state the law on what appears, at first 
sight,  to be a  number  of  miscellaneous  and unconnected 
points, but which are really interconnected as part of  a law 
securing the presence of  parties in court for submission to 
adjudication.  There are, in this procedure, many survivals 
of  a pre-curial period, which have been embodied in the law 
of  courts. 
I. Li~nitation. 
§ I.  The fixing of  a period of  limitation for the assertion 
of rights is generally regarded as incidental to an advanced 
legal system, and as one not found in ancient systems.  It 
is interesting, therefore, to find in Wales a complete law of 
limitation, together with some rules permitting of  an exten- 
sion of  the regular period. 
§ 2. In a few cases a plaint had to be filed ' immediately '. 
This was the rule in cases of  insult and fighting, and, accord- 
ing to the Dimetian Code, in surety cases.  The laws do not 
clearly  define  what  is  meant  by ' immediate ', except  in 
surety cases, where it rneant nine days after refusal to pay; 
but  it  apparently  implied  that  the  claim  must  be  filed 
during the existing session of  the courts, and could not be 
filed in the session next following the date of  the cause of 
action. 
§ 3.  We  have  also  seen  that  where  a  judgement  was 
challenged  by  mutual  pledge,  the  challenge  had  to  be 
' immediate ', in  which  case  the term  meant ' before  the 
rising of  the Court ', and that an extension  of  the period 
was allowed to a year and a day wherever the judgement 
had been given ' in absentia ', or where the suitor had been 
Prevented  from  challenging  by  oppression  on the part of 
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$4. The majority of  cases was governed by the rule of 
'  a year and a day '.  This rule applied to all other criminal 
actions,  to  all civil actions not based on suretyship and involv- 
ing a claim to recover money, cattle, or movables; and to 
some land suits. 
It applied  not merely to the institution of  suits, but to 
executions, defences, and prosecutions after institution ; so 
that a person,  who had been  granted relief  or  possession, 
must take steps to execute within a year and a day, other- 
wise his relief  lapsed ; a  defendant must reply  to a  claim 
made in the same period, otherwise his defence was barred ; 
and a person suing must not sit idle after instituting, for, if 
he allowed a year and a day to pass by while he sat on his 
plaint, he was ousted from relief. 
One  authority  appears  to indicate  that  there  was  no 
limitation until a plaint  had been  filed, and that the law 
only applied to the prosecution of  plaints filed, but this is 
clearly opposed to the generality of  authorities. 
§ 5.  To the general rule that a  case must be instituted 
within a year and a day of  the cause of action there were 
exceptions. 
Where a  lord  refused  justice  for  land and soil or other 
property,  limitation  did  not  run.  The  person  aggrieved 
could  sue at any time within  a  year  and a  day after the 
refusal to permit justice  to be sought had been withdrawn. 
So, too, where a man sought relief against '  oppression ' there 
was no limitation. 
Limitation  did not  run while plaintiff  or defendant was 
on  military service,  or  was  a  hostage ; in  fact  no  plaint 
could be filed against a defendant during such period.  Nor 
could  a  case  be  filed  against  a  defendant  on pilgrimage, 
seeking absolution for an offence, until he had been  away 
for  a  year  and a  day, in which  time it was presumed  he 
had had time to return;  and no time ran against a man 
summoned  as defendant, who failed  to appear and put in 
his defence, if  he were bedridden and unable to attend. 
The existence of war also operated to suspend limitation, 
and a suit could be filed in a year and a day after the declara- 
tion of peace.  It is doubtful, though, if  this affected anybody 
CH. I  LIMITATION  IN  LAND-SUITS  271 
wllo  was not engaged in war, provided the courts were not 
closed owing to the exigencies of war. 
$6. The laws  regarding  land suits appear at first  sight 
extremely  complicated,  but  it is  possible  to reduce  the 
system to a series of  simple rules. 
Limitation depended in fact on a  number of  factors :  (a) 
whether  the land was ancestral,  (b)  whether the defendant 
was resident within or outside the jurisdiction of  the court, 
and  (c)  whether  there  had  been  acquiescence  in the dis- 
possession complained of. 
If the land were not ancestral, then, provided the plaintiff 
had been in the jurisdiction of  the court and had acquiesced 
in dispossession for a year and a day, his claim to recover 
was permanently barred.  If  he had been outside the court's 
jurisdiction  when  possession was  taken  by the defendant, 
time did not begin to run against him until he had returned 
to  the  country  and  had  acquiesced  in  dispossession  for 
a year and a day after his return.  If  in either case, during 
the running of  the year and a day, he manifested  his non- 
acquiescence by an act of  'lawful  disturbance', limitation 
ceased  running  against  him  and could  not  begin  to  run 
again. 
Limitation only began to run against the last immediate 
possessor  of  ancestral  land  and  did  not  affect  his  heirs. 
This was subject to one exception, viz. il the whole ' wely- 
gord ' were dispossessed by decree of  court the decree was 
final against all, but if  such decree were given ' in absentia ' 
of some  of  the '  welygord ', those  absent  could  have  the 
case reopened within a year and a day of  their return, but 
not afterwards. 
If ancestral property were lost, it was open to any of  the 
heirs, in  all other cases, to sue for possession within three 
ages of ancestors (variously computed at IOO  or 180 years), 
if such heirs  had been  continuously resident  in  the same 
' cantref '  or  ' cymwd ' without  ' lawful  disturbance ',  or 
within  nine  ages  of  ancestors,  the plaintiff  himself  being 
the  ninth, where the heirs had been  continuously absent. 
The  amount  of  property  which  a  plaintiff  could in such 
a case recover was not necessarily  the whole : it might be only a portion, if  the occupants in possession had acquired 
a right of  ' priodolder '. 
Should any person between the fourth and ninth genera- 
tion return, limitation began  to run against him upon his 
return, and terminated on the expiry of  a year and a day 
after return, unless he committed '  lawful disturbance ', in 
which  case,  as before,  limitation  automatically ceased  to 
run, and when the ninth man returned, he claimed by means 
of  '  uttering a  cry over  the abyss '.  If  he did  not  claim, 
time ran against him for a year and a day from the date of 
return, provided also that he could cause limitation to cease 
running by a  ' lawful  disturbance ' ; but an act of  ' lawful 
disturbance ' by the ninth man did not enure for the benefit 
of  his heir, as the right of  the tenth generation to recover 
land was never conceded. 
One passage in the XIth Book may be read to allow the 
tenth man to claim  the benefit  of  a ' lawful  disturbance ', 
but this is opposed to all other indications. 
$7. The provisions as to '  lawful disturbances ' are very 
peculiar.  There were three different  kinds of  '  lawful  dis- 
turbance ' (tlzrwyf cyfreitlzawl), viz. killing  a person  on the 
land, burning a house on the land, and breaking a plough 
on the land, that is to say, a person out of  possession could 
come on the land and commit one of  these acts by way of 
assertion  of  his  right,  and  immediately  stop  limitation 
running against him. 
The Codes do not mention ' killing a person ' as a ' lawful 
disturbance ', but the Anomalous  Laws have  many  refer- 
ences to it. 
There is some confusion in the laws as to whether '  lawful 
disturbance ' could  be  committed  with  impunity :  some 
passages  appear to suggest that there was  no punishment 
for  a  lawful  disturbance,  committed  by  a  person  entitled 
to possession, against a persoil not so entitled and refusing 
possession ; but the real  effect  of  this drastic method  of 
asserting  rights  seems  to have  been  to force  the  person 
injured thereby to seek reparation in court.  If  he did not, 
the ' lawful disturbance ' operated as a recovery of  posses- 
sion by the disturber : if  he did, the offender  or his descen- 
dant could plead, not that he had committed an offence in 
assertion of  his right, but that he had been punished for an 
offence committed in such assertion, the assertion  of right 
then acquiring the same status as a plaint instituted ; that 
is to say, the disturber could say that his assertion of  right 
had never been adjudicated upon, and that his claim, made 
by such assertion, was still sub judice,  and that limitation 
could not run while the claim was sub judice. 
That appears to be the meaning assigned in later law to 
lawful disturbance ', a  procedure  which  seems  to have 
existed  as a  mode  of  distress before courts were  open  for 
the adjudication of  claims. 
L~ivful  disturbance,  it  should  be  added, could  only  be 
operative where the claim was for land. 
3 8.  Limitation is practically absent as a rule of  law from 
the Germanic Codes, but in the  Irish Laws there are occasional 
references to it. 
In the Senchus M8r, I. 67, for example, it is said that the 
life of  three kings is reckoned  as the period  of  limitation, 
but such references  as there are deal not  with  limitation, 
within which  a suit to assert a right might be brought, or 
rather distress might be taken to enforce a claim, but with 
the  prescription  at the  expiry  of  the  period  of  which 
occupation or enjoyment created title. 
The existence, therefore, in  the Welsh  Laws of  a  law of 
limitation, so frequently insisted upon, is remarkable when 
we consider its comparative absence in other laws ; and so far 
as can be judged, it appears to have been  an entirely indi- 
genous gr0wth.l 
2. The injunction of tlze cross. 
$ I. The Welsh Laws contain a very detailed and interest- 
ing procedure relative to injunctions or interdicts in regard 
to property  in  dispute.  It is not mentioned in  the Vene- 
dotian Code ; and it was  possibly  a  procedure which  grew 
up in South Wales as a means of  preventing persons  from 
taking the law into their own  hands and forcing them to 
submit to curial jurisdiction. 
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$2. Wherever  any property  or rights  in  property were 
in dispute, the claimant, or the person protecting property 
in his possession, was  entitled to place a wooden  cross on 
it, and, thereafter, the existence of  the cross on or against 
the property operated as a bar against an assertion of  right 
therein, except by suit instituted by the opposing side. 
$ 3.  Where rights in property were threatened, it was the 
duty of  the person  seeking protection to resort to the lord, 
and demand that a cross should be given  him  and placed 
on the property to protect  it.  No one could place a cross 
on property unless he procured it from his lord, except that 
where  a ' priodawr ' was  threatened with loss of  his '  tref 
tadawc ', either by being dispossessed by a claimant out of 
possession, or, if  he were out of  possession himself, his right 
to recover were threatened by lapse of  time and he had no 
time to resort  to the lord, he  could erect a cross himself, 
and then go to law for protection, or for redress, if  the cross 
were broken. 
Crosses could also be placed on land by the lord, without 
application by parties,  when  there  was  a  suit  relative  to 
such land.  In that case the proper person to place the cross 
on the land was the '  canghellor '. 
$4. Where a  cross was  erected by a person  claiming or 
defending property, the person  erecting it, having received 
it from the lord in the presence  of  witnesses,  proceeded  to ' 
the site. 
He  laid  formal  claim  to  the  property  in  presence  of 
witnesses, handing over to the other side a  relic  on which 
the latter was  to swear  to his  title.  The cross  was  then 
either delivered into the hand of  the opposing side or planted 
on the property, where it was left until the claim between 
parties was decided. 
If  the property in suit were land, it was placed  on  the 
land ; if  it were other property, over against the property 
or at the usual place of abode of  the party from whom there 
was danger of infringement of right.  It was of  no avail if 
placed elsewhere. 
§ 5.  Crosses  as  interdicts  could  be  used  practically  in 
every claim, not only in regard to land, but in claims based 
on  briduw ' or  '  machni ' ; and they were  used  also  to 
enforce such  matters  as  the levy  of  the spear  penny  in 
homicide cases  or to exact  the oath of  an absolver  from 
a person suspected of theft. 
They  could  not,  however,  be  used  so  as to prevent  a 
priodawr ' in possession of  ' tref  tadawc ' from utilizing it, 
nor placed on grass-lands between the 9th of  February and 
9th of May, nor between 9th of  August and 9th of  December. 
Nor  could they be planted during the blank days of  court. 
$ 6.  A  cross was  of  no avail against an animal, who,  of 
course,  could  not  understand  its import,  nor  could  it be 
erected to close a customary pathway, nor  on  any timber 
so as to prevent  the possessor from working on it, nor  on 
crops  so  as to prevent  reaping, nor  on  pannage  so as to 
prevent the resort of  swine to the open woods. 
$ 7.  A cross put up secretly was inoperative :  it must be 
put up, if  possible, in the presence of  the opposing party ; 
but, if  the latter could not be found, it might be erected in 
the presence of  witnesses. 
No  cross was  effective, so as to cause a breach of  it to 
be  punishable,  against  an  idiot,  a  youth  under  fourteen, 
or  a foreigner, or other person  acting under the dominion 
of another, and no married woman could employ a cross. 
$ 8.  A  cross disobeyed entailed definite penalties.  They 
were not exacted if  the cross were erected by a ' priodawr ', 
protecting his '  tref  tadawc ', without  his  having  got the 
cross from the lord, unless he made formal complaint. 
If a man erected a building on land, in defiance of  a cross 
placed  on the land, he  forfeited  the building  to the lord, 
even if the land were eventually found to be his.  He was 
also fined either a ' camlwrw ' or a ' dirwy '. 
If a person used land in defiance of  a cross he was fined 
a  ' camlwrw ', even if  he eventually won  the case, but in 
that contingency the person placing the cross was also fined. 
Ploughing in defiance of  a cross was punished  as a breach 
of boundary,  the fine being  equivalent  to the legal worth 
of the ploughman's  right  foot  and the driver's  left  hand, 
and the oxen were all forfeited. 
S 9.  A  cross was effective only until the litigation ended or for  a year  or during the life of  the lord  from  whom  it 
was obtained. 
Contempt of  a citation to reply to a charge of  breach of 
cross  or  continued  defiance  of  a  cross  was  punishable  by 
banishment or imprisonment without term.' 
3. Oaths. 
tj I. When we come to consider trials we shall find constant 
references to the taking of  oaths and counter-oaths by the 
plaintiff,  the  defendant, the witnesses,  the compurgators, 
and even by the judge himself. 
The  whole conduct of  trials from beginning to end depended 
upon the taking of oaths, and some preliminary account is 
here  necessary  as  to  the  methods  of  taking  and  forms 
of  oaths. 
5 2.  The  ordinary  form  of  swearing  was  upon  sacred 
relics.  The relics had to be produced by the person challeng- 
ing the other to take an oath, and once they were produced 
in court, they were, after pleading, common to both sides. 
A person requiring another to take an oath had to come 
to court with the relics in his hand; and, if  he omitted to 
do so, he was entitled to no adjournment in order to obtain 
them, but the judge could await their production, provided, 
in the interval, he did not vacate his judgement-seat. 
No oath upon a relic could be taken by a man with arms  , 
in hand ; all arms were removed and placed in safe custody. 
Relics which were the property of  a church or furnishings 
of  a church could only be used  for swearing  by members 
of  the community owning them, and, if  an oath were taken 
in a church or churchyard, no relics were needed, as those 
places  were  themselves  sacred  relics.  Frequently  oaths 
taken in church were administered on the altar. 
5 3.  The XIVth Book considers oaths not merely accord- 
ing to the formulary or object sworn by, but according to 
the purport of  the oath.  It is said that there were three 
kinds of  oath, the complete oath (cwbl llw), the loose oath 
(gwallaw llw), and the futile oath (ofer Ih). 
A  complete  oath consisted  in  swearing to the truth of 
D. C. 550,  600, 604 ; G. C. 674, 764 ; V. 38, Sq, 86; IX. 254; X.  336 ; 
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a  thing  or  in  denying  a  thing without  reservation,  or  in 
swearing to a doubtful matter to the best of  a man's  belief 
and conscience, when it was not known for certain whether 
a particular fact were true or false. 
A complete oath must be taken by an owner of  property 
claiming it, or by a defendant denying a claim or charge, 
or by an agent of  either plaintiff  or defendant, and also by 
a person taking the oath of  an absolver, by an '  eyewitness ', 
by a counter-witness, and by a ' tyst '. 
Swearing to a  doubtful  matter  to the best  of  a  man's 
belief  or  conscience  was  appropriate  when  a  judge  was 
asked to  swear to a judgement given by  him, and he demanded 
time to recollect  what judgement  he  had given ;  when  a 
surety was asked to state what was the extent of  the surety- 
ship he  had  given ;  when  a  lord  was  asked  to swear  to 
a point in dispute between two of  his men  and he needed 
time to remember;  when  a  priest  was  required  to swear 
as a ' tafodiog ' ; and generally speaking by compurgators. 
Such  oaths were  termed  doubtful,  because  the  person 
swearing had either no personal knowledge,  and could only 
swear on the basis of  reputation or probability, or because 
he was not clear as to his recollection, but, if  he swore that 
such and such was  the case '  to the best  of  his belief  and 
recollection ', the oath was accepted as equal to any other 
complete oath. 
A loose oath was not an oath which was loose in character 
or unreliable.  Oaths were denominated ' loose ' when  the 
person  taking an oath was  not  sworn on  the relics,  either 
by virtue of  express provision of  law, or because the other 
side did  not  ' push  him  to the extremity ', i. e. force him 
to swear  on the relics.  The oath was loose because  there 
was no religious sanction behind the oath. 
A loose oath by provision of  law could be taken by certain 
' tafodogion ' only, and then only, according to some authori- 
ties, in cases where a father swore to a dispute between two of 
his sons, where the swearing was  by a convicted  thief, or 
where a woman in extremity swore paternity. 
A futile oath was any other kind of  oath, it being called 
futile because it had no effect. $4. Oaths could not be administered to a lord, a pleader, 
a  blind,  deaf, or  dumb person,  or  a  child  under  the age 
of  seven. 
Oaths were,  according to the circumstances,  taken once 
or  thrice, e. g.  in  appraiseinent, prosecution  for murder  or 
theft  on plaint or '  dognfanag ' ; and alternate oaths were 
administered  to both sides,  e.g. in surety cases, contract, 
and ' briduw ' cases. 
The forms  of  oath  are  mentioned  in  their  appropriate 
places. 
$ 5.  English procedure was identical in the fact that oaths 
were  required  by  law  from  the  beginning  to the  end  of 
a case.  The forms employed in the Welsh Laws are almost 
the same as those given in the early English ' Fragment on 
Oaths ',  a  document  of  the late  tenth  or  early  eleventh 
century, which likewise provides that all oaths were to be 
taken on the relics. 
This latter provision  is emphasized in  c.  2  of  Ethelred's 
Wantage Law : 
' Let  every  one  go  to  the  witness  of  that which  he  dare 
swear on the relic that is given into his hand.' 
There  is  one  striking  difference,  however,  between  the 
English and Welsh system ; for, whereas the oath of  every 
man,  competent  to take an oath, had  in  Welsh  Law  the 
same value as the oath of  another, that was  not  the rule 
in English Law, under which the value of  a man's oath was 
assessed  according to his status, e.g, the oath of  a twelve- 
hynde man was  worth the oath of  six ceorls.  In English 
Law the number  of  oaths required  was regulated,  not by 
the number  of  persons taking the oath, but by the sum- 
total of  the value of  the social status of  those swearing. 
This peculiarity of  English Law is especially apparent in 
the Laws  of  Wihtraed,  which  regulated  the  exculpatory 
oaths. 
A  king's  or bishop's  word  was  incontrovertible without 
oath ; a priest  or deacon cleared himself  by his own oath, 
'  Veritatem  dico  in  Christo,  non  mentior ', taken  in  the 
presence of  the altar, and other clerics required  the assis- 
tance of  four fellows, and so on. 
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Oaths are frequently  measured  in  English  Law  by  the 
llumber  of  ' hides ' of  land held by the swearers. 
9 6.  The Germanic system was identical, and in the Lex 
Frisian., Tit. XI, XIV, we have a series of  forms of  swearing 
to the English and Welsh oaths1 
4.  Terms  for  institution and hearing. 
$ I.  Safety  to attend court  was  secured  to  every  one 
entitled to move the courts, and the right to sue was  one 
which could be refused to no free or unfree man.  If  by any 
chance a lord were so unjust as to close the court to any one, 
the right  of  such  person  could  never  be  extinguished  by 
lapse of  time :  it survived to him  and to his  heirs  to all 
eternity. 
Provided  a  man  claimed  ' loss  and gain ', he  must  be 
listened to, and justice accorded without delay, but in order 
to prevent  frivolous  or unjust  claims, a man who lost his 
cause,  whether  on  the  ground  of  ' res  judicata'  or  the 
merits, was fined a '  camlwrw ' ; while a man falsely accusing 
another  was  liable  to the same penalties  as  the accused 
would  have  been  if  found  guilty  of  the  offence  charged 
against him. 
$2. For the institution and hearing of  suits in respect to 
land, there were  two terms and two vacations, each term 
being preceded by nine days for the reception of  plaints. 
The dates for  the reception  of  plaints were  the 1st to 
9th of  May,  and the  1st to 9th of  December,  and terms 
were open until the 9th of  August and the 9th of  February 
respectively. 
At  other times the courts were closed for land suits, so 
as  to  avoid  interfering  with  ploughing  and  harvesting, 
unless the subject-matter were church land, demarcation of 
boundaries,  or the suit were  one by a '  priodawr ' against 
a ' non-priodawr '. 
For all other assertions of  right, civil or criminal, includ- 
ing the excepted land suits, the courts were always open, 
except on Sundays, Mondays, and certain high festivals of 
the Church.  Similar ' blank ' days were prevalent in early 
'  V. C  zoo,  204;  D  C. 400,  614  ; IV.  34,  36; V.  44,  -16,  66;  VI. 98; 
XIV. 576,  622,  662, 664,  666,  676. E~lglish  Law, and  by c.  17  of  Cnut's  Ecclesiastical  Laws 
the courts  were  closed  on  all  festival days,  ember  days, 
Easter days, regular fast days, for eight days after Advent, 
for fifteen days after Easter, on St. Edward's Day (April 15)) 
and St. Dunstan's Day (June 14). 
$3.  Suits must be instituted and commenced before mid- 
day.  Filing a suit on a closed or blank day did not involve 
a loss of  the claim, unless in his plaint the plaintiff stipulated 
for '  loss and gain '.  If  he  did  that and filed  on  a  blank 
day, he lost  his claim entirely.  Sin~ilarly,  a lnan who filed 
a  suit for land during the closed periods,  lost his right  to 
sue subsequently.  He was  asl<ing for  that which  the law 
was not in a position to grant him. 
Otherwise, the effect of  filing a suit out of  the fixed times 
was merely to postpone the fixing of  a date for hearing. 
$ 4.  Likewise, if  a  man  filed  a suit prematurely,  before 
the cause of  action had ripened, hc did not necessarily lose 
his right to sue.  For example, if a man sued on a contract 
before the expiry of  the period  within  which  the contract 
might be performed, the result was that the hearing of  the 
case was postponed  until  a  period  had  expired, after  the 
date for performance, equivalent in duration to that within 
which the claim had been made prematurely.  Here again, 
if  the plaintiff  stipulated for  ' loss  and gain ', he  lost  his 
claim  as he  was  asking  for  that which  the law  could  not 
give. 
The proper procedure for the officers of  the court to adopt 
when a man sued at the wrong time was to inform him that 
law could not be prosecuted  then, and the suitor was rele- 
gated to bring his suit at the proper time. 
One authority implies that a land suit instituted at the 
wrong time was barred in perpetuity;  but the proper law 
seems to have been that the plaint was simply not received, 
and  the plaintiff  had  to bring  his  suit  when  the  courts 
were open. 
$ 5.  Sundays  and  Mondays  were,  generally  speaking, 
closed not merely for the reception of  plaints, but also for 
the hearing of  suits.  A suit, however, filed before midday 
on a Friday, could be put down for hearing on Sunday or 
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Monday, provided it was not a case in which the ownership 
of property had to be sworn to. 
5 6.  Special rules are given as to the time within which 
a suit for blood-fine was to be instituted.  If  the kinsmen 
of the murderer  and the murdered  man were  of  different 
countries, that  is  ' cantrefs ',  the  prosecution  was  to be 
conlmenced on the first day of  the week next following the 
date of  the murder ; if  they were of  the same ' cantref ' or 
' cymwd ', on the third day following, and the kinsmen of 
the alleged murderer were to reply in fourteen, nine, or six 
days, according to their place of  residence. 
The Venedotian Code fixes no period within which a pro- 
secution  must  be  instituted,  but it  fixes  a  period  within 
which  blood-fine  must  be  paid  ' after  being  summoned ', 
while  the  Gwentian  Code  combines  the  Venedotian  and 
Dimetian Codes, fixing the same periods for institution and 
reply.' 
5. Tinzes  in  cases. 
$ I.  In addition  to fixing  dates on  which  plaints  were 
presentable,  the  Welsh  Laws  attempted  to  regulate  the 
times to be allotted for  each  step in proceedings from the 
clate on which parties appeared up to the date of  judgement. 
The intent of  the law  was  to secure as early a  decision 
as  possible,  and the  fixing  of  periods  for  the  respective 
stages  of  litigation  was  considered  indispensable  for  the 
proper administration  of  justice. 
§ 2.  The law  appears to recognize  four  stages after the 
institution of  the suit :  (a) a date for appearance, obtaining 
aid, and the giving of  sureties ; (b)  a  date for  pleadings ; 
(c)  a  date  for  evidence  or  compurgation,  whichever  was 
appropriate to the particular case ; and (d) a date for judge- 
ment. 
It might of course happen  that all the four  stages were 
completed in  one or two days, or it might equally happen 
that adjournments were necessary before a particular stage 
was completed, e. g. though the first stage was for appear- 
V. C. 130, 140, 166, 172,174,22S ; D.C. 440, 452, 540,512, 588 ; G. C. 
702, 756,758, 772,776, 794; IV. 26, 32 ;  V. 56,70, 74,76,88; VI. 106, I 14, 
142; IX.  272,276, 284; X. 341.  364, 376; XI. 434, 448; XIV. 648, 690. 282  ENFORCEMENT  OF  JURISDICTION  PART IX 
ance, aid, and sureties, time could  be  demanded  for  pro- 
curing aid or sureties, and it was the common practice for 
judgement  to be delivered on the same day as the date for 
evidences,  which  was  commonly  called  the day for  ' loss 
and gain ' or final disposal. 
$3. Surety cases were treated as urgent  and, subject to 
such causes as operated to delay any suit, must be enter- 
tained and decided without delay. 
The law  laid  down  the general rule that, in land suits, 
pleadings should be completed in three days after the date 
for appearance, and judgement  delivered on  the ninth day ; 
and in  boundary  cases  and  cases  between  a  ' priodawr ' 
and a ' non-priodawr ' judgement  could be delivered before 
the ninth day arrived. 
But, though  this was  the aim of  the law, it is obvious 
that it was only a high-water mark aimed at ; for we  find 
it provided  that, should  it happen  that a  plaint  for  land 
were not disposed of  before the expiry of  the term in which 
it was  instituted,  the plaintiff  was  to renew  his  plaint  in 
the  reception  days  of  the  nest  term,  and his  suit  then 
secured preference ;  and, for its disposal, the courts must 
remain open even during harvest and ploughing, except on 
the universal  blank  days of  Sundays and  Mondays,  and 
a week from Christmas Eve, Easter Eve, and Whit-Sunday. 
$ 4.  The  regular  practice  in  all  cases  was  that  when 
parties  appeared  on  the  date  fixed  for  appearance,  the 
defendant,  if  he were  not  in  possession  of  a  statement of 
claim,  could  demand  one  from  the  plaintiff.  The  claim 
was then recited in court.  Defendant could either reply to 
the claim at once, or demand an adjournment in order to 
obtain ' aid ', that is to procure  an advocate and consider 
his defence.  He had to be careful to avoid saying he was 
not to be called upon to answer suddenly, as that was not 
a  legal plea ; he must say that he was entitled in law  to 
time for ' aid ', or that he had a special privilege exempting 
him from replying on that particular day.  He had also to 
specify the period to  which he was entitled,  otherwise he could 
be called upon to appear with ' aid ' on the following day. 
NO time could  be  claimed  for  ' aid ' in a  case of  surety 
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and debtor, nor in a suit which was being prosecuted in the 
supreme  court,  nor  if  the  defendant  appeared  with  his 
advocate, but, in the latter case, he could be given time on 
the day to consult with his advocate before replying. 
Plaintiff  was  at no time entitled to obtain time for aid, 
as he was supposed  to be  ready to prosecute  his claim to 
the end from the moment he filed it. 
The period allowed for aid is put in some authorities at 
three, five, or nine days, in others at three, nine, and fourteen 
days,  according  to whether  parties  resided  in  the same 
' cymwd ', '  cantref ', or a different '  cymwd ', the interven- 
tion  of  floods between  defendant  and his home  extending 
the period  to the maximum,  and at nine days in all cases 
where the dispute was between the Church and a layman. 
$ 5.  The step next succeeding  the procuring  of  aid was 
the furnishing of  sureties to abide law. 
This might be done on  the very first day as soon as aid 
was obtained.  Defendant, but not plaintiff, was entitled to 
time to find sureties, and he could always decline to provide 
them until he  had received  a  full  statement of  the claim 
made against him. 
The periods of  adjournment which might be granted for 
producing sureties were of  the same duration as for obtain- 
ing aid. 
$ 6.  It appears that as soon as aid was procured and sure- 
ties  furnished,  parties  at  once  entered  upon  pleadings. 
They might be extremely complicated,  but there seems to 
have  been  no  interval between  the furnishing  of  sureties 
and pleadings. 
As soon as the pleadings were finished, then, if  a decision 
could not be given on the pleadings, time was given for the 
production  of  ' evidences ' or  compurgation, according  to 
whichever  was  appropriate-the  day for '  loss  and gain ', 
identical with the Anglo-Saxon ' andage '. 
The same periods for the production of  proof  were given 
as for obtaining aid and sureties, except that the Dimetian 
Code  and  the XIth Book  say, in  isolated  passages,  that 
a year and a day might be granted if  there were a '  warrantor ' 
or a ' protector ' absent beyond the seas. § 7.  Ordinarily, no further adjournme~lt,  even if  the fixed 
day were  a  blank  day, was  allowed.  Absence  of  a  party 
entailed a determination of  the suit in favour of  the party 
present ; but, if  any one of  them died between the pleadings 
and the day for ' loss and gain ', substitution was allowed, 
though one authority says that the suit abated. 
It must be remembered, though, that the time given for 
loss or gain was  given  to produce  proof  on the matter in 
issue  on  the pleadings.  It might  happen  that  the  proof 
given  would  raise a  new  issue,  e.g. if  in  a  theft  case  the 
accused  undertook  to produce  a  'warrantor ' and did so, 
and the ' warrantor ' sought to free himself  from responsi- 
bility by casting tile burden  on another ' warrantor ', there 
was an entirely new issue, so time was allowed to produce 
a new '  warrantor ', provided the process could not be carried 
on beyond the third had. 
We are here using the word ' proof ' in  a wide sense  to 
cover '  protectors ', '  eyewitnesses ', or what not. 
§ 8.  For the production of  ' compurgators ' the law lays 
down no period applicable to all cases.  In theft cases it is 
said the compurgators were to be produced within  a week 
from the next following Sunday, on  which  day they were 
sworn  in  the parish  church  or  churchyard,  but  it would 
appear that the court had power to fix any date of  general 
convenience. 
9.  As  regards the last stage, judgement  was generally 
delivered at once, but the judges were entitled to a period, 
not exceeding nine days, within which to deliver judgement. 
§ 10.  Except where  the law gave theBparties  a  right to 
time,  they  could  demand no  adjournment, and no  agree- 
ment between parties to adjourn a case was given effect to. 
Apart  altogether  from a  desire  to  dispense  judgement 
with celerity,  there was an important reason why the law 
should provide for rapid disposal. 
We have noted that justice  was regarded  as proceeding 
from the lord.  The effect  of  this upon cases was that, where 
a wrong or illegality was committed, amounting to a breach 
of the lord's  peace,  the action terminated with  the death 
of  the lord  whose peace  had  been  broken.  There was  in 
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fact a sort of  amnesty for all crime with the death of  the 
lord  in  whose  time  crime  had  been  committed.  A  man 
could not be prosecuted by a lord for an offence committed 
in the lifetime of  his predecessor : it was not his peace that 
had been  broken, but the peace of  one no longer  alive to 
vindicate it. 
This  did  not  prevent  an individual wronged  in  honour, 
limb, or  property  from  recovering  compensation,  but  the 
criminal penalty, where there was one, was not enforcible. 
As already pointed out, a wrong committed had a twofold 
aspect : it might be a wrong or injury entailing damages, it 
might be a crime requiring punishment.  The right to recover 
property  or  damages subsisted, but the power  to punish 
lapsed.  Nevertheless,  though  the  lord  could  not  award 
punishment  for  offences  committed  in  his  predecessor's 
time, he could give effect to a punishment awarded. 
§ 11. Notwithstanding the fact that rights to damages did 
not  lapse with  the lord's  death, the right  to continue  an 
action  pending  in  his court did;  and consequently  in  all 
important cases, like affiliation, land cases, claims for blood- 
fine or injury, it was essential to complete them in the life 
of  the lord, and, if that were not done, the suit had apparently 
to be reinstituted and decided de novo. 
We can appreciate, therefore, the urgent need for celerity 
in disposals. 
3 12.  We have elsewhere noticed  that all suits in which 
more than one person was interested had to be prosecuted 
in  the name  of one person.  It followed that there could 
never be any joinder  of  claimants or of  different causes of 
action.  We might also add that there could be no set-off 
in a claim.  There was an axiomatic principle that no person 
could  be  subjected  to two  actions  at one  and  the same 
time.  He must be left free to answer one claim at a time. 
Hence we have provided definite rules of  priority. 
§ I3  The general rule was that the suit first instituted 
must be heard and disposed of  before the other was entered 
upon. 
But to this rule there were two important modifications. 
The first was  that, if  a  claim  of  oppression  against  the lord were made, all other pending cases had to be suspended 
until  it  was  disposed  of.  The  suitor  was  entitled  to  a 
verdict  of  country  on  his  allegation,  and  till  that  was 
obtained the courts were closed to others. 
The  second  rule  was  that  ' innate ' claims  against  an 
individual had precedence over personal claims.  An innate 
claim  was  one  in which  the plaintiff  sued  on the basis of 
inherited  right  or status, e. g.  a  claim  to recover land by 
virtue of  ' ach ac edryf ', or ' dadanhudd ', and a personal 
claim  was  one  in  which  plaintiff's  cause  of  action  was 
acquired by himself  and not derived by descent. 
$ 14.  The rule of  priority and the rule against joinder  of 
claimants  operated  to prevent  a  man  accused  of  several 
thefts  being  tried  for  all  of  them  together.  There  were 
separate suits by each owner heard in the order of  priority 
of  suing. 
If  the accused  were  acquitted  on  the first  charge,  the 
next in order was heard ; if  he were convicted, it is said by 
one  authority  that the second  charge could not  be taken 
up, as the thief  was  dead  in  law,  but  another  authority 
states he must answer both claims, and if  he were convicted 
of  theft present, he was  sentenced  to death for  the first, 
and his property to the extent of  £7  was  forfeited for the 
second. 
$15.  From what we have stated above, it is obvious that 
some rule of  '  lis pendens ' became necessary,  and we  find 
a  simple, straightforward  doctrine as to what  constituted 
' lis pendens ', to which nothing can be added. 
To use modern phraseology, a suit became ' pending ' as 
soon as the plaint was presented, and any transfer of  right in 
property by a defendant in possession, after the presentation 
of  a plaint, was invalid and inoperative. 
$16.  The attempt to secure earIy  disposal of  litigation 
had its counterpart in early English Law. 
The most striking provision is in the law of  Hothaire and 
Edric, c. 10  : 
' If  one  man  make  plaint  against  another,  after  he  has 
given  him  borh  (surety),  let  them  seek  for  themselves 
an arbitrator  within  three  days,  unless  a longer  period  be 
required.' 
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We have here undoubtedly traces of  the old rule prevalent 
before  courts were  established,  but we  find  references  of 
a similar nature prevalent when courts of  the '  gemat ' were 
in full operation. 
A similar rule existed among the Bavarians,l directing the 
conclusion of suits in fifteen days, and in the Lex Langobard., 
Ed. Luit., c. 25. 
The Scots Leges Quatuor Burgorum, c. 82, also has a rule 
of priority, confined, however, to cases of  assault : 
' Gif  ony  man  stryltis  another  quhar  thruch  he  is  rnayd 
blaa  and blody, he  that is  made blaa and blody sal fyrst be 
herde  quhethir he  cumys furst to plenge or nocht.  And  gif 
that bathe be  blaa and blody, he that fyrst plengeis hym sal 
fyrst be  herde.' 
6. Institation. 
$ I. Cases were ordinarily instituted, at any rate in later 
times, on written plaints, and many model plaints are given 
in the Anomalous Laws.  Plaints, however, were not needed 
in cases of  suretyship, impounding of  cattle for trespass, and 
disputes re the soundness of  animals and co-tillage of  land. 
In such cases the judge  was  empowered  to dispose  of  the 
cases summarily ;  but, if  they were instituted on plaint, they 
were tried by the procedure applicable to suits instituted on 
plaint. 
5 2.  In the courts of  the ' maerdrefs ' the proper person 
to receive plaints was the ' land-maer ', who disposed of all 
cases from such ' trefs ', and apparently the porter or usher 
could receive plaints for such ' trefs '.  In disposing of  cases 
the  ' land-maer '  appears  invariably  to  have  exercised 
summary powers. 
$ 3.  Plaints  for  trial  in  the  ' cymwd ' and '  cantref ' 
courts were received by the '  maer ' and '  canghellor ', but free 
access  to  the  lord  was  secured  for  litigants  demanding 
Justice.  It was the duty of  the 'maer' and 'canghellor' to 
summon the court, and place before it the plaints on which 
adjudication was sought. 
Lex Baiuor.. Tit. 11. c.  IA 
V. C. 130,  142, 144,.150, ;64,  166, 250;  D. C.  426, 540. 542, 544, 546. 
556.588; G.  C. 756.758, 794; V. 78,80; VI. 106, 112, 118; VII. 126, 128, 
1X. 216, 230,  232,  242, 248, 272, 274; XI. 400,406,  410, 420, 424; 
XIV. 598,  640, 656, 668, 676, 728, 732. 3 4.  KO suit  relating  to  property  or  personal  injury, 
whether  the action were  of  a  civil  or criminal nature,  or 
against  a  principal  or  accessary,  could  be  instituted,  as 
a general rule, except by the person entitled to relief, if  he 
were  competent  and able to appear himself,  inasmuch  as 
he would be required to swear in stating his case or in reply 
to the defence. 
In a case of  fighting the lord could take action for ' bloody- 
ing the earth ', and the steward if  the fight  were  between 
two officers of  court; but these are not  really exceptions, 
for  bloodying  the earth  was  an  insult  to the  King,  and 
fighting among officers was a matter in  which the steward 
was entitled to a portion of  the fine. 
Should any one else lodge a plaint  on  another's behalf, 
the real plaintiff  must appear, and if  he did not then ratify 
the plaint, the person filing it was fined 180  pence. 
3 5.  In early English  Law the rule was  the same.  Pro- 
ceedings opened  with  the '  for-at11 ' of  the plaintiff, but in 
Cnut's  Law,  c.  22,  a  ' thane ' was  allowed  to  prosecute 
either on his own ' for-ath ' or that of  a ' true man ' of  his. 
§ 6.  Certain persons  were  not  competent  to sue  at all. 
A  minor  under  7  (or according  to some  authorities 14,  if 
a male, and 12,  if  a female) could not sue, but a ' faithful 
fosterer ',  given  him  by his lord  after  his father's  death, 
could  sue  for  him  as his '  guardian ad litem ' ;  married 
women  were  not  competent  to sue  except  for  their  own 
honour-price, their own property stolen, or for land owned 
by them in  their own  right ; dumb persons,  being  unable 
to plead  and to swear,  were  also  incompetent,  but  they 
could sue through an advocate allowed by the King. 
Insane persons were subject to the same disability. 
Foreigners  and bondmen,  of  course,  could  not  sue,  as 
they were outside the common law, but that does not mean 
that they had no  remedy ; they sued through the Cymro 
to whom they were commended, held land, or were bound, 
the Cymro demanding justice  for himself as injured through 
his man. 
Likewise, these perscns could not be sued except through 
their guardian or superior. 
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In the Irish Law of  distraint  we  have similar provisions. 
According  to the Senchus M6r,  I. 87,  103, 107,  strangers, 
infants, idiots, and bondmen could not distrain. 
$7. In the law of  theft, the procedure in which governed 
a considerable part of  the criminal law, the rule is frequently 
insisted on that the owner of  the stolen property, and he 
alone, could  sue.  The rule applied to actions for violence 
and surreption,  and the lord could not prosecute  without 
the owner's complaint. 
Though one authority refers to the rebuttal of  a charge 
of being  an  accessary  by  the sole oath of  accused, when 
charged  by  a  person  who  was  not  owner, the same rule 
applied  to all  such  charges;  and  the lord could  take no 
action  against  an accessary  on his own  account.  To this 
extent criminal law was  still a  matter of  private  and not 
State concern. 
$ 8.  An  interesting  discussion  is  entered  into  in  the 
Anomalous Laws in regard to the application of  the rule to 
the case of  a deposit stolen from the custody of  the bailee, 
where  the stolen property was  discovered.  As  the person 
prosecuting  for  theft  had  to swear  (a) that the property 
was his, and (b) that it was stolen from him, the form of  the 
oath appeared to debar the bailee from suing, as the property 
was not his, and also the true owner, because it was not taken 
from his possession.  The commentator does not get over 
the difficulty  satisfactorily ; but concludes that, though some 
judges  would  not  allow an action for  theft by the owner, 
the law allowed an owner to swear to his property wherever 
it might be, but he avoids asserting he could maintain an 
action for theft, and confines him to an action for recovery 
of the property. 
5 9.  To the general  rule  that an action must be main- 
tained  by  the owner,  there were  two  marked  exceptions, 
both applicable to theft absent, i.  e. where the stolen  pro- 
perty was not forthcoming. 
The first of  these cases  is  known  as ' dognfanag ', that 
is a  case where  there was  ' competent  information ' (from 
' dogn ' = enough, '  mynegi ' = to inform). 
It is referred to in  the Venedotian  and Dimetian Codes, 
,  3054.2  U and it  was  obviously  not  a  recent  importation  into  the 
laws. 
In the Venedotian Code it is said that the loser of  stolen 
property or other informant could, if  he desired, go to the 
lord  and say that a  person,  whom  he  dare not  mention 
either on account of  his rank or property, had committed 
a theft. 
The lord was then to summon the parish priest  and tell 
him what had been  imparted to him.  The informant was 
then sent with the priest to the church door, where he was 
solemnly warned to beware of  ~erjury.  He was then thrice 
sworn, at the church door, in the chancel, and at the altar. 
The priest returned to the lord and communicated what the 
informant  had  sworn  to, and the lord  thereupon  became 
seised of  the power to prosecute on the information received, 
swearing to being possessed of  information. 
The Dimetian  Code refers to the instance  in  somewhat 
similar words, saying, however, that when the accused was 
brought up for trial, the priest had to confirm the informa- 
tion orally three times and once by oath. 
Briefer  references  are also found  to the method of  pro- 
secution in the Anomalous Laws ; and in one authority the 
information  is  limited  to the  case  of  ' lliw ', that  is  an 
allegation  by  the informer  that he had seen  the thief  in 
possession  of  the stolen  property  in  open  daylight.  We 
appear to have a similar rule in early English Law, as the 
Fragment on  Oaths, c.  4, provides for  the oath of  a  pro- 
secutor acting on ' information '. 
The second case, in which the intervention of  the owner 
was  not  necessary,  was  where  a  thief,  already  convicted 
and under sentence of  death, gave information at the foot 
of  the scaffold as to his confederates.  A thief  so informing 
was  a ' tafodiog ', that is  to say his  statement  was  con- 
clusive and could not be denied. 
This statement need not be on oath ; but to prevent  all 
possibility of  the informant expecting mercy as the price of 
his information, it was  provided  that the statement must 
be  made  at the foot  of  the scaffold,  after the halter had 
been  placed  round  the  informant's  neck,  and  that  the 
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esecution  was not to be delayed because of  the information. 
The sole sanction behind  the statement was the desire  of 
the convict to ease his conscience and make his peace. 
In one  passage  the Dimetian  Code  certainly  says that 
a  thief  could  come  to a  priest  and confess who  his  con- 
federates were, and swear  thereto as in the case of  ' dogn- 
fanag', provided he cared nothing what happened to himself ; 
but  it is  not  the information  of  the thief  that was  used 
thereafter, but the statement of  the priest as to the informa- 
tion  he  had received, that is to say it was really a case of 
dognfanag '. 
It may be added that, contrary to the general rule that 
a woman  could  not testify  against a  man, a woman  thief 
under sentence of death could be a ' tafodiog ' at the foot 
of  the gallows,  as she was  acting  not  on her privilege  or 
status as a woman, but on her status as a convicted thief. 
§ 10.  In homicide cases, except where the person  killed 
was  a  youth  under  14, the right  to sue  belonged  to the 
relations of  ' galanas-kin ', but in  the case of  a boy being 
killed, to the father.  This was the universal  rule, and the 
lord  himself  could  not  prosecute  unless  the person  killed 
were an idiot under his protection.  The same rule applied 
in respect to accessaries to murder. 
§ 11. We have to notice briefly the law applicable where 
there  was  a  number  of  persons  interested  either  in  the 
prosecution  or defence of  a case.  The law recognized only 
one plaintiff and one defendant.  Consequently, the persons 
interested  appointed  one  of  their number to sue or  swear 
on their behalf, the remainder being bound by his acts. 
The procedure is specially mentioned in the law of theft, 
' mamwys ', and the recovery of  property.  It was the rule 
also in land suits, and particularly in cases of  ' dadanhudd '. 
A peculiar case was where twins were interested.  They, 
it is said, sued as one man, with the corollary that, in cases 
of  sharing,  twins  took  not  two  shares,  but  one  share 
on1y.l 
V C.  110, 188,  242,  246;  D.  C.  418,  424,  434,  462,  464;  IV.  2;  V.  40, 
72,  78; VI 98,  I 18;  VIII.  210; IX.  226,  250, 252,258,260,  262,  300;  X. 
3g2  ; XI. 406.436,  438;  XIV.  576,  592,  598,  618,  620,  654,  664 666,  670, 
672,  680,  682,  700,  706,  738. 710,  728,  734,  738. 292  ENFORCEMENT  OF JURISDICTION  PART IX 
7. The  place  ad  form  of  sittivzg. 
5 I.  The Codes are very insistent upon  the proper place 
and form of  holding court. 
Custom insisted that the venue of  the court must be well 
known  and open, and that every person  should have free 
access to the court during its session. 
The court had also to be sufficiently extensive to admit 
of  any  person  being  present  who  so desired;  the  laws 
provide that the area of  a court must be at least an ' erw ' 
in extent.  It follows that it must be in the open air. 
$2. The rule was that, so far as possible, the court should 
sit on the site where the cause of  action arose.  In land cases 
this was the invariable rule ; ancl, if,  on  the day fixed  for 
hearing, the court were sitting elsewhere than on the land 
in suit, it was open to the defendant, at any time before he 
replied to the claim, to protest and demand an adjournment 
of  the court to the land. 
The adjournment granted  was  until  the next  day, not 
being a Sunday or Monday, but we  are also told that the 
judge could extend the period of  adjournment up to fifteen 
days. 
If there were  no  protest  against  the venue,  the court 
could continue its hearing, but it was  exceptional for  the 
court to sit elsewhere than on the land in dispute. 
$3. On assembling, the court was presided over by  the 
King,  or lord  or his representative, the ' penteulu ' of  the 
royal household, ' canghellor ', or steward. 
The King or his representative sat with his back to the 
sun, lest the glare of  it should incommode him, and the order 
of  sitting was as follows: 
Gwrdas.  Elder. 
Priest.  Judge of  Cymwd 
v  v 
A  A  A 
Guider  Defendant.  Pleader 
(kanllaw).  (keghaus). 
Elder.  Gardas. 
Judge of  Court.  Priest. 
v  v 
A  A  A 
Pleader.  Plaintiff.  Guider. 
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This arrangement applied to the King's supreme court on 
circuit in the '  cyrnwds ', but ' mutatis mutandis ' it applied 
also to the ordinary ' cymwd ' courts. 
The '  gwrdas '  and elders had no functions in the court, and 
they were there simply as representatives of  the community. 
01lce the court was arranged, the lord was not to vacate 
the  throne  until  the  judges  went  out  to  consider  their 
judgement,  and the judges  were not allowed to eat, drink, 
or separate without obtaining the permission  of  the lord. 
Parties had to remain  standing throughout the proceed- 
ings and were likewise not to leave court during the sitting. 
3 4.  As  soon  as the court was  arranged  in  this formal 
order, the parties were asked who their pleaders and guiders 
were, and if  they would  abide law;  and, if  they said they 
would,  the judge  asked  the lord  to ' place  law  between 
them ', again signifying that justice was the King's.  When 
the presiding lord had declared  that law  had been  placed 
between the parties, the conduct of  the case thereafter was 
left entirely in  the hands of  the judge,  and the presiding 
lord became a figurehead, remaining  silent throughout the 
proceedings. 
On every subsequent sitting of  the court the same arrange- 
ment of  parties was observed. 
$ 5.  Throughout  the  session  order  was  maintained  in 
court by the usher,  and if, after he had proclaimed silence 
in the field, any one was guilty of  breaking it, except when 
called upon in due order, the offender was fined 180 pence, and 
nothing he said could be made use of  by the party, in whose 
interests the interruption had been made, or by his pleader.' 
8. Sztmnzorci~zg  of  defendant. 
$ r. After the presentation of  the plaint, if  the case were 
a  land case  involving  proof  of  kin  and descent, the lord 
called  upon  the elders to inquire into and give a  finding 
upon the plaintiff's assertion that he was of  kin and descent 
as alleged.  The finding they gave on this point was final 
and conclusive;  if  it were adverse to the plaintiff, his suit 
Usher.  Usher  V.C. 142,144,146;  D.C.440;  G.C.674;  IV.26,  23;  V.  56,70;  VI. 128, 
130: VIII.  zoo,  zoz ; IX.  212,  214,  250; X. 360,  386;  XIV.  578,  630,  732. was dismissed '  in limine ', without calling on the defendant ; 
if  it  were in his favour, summons was issued on the defendant 
to answer the claim. 
In all other cases summons was issued immediately after 
presentation of  the plaint. 
5 2.  The summons was issued on all defendants, mention- 
ing the date and place of  hearing. 
If  a whole family, however,  were defendants, it was not 
necessary to summon those members of  it who were resident 
in a distant country, as that would delay justice, and more- 
over, there was no means of service in  a  foreign  country. 
But,  if  a  case  proceeded  while  some  were  absent,  and 
adjudication  were given against  the family  to which  they 
belonged,  they had the right to demand the reopening  of 
the case within a year and a day after their return. 
$ 3.  The summons was served by the usher  and by him 
alone.  He could only serve within the court's jurisdiction, 
for no court had power to issue process outside its jurisdic- 
tion.  In the exercise  of  his  duty  he  could  trespass  on 
any land. 
The usher had to proceed to the residence of  the defendant 
with witnesses.  He struck the doorpost  of  his house three 
times,  calling  on  him  to appear.  Service alleged  to have 
been made in the presence of  witnesses could not be denied, 
except by  objecting to the witnesses  in  the same way  as 
witnesses in a suit could be objected to ; service made with- 
out witnesses  could  be  denied  by  the oath of  the person 
summoned, supported by  the oaths of  two men  equal in 
status to himself. 
The Dimetian Code allowed summons by taking sureties 
for appearance or by distraint on property. 
In the XIVth Book it is said that the law required that 
a summons must be served personally, but custom allowed 
citation in the parish church, on the land, or at  the defendant's 
house.  It is  probable  that  the striking  of  the doorpost 
three times was the original method, and that, as time went 
on, any effective mode of  giving notice was permitted. 
3 4.  There was no period fixed for summons which must 
elapse before hearing ;  a  summons  served  on  the day for 
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appearance  was  good,  but  the defendant, if  served, had, 
as we  have seen, ample time afforded him to prepare his 
defence. 
$ 5.  Refusal  to appear when  summoned  or  leaving  the 
field  of  judgement  was  a  contempt  of  court  for  which 
definite penalties  were  prescribed.  Contempt  of  the first 
summons  entailed  a  '  camlwrw ' ; contempt  of  a  second, 
issued with surety, was likewise punishable ; and contempt 
of  the  third  entailed,  not  merely a  fine,  but an ex-parte 
decision if  the case were a civil one. 
Plaintiff  was put into possession of  the property claimed 
forthwith; but defendant might have the case reopened, if 
he appeared in a year and a day and gave security that he 
would abide law.  If he failed to do so, plaintiff's possession 
ripened into full title. 
If  the contempt were committed in a criminal action, the 
lord  pronounced a sentence of food-forbiddance.  Any one 
who then saw the person in contempt was entitled to seize him 
and bring him to judgement,  any one who  gave him food 
was punishable with ' camlwrw ', and, so long as the order 
of  food-forbiddance subsistecl, the absconder's property was 
liable  to attachment.  A person  accused of  a  crime could 
purge his contempt by submission to law and could recover 
his property if  he had a valid excuse for non-appearance. 
5 6. No final order, either in a civil or criminal case, could 
be passed without the issue of  three summons.  Nor could 
any  judgement  be  given  where  defendant  had  not  been 
properly served. 
$7. There were several lawful excuses for non-appearance, 
and these  excuses  operated  also  to give  either  party  an 
adjournment after the case had once started.  The excuses 
recognized by law were  the intervention  of  flood  and ebb 
from mountain  to between  the party and  court ' without 
bridge  or ford ', imprisonment of  the party, bedridden old 
age, disease or wound certified to by a physician, death of 
Party, pestilence in the land, contrary winds if  the party 
had to come  by sea, the incursion  of  invaders, necessary 
military service of  the lord, being a hostage, inaccessibility 
to the court for any reason outside the party's control, and absence up to a year and a  day on a pilgrimage to Rome 
to secure absolution for a crime. 
Though these causes operated not only in the case of  the 
first  appearance  and  subsequent  hearings,  they  were  no 
excuse for non-appearance on the date fixed for final hearing. 
For  that date-the  day of  loss  or  gain-the  party had 
contracted to establish his case, and, as he failed to do so, 
he was entitled to put forward no excuse. 
Custom, however, it is said, permitted an excuse for non- 
appearance on the date fixed for loss and gain. 
§ 8.  The Statute of  Rhuddlan maintained  the principles 
of  this law.  Under  it a  defendant  was  twice  summoned 
after the first  default, and on the third failure judgement 
was given ex pavte, and for each default ' a penalty shall be 
incurred  to our  lord  the Icing  according  to the law  and 
customs of  Wales '. 
§ g.  The early English Laws show the system was the same 
in England in its main features. 
In the Laws  of  Hlothaire  and Edric refusal  to  appear 
involved a fine of  12s. to the King ; the Laws of  Athelstan, 
c. 20, ordain that refusal to appear, when thrice summoned, 
resulted  in  defendant  being  arrested,  fined,  and  put  in 
' borh ' ; and in William  the Conqueror's Carta, c. 14,  the 
procedure  recalls  that  prevalent  in  Wales.  On  the  first 
default defendant was again summoned, if  he again defaulted 
he was fined an ox, on the next default another ox, and on 
the next he  paid  the ' ceapgild ' or amount of  claim  and 
the whole of  his property was forfeited to the King. 
In the so-called Laws of  Henry I, 51,  c. 2, the period for 
appearance was fixed at seven days, and failure to appear 
entitled  plaintiff  to an ex-$arte  decree  on  his  triple oath. 
A contun~acious  defendant became ' tyht-bysig ', that is, he 
was seized by force and his property confiscated  under the 
Laws of  Elfred, Athelstan, Edgar, and Canute. 
As  in  the Welsh  Laws there were  statutory excuses  for 
non-appearance, which are enumerated in the Leges Hen. I 
as ' infirmitas,  domini  necessitas,  exercitus, cause  suorum 
hostium, et justiciae regis '. 
5 10.  Similar  rules,  though  nothing  like  so  complete, 
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appear in the Germanic Codes.  The main principles were 
the same.  The duty of  summoning  lay on  the  plaintiff, 
who had to warn  the party summoned beforehand ; non- 
attendance was punishable with a  heavy fine, and persons 
engaged in the service of  the lord were exempt.l 
9. Szweties to abide law. 
§ I.  In practically every system of  early law one of  the 
first acts performed by parties on their appearance in court 
was  the furnishing of  sureties ' to abide law ', symbolical 
of their  submission  to jurisdiction,  which,  though  in  fact 
was  a  survival  of  the  consensual  origin  of 
jurisdiction. 
In the early Welsh  Laws  the provisions  on the  subject 
are fuller than are to be found in any other system. 
5 2.  As  soon  as parties  were  arranged,  they  produced 
their  sureties  to abide  law.  In ordinary  cases  it would 
seem that the sureties might  be pledgors of  goods, but in 
land suits the pledges  must  be living  personages-two  in 
number-and  they  were  kept  in  custody by  the King  or 
lord until judgement  was pronounced. 
Plaintiff  had to produce his  sureties with him,  but the 
defendant was allowed the same time for production as he 
was for '  aids '. 
If living  pledges  were  required,  they  had  to be  of  the 
same status as their party, and, should they break custody, 
no sanctuary of  Church could afford them shelter. 
9 3.  Sureties,  it is  said,  were  demanded  in  land  suits, 
'  lest a homeless pauper should come to claim land and tire 
the party and session, and when he willeth withdraw from 
the country without rendering compensation  and again do 
the same thing '. 
§ 4.  The Court was not seised of  jurisdiction until sureties 
had been  demanded  and given  or refused :  the mere  fact 
'  See,, inter alia, Lex Sal., Cod. I, 11, 111, IV, XLIX, LVI, CVI ; Lex 
Rip., Tlt.  XXXII ; Lex Chamin., 40,  43 ; Sapt. Claus.  11, i.  z ;  Cap. 
Lud.  1 ; Waitz,  154,  191 ;  Sohm Proc.,  126; Id. Riu. Gar.,  "4,  139; 
Lex Alamman., Tit. XXXVI, cc. 3, 4 ; Lex Baiuor., Tit. 11, cc. 13, 14 ; 
alld Leges Bur~und..  VIII. c.  7. 
References i<Laws:-v:  C. ;,+2  ; D. C. 394, 396,  546, 610 ; G. C.  676, 
7s6, 758, 774, 790 ; Iv. 24; v.  60; VI. 106, 114;  IX. 272, 302;  X. 326, 
350,  360.  384; XI. 402, 418;  XIV. $98, 614, GIG, GzG,  652, 720,  732. that parties had spoken of  litigation in the presence  of  the 
judge, without binding themselves in law, gave the ccurt no 
power  to adjudicate, but if  any one  called  upon  to give 
sureties refused to do so, he had all his property confiscated. 
5 5.  The  surety in  a  case  could  not  defend  it for  his 
principal,  nor  could  he  obtain  an  adjournment  on  his 
account.  His functions were to produce the party and to 
undertake he would abide by law; but as time went on his 
duties tended gradually to be limited to the production  of 
his party, so that it became law  that if  a defendant were 
resident  in  a ' border-country ' and, after giving  security, 
fell  into  contempt  by  non-appearance,  the  surety  was 
responsible to satisfy the judgement, but if  the defendant 
were resident  in  the jurisdiction  of  the court  and fell into 
contempt, the surety was fined a ' camlwrw ' for not pro- 
ducing him, and on payment of  the fine he was freed, the 
defendant being resummoned to appear. 
We have reached in this provision practically to modern 
ideas of  furnishing security for appearance, a long advance 
upon providing a ' sacrainei-~tum  ' out of  which the practice 
originated. 
$6. The procedure  was  maintained  in  Welsh  Law  for 
many  centuries  under  the  provisions  of  the  Statute  of 
Rhuddlan, at least in civil cases.  The third chapter of  the 
Statute provides : 
' When any one shall have complained to the Sheriff of  any 
trespass,  taking  and  wrongful  detaining  of  cattle,  unjust 
taking,  debt  or  other  contract  unfulfilled, the  Sheriff  is  to 
take pledges to prosecute the claim.' 
$7. The taking of  sureties to abide law was a part of  the 
procedure  of  Roman  Law  under  the  provisions  of  the 
XI1 Tables. 
Under that law, on the appearance of  parties before the 
magistrate, a fixed amount by way of '  wager ' was deposited 
by parties.  The procedure was invariably employed in the 
' actio  sacramenti '.  Parties  started  with  a  claim  and 
denial,  seizing  the  article  in  dispute  as  symbolical  of 
strife. 
The magistrate then interfered  to stop the quarrel,  ;~nd 
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each  party gave a '  sacramenturn ' or wager,  the loser  of 
the case forfeiting the same to the Treasury. 
Tile  procedure  was  symbolical  of  the ancient  mode  of 
settling a dispute, namely,  by force, parties consenting to 
lay aside the appeal to force by a consensual submission to 
arbitration. 
The procedure  was  modified  in  later times  in  the sub- 
stituted '  condictio ' ; but even in '  condictio ' definite trace 
was retained of  wager or surety to abide law. 
§ 8.  The same symbolical procedure existed in the early 
Anglo-Saxon  Law.  It is mentioned as early as the Laws 
of Hlothaire and Edric (A.D.  675), c. 8 : 
' If  any  man  make  plaint  against another  and  meet  him 
at  the methal or  thing, let  defendant always give seculities 
and do him such right as the Icentish judges prescribe to him.' 
Refusal to give security involved the defendant in a fine 
of  12s.  (c. g), and apparently the case could  then proceed 
ex parte. 
It is likewise mentioned in the Wessex Laws of  Ine, c. 8, 
the penalty there for refusal being 30s. 
We find it also in the Laws of  Ethelred,l where the actual 
value of the security required was laid down according to 
the court in which the litigation was being conducted : 
' And in  a Iiing's suit let every man  deposit a " wed " of 
six  half-marks, and  in  an  earl's  and  a bishop's  12  ores, in 
every thane's, 6 ores.' 
In the Laws of  the Confessor, c. 36, there is a full pro- 
vision applicable to theft cases : 
' De Latronibus interfectis pro latrocinio. 
' Si  post  justiciam  factam  fecerit  aliquis  clamorem  ad 
justiciarum quod injuste interfectus sit et quod injuste jacet 
Inter  latrones, et  si dixerit  quod  velit  hoc  diracionare,  det 
vadiinonium et plegios.  Et detur ei terminus unius mensis, 
ut  habeat  parentes  interfecti  ex  utraque  parte generis  sui, 
scilicet ex  parte patris XI1 et ex parte lnatris VI ', 
a similar suretyship being required from the accuser. 
§ 9.  In Ireland the rule was the same when  arbitration 
was submitted to, but we need only refer to one reference 
in the Heptads, V. 353, where we find a Brehon forbidden 
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to give  judgement  without  a  ' fonaidhm-bond ' to  abide 
by it. 
$10.  Procedure is not very fully dealt with in the Ger- 
manic Laws, but that this branch of  it was essentially the 
same as in Wales is clear. 
We  need  only quote the Lex  Alamman., Tit. XXXVI, 
C. 2 : 
' Si quis alium mallare vult de qualecumque causa, in  ipso 
ma110  puplico  debet  mallare  ante  judice  suo ut  ille  judex 
cum  distringat  secundum legem, ct  cum  justicia  respondeat 
vicino  suo aut  qualiscumquc persona  eum  mallare  voluerit. 
In uno enim placito mallet causam suam, in  secundo si vult 
jurare juret secundum collstitam legem. 
' Et in primo mallo  spondeat sacramentales et fidejussores 
praebeat  sicut lex  habet,  et  wadium  suum  donet  ad  misso 
comiti  vel  ad  illo  centenario, qui praeest  ut  in  constituto 
die aut legitime juret.' 1 
Practically the same provision  occurs in the Lex Baiuor., 
Tit. 11, c. 14, and the Lex Langobard. (Ed. Roth.), c. 361.' 
Here, as elsewhere,  the spelling, grammar, and orthography of the 
-  - 
original is retained. 
Vr.C.  144,  Ijo,1j4;  U.C.554;  IV.26; V.70; VI. 104;  VII. 130; VIII. 
202 ; Ix.  274;  x.  322, 324 ; XI.  400;  XIV. 660, 702. 
THE LAW  OF PROOF.  RAITH  AND 
EVIDENCE 
$ I. To understand the law  of  proof  in early Wales we 
have to capitulate briefly the broad lines of  procedure. 
~l;e  assertion  and establishment of  a right had in  early 
socizties to be made according to a definite rigorous form, 
and the most minute attention had to be paid to external 
observances, failure to follow which  might result  in a loss 
of claim altogether. 
€J  2. When parties were arranged in court and were bound 
in law, proceedings commenced with pleadings, then came 
the proof, then came the judgement.  The pleadings had to 
be made according to strict undeviating rules until an issue 
was arrived at.  When the issue was arrived at and stated 
in  the form  of a  quasi-judgement,  the onus  or rather the 
privilege  of  proof  was  determined  by  the form  of  issue. 
The form of  issue likewise determined the nature of  proof 
required  to establish  the issue,  and proof  could  only  be 
given  in  the affirmative  on  that issue-there  could  be  no 
rebuttal.  The proof  proffered had to satisfy certain tests, 
and what the advocate for the opposite side had to do was 
not  to  cross-examine  and  shake  the evidence  given,  for 
that he could not do, nor to produce evidence in rebuttal, for 
that, too,  he  could  not  do,  except  in  certain  land  suits 
where a rule of division applied.  He had to show that the 
proof  offered did not  subscribe  to the tests laid  down by 
law.  If he failedto do so, the evidence stood ; if  he succeeded, 
the evidence failed, and the issue was established  or  not 
established  accordingly.  Judgement  followed,  the  free 
judgement  of  the court being limited within the boundaries 
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5 3.  When  plaintiff  appeared  in  court  and declared  his 
claim in set terms, defendant appeared and answered.  There 
was  an elaborate system of  replication  and re-replication, 
each party manceuvring to get the advantage of  producing 
proof.  When it was determined what the point in issue was, 
the privilege of  producing proof was automatically regulated 
by the law.  Rules were laid down as to how the proof was to 
be given, how it could be challenged, and the court directed 
that proof  of  the issue should  be given  in  the particular 
form prescribed by law.  The proof  was then tendered ;  the 
other side did its utmost to secure its rejection by objection 
or contravention ;  and, if the proof was in accordance with 
the form required and withstood the attacks made upon it, 
it was held that that proof was complete ; if  it did not, it 
was incomplete, and judgement was given not on the merits 
of  the case, after hearing the evidence of  both sides on the 
issues,  but according as to whether the evidence given by 
the party entitled to produce it was complete or not. 
$ 4.  Judgement, when given, could be challenged only on 
the grounds that the court had disregarded the proper form 
of  procedure,  had given  one  party the privilege  of  proof 
when it ought to have given it to the other, had held proof 
was complete when it was not, or had given a relief which was 
not the relief that followed in law from the facts established. 
Such in  broad  outline was the form  of  procedure.  At 
present we are concerned simply with that part of  the pro- 
cedure which related to proof. 
$ 5. Ancient Welsh Law contemplated two modes of  trial, 
or rather of  proof, proof by ' evidences ' and proof by '  raith ' 
or oath of compurgation, each system being mutually exclusive 
of  the other; that is, it determined that certain cases were 
to be disposed of  by compurgators, others by ' evidences '. 
It is  essential  to  explain  how  these  different  modes 
functioned  before  we  can  consider  the law  of  pleadings, 
and we  must here assume that an issue had been  arrived 
at for the proof of  which either compurgators or ' evidences ' 
had been demanded by the court. 
'  Contravention ' does not mean '  rebuttal ' or counter-evidence.  For 
meaning vide infra. 
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2. Proof  by  compurgation. 
5 I.  The institution  of  compurgation is said in the Ano- 
malous  Laws to have  been  introduced  by  Hywel  Dda to 
take the place of  trial by ordeal, a practice to which we find 
in the laws only one other reference, namely in the VIIIth 
~~ok,  where it is asserted that no one under 21  or over 63 
was to be adjudged to the ordeal.  Of  ordeal we  have no 
trace elsewhere  in  Welsh  Law, and there seems to be  no 
question that it never prevailed among the Welsh peop1e.l 
The institution of  compurgation bears in  itself  proof  of 
a more remote antiquity than the days of  Hywel Dda, and 
it prwailed among all early Nordic peoples. 
5 2.  In all cases in  which, under the law, compurgation 
was adjudicated, it was adjudicated after the plaintiff  had 
sworn  to his claim  and after  the defendant  had counter- 
sworn  denying the claim,  and, if  such  oath were  needed, 
after a further counter-swearing by the plaintiff  reiterating 
his claim.  The issue that was left to the compurgators to 
determine was,  in  civil  cases,  whether  defendant's  denial 
of  the claim was true, and, in criminal cases, whether the 
accused's asseveration of  innocence was true.  Compurgators 
compurgated  from  a  claim  and  did  not  prove  a  claim, 
which  was  sufficiently  established  if  there were  no  com- 
p~rgation.~ 
$3.  The composition of  the compurgators varied according 
to the nature of  the claim  or charge.  It varied  both  in 
quantity and quality. 
In South Wales we  find  frequent  references  to a '  raith 
or country ' or ' raith of  wood and field ', which  consisted 
of  fifty free landholders,  not  necessarily  related  to the 
defendant or accused, which  was a  development  from  the 
' compurgators ' elsewhere spoke11 of. 
In the  MS.  Titus D.  I1  of  the Venedotian  Code, after 
a  statement  showing  the  varying  composition  of  com- 
purgators for theft, we are told that '  at present ', i. e, some- 
time  subsequent  to Hywel  Dda's  redaction,  it was  cus- 
tomary to demand twelve men  to compurgate in  all theft 
VIII. 210;  XIV. 622. 
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cases.  This may be due to the copying of  the English rule, 
and it, at any rate, appears to indicate some attempt at 
standardization. 
Ordinarily, however, the compurgators varied in numbers 
from three to even 600 (though it is hard to believe that the 
latter figure ever prevailed), according to the nature of  the 
case, or the offence, or the '  supporting facts ' (not evidences) 
available in support of  the claim or charge. 
Generally  speaking,  though  not  invariably,  the  com- 
purgators were related in ' galanas ' degrees to the defendant, 
and two-thirds had to be drawn from the paternal relatives, 
one-third from the maternal relatives of  accused. 
$ 4.  In addition, there were certain definite qualifications. 
In some  cases half  must  consist  of  ' nod-men ', in  others 
they might be exclusively men who were not ' nod-men '. 
The  phrase  ' nod-men '  is  used  in  the  Codes  in  two 
diametrically opposed senses, but the reason is clear when 
we  remember its etymological origin.  The word ' nod ' is 
the Welsh form of  the Latin ' notus ', something known  or 
marked. 
The phrase is used twice in the Venedotian Code and once 
in  the VIth Bock  as equivalent  to a  marked or  branded 
man, i.e. a bondman, who could never  be a compurgator. 
Elsewhere,  where  it  is  said  that  a  ' nod-man ' must  be 
included among the compurgators, the word indicates a man 
of  mark or distinction, some one whose oath of  compurgation 
had an extra value by virtue of  the social position  of  the 
mail  taking it. 
Again,  in  some  compurgators there had  to be  included 
men  who  were  under  the three vows  of  abstinence  from 
women, horses, and fine 1inen.l 
5 5.  No woman could be a compurgator for theft, murder, 
or suretyship,  and even where a  woman  was  adjudicated 
compurgation, her compurgators, except in rare cases, must 
be men." 
$6. The primary qualification of  all compurgators must 
be Cymric birth, free or unfree, and consequently no foreigner 
was  entitled  to be a  compurgator,  nor  could  a  foreigner, 
' V. C. 92, 240; G. C. 688; VI. 100;  XIV. 638.  ?  Ir.C.  103. 
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of  an offence,  demand  the adjudication  of  com- 
purgators, inasmuch as he had no right to call upon relatives 
to aid him. 
This  bar  on  a  foreigner  producing  compurgators,  was 
from a foreign family when it became ' adscriptus 
glebae ',  and, in  acquiring  unfree  status,  it acquired  the 
right of  demanding aid from re1atives.l 
$7. Where a man was  the son of  a  Cymric father and 
a foreign mother, he had no maternal kin on whom he could 
call.  Hence,  where  he  had  to produce  coinpurgators  of 
mixed  kin,  he  could  supply  the deficiency  of  mother-kin 
by swearing his own oath as many times as was necessary 
to make up the number he would have produced  from his 
mother-kin had he possessed one.? 
$ 8.  The case of  a sari of  a Welshwoman given in marriage 
to a foreigner is not mentioned ; but as he was, until he got 
'  mamwys ', a foreigner, the reason is obvious, and when he 
acquired ' mamwys ', his maternal kin was both father-kin 
and mother-kin to him. 
$ g.  Where  n man  accused or sued was  a  foreigner, he 
must be sued or accused through his lord, who coinpurgated 
or released him, or, according to one passage, the foreigner 
could compurgate himself  by swearing the number of  oaths 
which compurgators adjudicated upon a Cyinro would have 
sworn.3 
§ 10.  In civil  cases  based  on  ' machni ', ' amod ', and 
' briduw ',  the  compurgators  were  invariably  seven  in 
number,  the  person  denying  together  with  four  men  of 
paternal-kin  and  two  of  mother-kin,  related  to  him  in 
' galanas ' degrees.  When a  lord  denied  the suretyship of 
a dead surety, the compurgators were drawn from his own 
and not the surety's kin, and where a son denied the surety- 
ship of  his deceased  father, the mother-kin, responsible  for 
providing some of  the compurgators, was the mother-kin of 
the father and not of  the son. 
If, however,  in  surety cases part were  acknowledged, it 
sufficed for the denier to deny the unacknowledged portion 
with  his own  oath, provided  the suretyship had not been 
' D. C.  512 ; V. 94, VI. 114.  VI. 114.  D. C. 512. 
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entered into in the presence of  the court, in which case the 
presiding officer was associated with the denier in his oath. 
In a case of  breach of  cross, that is, disobedience  to an 
injunction, the compurgators were three in number, includ- 
ing the denier.' 
5 11.  In criminal cases the number is variously stated. 
The ordinary rule in South Wales was that all crime was 
compurgated by the oath of fifty landowners.  We find that 
number prescribed  for  murder, arson, theft, accessaries  of 
theft  and arson  (with the addition  that if  any  one  were 
burnt, three must be under vows of  abstinence), robbery, 
rape, maiming, violence, stealthily killing an animal, ' cyrch 
cyhoeddog ', rescuing a prisoner, cutting wood without per- 
mission,  and  adultery  (when  if  the person  charged  were 
a woman, the compurgators were women). 
The  same  figure  is  fised  in  the  Venedotian  Code  for 
adultery and rape, but not for other cases. 
At the same time we  have  in  the Southern  Codes  and 
the Anomalous  Laws mention, on several occasions, of  the 
numbers  varying  according  to the  offence,  following  the 
Venedotian Code in this respect. 
We have, e.g., compurgators for homicide put as low as 
10,  elsewhere  at 50  to 300,  sometimes  doubled  for  way- 
laying  or  secret  murder,  sometimes  trebled  for  stealthy 
murder.  Sometimes we  are told  that among them  there 
must be men under vows. 
For murder of  a bondman, which was treated as theft of 
the master's property in him, the number was 24. 
The  rule  as  to compurgators  required  to  deny  being 
accessory to murder has been misinterpreted.  The true law 
was that if  a person  admitted being accessory  to murder, 
then, if  he denied being the actual murderer, the number of 
compurgators was increased to 100,  zoo, or 300, according 
to whether  the accessory  act admitted fell  into the first, 
second, or third grade of  accessory acts.  It is true that the 
phraseology  of  some authorities lends colour  to the inter- 
pretation  that  these  enhanced  numbers  applied  to  the 
11. C.  I 14-16,  124-6 ;  D. C. 396-8,  430-2  ;  G. C. 788 ;  IX. 354, X. 
308. XI. 444, XIV. 712. 
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denial of  the accessory  acts themselves, but a collation of 
all the references leaves little room for doubt that that was 
not the case ; the ordinary number for a man denying an 
accessory act was the same as for murder, and the number 
was increased when the accused admitted being an accessory, 
but denied actual. murder.' 
$12. In theft cases the numbers varied according to the 
value of  the property stolen. 
Property  was  generally divided  into four  classes:  (a) a 
small amount or a load which could be carried on the back, 
(b) a horse load or an ox or goods of  the value of  5s. or 10s. 
upw?.rds,  (c) goods of  the value of  LI, and (d) goods of  the 
value of  over £1. 
These divisions and the numbers of  compurgators are not 
__,,  uniform ; the latter generally consist  of  5, 7 or  10,  12  or 
24 men, in an ascending scale, according to value. 
Where a charge of  theft was based upon ' Iliw ' (sight of 
an informer), the number was raised to 24 or 33. 
The number for accessaries  to theft is generally fised at 
50, though on one occasion in the Venedotian  Code as low 
as 5 ; and in the case of  prosecution for possession of  stolen 
property under the law of  ' the hundredth hand ', a hundred 
oaths are sometimes  prescribed.  In the case  of  violence 
absent, it was invariably 50, and of  ' ffyrnigrwydd ', roo." 
$ 13.  In regard to arson little is said.  The usual number 
was  50 landholders for  arson and its accessory  acts.  The 
Venedotian  Code fixes it on  one  occasion  at 12  in  a  case 
where damages for fire were sought. 
For treason, compurgators were double those for homicide. 
For fighting, in which injury resulted, 3, 6, and 9, or 3, 4, 
and 5, according to the nature of  the injury, were required; 
and for insult without bodily injury, the alleged offender's 
oath sufficed to clear him. 
For domestic offences, short of  adultery, a married woman 
alleged to have suffered herself to be caressed or kissed, and 
V. C. 86, go, 92, 96, 100-2,  218, 220-8,  230, 254 ; D. C. 396, 400, 406, 
408, 412, 414, 416,  520, 522.  524, 570,  592-4,  614 ; G.  C. 688, 690-2,  748, 
750, 778, Bc. 
V. C.  240-2,  254-6;  D. C. 488,  594, 614 ;  G. C.  690-2;  V. 54,  60,  vr. 100, IX. 224, 232, X. 308, 310, XIV. 678, 680-3,  706-8,  726. 308  THE  LAW  OF  PROOF  PART IX 
the man alleged to have offended, cleared themselves with 
compurgators  of  14  and  7,  the woman's  including  her 
mother, father, brother, and sister ; and a virgin wife deny- 
ing unchastity before marriage, cleared herself by 7 similarly 
constituted compurgators. 
$14.  The details of  the compurgators could be continued 
indefinitely, but enough has been  said to show that there 
was  no  uniform  rule.  The  number  probably  varied,  not 
only from place to place, but from time to time, as it did in 
England, until it became standardized at 12. 
$ 15.  The  effect  of  compurgation  was  universally  the 
same ; if  the compurgators stood by the accused or defen- 
dant, the verdict was in his favour ; if  they did not, it was 
against hi1n.l 
(i 16.  The duty of  producing  coillpurgators  was  always 
placed upon the person who was to be compurgated or whose 
statement was to be supported. 
The time to produce was  ordinarily the next  following 
Sunday but one, and they were produced and sworn in the 
producer's  parish church, the oath being  taken  before  the 
Bendicamus  and  the  distribution  of  the  '  mass-bread '. 
The  appearance  and swearing  of  compurgators  could  be 
enforced by the lord levying distress, and, if  between calling 
and appearance,  a  nodman  died,  another  could  be  sub- 
stituted in his place." 
$17.  No compurgator co~xld  be ' objected to ', except on 
the ground of  want of  relationship to the party calling him 
(an  objection  not  applicable  to the  South  Wales'  com- 
purgators  of  neighbours),  minority,  or  being  a  religious 
devotee, and, therefore, dead to the world ; and a challenge 
on the ground of  want of  relationship was sufficiently met 
by the compurgator swearing to his relationship. 
The  oath  taken  by  a  compurgator  was  ' to verify  the 
statement of  the party calling him ' in civil cases, and ' that 
that which was sworn by the criminal was most likely to be 
true' in a criminal case ; a nodman's  oath, however, being 
that he ' considered the accused's oath to be true '. 
' E.g. V.C rrq; D.C.  qSo, 592. 
V. C, I 14, 134 ; D. C. 480 ; V. gor IX. 234, 254, XIV. 678 
CI-I.  11  COMPURGATION  309 
If nodmen  were  needed,  the failure of  one  nodman  to 
support  the party calling him, vitiated the compurgation ; 
but, when nodmen were not needed, the opinion of  a two- 
third majority prevailed in favour of  the party calling. 
Compurgators were always personal to the accused, so if 
the latter died before they assembled, the son of  the deceased 
could not ask that they should be sworn.  The effect of  the 
death of  a  person  charged,  before  the compurgators were 
sworn, wasthat thelord could demand £7 out of  his property, 
but if  he left  no property, nothing could be demanded of 
the children.  In England the rule was different, as a dead 
mall could there be sworn off  theft by his kina1 
§ 18.  The procedure of  compurgation was not confined to 
Wales.  It suffices to mention, so far as Scandinavian peoples 
are concerned, the reference in Eric's Kopnhagen Law, c. 89, 
where it is said : 
' Then  shall the man  who  is  accused  defend himself  with 
an oath of  denial as the old custom is.' 
5 19.  In the early English Laws there are frequent refer- 
ences to the system. 
It is found in  the Laws of  Wihtraed,  the Laws of  Ine, 
cc. 14,46,54, the Laws of  Edward, c. 5, the Laws of  Athelstan 
and the Ordinance of  Woodstock,  to say nothing  of  the 
Laws of  Cnut, cc.  22,  41,  and those of  the Confessor and 
Conqueror. 
The provision  in  Edward the Confessor's  Law,  c. 14, is 
worth quoting : 
' Si quis appellatur de furto, et sit liber homo, si bone fame 
hucusque  fuerit,  et  testimonium  bonum  habuerit,  purgabit 
se per juramentum suum.  Quod si ante culpatus fuit purgabit 
se  duodecima  manu  et  eligentur XI111  legales  homines  ex 
nomine qui juramentum hoc faciant,' 
the ordeal following, if  they would not swear. 
There  are  many  points  of  resemblance  between  thc 
systems. 
The form  of  oath  sworn  on  the sacred  altar  (Laws of 
Wihtraed) was, according to the Fragment on Oaths, c. 6, 
similar to that prevalent in Wales, ' I swear that the accused's 
' V. C. 136, 162-4;  D. C.  610, V. 90,  VI. 134, IX. 254, XIV. 636 310  THE  LAW  OF  PROOF 
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oath is clean and unperjured ', and, as in Wales, the amount 
of the jury constantly varied, at least in the earliest times. 
In early  days the minimum  jury  consisted  of  so many 
'  hides ', that is to say where  an oath  of  IOO  hides  was 
required, it had to consist  of  men  holding 2, 6, or 12  hides 
of land each, the total of  whose hidage amounted to 100. 
The hidage required of  a jury  was generally equivalent to 
the number of  shillings which the law provided as the ' b6t ' 
or compensatioll to be paid. 
Later, however, the usual compurgation oath was  madc 
by twelve men of  the same status as the accused. 
After the time of Edward, a  man once convicted  could 
never  be  adjudged  a  compurgation ;  he  was,  under  the 
English Law, forced to the ordeal, and, after the Ordinance 
of  Woodstock, there was a gradual substitutioll of  a jury  of 
countrymen for a jury of  kinsmen, culminating in the Con- 
fessor's  institution  of  the  ' tenmann-tale ',  and  the 
Conqueror's  compurgation  by  twelve  men  of  the  neigh- 
bourhood. 
Unlike, however,  the Welsh  Laws, the system of  ordeal 
was  growing up as a parallel, see e. g. Cnut's Secular Laws, 
cc. 22 and 30, and there was a gradual extension of  ' lad ' 
(compurgation) to include  not  only ' lad ' proper  but  the 
ordeal of  iron, water, and ' corsnaad '. 
Another resemblance was that, according to the Ordinance 
of  Wantage, c.  13,  the oath of  a two-third majority of  the 
jury  of  twelve sufficed to compurgate a man, and care was 
taken in  English Law  to secure  unanimity  by  fining  the 
dissentient  minority three marks each.  With this may be 
compared  the Danish Law, Priv. Civ. Pupensis, A. u. 1296 : 
' Sed si illi XI1 in unum convenire non poterint, major pars 
praevalebit, et quicquid juramento  suo decreverit.' 
§ 20.  Identically the same procedure existed in the Scotch 
burghs, and was applied to civil and criminal actions. 
In the Leges Quatuor Burgorum it was provided : 
C. 26.  ' Gif  a burges be  chalangyt be ane uplandis man of 
any thyft fundyn with hyn in his hous  or  in  his sesyn  . . - 
and says . . . at he it lachfully bocht . . . he  sall clenge hym 
with the athe of  XI1 nlen of  his nychtburis.' 
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and 
C. 28.  '  A burgis may thruch his anarys voyce put hym till 
athe at nytis hym his dett quahat man sumevir he be.' 
It is true, of  course, that a charge of  theft present would 
be met, in Welsh  and English Law, not  compurgation, 
but by avouchment to warranty.  The Scots Burghs used 
colnpurgation  where  the Welsh  and English  preferred  the 
alternative method of  shields.  There are numerous other 
references in the Scots Law which need not be mentioned. 
3 21.  In the Germanic Laws the system prevailed every- 
where, the juries  varying in  numbers according to offence. 
It will be sufficient to indicate the widespread character of 
the system by merely mentioning a few references : 
Lex  Alamman., Tit.  XXIV,  XXVII, XXVIII,  XXX, 
XCII ; Lex Baiuor., Tit. I, c.  24, IX. cc. 2, 3 ;  Lex Bur- 
gund., Tit. VIII ; Lex Frision., Tit. I, 11, 111, XI, XIV, XX ; 
Lex Langobard. (Ed. Roth.), cc. I, 166,  198, 359, 361,  362 ; 
Lex Saxon., Tit. 11, 29, and Lex Angl. et Werin., cc.  I, 4, 
45, 48. 
3. Trial by  evidences 
In order to understand the Welsh system of  evidence, we 
have to disregard completely all modern ideas on the sub- 
ject.  We are face to face with a totally different conception 
of  proof  and of  evidence. 
The system was  not peculiar  in  any way to Wales ; it 
was a common heritage of  Celtic and Teutonic peoples, and 
it did not disappear from these islands until long after the 
Norman Conquest. 
The value of  the Welsh Laws is that they furnish excep- 
tionally full details of  the operation of  the ancient system. 
(i) Oral evidence in Welsh Law. 
Welsh Law recognized four kinds of  ' witnesscs ', (a) '  tafo- 
diog ',  (b)  ' ceidwad ',  (c)  '  gwybyddiad ',  and  (d) ' tyst ', 
each having its own functions, and found no place for docu- 
mentary  evidence  until  the latter was  introduced  by the 
Church. 
(a) The ' tafodiog ' witness 
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The word  litcrally  means '  tongue-man ', and it is  some- 
times used also as the equivalent of  ' advocate '. 
The  real  ' tafodogion ' or  '  tongue-men ' were  testifiers 
whose  sole statement, sometimes on  oath, sometimes not, 
was absolutely conclusive on the   articular point on which 
they  were  competent, according  to law,  to inalte  a  con- 
clusive statement. 
The  Codes  require  an oath  froin  every  ' tongue-man ', 
but  the Anomalous  Laws  dispense  with  it in  some  cases 
where the ' tongue-man ' was a lord, a judge, or a father. 
Oaths  were  administered  on  the  relics,  and nine  days 
were allowed within which the oath might be taken, except 
in the case of  a priest or a convicted thief, in both of  which 
cases the statement was to be made at once. 
$ z. Three lists of  '  tongue-men ' are given in  the Laws, 
in the Venedotian and Dimetian Codes, and the IXth Book, 
while scattered references  to individual ' tongue-men ' are 
frequent elsewhere. 
According  to the Laws  there were  nine  ' tongue-men ', 
and the three lists agree in the main.  The order, however, 
is  not  always  the same ;  the points  on  which  the con- 
clusive testimony  could  be given  vary in  some cases,  and 
though  seven  of  the '  tongue-men ' are universal,  for  the 
remaining two places five different persoils are mentioned. 
$3. The  first  ' tongue-man ' was  a  lord  in  a  dispute 
between two servants or inen of  his. 
The Venedotian Code says that, where there was a dispute 
between two servants or men of  a lord, either party could 
appeal to the lord  for  his  statement  on  thc matter ; and 
thereupon both parties were bound  by the conclusive state- 
ment of  the lord. 
The Dimetian  Code elaborates the provision  and deter- 
mines that a  lord  was  competent  only  if  he were  not  in- 
terested  in  the suit or its subject-matter, and confines his 
testimony  to  one  point  only,  viz.  where  it  was  agreed 
between  parties that  the subject-matter  had  been  under 
litigation  already before  the lord,  and the point  in  issue 
between them was the manner in which the cause had been 
before  the lord,  then  one  party must  assert  on  oat11  and 
the other deny that the cause had been before  the lord in 
a  particular  manner,  the  lord's  statement  on  the  point 
&ether  it had been so or not being conclusive. 
The IXth Book merely limits the lord's conclusive state- 
ment to a case where the men were ' near ' to him, and the 
XIVth Book  says they must  be corlnected  with  him, and 
asserts that the point referred to him was the extent of  the 
claim previously made. 
The IXth Rook  exempts the lord  from  an oath, so does 
the XIVth Book, unless  one party were more nearly con- 
nected with him than the other. 
It seems,  therefore, that  the lord's statenlent  was  con- 
clusive only as regard the form or extent of  a claim previously 
made in his court between two men of  his. 
5 4.  The second ' tongue-man ' was ' a father between his 
two sons '. 
Here,  again, the Venedotian  Code compelled  submission 
to the father's statement if any one of  his two sons appealed 
to him ; and it and the Dimetian Code give no indication 
as to the point  on which  a  father could give a  conclusive 
statement. 
The Dimetian Code required an oath on the head of  the 
son  against  whose  contention  he  gave  testimony.  The 
IXth Book dispensed with an oath, but provided that the 
two sons must be of  the same mother ;  the XIVth Book 
dispensed  with  an  oath  if  they  were  full  brothers,  and 
required one if they had different mothers. 
In the absence of  any limitation of  the matter on which 
a father could malie a ' tongue-man's ' statement, it would 
appear  that his statement on  any point  in issue  between 
his two sons was conclusive. 
§ 5. The third tongue-man was a judge. 
Wherever parties had litigated and a judgement had been 
given  them, if  any dispute arose  as to the nature of  the 
judgement  given,  the fact  of  judgement  being  admitted, 
the judge was competent to make a conclusive statement as 
to the nature of  his judgement. 
The instance is frequently mentioned in the Laws.  The 
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demand one  if  the judge  availed himself  of  nine  days to 
recollect.  A judge's  tongue-man statement was not a judge- 
ment, and so could not be challenged by mutual pledge. 
Should the judge  declare he had given no judgement, he 
was not to be credited, for both parties agreed he had given 
one, and then other proof  coulcl  be given  both of  the fact 
and thc nature of  the judgement. 
$6. The fourth tongue-man was a  man who had stood 
surety in a bargain. 
Where it was admitted that he had stood a  surety by 
both  creditor  and debtor,  and  the sole  question  in  issue 
was  the extent  of  the bargain  entered  into, the surety's 
statement was  conclusive  on  the issue.  If  it were denied 
that the alleged  surety had ever  been  a  surety at all, he 
could not be appealed to as a tongue-man. 
The surety, if  he could not recollect whether he had been 
a  surety or not, was  allowed  three days to recall the fact 
in, and a further nine days to recall the extent of  the bargain, 
and he must be sworn on the relics if  either party desired it. 
There was not much probability of  the surety forgetting, 
as in the law of  surety and debtor a defective memory was 
a  dangerous thing for  a  surety to be burdened  with :  he 
became liable himself for the claim. 
One passage in the XIVth Book appears to imply  that 
a surety was, like other witnesses, subject to contravention. 
3 7.  The fifth tongue-man was ' a maid as to her maiden- 
hood ', but there is considerable divergence as to what this 
actually connoted. 
The Venedotian  Code states that if  a  maid were  taken 
without  gift  of  kin,  and  she  asked  her  abductor  what 
'  agweddi ' he intended to give her, her statement as to the 
amount agreed upon was conclusive because she had been 
taken to a place ' where there were no wedding guests '. 
The Dimetian Code in one passage gives exactly the samc 
version; but in the list of  tongue-men  it says that wheic 
a woman was given in marriage by gift  of  kin as a maid, 
and her  husband  contested  her  virginity,  her  own  state- 
ment  was  conclusive  on  the question  if  she were  in  her 
twelfth year,  and  further  that a  woman,  coinplaining  of 
CH. 11  THE ' TAFODOGION  '  31.5 
violation  and asserting she was a maid at the time, could 
give conclusive  evidence  on  the point.  The IXth Book, 
on  the other hand, gives a  maid, who obviously had been 
violated,  the right  to make  a  conclusive  statement as to 
the identity of  the person  guilty of the act, and both the 
Southern Codes make the same provisions in some passages, 
but  take away  the force of  the assertion  by  prescribing 
compurgation immediately after. 
The Venedotian Code does not recognize  the tongue-man 
statement  of  a  twelve-year-old  wife,  but  required  at all 
ages compurgation to establish maidenhood, when doubted. 
It is clear, therefore, that there was much divergence as 
to the application of  the rule.  Probably the original rule 
was that a woman's  oath as to whether she were a maid or 
not was conclusive, but, as time went on, modifications were 
introduced as to the circumstances in which the general rule 
was applicable. 
5 8.  The sixth ' tafodiog ' was the herdsman of  the hamlet. 
All  authorities  agree  that  if  an animal  in  a  herd  killed 
another in  the herdsman's  presence, the herdsman's  state- 
ment as to which animal was the killer was conclusive. 
The IXth Book  adds that the herdsman was only to be 
credited if  hc had no animal of  his own in the herd, and the 
XIVth Book  only  allows  the herdsman's  statement to be 
conclusive if no other witness to the killing were available, 
and adds that no herdsman could be a tongue-man against 
a man killing an animal. 
§ 9.  The seventh tongue-man was a ' thief at the gallows '. 
All  authorities say that a  thief at the time of  execution 
could not be gainsaid when he announced who his accessary 
or co-thief was.  The IXth Book agrees with the Codes. 
5 10.  For the last two places  in  the list of  tongue-men 
there is divergence. 
The Venedotian Code gives a place to an abbot between 
his  two monks,  implying that where  there was  a  dispute 
between  two monks  (who being civilly dead could  not sue 
0'  be sued in a civil court), the abbot's decision was con- 
clusive. 
Ihc Dimetian  Code also gives a place to this instance. PART IX 
The Venedotian Code also mentions a donor respecting his 
gift, that  is  where  a  man  made  a  gift  and  two  persons 
claimed each  to be the donee, the donor's statement as to 
which  was the donee was conclusive.  The Dimetian Code 
also  mentions  this  case with  special reference  to the gift 
of  a  woman  in  marriage,  and the IXth Book  repeats  in 
substance what the Venedotian Code says. 
In the Dimetian Code it is said that a priest was a tonguc- 
man between his two parishioners ' in respect to what they 
had previously testified to him '.  Referring to this, which 
is accepted by the IXth Book, the latter says, in one passage, 
that the priest was a tongue-man where there was a dispute 
as to which  party was  to benefit  under  a  bequest  madc 
through a  priest-really  a  variation of  the donor tongue- 
man-and,  in another, that he was a tongue-man where hc 
saw a thief in open daylight with the stolen property in his 
possession,  accused  and  accuser  being  of  his  parish-a 
variant of  the combined rule of  '  dognfanag ' and ' Iliw '. 
The Diinetian Code adds that a11  ' amodwr ' or ' contract 
man ' was  a  tongue-man  as to the terms  of  a  contract 
where it was admitted he was such.  This is only a variant 
of  the surety-tongue-man, the contract-man being in many 
particulars  similar  to a  surety, without,  however,  all the 
latter's liabilities.  The XIVth Book mentions the case, but 
places the contract man on the same footing as a  surety, 
whom it allows to be contraverted. 
Though not mentioned in any of  the lists, it is stated, on 
two occasions in  the Anomalous Laws, that the mother  of 
twin sons was a tongue-man  on the question which  of  the 
two was the elder, when it had to be decided which was to 
succeed to the homestead. 
It is impossible to decide which of  these competitors are 
entitled to the vacant places in the list of  nine ; but, in  all 
probability,  more than nine statements were  admitted  as 
conclusive, and that it was only the desire to round them 
off,  on  the general  analogy  of  ' nines  of  law ',  that  led 
different authorities to exclude some admitted by others.' 
V.C.  86-8,  108,  110;  D.C.  374,  422,  424,  458,  462,  518,  520; 
G.  C. 744-8.  750; V. 64. VII. 148, VIII. 174, IX. 226, 2544, 262, X. 346, 
XI. 420, XIV. 602,  634, 660, 692, 728. 
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(b)  The '  ceidwad '. 
5 I.  Th? second class of  witnesses was that of  '  ceidwad ' 
or ' protector '. 
The function  of  a ' ceidwad ' was  to keep  (cadw).  He 
was  a  special  kind  of  witness,  and  could  only  swear  to 
protect  a title to property 01-  status.  A protector  did not 
give  evidence  in  opposition  to anybody ; he  simply  sup- 
ported the party who  called  him  in  defence  of  status or 
title, and the fact that he could not cause loss to any one 
is insisted on more than once in the Laws. 
$ 2.  The circumstances in which  a '  protector ' could be 
called  are enumerated as follows :  in  support  of  title to 
land, in  support of  the three special  defences  in ' theft ', 
viz.  custody before loss, birth and  rearing, and  guestship 
(q.v.), in support of a man's status, in support of  a Cymro 
claiming a person as his commended foreigner, and, according 
to the IXth Book, in support of the vendor of  an animal in 
regard  to the soundness of  such animal when sold. 
$3.  The primary qualifications of  a ' protector ' were that 
he was a freeman and a landowner ; he had to be '  respect- 
able ', i. e.  worthy  of  respect,  and no  foreigner  could  be 
a ' protector '. 
When  a '  protector ' was called  to support title to land, 
some authorities insist on  his being  a  '  land-borderer ', i. e. 
one owning  land abutting on  the land, the title to which 
he was supporting ; others demand merely ownership in an 
adjoining ' tref ', others ownership in the same ' cymwd '. 
Protectors in support of  any other matter need  only be 
'  respectable ' landowners,  and even the ownership of  land 
is not invariably insisted upon. 
$ 4.  The  oath  taken  by  the  ' protector '  was  ' to  the 
extent  the  advocate  shall  instruct  him  to say, swearing 
that every point is true ' ; in other words, what happened 
was that counsel repeated what his client had sworn to as 
to title and status, and the protector swore that each word 
of that allegation was true, or, as it is put in the Anomalous 
Laws,  ' Protectors are to swear  that the property belongs 
to the person  calling him, and that he never parted  with 
the ownership thereof '. 3 18  THE LAW  OF  PROOF  PART IX 
5 5.  Contrary to the rule relative to ' gwybyddiaid ' and 
tystion ', no protector could be objected to on the ground 
of  suspected partiality, because the essence of  his evidence 
was that he could not, in the eyes of  the law,  be hostile, 
as he was  merely protecting  one side without causing loss 
to the other.  The sole ground for objection was  want  of 
respectability,  though  the IXth and XIVth Books  speak 
of  objections on the ground of  his being a married priest, 
an arrant coward, a false witness guilty of  breach of  faith, 
a  minor,  a  wife,  a  blind  person;  but escept where  these 
facts went  to the root of  a  person's  capacity to swear at 
all  (e.g. minority), it is  questionable if  these  grounds  of 
challenge  were  not  simply  applicable  to  other  classes  of 
witnesses. 
$6. As regards quantity, two protectors sufficed, but the 
more there were procurable the better. 
Two  protectors  were  essential  to support  a  defence  of 
birth  and rearing  and custody  before  loss  in  theft  cases, 
and they must be of  equal status with  defendant, or  else 
one must be superior in status and one inferior.  They must 
also be neighbours,  and so conversant with the facts they 
were deposing t0.l 
(c)  The ' gwybyddiad '. 
5 I.  The third class of  witness is termed ' gwybyddiad ', 
that is, ' men who know '.  They approximate to what we 
would  call  ' witnesses  to  fact ' or ' eyewitnesses ' in  the 
present  day, but with  material differences in  the method 
of  handling their testimony. 
In employing the English term, ' eyewitness ', the essen- 
tial differences must be remembered. 
One of  the cardinal rules of  the Welsh Law of  proof  was 
that there could be no testimony except to a word or a deed, 
that is testimony to a thought or an unperformed act was 
not  permissible,  though  evidence as to the non-existence 
of  a  fact,  that  non-existence  being  itself  a  fact,  was 
allowed. 
$ 2.  Eyewitnesses testified to words,  acts, or  deeds  said 
' V. C. 162, 2 jo ; D. C. 438, 608,  610-12  ; G. C  762, 774 ; VII. 132-4. 
IX. 216-18,  230,  274, 282, 296-8,  XIV. 634, 694, 738, 740. 
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or done in  their  presence  and to their  knowledge  outside 
court, when  such  act, deed,  or word  was  in  issue.  The 
material part of  their oath was that they swore to '  knowing 
and seeing ' the fact which they deposed to, e. g. that they 
had seen a boundary line being broken,  or that they had 
seen  gold  and silver  being  counted  out in  their presence, 
when the question of  payment was in issue. 
Their  functions were  exactly  the same as those  of  the 
witnesses referred to in the Senchus M6r,  I. 85 :  ' No  one 
with  the Fieni witnesses a  thing of  which  he was  not  an 
eyewitness.' 
5 3.  In English  Law their  oath  was  identical  in  sub- 
stance with  the Welsh one (Fragment on Oaths, c. 8) : 
'  In the name of  God, as I here for N. in  true witness stand, 
unbidden and unbought, so I with my eyes oversaw, and with 
my ears overheard that which I with him say.' 
This class of  witness is also referred to in Cnut's Secular 
Law,  c.  23,  which,  dealing  with  vouching  to  warranty, 
provides that the witness'  oath shall be '  that he is a true 
witness to him as he saw with his eye and heard with his 
ears  that he  rightfully  obtained  it ', and in  the passing 
reference to witnesses  ' who  heard  and  saw' in  the Lex 
Baiuor., Tit. XIII. 2 and XVI. 2. 
$ 4.  It is to be noted that an eyewitness, being a witness 
to what he ' knew  and saw ', could not testify to what he 
had  done himself;  he must  testify  to what he had seen 
others  do.  So,  if  a  suit  for  partition  were  lodged,  and 
defendant pleaded  that the property sought to be divided 
had  already been  divided, he could not  call on the other 
co-sharers  in the property to say they had participated in 
a  sharing.  If he  did  rely  on  them  as eyewitnesses,  the 
plaintiff could at once object, and his objection was valid 
that they were not competent eyewitnesses. 
5 5.  In Roman Law it was essential that there should be 
two witnesses  to a  fact, and in Welsh  Law the same rule 
to eyewitnesses.  At the same time there was  no 
bar to more, and force was lent to testimony by quantity.' 
V.C. 164; D. C.  422, 458, 460,  608;  VII. 134-8,  276, 280-6,  292-4, 
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(d) The' tyst '. 
$ I.  The word '  tyst ' is a derivative of  the Latin '  testis ', 
witness ; but the best translation of  the term in Welsh Law 
is '  attestator ', an attestator, though, of  a particular kind. 
In early times the proceedings  of  all courts were  oral ; 
there was no ' written record '. 
Now,  as  everything  in  the  administration  of  justice 
depended on  the observance  of  rigid  formalities  in  plead- 
ing,  &c., it is obvious that there must be some means  of 
maintaining a record of  what had passed, and of  its being 
brought definitely to the notice of  the court that a certain 
thing had happened in the presence of  the court. 
$2.  It was  the  function  of  attestators,  therefore,  to 
certify  to the judges  what  had passed  or was  passing  in 
court, exactly as the ' faster ' did in Scandinavian custom. 
Suppose,  for  example,  during  the  hearing  of  a  case, 
a party objected  to a witness at a time when  the law  did 
not  permit  him  to object, or raised  an objection  against 
a  surety which  he was  not  entitled  in law  to take.  The 
opposing  party at once drew attention to the irregularity, 
and certified  the fact  to the court  by the production  of 
attestators,  who  deposed  to  having  heard  the  irregular 
objection. 
Again,  it was in criminal cases the duty of  a defendant 
to give an immediate reply to a plaintiff's claim.  If  he did 
not  do  so,  the plaintiff  at once  produced  attestators  to 
prove that the defendant had failed to answer, and, as soon 
as they had certified  to  the omission,  the case proceeded 
' ex parte '. 
Attestators were constantly in use in all stages of  suits, 
wherever  a party admitted any fact, omitted to reply  or 
produce  proof  of  a  fact he was  required to prove, or  did 
anything which might operate to the benefit of  his opponent, 
to certify to the court  the fact of  admission, omission,  or 
what not. 
5 3.  It was  possible  for  a  judge  to be an attestator in 
respect  of  a  word  spoken  to him while  on  his  judgement 
seat ; he could, as we would now say, take ' judicial notice ' 
of the fact, but he had to swear to it.  He could not, how- 
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ever, be  a  protector  or  an eyewitness to a  fact  occurring 
outside court relating to a case which he was hearing. 
This, therefore, is the meaning of  the constant definition 
of a ' tyst ' as a person '  who testifies to a discourse spoken 
in  his  presence ' ; he was  an attestator of  pleadings  and 
in court. 
4.  It must not be supposed that there is a uniformity 
of language in the laws on the subject ; quite the contrary. 
There is  constant  confusion in  the phraseology ; ' tystiol- 
aeth ' is used to cover all kinds of  evidence, and ' tystion ' 
is sonletinles used to include '  protectors '  and '  eyewitnesses ', 
though  the latter two words  are rarely, if  ever, confused ; 
but,  notwithstanding  the  confusion  of  language,  the dis- 
tinction  between eyewitnesses  and attestators is frequently 
mentioned.  It is pointed out that an eyewitness spolte to 
a fact occurring before the court sat, an attestator to a word 
spoken  in  court ;  an  eyewitness  spolte  of  that which  he 
knew, an attestator to that which he was asked to attest ; 
an eyewitness gave testimony ill opposition to a denial, an 
attestator did not ;  the testimony  of  an eyewitness might 
subject a man to imprisonment or punishment, that of  an 
attestator could not. 
5 5.  As  to numbers it was axiomatic that there must be 
two attestators, neither more nor less, while there could be 
any number of  eyewitne~ses.~ 
(e)  Objections to eyewitnesses and attestators. 
$ I.  We have already noticed  that no ' protector ' could 
be objected to except on the ground that he was not a free 
landowner. 
Both an attestator and an eyewitness could be objected 
to for several reasons. 
5 2. The principal grounds of  objection were the existence 
of one or other of  the three feuds, viz.  that there existed 
between  the witness  and the party, against whom  he was 
deposing,  an  unsatisfied  murder-,  land-,  or  woman-feud, 
which  is  specially  defined  as living  at the time  with  the 
other man's wife.  It is also indicated that if  the attestator 
'  C. 420-2,  460-2,  482, 590-4,  608 ;  IV. 26, V, 86, VII. 132-4,  144-4, 
I54,  VIII  186, IX. 240,  XI. 436, XIV 634. 
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or eyewitness were of  nearer affinity  to the person  he was 
deposing for than to the man he was deposing against, that 
was a valid ground of  objection. 
It may  be  noted  that, according  to the Vth  Book,  if 
a  representative  of  several co-plaintiffs were appointed to 
conduct a suit, the objections to an eyewitness could only 
be made if  the feud relied  upon existed  between  the eye- 
witness  and the representative,  and that a  feud  between 
the eyewitness and one of  the persons represented  was not 
a valid ground of  objection. 
A satisfied feud was no valid ground for objection, and if 
the lord  certified  that the feud had been  settled, it could 
not be urged against a witness that he was at feud. 
These principal grounds of  objection are termed ' llysiant ', 
or ' rejections '. 
9 3.  There  are  numerous  secondary  lists  of  what  are 
termed  ' gwrthneu '  or  facts warranting  a  contravention 
of  a witness. 
Some  of  these  relate  to absolute  incapacity,  others to 
lack of  credibility.  The Dimetian  Code mentions,  among 
the grounds for contravention, corruption, being interested in 
the suit, acknowledged breach of  faith, notorious perjury, 
theft  or  robbery,  cxcomrnunication  by  name,  evident 
enmity, and being a breaker of  the peace. 
Other  lists variously  include,  in  addition,  husband  and 
wife as against each other, foreigners as against Welshmen, 
bondmen,  foreigners  ignorant  of  the language,  drunkards, 
deaf, mute, blind, or insane  people,  boys under  fourteen, 
men of  Gwynedd, Powys, or South Wales against residents 
of  the other countryside, friars, anchorites, hermits, monks 
or priests who had broken their vows, unless pardoned by the 
Pope  or  Bishop,  spendthrifts,  married  adulterers,  persons 
guilty of  patricide or matricide, persons guilty of  unnatural 
offences, sacrilege,  treason,  and false  coining,  and judges 
guilty of  deliberate false judgement. 
$4. In certain cases eyewitnesses were required to have 
special qualifications, e.g. a person  deposing to partition of 
land or to a case of  '  mutual strife ', must be landowners of 
an adjoining '  tref ', likewise a witness in a '  dadanhudd ' suit. 
5 5.  These variations are but natural, and are accounted 
for by the fact that, through the centuries in which Welsh 
Law  was  administered,  there  was  a  continuous  develop- 
ment proceeding.  Originally it would seem that there were 
certain fundamental grounds of incapacity-minority,  being 
a wife, being  deaf, blind, insane, bond, or ignorant  of the 
language-operative  against  all  kinds  of  witnesses ;  that 
must  be  Cymric  landowners ;  and  that  eye- 
witnesses and attestators must  not  be suspect on  account 
of feud.  Later, other  grounds, which challenged a  man's 
credibility, such as cowardice, conviction of  crime, untrust- 
worthiness manifested by  breach of  faith  or  perjury, and 
the like were added. 
5 6.  In Ireland there were similar bars on the competency 
of  witnesses.  Co-owners,  purchased  witnesses,  degraded 
priests,  cuckolds,  women,  angry  men,  and  persons  who 
would benefit if the case were decided on their testimony, 
were  all  lumped  together  by the  Heptads  (V. 285)  in  a 
common inc~mpetency.~ 
(ii) Otlzer  evidence in Welsh Law. 
We have now to consider very briefly certain other forms 
of  evidence. 
(a) Record of  court. 
5 I.  The first of  these is the so-called ' record of  court '. 
In the Triads of  Dyfnwal Moelinud we find many references 
to the maintenance of  a written record of  court, whichit is 
said was destroyed at the conclusion of  the case, but outside 
the Triads we  have little evidence of  its existence.  It is 
possible the author was  thinking  of  the court at Ludlow, 
one of the peculiarities of  whose existence is that practically 
no records have survived. 
$ 2.  The maintenance  of  a  record  of  court  was  a  late 
introduction, and there is no reasoil to suppose that there 
was,  in  this matter, a  more  rapid  development  in  Wales 
than elsewhere. 
The Venedotian  and Gwentian Codes have no references 
to the maintenance of  such a record.  The Dimetian Code 
D. C.  422,454, 590 ; VII, 132, VIII. 204, IX. 218,276, X. 326, XI. 408, 
XI\'.  654. 700,  740. 
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and the XIVth Book mention the priest as the clerk of  the 
court, who maintained a cause-list and kept a note of  the 
pleadings  until a  case was decided, adding that the clerk 
was introduced as an official by Hywel Dda. 
g 3.  There are various references to the ' cof  llys ', which 
Mr. Owen has translated as ' record of  Court '.  The phrase 
literally means the ' remembrance or recollection of  Court ', 
which,  it is  obvious,  need  not  be  assured  by  anything 
written. 
The Dimetian  Code  states that one  of  the certain final 
testimonies  is  the  testimony  of  a  court  showing  ' cof  ' 
(translated by Mr.  Owen  as ' producing the record '),  and 
that the ' cof  llys ' was  conclusive proof  of  an  agreement 
entered  into between  parties,  the  terrninatio~l  oi  a  suit, 
and  an  illegality  done  by  a  lord  towards  his  man  in 
court. 
It also  says that a ' cof  llys ' was by the swearing out- 
right of the ' cofwadurion ' or '  remembrancers ', and that 
it was  concerned  with  what  occurred  in  the presence  of 
court, and that no defence was of  avail unless it was i11 time 
according to ' cof  llys '. 
None  of these passages indicate a ' written ' record, and 
the swearing  outright  of  ' cofwadurion ' seems  to be  the 
same as the swearing of  attestators. 
Other  references  to ' cof  llys '  appears  in  the Xth and 
XIVth Books,  but  none  of  them  refer  unmistakably  to 
written record. 
It appears, therefore, that ' cof  llys ' meant not a written 
record, but the recollection of  the court as to what happened 
in  court, after the fact had been  fised in  memory by the 
swearing of  attestators. 
$4. That a  priest  was  present  in  court  at all times  is 
indubitable ; he was there to give religious sanction to the 
proceedings, to pray for guidance, and, as he was frequently 
the only  literate  man  in  the assembly,  the practice  may 
have grown up of  his keeping a cause list and notes on the 
proceedings,  but there is nothing  to show  that any such 
record was available in evidence.' 
D.  C  364,  404,  458,  460,  588,  592 ;  X. 324,  356,  384,  XIV. 658,  693 
(b)  Documentary evidence. 
The use  of  documentary evidence in the early courts of 
Europe is distinctly traceable to the Church.  In the Welsh 
Laws  there is  no mention  of  documentary evidence being 
admissible at all, and we  may assume that, at any rate in 
the tenth century, it was not of  any value. 
(c)  The ' tystiolaeth marwol '. 
g 1.  There are some references  in the Laws to what are 
called  the ' tystiolacth  marwol '  (dead testimonies).  The 
are to be found in the Southern Codes as well as 
in the Triads of  Dyfnwal Moelmucl. 
5 2.  Two distinct meanings are assigned to the term in the 
Dimetian Code. 
In one passage  it is asserted  that if  an attestator werc 
brought  against  a  witness  before  he  testified  in  order  to 
contravert  him,  or  were  produced  to assert  that  a  party 
had  not  raised  a  defence in  a  suit  when  he had actually 
done so, or to assert that he had said something which he 
had  not said  (all acts during the hearing  of  a  suit), that 
testimony was ' ~narwol  ' or ' dead ' and valueless. 
The other references give  a  different  significance  to the 
phrase.  They are confined  to certain testimony admissible 
in land suits only. 
If  there  had  been  dispute  and  fighting  between  two 
parties  in  respect  to land  or  land  boundaries,  and  that 
dispute  had  been  duly  terminated,  then,  if  the  original 
parties  were  all  dead,  the sons  or  grandsons or  relatives 
could, in a subsequent suit, prove what they had heard on 
the  matter  from  their  ancestors.  This  was  evidence  of 
tradition  from  the dead,  and  was  permissible  and  called 
' marwol ', as being from the dead. 
In a suit  for land by  ' ach  ac edryf ', the elders of  the 
countryside were, before the defendant was called, required 
to make a return as to whether or not plaintiff  was of  the 
kin  and descent  he alleged.  That return  was  said  to be 
marwol ', because it was conclusive. 
Again, where a man claimed land on  the ground that it 
helonged  to him  by  descent,  he could  point  out  the fire 
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there by the collateral through whom he claimed, as evidence 
of  occupation.  He  could  also  point  out  barns  or  other 
erections,  or ploughed  furrows.  Their  existence  could  be 
proved  probably  by  reputation,  and  such  evidence  was 
admissible.' 
(iii)  Tlze prod~ction  and testing of witnesses. 
5 I.  We  may  now  turn  to the mode  of  procuring  the 
attendance of  witnesses  and of  challenging  such  as were 
subject to challenge. 
§ 2.  When pleadings were in progress the parties had, in 
making their allegations, to assert that they had witnesses, 
protectors, or eyewitnesses, or both to support them. 
They might say that they had so many witnesses, specify- 
ing  the number,  or  they  might  say, ' I  have  enough  to 
know that that which is asserted is true.' 
Where it was appropriate to hear witnesses on both sides, 
after one party had asserted that he had witnesses to sup- 
port him, the other might say he had as many and as good, 
or he might say that he had more or better. 
It was of  the greatest importance, as we will note, what 
the actual words used  were, and the careful litigant would 
not  commit  himself  beyond  saying that ' he had  enough 
who knew ', and, where appropriate, that those he had were 
as many and as good as the other side's. 
§ 3.  When  the pleadings  had  been  con~pleted  and  the 
matters in issue fixed,  should  the judges  find  themselves 
unable to decide on the pleadings, the party or parties were 
questioned as to who their protectors or eyewitnesses were. 
The party questioned, accompanied  by his  pleader  and 
guider, was  alone entitled  to withdraw  to another part of 
the field and consult ; any one unauthorized joining  in the 
consultation being fined three kine. 
The party or parties returned to the field, and announced 
by name  the witnesses  relied  upon,  adding again, if  they 
were careful, the words, ' and enough to know '. 
Until  this was  done no  witnesses  could  be  called,  e.g. 
a party could not support his claim by producing evidence 
'  D. C. 452-4,  460 ; G. C. 772. 
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before the other side had replied to the claim ; if  he did so, 
the evidence was disregarded. 
3 4.  If, in pleading,  the party had merely  said that he 
had so many witnesses, without adding, ' I have enough to 
know'  or  equivalent  words,  then  he  was  bound  down 
irrevocably  to the list  he  had  given,  and the people  he 
produced  must be those mentioned in full.  It is even said 
in the XIVth Book that they must be produced in the exact 
order  in  which  they  had  been  named,  so  that  if  a  man 
promised to produce David and John, he could not produce 
John before David. 
A party could not deviate from his list given without the 
words, ' and enough to know ', by a hair's breadth ; and so 
if any one of  his witnesses failed him later or were challenged 
successfully by the other side, the whole of his case collapsed. 
He had made a promise to prove by such and such testi- 
mony, and by that testimony alone, that his assertion was 
true, and he had failed to carry out that promise. 
If, however,  he had  added  the words,  ' and enough  to 
know ', he was not bound down irrevocably.  The men he 
had mentioned had to be produced; but if  they failed  for 
any  cause,  the party  was  entitled  to substitute in  their 
place any one present in the field of  judgement. 
Likewise, if, in a case where evidence on both sides  was 
heard, the reply of  the second party had been  that he had 
better  or more  men  to support  him  than  the other  side 
had,  it was  of  no  use  his  producing  only  men  equal  in 
quality and quantity to his opponent's.  He had promised 
better proof, and not merely equal proof;  and, having pro- 
duced merely equal proof, he had failed in his promise and 
lost the advantage of  equal division of  the property in suit, 
which  in  some  cases  was  the form  judgement  must  take 
when proof was equal. 
§ 5.  We have already noticed the period of  adjournment 
for witnesses not in the field-three,  nine, or fourteen days, 
as thc case might be-the  day fixed for evidence being the 
day for ' loss and gain ' or final disposal. 
No  process of  court was issued to compel appearance of 
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himself, and no one  could be  compelled  to give  evidence 
against his will. 
§ 6.  On the day fixed for ' loss and gain ', parties attended 
with  their  witnesses.  There  could  be  no  adjournment if 
the witnesses  were  absent  or  dead, nor  any adjournment 
to put in  a  fresh  list.  The case  had to proceed  without 
delay. 
On  assembling,  parties  paraded  their  witnesses  to  see 
that they were  in  accordance  with  the list  promised.  As 
they  were  paraded  it  was  competent  to the other  party 
to ask what the status of  each witness was, but there could 
be no challenge at that stage.  The parade was for informa- 
tion only. 
The judges  then called  on parties to recite the status of 
their  witnesses,  and the latter were  asked  if  they would 
stand by their parties. 
a  ing swear-  Proceedings then commenced by the party le  d' 
ing to his claim, and the witnesses were called, one by one. 
in the order determined by whoever had the right of proof 
of  the particular issue before the court. 
It was  the universal  rule that the right  of  leading wit- 
nesses rested with him who asserted a fact. 
' The law says that in whatsoever case it may be necessary 
for him to state the causes in the law  along wit11  the matter 
of  action, it is necessary  for  him  to  prove  the  causes as hc 
shall prove the matter.' 
This was the rule wherever ' res judicata ' was pleaded ; 
wherever the plaintiff  countered the plea of  ' res judicata ' 
by  asserting  a  successful  appeal  through  mutual  pledge ; 
where the plaintiff in a case of  mutual strife asserted oppres- 
sion ; where in like case the defendant countered by a plea 
of  abandonment ; where in a case of  ' mamwys '  the plaintiff 
asserted his mother had been wrongly given in marriage to 
a foreigner ; where, in such a case, defendant urged that his 
sister had been married to some one else or to a Cymro, or 
where he asserted plaintiff had received ancestral land else- 
where ; where in a claim for demarcation plaintiff  was said 
by defendant to have had boundaries  already demarcated, 
or  where  plaintiff  pleaded  in  reply  a  new  encroachment 
since that demarcation ; where in a claim for ' dadanhudd ' 
plaintiff  alleged illegal ejectment ; where plaintiff  in a suit 
for sharing of  '  tref y tad ' asserted he had received no share ; 
or  where,  if  plaintiff  had omitted to say he had received 
no share, defendant asserted he had had ; or where plaintiff 
said  the  previous  sharing  had  been  partial-in  fact,  all 
occasions where a fact was asserted and then denied. 
The right to lead belonged  to the plaintiff  or defendant, 
wlhichever asserted a fact which was  the first fact in issue 
to be decided between them. 
5 7.  The issues  before  a  court  might  have to be  deter- 
mined  by  protectors  or eyewitnesses, or  by  both,  e.g. in 
a case of  mutual strife there might be two issues, (a)  involv- 
ing  title, and  (b) raising  a  question  of  alleged  ejectment. 
Such  issues would  be  determinable  (a) by  protectors,  and 
(b)  by eyewitnesses, and the issue involving a fact would be 
disposed of  first. 
§ 8.  If  protectors were produced  to  swear, the opposite 
party rose  immediately  before  the protector  was  sworn and 
challenged  him, if  he could, protesting he was not  a com- 
petent protector. 
One  authority,  confusing  protectors  with  eyewitnesses, 
states that the former could only be challenged after taking 
an oath, but this is inaccurate :  the challenge was directed 
not  against what the protector  might say, but against his 
capacity to say anything at all. 
If the protector were not challenged at this stage, he could 
not be challenged afterwards. 
5 9.  We  have  already  seen  that  a  protector  could  be 
challenged on the ground that he was a foreigner, and that 
two  authorities add cowardice,  perjury,  and breach  of  a 
religious vow. 
These  authorities give  important  accounts  of  the  pro- 
cedure to be adopted in challenging a protector. 
If the protector  were being challenged on the ground of 
being a foreigner, the objecting party stated : ' God knows 
You  are a  foreigner,  and, if  you  deny it, I have enough 
who know that it is so, and no foreigner can be heard against 
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he was not heard.  If  he were prepared to maintain he was 
not a  foreigner, he asserted an ' arddelw ', of  which  there 
were three open to him : 
(i) Assertion of  status as a Cymro. 
(ii) Denial of  being a foreigner. 
(iii) A  demand on the other side to declare to whom he 
was alleged to be commended, coupled with a denial 
of  being a foreigner. 
The procedure varied according to which  of  these ' ard- 
delws ' he raised. 
If  he asserted status, he mentioned the status-that  of 
office or blood, using the usual phrase that he had enough 
who knew the fact. 
If  the  party  challenging  would  not  admit  the  status 
named,  the  issue  before  the  court  became  the  question 
whether the protector had status or not, and the would-be 
protector  was  entitled  to  produce  protectors  to  support 
his  status,  if  they  were  in  the field.  If  they  were  not 
in  the field, no adjournment for their production could  be 
given. 
These supportingprotectors could themselves be challenged 
in exactly the same manner, subject to this limitation that 
a protector to support status of  a would-be protector could 
not  be  challenged,  except  on  the ground  that he was  a 
foreigner.  If  these  supporting  protectors  survived  the 
challenge, then it was held that their support of  the original 
would-be protector entitled the latter to be sworn. 
If  there were no protector  to his status in the field, the 
party challenging could appeal to the lord ; and, inasmuch 
as there could be no status without investiture by the lord, 
a  statement by the lord  that investiture had or had  not 
been granted was conclusive. 
If the would-be protector  could not  produce protectors 
who would support him, or if  the lord determined that he 
had not had investiture, he was not allowed to swear. 
If the would-be protector raised the '  arddelw ' of  denial 
of  being  a  foreigner  alone, he  was  asserting  a  negative. 
The objecting party having asserted a positive was entitled 
to lead  eyewitnesses  to  establish  his  assertion-not  pro- 
tectors-provided  the eyewitnesses  were  in  the field.  If 
they were not, no time was granted to him. 
These eyewitnesses could be objected to by the would-be 
protector  in  exactly  the same way  as other eyewitnesses, 
and proof  of  the objection was heard as proof  of  objection 
to an original eyewitness would  be heard.  There was,  in 
fact, a ' case within a case ' going on.  If  these eyewitnesses 
survived  the challenge  and swore  to the protector  being 
a foreigner, the latter could not be heard in the suit. 
If the protector raised the third ' arddelw ', the challenger 
had to mention the Cymro whose commended foreigner he 
asserted the protector to be. 
If such Cymro were in the field, he was produced at once, 
and should he say the protector was not his foreigner, that 
was conclusive, because  the law would  not allow property 
to be forced upon a person against his will.  If  he were not 
in  the field, there was  to be no  adjournment for his pro- 
duction.  If  he alleged that the protector was his foreigner, 
the ' onus probandi ' shifted on to the protector, who was 
then entitled to produce protectors to his status, and if  his 
protectors supported him well and good, it was held that he 
was  not a  foreigner ;  if  they failed, the statement of  the 
alleged  overlord  prevailed,  but it could  not  avail  against 
protectors establishing status. 
If the opposite party challenged a protector on the ground 
that the latter was a coward, the contention was raised by 
the challenger stating :  ' Your word is of  no effect against 
ally one, whether  it be  good  or evil.  You are a coward, 
and I have enough who know it.'  The protector  formally 
denied  the allegation, and the judge  then asked  the chal- 
lenger  to produce  his  eyewitnesses  to the assertion.  No 
time was granted to produce them, if  absent, but, if  present, 
they  were  produced,  sworn  as eyewitnesses  always were, 
and subjected to the same objections.  They had to swear 
to ' knowing  and seeing ' the protector refusing  to go  on 
service  with  his lord  on  no  less  than three occasions.  If 
the necessary  number  of  eyewitnesses survived objections 
to  themselves and swore what was required  of  them,  the 
Protector was rejected. PART IX 
If  the challenge were to the effect that the protector was 
a '  religious ', who had broken his vow, the procedure was 
identical, the eyewitness in this case being required to swear 
to ' knowing and seeing ' the protector maki~lg  his vow and 
breaking it. 
In the case  of  challeilge  on  the ground  of  perjury  the 
procedure was  the same, the eyewitlless  of  the challenger 
swearing to ' knowing and seeing ' the protector giving false 
evidence and to his doing penance thereafter for his deed. 
$10.  After these proceedings  were con~pleted  in respect 
of  the first protector, he was rejected or accepted according 
to the validity or reverse of  the challenge.  Then the next 
protector was called forward, and the same procedure gone 
through with him,  and so on  until the last protector  hacl 
been produced and disposed of. 
Two  protectors  were  sufficient to  support  a  person's 
assertion of  title or status if  they survived challenge, unless 
more had been  promisecl, but the statements must  corre- 
spond. 
§ 11. The protectors  admitted to prove were sworn  and 
heard, and then, if  they supported the party calling them, 
his status or title was established in law :  if  they failed to 
support, it was not established. 
§ 12. The evidence of  a protector could not be denied by 
the production  of  any evidence on the other side ; it was 
unrebuttable.  But in  certain lancl  suits, ill  which  it was 
possible  under the land laws  for  there to be  two distinct 
sets of  ' priodorion ' having full title, the other side could 
then  proceed  to establish  its  title  by  the  same  process. 
Title might be better or worse  according to the length of 
occupation, but if  both established a four-generation occupa- 
tion, title was equal, and the law directed a sharing. 
If  the protectors failed to prove equal or better title, the 
land went to the claimant ; if the protectors of  both parties 
failed to establish title, the land went to the lord. 
5 13. In the case of  a surety witness, the fact of  whose 
suretyship was  challenged by one of  the parties, the only 
difference in procedure was that his being a surety must be 
challenged  before  the surety had  placed  the sacred  relics 
to his lips.  If  he were not challenged then, the challenge 
being that he was not a surety, he could not be challenged 
later. 
The fact as to whether he was or was not a surety was 
decided by the production of  eyewitnesses. 
The challenge was made by the oath of  the party chal- 
lenging,  and  denied  by  the surety's  oath, followed,  it is 
said, in one authority, by compurgation. 
Contract-men were not challenged : their statements were 
denied, and the question submitted to compurgators. 
5 14.  The procedure for producing and challenging eye- 
witnesses was similar to that pertaining to protectors, but 
the mode of weighing their evidence was materially different. 
When  the determination  of  an issue  depended  on  eye- 
witnesses, there were two courses open to the opposing side : 
he  could  either  challenge the witnesses  or  could  produce 
witnesses in support of his rival contention.  He could not 
produce witnesses to a negative or to deny the other side ; 
he relied on proof of  a counter-allegation to nullify the proof 
of  the other party.  The same rule occurs in  the Laws of 
the Conqueror, c. 46 : 
' Absonum videtur et juri contrarium ut probacio fiat super 
testes qui rcm calumpniatam cognoscunt.' 
No  party could do both, that is, he could not challenge 
the first party's witness and produce evidence of  his own. 
He  could  not  even  challenge some  witnesses  and produce 
evidence in support of  his own contention to counter others. 
He  must  select  one  line  of  defence  or  the other.  If  he 
challenged  the witnesses, he entered a plea  of  ' rejection ' 
or  an  ' objection '  against  each  one  successively ;  if  he 
resolved on offering witnesses, it was  said that the parties 
had committed their ' arddelw ' to the witnesses. 
$ 15.  If  the first  mode  of  proceeding  were  adopted,  it 
followed in the main the lines  of  challenge in the case of 
protectors,  but there were some differences. 
As  each  eyewitness  was  produced  in  order  before  the 
court, he made an oral statement, without oath, in the first 
instance. 
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and if he pressed one he must press all, that is he demanded 
that his statement should be repeated on oath on the relics. 
If the  eyewitness  declined  to  take  the  oath,  his  oral 
statement was set aside,  and the witness  stood down.  If 
he took the oath he repeated the statement, and then, and 
not  until  then,  did  the opposing  party challenge him  by 
'  rejection ' or '  contravention '. 
Any one challenging an eyewitness before-and  the same 
rule applied  to attestators-was  debarred  thereafter from 
challenging, though  the Dimetian  Code states that objec- 
tion  by  ' gwrthneu '  could  be  taken  when  the  witness 
started his statement. 
The reason given is a simple one, viz. that no one knew 
before the eyewitness spoke what his evidence, which might 
be favourable to the opposing side, would be. 
The objection  was made by ' counter-swearing ' against 
the  witness,  alleging  he  spoke  falsely,  and  naming  the 
objection  against him-feud  or  what  not.  If  the witness 
admitted the feud  or  other objection, or did not  deny it, 
his admission or non-denial was at  once certified to the court 
by attestators, dei~ominated  in this case, '  gwrth-tystion ', 
against whom no objection could be taken, and the witness 
stood down. 
If  he denied the objection, the opposing party was entitled 
to establish not that he had spoken falsely, but that there 
was a feud or other valid objection against him.  This was 
done by the production  of  eyewitnesses  to the objection, 
they  themselves  being  subject  to  the  same  process  of 
objection. 
If two or more unimpeachable  eyewitnesses  in  the field 
swore  to  the  feud,  it was  held  proved,  and  the  original 
witness was disregarded.  If  proof  of  the objection failed, 
the witness's  statement was  received  as true.  The same 
process  was  repeated  until  all  the eyewitnesses  were  dis- 
posed of. 
§ 16.  If  the proving party had promised a definite number 
of  eyewitnesses, and one or all of  the stated number failed 
or did not appear, the party failed to establish his case.  If 
he had promised  ' enough  to know ', he  could produce as 
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many as he pleased, and if  he succeeded in producing two 
who were unimpeachable,  he had proved his point ; if  he 
failed to do so, he failed  to prove his point.  At least  two 
as we have already seen, were essential. 
Of  course,  if  there were  no  defence  at all, the proving 
party  simply  produced  his  eyewitnesses,  whose  evidence 
was  certified  to  the  Court  by  attestators  as  being  un- 
objected to. 
§ 17.  If  the opposing party selected the other method of 
meeting  a  claim,  viz.  by  the production  of  witnesses  to 
support  his  counter-contention,  they  were  produced  after 
the first proving party had produced his.  What happened 
then was peculiar. 
They  could  not  be  challenged  if  they  were  competent 
and privileged, and the result depended on what the oppos- 
ing party had promised-witnesses  better, superior or more 
numerous, or simply equal. 
The  question  of  superiority,  inferiority,  or equality  of 
witnesses was left to the judge or bench to decide. 
The judges  were to be influenced  in  deciding which was 
the superior set of  witnesses  by the comparison of  status, 
respectability,  and number.  That was the test, and appa- 
rently the sole test, of  the value of  eyewitnesses in competi- 
tion with one another. 
Having  weighed  the value  of  the evidence of  the eye- 
witnesses in this balance, the judges  decided the matter in 
favour of  that party whose  contention was  supported  by 
the better witnesses, and, if  the witnesses were equal, then, 
if the defendant had promised better witnesses, the decision 
was in plaintiff's favour, but if  he had promised only equal 
eyewitnesses, the subject-matter was divided equally, pro- 
vided title was equal. 
§ 18.  Attestators, not being '  gwrth-tystion ', were dealt 
with in  exactly the same way,  and, when  the whole  case 
was  concluded,  either party could produce  attestators  to 
certify to the court  that this point  or the other had not 
been denied or defended. 
§ 19.  Now  at first  sight  this system would  seem to be 
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were  resorted  to estensively.  It is  not  likely  that that 
ever was  the result,  for  the reason  that  no party would, 
for the mere fun of  producing incompetent and demonstrably 
false  testimony, go  on  doing  so  indefinitely.  Ordinarily, 
the facts of  a case and the standing of  protectors and eye- 
witnesses  would  be  perfectly  well  known,  and  common 
sentiment would not allow a gross abuse of  the procedure. 
Moreover,  there was ever present  the real spiritual fear of 
falsely swearing on the sacred relics, and, behind it all lay 
the power  of  the Church, for  over  and over again we  are 
reminded that, if  any one gave false testimony, the Church 
was to proceed against him. 
Further, to prevent  delay, there  was  the very  definite 
legal provision  that challenging could  not be used  in order 
to  protract  litigation.  Witnesses  to  support  challenges 
must be in the field at the time ; and, at most, a case could 
drag on  for  not more than one term to another, for, if  at 
the end of  that time neither party had failed with his pro- 
tectors and eyewitnesses, it was held that the plaintiff  had 
not established his c0ntentions.l 
(iv) Stateme~zts  not ' evidence '. 
$ I.  There were certain statements, which we would now 
class as evidence, which in ancient Welsh Law were outside 
the ordinary procedure relating to evidence. 
Ej  2.  First of  all was the statement of  plaintiff or defendant. 
Such  stztement  invariably  preceded  all  witnesses,  but  it 
amouilted to nothing but a sworn statement of  claim, and, 
if  denied by the other side, it proved nothing. 
5 3.  The nest statement was  the statement of  a ' lliw ' 
or light, in cases of  theft absent, a case in  which  no ' evi- 
dence ' was admitted, and which was decided by a compurga- 
tion.  When a complainant  had no personal  knowledge  of 
a  theft, he could  say that he was  complaining  on  the in- 
formation of  a light, and the informer was produced after 
' V. C.  146-8,  Ijo, 1j2, 154, 156. 160, 163, 16.1,  250;  L). C. 396,  420, 
422,  426,  458, 460-2,  534-6,  588, 590;  IV. 28, V. 66, VI. 110,  VII. 126, 
132, 134, 136,  138,  140,  142,  144,  150-8,  162-4,  VIII.  176.  186, 202, 
IX. 218, 220,  222, 224, 230-4,  242-6,  252,  264,  274, 280,  282,  284,  286. 
292, 302, XI.  406, XIV. 568, 634, 654, 660-2,  694, 696, 698, 700, 702, 704, 
738. 
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him  to swear to the information  given  and his knowledge 
thereof.  The information  was the basis  of  the claim,  but 
it  was  not  ' evidence ' in  the Welsh  sense  of  the term, 
subject  to the rules  and results accruing from established 
proof. 
$4. The third statement was  the statement of  an ' ar- 
Ivaesaf' or  warrantor  in  cases  of  theft  present.  In such 
a case the owner of  property stolen  could proceed  against 
the man  in  possession  by suit to recover  possession.  The 
man  in  possession  could,  among other defences, plead  an 
' arddelw ' or  ' avouchment ' of  a warrantor, i. e. he could 
allege  that  he  had  received  the property  bona  fide  from 
a third party.  Hc could cite him as his ' warrantor ' ; and if 
the warrantor  admitted  giving  the property, the original 
defendant was freed from the suit, and the ' warrantor ' was 
substituted in his place. 
Now  it is obvious that a cited  ' warrantor ', particularly 
a dishonest one, might refuse to take over responsibility. 
It was a cardinal rule of  the Welsh law of  evidence that 
no person  could deny the evidence of  his own ' witnesses ' ; 
and, if  a ' warrantor ' had been a ' witness ' of  any sort in the 
eyes of  the law, a perfectly  innocent defendant would have 
been deprived of  the power of  proving his bona fide posses- 
sion derived from a third person or even complainant. 
This  impossible  situation  did  not, however,  arise ;  for 
a 'warrantor ' was not a ' witness ', and so where a man cited a 
I warrantor ' ,  and the  latter refused to take over responsibility, 
it was  competent  for  the original defendant to prove  by 
' eyewitnesses ' that the alleged warrantor had delivered the 
property  to him.  It can be  seen  at once, therefore, why 
the systems  of  sureties  to bargains was  an all-important 
part of  the Welsh Civil 1z~w.l 
5 5.  The system  of  evidence  which  we  have  been  dis- 
cussing, dependent upon the formalities of  oath and counter- 
oath,  was  condemned  in  violent  language  by  Giraldus 
Cambrensis, but he clearly did not understand the system, 
and only saw the externals of what he was condemning. 
The best commentary on the system is that it was common 
' V. 62 ; VI. I24 ; VTI.  162. 
3054.2  Z 338  THE  LAW  OF PROOF  PART IS 
to every European people  in  the early Middle  Ages-not 
the Welsh only, but the Anglo-Saxons and Germanic tribes 
without exception. 
The VlTelsh  people  clung tellaciously  to the system, and 
Edward I, when he swept away the system of  colnpurgation 
in criminal cases, confirmed  the practice of  trial by '  evi- 
dences ' in  civil  matters on  the urgent  representation  of 
the Welsh themselves.  We can with advantage reproduce 
the fourteenth section of  the Statute of  Rhuddlan : 
' Whereas  the people  of  Wales have besought  us  that we 
would  grant  unto  them  that  concerning  their  possessions 
immoveable, as lands and tenements, the truth may be tried 
by  good  and lawful men  of  the neighbourhood,  chosen  by 
consent  of  parties;  and  concerning things  moveable,  as of 
contracts,  debts,  sureties,  covenants,  trespasses,  chattels, 
and all other moveables of  the same sort, they may use  the 
Welsh  law whereto  they have  been  accustomed,  which  was 
this, that, if  a man  complain  of  another upon  contracts or 
things done in such a place that the plaintiff's  case may be 
proved  by  those who  saw  and heard  it, when  the plaintiff 
shall establish  his case by  those  witnesses whose  testimony 
cannot be  disproved, then  he  ought to recover  the thing in 
demand  and the adverse party be  condemned ; and that in 
other cases, which cannot be proved by persons who saw and 
heard, the defendant should  be  put  to his  purgation,  some- 
times with  a greater number, sometimes with less, according 
to the quality and quantity of  the matter or deed ; and that 
in  theft, if  one be  taken with  the mainour he  shall not  be 
admitted to purgation, but he holden for convict. . . . 
' We . . . do grant the premises : yet so that they hold not 
place  in  thefts, larcenies, burnings, murders, manslaughters, 
and manifest  and notorious robberies.' 
The Normans would have substituted for the system the 
far more unsatisfactory system of  trial by ordeal or wager 
of battle, which  placed  the ascertainment  of  truth in  the 
hands  of  a Deity, prepared to  manifest it through the  medium 
of  boiling  water, hot iron,  mortal  combat, or the cursed 
morsel. 
III 
THE LAW  OF PLEADINGS 
1. I~ttroductory. 
$1. Giraldus  Canlbrensis notes,  as one  of  the  charac- 
teristics of  the Welsh people of his day, ' that they omit no 
part of natural rhetoric in the management of civil actions '. 
This, on the whole, is a  fair summary of  the apparently 
intricate  system  of  pleading prevalent  in  the  old  Welsh 
Laws. 
5 2.  The law of  pleadings is comparatively a  late intro- 
duction into any system of  law.  When the original system, 
whereby  a  man was  left  to seek  his  own  justice  by the 
strong arm, was supplanted by a submission to arbitration, 
there was no  settled  form of procedure.  The arbitrators 
discussed  the  case  among  themselves  without  hearing 
speeches  or witnesses ;  they  were  generally  cognizant  of 
the facts, and they gave judgement  in accordance with the 
traditions applicable to similar facts. 
Out of  the arbitrators sprang the courts with the appoint- 
ment by the King of  experts, who had not the same cogniz- 
ance of  facts, but who were skilled in applying the traditional 
rules  to facts once  ascertained, i.e. in  giving  judgement 
according to rule upon the facts. 
Procedure,  pleadings,  statements of  case,  production  of 
witnesses, and form of  judgement  all grew up, when courts 
were  established,  to provide for the formal submission of 
the case to the court's jurisdiction, for the presentation of 
the claim and reply,  for the proof of contentions, and for 
the adjudication on the facts ascertained.  Hence we find 
a  complete absence of  curial procedure in the Irish Laws, 
which  recognized  no courts, and a  very advanced system 
ln Wales, where courts had been in existence for centuries. 
S 3.  The  characteristic  feature of  all  early  regulations 
relative to pleadings is a rigid formality to be observed i11 
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stating and ans~rering  a claim, failure to observe any one 
formality  frequently  vitiating  the  claim  or  reply  in  its 
entirety.  Traces of  this ancient characteristic  are present 
in the Welsh  Laws as we have them, and we  have strong 
insistence placed on the importance of  correct pleadings. 
But though  traces  of  this  characteristic  exist, we  have 
the very striking fact that the Welsh  Laws had advanced 
considerably, and did  not, as did  early Rolilari  law, make 
an  error  in  pleading  necessarily  involve  the  vitizting  of 
a claim. 
§ 4.  The effect of  an error  in pleading  is  well  expressed 
in the following extract : 
'  Every kind  of  fault in pleading, wl~icll  shall not affect the 
strength  of  a suit  and  its matter  altogether, causes a delay 
in  suit, without total failure, and, therefore, it is permitted 
to recur to law (i.  e, to invoke the law again). 
' Every  kind  of  fault  in  pleading, which  shall affect  the 
strength  of  a suit  and  its matter  altogether,  so  that it  do 
not press upon  the mode  of  a suit and practice of  pleading, 
accords in causing a total failure, with the exception of  suits 
to which are assigned known limits in law, as in a claim beyond 
a year and the like, and that is a bar to gain upon a completed 
period.' 
Again, in the description of  defences available, as stated 
in the XIth Book, p. 446, we are told that a defence, that 
the claim was one to which no answer was required, could 
be  raised when  there had been  a fault in pleading  (i.  e. in 
plaintiff's  statement of  claim), which  affected the gist and 
matter of  the suit altogether,  though not p~vssi~zg  upox the 
mode of  a suit or the pyastice  of pleading, such as ' interven- 
tion in a common country ', or a trifling claim, or the lapse 
of  time, so as to become an everlasting impediment and the 
like,  and that a  defence with  answering  ' so that nothing 
shall be lost through the claim ', resulted in ' impediments 
of  terms, and then it is permitted to have recourse to law '. 
Yet again we are told that no title to land could be lost 
simply  through a  fault in  pleading,  unless  the fault were 
thrice repeated ; and lastly it is provided that a prosecution, 
in which a ' dirwy ' or ' camlwrw ' was payable to the King 
for the offence charged, could not be thrown out by the use 
' x.  3721  374. 
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of a faulty espression by the prosecutor, unless the King or 
lord permitted  it-a  provision  in  marked contrast  to the 
English rule under which an error in the phraseology of  an 
indictmellt  might  operate  to  secure  the  acquittal  of  an 
accused person.' 
$5. The import of these extracts is that mere irregularities 
in  had the effect onIy  of  forcing  the plaintiff  to 
renew his suit in more regular form ; that it was not unless 
there were a legal bar to a suit, such as adverse possession, 
failure to prosecute within the statutory period after filing, 
want  of  interest  in  the subject-matter of  the suit, limita- 
tion, and so on, that a  suit was  to be dismissed  entirely; 
and that no irregularity in pleading could by itself  benefit 
a person accused of  an offence. 
3 6.  The rigidity demanded in pleadings is characteristic 
of  all laws  which  possessed  any kind  of  judicature,  con- 
sensual or compulsory. 
It was a feature of early Koman law, it was also a feature 
of  early  Germanic  law, and, as an illustration  of  how  far 
it  was  insisted upon in  the latter, we  may mention  that, 
among Germanic tribes, it was originally the rule that if  in 
denying the plaintiff's  claim, word by word, the defendant 
stammered,  the latter  at once  lost  his  case,  a  provision 
which throws a definite light on the exclusion of  stammerers 
in Welsh law from giving testimony. 
This  uniform  insistence  on  rigidity  was  not  without 
a reason.  The reason was that when causes were submitted 
to arbitration, the fact that the remedy which a man had, 
wherewith  to right a wrong, was force was never lost sight 
of. The submission to arbitration never forgot that, though it 
was a substitute for force, it itself was a procedure of  coercion, 
but a coercion which had to be applied according to a well- 
defined method sanctioned by custom  and public  opinion, 
which would suffer no deviation from rule. 
2. The  plaiilt. 
§ I. The Welsh law of  suits divided cases into three main 
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suits for damages, and prosecutions  (gyvv).  Pleadings natu- 
rally  vary to some extent according  to the nature of  the 
claim. 
§ 2.  Pleadings  proper  cornmcnced  aftcr the parties had 
been  arranged  in  court  and  had  furnished  sureties  to 
abide law. 
The plaintiff must be prepared to plead as soon as sureties 
had been given ; and if  he were not so prepared, he was at 
once non-suited, and judgement was entered in defendant's 
favour.  It is of  interest, however, to note, as showing the 
a 1011  survival of  the original idea that submission to adjudic t' 
was consensual,  that a plaintiff,  who was  not prepared to 
plead before sureties had been given, was fined and was at 
liberty to withdraw his suit, reserving  to himself  the right 
to institute a  fresh suit within  a  year  and a  day, at the 
espiration of  which term no new suit could be instituted. 
9 3.  There was no absolute necessity for a written plaint, 
but the practice in later times was to initiate proceedings 
on written plaint. 
Several examples of  model plaints are given in the XIIth 
Book. 
A perfect plaint had to contain certain particulars ; these 
particulars are called the four bonds of  a suit, the ' rhwyrn 
dadl ', and consisted of  the following : 
(i)  A statement ol the names of  parties, the Court or  official 
to whom  the plaint was presented.  The Court must be 
mentioned, but  it  sufficed  to  designate the  official  by 
the title of his office. 
(ii) A  statement  of  the  cause  of  action,  i.e, the  nature  of 
the property  claimed  (land, goods,  &c.), the plaintifk's 
title thereto, the name of  any security entitling-  plaintilf 
to recover possession,  and  the  circun~stances  in  which 
plaintiff was deprived of  his property. 
(iii) A statement showing the exact amount of  compensation 
or  the  exact  amount  of  property  claimed-so  many 
' erws ' of  land, so many head of  cattle with their quall- 
ties, &c. 
(iv) A  statement  as  to  the  time  when  the cause  of  actiol~ 
arose,  either  by deprivation  of  property  or  refusal to 
restore;  together  with  a  statement  as  to  the  law  of 
which  defendant had  committed a breach, i.e. the law 
of  theft, surreption, injury, or what not ; provided that 
it was not necessary to mention the law of  which there 
had been  a breach if  the cIaim were  one to recover an 
' alltud ',  one  concerned  with  cattle-trespass  where 
defendant had impounded cattle in  a jurisdiction  other 
than that in which the cattle had been seized, or one of 
' dadanhudd '. 
The effect  of  omitting one of  these '  rhwym  dadl ' was 
that there was  an ambiguity in the plaint ; there was  an 
incomplete  demand,  and the court  could  not  grant  relief 
without knowing the whole  of  the grounds on which relief 
was  sought ;  so a  plaint,  not  containing  the four  bonds, 
was inadmissible, but the plaintiff  could sue again. 
If, however, the omission had only been of  the statement 
of  what law had been broken, the judge might at any time 
inquire and admit aillendinent ' pro tanto '. 
If the plaint contained inaccurate statements of  fact, that 
was quite another matter.  Inaccuracy in statement of  fact 
was a ' faulty word ', and, when  the inaccuracy was estab- 
lished, the plaintiff  lost his claim to the extent of  the faulty 
word.' 
3. Cazlse of  action. 
5 I.  I11  using the phrase '  cause of  action ' (defnydd had) 
we are employing a term, which  has a more or less definite 
meaning,  often  difficult to express  in  concrete  terms,  in 
modern  jurisprudence.  Using  non-technical  language,  a 
cause of  action means the whole set of  circumstances which 
entitle  a  person  affected  thereby  to  a  remedy  against 
a person or persons responsible for such circumstances. 
Q:  2.  That  does  not  quite  cover  what  was  meant  by 
' defnydd  haw1 '.  It included  that ; but  it  meant  more 
especially the manifestation of those facts or circumstances 
by a particular episode entitling the person affected to sue. 
What is meant will, perhaps, be more easily  understood 
by considering how the Welsh Laws dealt with the matter. 
Every cause of  action, it is said, must be based on a sight, 
or a word, or a deed ; there could be no cause of action, for 
example, based on a thought ; there must be a manifesta- 
tion by means of  something overt. 
' G. C.  756 ; IV. 22,  24  4:  TTIII. 202 ; IX. 2.42,  244,  252 : X. 316,  318, 
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Every sight, word, or deed did not, of  course, constitute 
a cause of  action ; it must be a sight, word, or deed infring- 
ing a law. 
§ 3.  Three  sights  (golwg) are  mentioned  on  which  an 
action could be brought ; the sight of  a witness as to what 
he had seen, the sight of an informer  as to what he gave 
information  about, and the sight  of  an accessary  to the 
crime of  homicide, theft, or arson. 
The meaning  of  this characteristic Triad is at first sight 
obscure; but its connotation is that one who was an accessary 
to murder, &c., by  seeing and not  interfering to prevent, 
could be proceeded against criminally because of  his ' sight ', 
that in theft cases, where the owner had no personal know- 
ledge of  the facts, he could take action on the information 
given  by  a  person  seeing  the  thief  in  possession  of  the 
stolen property, and that issues of  fact in cases which were 
not to be decided by compurgation, but by evidence, must 
be supported by the testimony of  ' eyewitnesses ', i.e, men 
who knew and had seen the facts. 
$4. Likewise, it is stated that there were three causes of 
action based  on words :  the utterance  of  a  word  causing 
' tongue-wound ', the utterance of  a  faulty word,  and the 
utterance of  a word by an accessary amounting to tongue- 
reddening in homicide, theft, or arson. 
This again is a  typical  Triad, where  three  facts, often 
essentially different, were strung together because they had 
one common factor, in this instance the ' use of  words '. 
The meaning  of  the provision  is that one  who was  an 
accessary  to  murder,  kc., by  spoken  encouragement  or 
conspiracy, could be proceeded against because of  his word, 
that a person insulting the King, the judge  in court or the 
King's priest, could be prosecuted for ' tongue-wound ', and 
that the use of  a faulty word, though  depriving a party of 
his remedy in that suit, did not operate to bar a new suit. 
' Faulty words ' occurred only in pleadings, and might be 
faulty because of  their excess or insufficiency.  They could 
be uttered by a plaintiff in stating his claim, by a defendant 
in defending, and by a defendant in denying.  If  a plaintiff 
uttered a word in excess or too little he lost his claim  ' pro 
tanto ' ; and though the Codes do not mention a subsequent 
suit, the later laws do in respect of  the part affected by the 
error;  e.g. if  a  plaintiff, entitled  to ten ' erws ' of  land, 
claimed only seven by error, he could not later in that suit 
ask  for the full ten, but he could bring a subsequent suit 
for the three he had omitted in his pleadings :  hence his 
faulty word  gave  him  a  ' cause  of  action '  in  the Welsh 
sense of  the term.  A  defendant uttering a faulty word  in 
defending  or  denying, i.e. in  not  replying  in  full  to the 
claim  made,  lost  his  defence  ' pro tanto ', and was  fined 
a ' camlwrw ' for not answering fully, the recovery of  which 
operated as a cause of  action to the King. 
$5. I11  regard  to causes  of  action  based  on  deeds,  the 
commentators do not  attempt to compress the deeds into 
Triadic form.  It is frankly admitted that ' the law is not 
competent  to show  nor  to declare what  several  deeds are 
matters of  action ' ; but it is pointed  out  that every deed 
conllnitted against law was a cause of  action to him affected 
by  it against the person  doing the deed, and further that 
there were certain deeds done by a man which entitled him 
to a remedy, e. g. where a  man  had  performed  labour  on 
land or the like, he had a cause of  action to recover payment 
iron1 the man on whose behalf he had done the w0rk.l 
4. PIeadiizgs  ow appeara~tce  iu  cozwt.  Ge~teval. 
jj I.  We may now turn to consider the pleadings on  tlie 
appearance of  parties in court after they had been arranged. 
In both trials by compurgation and evidences, oral plead- 
ings were commeilced  by the plaintiff  making a statement 
of his case on oath, with the same particulars as those which 
have been recited as requisite in a plaint. 
To this statement defendant replied-if  it were a civil case, 
after obtaining time for aid, if  a criminal case, immediately. 
A  refusal by  defendant  to plead,  if  he  were  called  on 
three times, was tantamount to a confession of  claim, and 
judgement  was given in plaintiff's  favour. 
§ 2.  If the case were one to be decided by compurgation, 
there were  two  forms of  reply  open  to the defendant,  an 
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acknowledge~nent  or a denial.  If  there were an acknowledge- 
ment, that ended  the case ;  if  there  were  a  denial,  the 
question was submitted to compurgators adjudicated upon 
the defendant. 
fj 3.  If  the case were one to be decided by ' evidences ', 
there were three forms of  reply open ; an acknowledgement, 
a  denial, and a  defence, or what is frequently termed the 
raising  of  an ' arddelw ' or  avouchment,  a  system of  trial 
which survived in civil cases until abolished in the reign of 
Henry VI 1  I. 
In one case in which  compurgation was the appropriate 
form  of  trial,  an avouchment  could  be  raised,  with  the 
result that the character of  the suit was at once changed, 
and it became  triable  by  ' evidences '  and  not  by  com- 
purgators.  That was  the case  of  theft  absent  where  an 
avouchment of  custody of  guests was raised. 
5 4.  An acknowledgement it is quite easy to understand, 
so also a denial. 
An  acknowledge~nent  was  simply  an  admission  of  the 
claim,  and might  be  partial  or  complete.  If  there  were 
only a  partial acknowledgement,  that part which was  not 
acknowledged had to be denied or defended, just  as if  the 
whole claim had been denied or defended. 
fj 5.  A denial was a repudiation of  the claim in whole or 
part.  A  denial hod  to be made by reciting the plaintiff's 
claim  and denying it word  by word.  There could be  no 
denial by a  general  statement to the effect  that ' I  deny 
everything  you  have  urged ' ;  the denial  must  be  clear, 
detailed, and immediate, and the omission to deny any one 
allegation of  plaintiff was construed as an acknowledgement 
of  that part. 
It was not permissible  for a party, called on to plead, to 
consult with his advocate as to whether he would admit or 
deny any fact alleged, and any attempt to consult operated 
as an acknowledgement. 
As soon as a fact was alleged and denied, that fact became 
a fact in issue,  and a decision upon it was come to either 
by compurgation or after hearing '  evidences ', according to 
whichever was the appropriate method prescribed by law. 
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fj 6.  It is extremely difficult to express  in  modern  ter- 
rnin~l~gy  what was meant by a ' defence ' of  avouchment. 
Wales had no monopoly of this method of  pleading ; it 
was  prevalent  among  the  early  English  and  Germanic 
tribes, but nowhere is its mode of  operation described with 
such detail as it is in the Welsh Laws. 
Perhaps the best description of  the system is to be found 
in the somewhat archaic language of  the VIIth Book : 
'A  lawful "  arddelw " is a stay of law; and a stay of  law 
is anything that shall turn the law from the subject concern- 
ing which  there is  a mutual arguing to another thing which 
shall be  as good  as it or  better, so  as to become  necessary 
to arrest  the law  in  respect  of  it  (i.e.  the  original subject) 
or in respect to the testimony that shall be produced thereon.' 1 
In other words the defendant neither admitted nor denied 
the claim  made :  what  he  did  was  to make a  statement 
alleging facts which, if  true, put the plaintiff  out of  court 
at once.  It consisted  in  opposing a  new  case  to that of 
plaintiffs.  That statement  of  defendant  became  the fact 
in issue, and the decision  on  the original fact asserted by 
plaintiff  was  stayed until  a  decision  was  come  to on  the 
statement made by defendant. 
The importance in practice of ' avouchment ' was that the 
defendant  acquired  the  privilege  of  proving  it, diverting 
proof  from  plaintiff's  original  allegation,  the privilege  of 
which was plaintiff's,  to the defendant's new statement. 
To an ' avouchment ' raised by the defendant, it became 
necessary for the plaintiff, in  his  turn, to admit or deny it 
or to raise o ' counter-avouchment ', which in its turn went to 
the root of defendant's  ' avouchment '.  If  he admitted the 
' avouchment ', he was out of court on the whole of  his claim ; 
if he denied it, evidence was led by defendant to prove it ; 
if he  raised  a  counter-avouchment,  he stayed  the law  as 
regards  the defendant's ' avouchment '  and diverted proof 
from it to his counter-avouchment, thereby recapturing the 
privilege of  proof-proof  not on the original claim, but on 
the counter-avouchment. 
To  this counter-avouchment  again  the defendant  could 
reply by admission  or denial or a still further avouchment, 
VII  156 348  THE  LAW  OF  PLEADINGS  PART IX 
and so on  until the pleadings were reduced  to a series of 
'avouchments',  the last of  which must either  be acknow- 
ledged or denied. 
'The decision on the last ' avouchment ' governed the whole 
case, for each  ' avouchment '  must go to the root of its pre- 
decessor, and the point in issue was, by this process, narrowed 
down to a single fact. 
$7. To deal at present  only with  the broad outlines of 
' avouchment ', we find that there were two kinds of  ' avouch- 
ment ' which  could be raised, that of  law or  ' status', and 
that of  fact. 
An ' avouchment ' of law was similar to what is, in some 
systems of  law,  called  a  preliminary  plea  in  law, a  legal 
plea  striking  at the  root  of  plaintiff's  claim  altogether, 
making it possible to decide the case on  that plea without 
going into the merits of  the case at all. 
The  defendant  neither  admitted  the  facts  nor  denied 
them :  he raised  a  plea  in law  which  absolved him  froin 
admitting or  denying.  For example, he might plead  that 
Chc  claim was either time-barred or barred by the rule of 
res judicata '.  That plea diverted proof from the question 
of  facts alleged in  the plaint  to the question whether  the 
claim was time-barred or ' res judicata '. 
But the raising  of  such a  plea  differed  very  materially 
from the raising of  a preliminary plea in modern law ; for, 
though if a preliminary plea be foutld in favour of  defendant 
urging it, the plaintiff is at oncc out of  court, the defendant 
is not if  he loses it, he can still plead on the merits.  Under 
old  Welsh law, however, if  a defendant raised an avouch- 
ment and lost it, he lost the whole case. 
$ 8.  A long list of  avouchments ' in law, as distinct fro111 
avouchments ' of  fact, can be gleaned from various parts of 
the authorities.  The list includes : 
(i) X  contention that the plaint  or  claim  was  illegal on  the 
ground that plaintiff  had no  status to sue, or  that the 
suit was premature or filed at the wrong time. 
(ii) A contention that defendant was absolved from answering 
in the court, in which the suit was filed, by virtue of  the fact 
that the court had no jurisdiction over him, e. g. that he 
was a clerk in holy  orders, not subject to the '  cy~nwd  ' 
court. 
(iii) A contention that the claim was '  res judicata ' ;  a '  trifling 
claim ' as it is termed in  the laws. 
(iv) A  contention that the  plaint  was  defective, e.g. that it 
did not  in  itself  amount to an assertion of  facts corre- 
sponding to the law to which appeal was made ; as, for 
instance, where  a plaintiff sued for '  violence' on facts, 
urhich, if true, did not amount to  ' violence ' in law, or 
that the person claiming had no interest in  the subject 
matter of suit, or that there had been no legal summons, 
or that the property claimed was not fully specified, or the 
relief claimed was not given,  or the parties were not named, 
or the time of  an  alleged contract was  not mentioned. 
It  is probable that many of  these ' avouchments '  (some of 
which  could  be  countered  by  amendment) were  of  later 
than the time of  Hywel Dda, and indeed that is the 
inference  to be  drawn  from  the fact  that  some  are not 
found in the Codes, and from the terms of  a passage in the 
Xth Book, which  says that among the pleas not found in 
the Law of  Hywel J>da  were certain unspecified avouchments. 
5 9.  The operation of  an avouchment of  fact was similar. 
The defendant, instead of  denying or admitting the claim, 
asserted  a  fact  which,  if  true, was  absolutely inconsistent 
with the claim made, and the law was diverted from ascer- 
taining whether the original fact alleged was true or not, to 
ascertaining whether the new fact alleged was true or not. 
We may illustrate by means of  an example.  A man might be 
charged with having committed theft by night, the property 
not being found, i.  e. a case of  theft absent.  Instead of  admit- 
ting or denying the charge, he could raise the avouchment of 
custody of  guests, that is, he could assert that on the particular 
night  on which he was  alleged to have committed theft, he 
was in the house of  another man as his guest. 
This particular charge, theft absent, was ordinarily sub- 
mitted for decision to compurgation, but if  the ' avouchment ' 
were raised, the law was at once stayed.  No compurgators 
were called, and the inquiry was diverted from the question 
Mether  accused  had  committed  theft  to  the  question 
\~hether,  on the night in question, he was in  the house  of 
his alleged host, a fact he had the right to prove by ' pro- 
tectors'.  If  he succeeded, the charge failed ;  if  he did not, 
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$10.  An ' avouchment ', once set up, could not be receded 
from or denied by the person putting it forward ;  the defence 
was based irrevocably on the ' avouchment ',  which was to be 
proved by appropriate '  evidence ' ;  and if  the ' a~rouchment  ' 
failed,  the  whole  case  was  adjudged  against  the  person 
raising it. 
§ 11.  Every reply to a claim had to be confined strictly 
to that which was urged, and  so  an  ' avouchment '  must 
strike at the root of  plaintiff's claim. 
A negative did not form an ' avouchment ' ; it constituted 
a  denial, hence  the facts alleged  must  raise  a  new  point. 
It  must cut the ground from under the opposing party's feet, 
hence a counter-claim  (arlinwl),  or to use modern language, 
a ' set-off ', could not be claimed, as if  any one had a set-off 
against a plaintiff, his remedy was not to urge it in  answer 
to the claim, but to proceed upon it as a separate cause of 
action  in  a  separate  suit.  This  is  in  very  marked  con- 
tradistinction  to the Irish Laws, where a Brehon, called in 
as arbitrator, took into consideration all manners of  set-off 
in making up his accounts between parties. 
$ 12.  The system, though at first sight complicated  and 
difficult  to describe, was  as a  matter of  fact  very  simple. 
There  was  plenty  of  room  for  ingenuity  in  pleading,  but 
the  procedure  was  inexorable.  Parties  were  fixed  down 
gradually  to definite  facts in  issue, and it was  impossible 
to  indulge in speculative pleas in the hopes of  defeating one's 
opponelit on a side-issue without risk in case of  failure ;  /it 
was impossible, too, to indulge in alternative or contradictoky 
pleas, or to drag into a case matters extraneous to it.  Tlie 
issue was clearly defined, and on its decision the case turned\ 
$ 13.  When the pleadings had been completed and reduced' 
to writing, they were recited by the presiding judge.  Parties 
were asked if  they accepted the pleadings, and if  they did 
not, they were at liberty  at this  stage, and at this  stage 
only, to amend them. 
After amendment they were again recited by the presid- 
ing  judge.  The judges  and  the priest  then  withdrew  to 
another  part  of  the  field  for  consultation,  and  any  one 
interrupting was fined three kine. 
On  retirement,  the  priest  opened  proceedings  with  a 
prayer  for  guidance,  and the judges  repeated  the Pater- 
noster. 
The pleadings were recited  once more, and consideration 
was given to the question whether it was possible to dispose 
of the issue without further information. 
If it could not be, a date, the date for loss and gain, was 
accorded  for compurgation or ' evidences ', whichever  was 
appropriate. 
3 14.  Before passing on to consider the actual pleadings 
in  specific cases,  we  may  mention,  in  the briefest  terms, 
the system prevalent in Iiome during the formulary period, 
in which there is a striking resemblance to the Welsh system 
of  pleading. 
During  the formulary period  parties were  called  before 
the  magistrate,  who  recorded  the  pleadings  and reduced 
the case in dispute to clear and definite issues.  These issues 
were forwarded to the Judex,  who had to determine what 
the law was, if the issue were established. 
The pleadings  or formulae submitted to the Judes  con- 
sisted of  : 
(a) The ' demonstratio ' or statement of  facts of  plaintiff's 
claim. 
(b)  The '  intentio ' or statement of  relief  claimed. 
(c)  The ' condemnatio ' or  form  the judgement  was  to 
take, if the claim were established or disproved. 
If the ' demonstratio ' were admitted, the defendant could 
combat the' intentio ' by urging '  esceptiones '.  For example, 
in a claim to recover a debt, defendant might admit all the 
facts on which  the plaintiff  relied, but urge as against the 
'  intentio ' or relief claimed that the transaction was tainted 
by fraud.  The formula was then, say : ' Thus is the relief 
claimed, if  fraud  be  not  established ', and the questio~l  of 
fraud would go to the Judex for decision. 
Here  we  have what  is  almost  equivalent  to the Welsh 
' arddel  w '  .  -. . 
To an '  exceptio ' the plaintiff  could plead a ' replicatio ', 
to which again there could be a ' duplicatio ', a ' triplicatio ', 
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The object of  the procedure was to get the facts in issue 
stated  clearly  and  distinctly,  and  once  they  were  ascer- 
tained they were red~~ced  to formulae for decision upon. 
The ' judex ' and parties were  confined  strictly to that 
which appeared in the formulae, and  no  one could travel 
outside the formulae. 
5  15.  The system, moreover, is identical  with  that pre- 
valent  among the Germanic and  Anglo-Saxon  tribes,  but 
we  need  not  here  give  any references,  except  in  regard 
to the prohibition on counter-claims  being made in  a suit, 
which were expressly forbidden in the Sachsenspiegel, TIT.  z, 
the Stat. Stradensis, p. 554, and in the Laws of  <:nut, c. 24. 
$ 16.  We may further note the identification of  ' denial ', 
'  avouchment of fact ', and ' avouchment of  law ' with the 
ordinary  medieval  division  of  pleadings  into  traverse, 
confession  and  avoidance,  and  demurrer,  under  which, 
where objection was taken on a point of  law, the objector 
was  considered  as  thereby  admitting  the  truth  of  an 
opponent's allegations as to fact. 
§ 17. It is  worth  while  also  quoting  here  Prof.  Vino- 
gradoff's illuminating account of  early legal procedure : 
' The  history  of Common  Law  procedure  presents special 
opportunities for watching the peculiar combination between 
rules  of  logic  and  the  requirements of  practical life  as con- 
ceived and formulated by lawyers. . . . 
' . . . The introduction  of  popular  opinion  as a factor in 
deciding the  trial made  it necessary for  the  judges  to  take 
special  care  that  the  moves  of  the  opponents  in  the  legal 
struggle should be reduced to their simplest and most regular 
expression. 
' . . . The  principal  feature  of  this  system  (of  pleading) 
was  the joining  of  issue, the reduction  of  nlatters in  dispute 
to a definite contradiction between " assertion "  and " denial ", 
between " yes " and "  no ".' 
5 18.  We may now  turn to the pleadings in the various 
suits referred  to in the Welsh Laws, dealing with them in 
detail in  the following order :  land suits, civil  suits, and 
criminal suits. 
By doing so we  will  appreciate how  in  particular  cases 
the general principles were applied. 
It must be said that in the laws, which after all said and 
done, were only lawyer's  notes, there is at times some con- 
fusion, not to say contradiction, but they are all resolvable 
with care. 
We fortunately have  in  the VIIth  Book  a  conlpilation 
on  pleadings  made by an extremely capable lawyer ; and 
MS. ' G ', a transcript  of the thirteenth century to be found 
in the Hengwrt Collection, is extraordinarily clear 
5. Pleadings ilz land suits. 
5 I.  The Venedotian  Code says there were  three claims 
for  land,  ' priodolder ', '  dadanhudd ', and  ' ymwrthyn ' ; 
but  it refers  to the following  land  suits in  other  places : 
' priodolder ', ' ach ac edryf ', ' dadanhudd ', ' ymwrthyn ', 
' rhan ', and ' rnamwys '. 
It gives  no  detailed  account  of  the pleadings  in  suits, 
other than ' priodolder ' suits, and its account of  the method 
of  pleading in a ' priodolder '  suit, though brief and succinct, 
is incomplete as to the order in which ' evidence ' was to be 
led and heard. 
5 2.  The Dimetian Code is almost silent on the matter of 
pleadings.  It refers to the exhibition (da~zgosso)  of  a claim 
and defence, and states one of  the practices of  law was the 
maintenance of  a lawful mode of  procedure in investigation 
in  court, ' as  the men  of  the court  and  the judges  may 
choose, whether by word  after word  or  turn after turn ', 
but beyond that there is little mention of  the form of plead- 
ings, while the Gwentian Code has even less to say than the 
Dimetian. 
This is in marked contrast to the disquisitions in the com- 
mentaries,  which  nevertheless are but  elaborations  of  the 
Venedotian ac~ount.~ 
(i) ' Priodolder ' suits and suits of  ' ach ac edryf '. 
§ I. ?'he  most important land suit was the suit of  ' prio- 
dolder ', of  which  there were  two forms,  a  suit  of  '  prio- 
dolder ' proper and a suit of  ' ach ac edryf '. 
5 2.  We  have  noted  in  the land  laws  and  the law  of 
' v. C. 146, 148, 16.1,  166; D. C. 464,  466;  IV. 26, 28; VII.  128,  154, 
'56;  VIII. 202;  IT;. 244, 252; X.  324,  326, 378, 384, 394; XI. 396  444, 
44:.  448;  XIV. 568, 570, 626,628, 650,  734. 
V. C. 146, 148, 174; D. C. 420, 534, 536,  588. 
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limitation that a man became '  priodawr ' of  land, where it 
had been held by four successive generations of  his family ; 
also that abandonment of  land did not immediately involve 
loss of  title to recover;  and, that where abandonment had 
been  followed  by residence  in  a  strange  country, it was 
coinpetent  for any one up to the ninth  descent  to claim 
recovery,  but  if  the abandoilment  had been  followed  by 
residence  in  the  same  country  and  continued  for  three 
generations, the right to  recover was exting~zished  thereafter. 
We  also  noticed  that,  during  the  period  of  absence, 
some  other  person  or  persons  might  have  entered  into 
possession  of  the land,  and by occupation  for  four  suc- 
cessive generations have acquired for themselves '  priodolder ' 
rights. 
$3. A suit by '  ach ac edryf ' was one where a person, out 
of  possession  of  ancestral  land,  claimed  recovery  thereof 
from persons related to himself on the basis of  being entitled 
to it by kin  and descent  (nch ac  edryf) from  an ancestor 
common to both of  them ; a claim of  '  priodolder  proper ' 
was  a  claim  against  new  occupiers,  who  might  or might 
not have become  ' priodorion ' themselves  by occupation 
for four generations. 
In the former case the question as to  whether the plaintiff 
was of  the same kin and descent as the persons holding the 
land was  referred  to the elders  of  the country to report 
upon  before  the defendant  was  called.  If  they reported 
favourably, the defendant could not deny the actual relation- 
ship;  if  they  reported  adversely,  the  plaintiff  was  not 
allowed to proceed. 
$ 4.  In describing  the  pleadings  the  Venedotian  Code 
apparently  only  contemplates  possession  being  held  by 
new  occupiers.  It does  not  draw any definite  distinction 
between  the two ;  but the Anomalous  Laws mention  the 
suits as separate, and particularly assert that a suit by kin 
and descent  could  not  be pursued  except  against a  stock 
of  co-relatives  having  the same common  ancestor  as  the 
plaintiff. 
In the actual procedure there was no difference  beyond 
that involvcd in the elclers' return. 
$ 5.  The Venedotian Code says that on being called upon 
to state his case, plaintiff  made the following assertions : 
(i)  that he  was  the true ' priodawr ' of  the land in  suit by 
' kin and descent ' ; 
(ii) that he had been unlawfully ejected ; 
(iii) that he was appealing to the law to be  reinstated in his 
property ; and 
(iv) that if  his  allegations were  doubted, he  had  enough  to 
know, i. e. to prove his contentions. 
To this the defendant replied, if  he contested, as follo~rs  : 
(i) that  he  himself was  ' priodawr ' and was  protecting  his 
land : 
(ii) that  if  plaintiff  was  ' priodawr ' he  had  departed  from 
the land of  his own  accord ; 
(iii) that hc had enough to know. 
The contentions here raised are not so sharply defined as 
we  shall find they were  in  the Anomalous  Laws,  and  the 
clear  distinction  between  denial  and  avouchment  is  not 
drawn. 
The procedure, however, followed was that applicable to 
a denial ; plaintiff's  eyewitnesses being  heard first  on  the 
question  of  eviction,  then  defendant's,  followed  by  the 
protectors of both parties to title. 
No reference is made to a defence going to the root of  the 
case. 
$6. The account given in the VIIth Book is very clear. 
In describing  the pleadings, it states that plaintiff  was to 
set forth his claim and its extent, and to assert : 
(i) that he was ' priodawr ' by kin and descent, having '  pro- 
tectors to prove title' ; 
(ii) that he had bee11 unlawfully ejected, and had eyewitnesses 
to prove the fact. 
It then proceeds to enumerate the replies open to defen- 
dant-acknowledgement,  denial, avouchment. 
If  there were acknowledgement, plaintiff at  once obtained 
his relief ; if  there were a bare denial of  title and of  eject- 
ment, plaintiff  was  entitled to produce his protectors  and 
eyewitnesses to establish his case. 
If  the defendant's plea took the form of  an assertion that, 
if the plaintiff  were a '  priodawr ', he had departed lawfully 
from the land (the form of  plea as stated in the Venedotian 
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Code), that was  regarded  as  a  simple  denial and not  an 
avouchment, and the right of  plaintiff to lead evidence was 
not affected. 
Avouchments going to the root of  the case are, however, 
mentioned. 
The instance given is a plea of  ' res judicata ', an avouch- 
ment.  This, which was an absolute bar to the suit, must 
be admitted, denied,  or countered by the plaintiff.  If  he 
admitted, his case was lost ; if  he denied, the right to lead 
evidence on the point  was defendant's ; if  he did neither 
one  nor  the other, he  could  raise  a  counter-avouchment, 
asserting that the former judgement  had been reversed on 
appeal, and that subsequent thereto the plaintiff  had been 
dispossessed.  If  defendant  acknowledged  this  counter- 
defence, plaintiff's original claim was decreed ; if  he denied 
it, plaintiff could prove the fact by eyewitnesses, and if  he 
failed to prove it, he lost his case. 
$7. The IXth Book  gives identically the same form of 
assertion by the plaintiff, and states defendant must acknow- 
ledge, deny, or raise an avouchment that he was neither to 
deny  nor  acknowledge.  The same results  are mentioned 
as  following  from denial and  acknowledgement,  and two 
avouchments are indicated, one that plaintiff  had already 
had his proper  share in  the  land  (i.  e. there had been  an 
adjustment  out of  court), and the other that it was ' res 
judicata '. 
To the avouchment there was to be an acknowledgement 
or  denial, no  reference  being  made  to a  counter-avouch- 
ment.  If there were  an acknowledgement, plaintiff's  case 
was lost ; if  there were a denial, defendant was entitled to 
lead evidence in proof, the decision on the whole case being 
determined by the decision on that issue. 
$8. The Xth Book  is briefer.  It states that when  the 
plaint  was  before  the  court  defendant  was  to  produce 
a  lawful avouchment  if  he  had  one,  mentioning  as such 
(a) an assertion that plaintiff  had  abandoned his  land and 
lost all right to it by absence in the same country for three 
generations, (b)  an assertion of  ' car-departure ', i e. aban- 
donment by residence in a foreign co~mtry  beyond the period 
elltitling plaintiff  to return, or (c) any other lawful avouch- 
ment. 
Here  there  was  no  denial  of  plaintiff's  claim,  but  an 
assertion of  facts which, if  true, cut the ground from under 
plaintiff's  feet. 
Plaintiff  was given the option of  admitting, denying  (in 
which  case  defendant  had the right  to lead evidence), or 
setting up a counter-avouchment, to which, in his turn, the 
defendant must reply by acknowledgement or denial, leaving 
the fact last denied as the issue in the case on the determina- 
tion of  which the whole case hinged. 
g.  A very similar form of  pleading in land cases existed 
among the Bavarians, see Lex Baiuor., Tit. XVII, c. 2.' 
(ii) A suit of  ' ymwrthyn ' or mutual strife. 
$ I.  This case is  referred  to, but the pleadings are not 
considered, in the Venedotian Code. 
A suit of  '  ymwrthyn ' was  one brought  by one of  two 
persons in possession of  the same land, the allegation being 
that the defendailt had come into possession by trespassing 
(govmes),  and the relief sought being eviction of  the trespasser. 
It is interesting because the principal point in issue must 
be title. 
§ 2. The pleadings given in the VIIth Book are : 
(i) an  assertion  by  the  plaintif1  that  he  had  sole  ' prio- 
dolder ' rights in  the lancl, with protectors to prove ; 
(ii) an  allegation  of  trespass with  eyewitnesses  to  establish 
the fact. 
The cause  of action  being  defendant's  admitted posses- 
sion, there could be no dispute on that point ; the whole 
case turned on title. 
Here  again  defendant  might  admit,  deny,  or  raise  an 
avouchment ; the same results following as in a '  priodolder ' 
suit.  If  he alleged his own title, this was merely a denial of 
plaintiff's  assertion, and did not  divert  plaintiff's  right  to 
lead  proof  as to his own  sole title ;  and defendant  could 
not  allege his own  sole title, for to evict plaintiff, also in 
Possession,  would  require a  separate suit on the principle 
'  V. C. 146, 148, 152, 172 ; D. C. 452,  454, 536,  588 ; G. C.  758, 762 ; 
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that counter-claims  could not be  adjudicated upon in the 
same suit. 
If, however, instead of  aclinowledging or denying, defen- 
dant wished to raise an avouchment, there was one of  such 
a character available as to avoid all reference to plaintiff's 
title.  He could urge that he had been in possession for so 
long a time without interruption as to amount to an ' inter- 
vention of country ', that is that he had been in possession 
for  three  generations,  without  disturbance,  an  assertion 
which, if  proved, entitled him to resist eviction. 
The law  was  at once  turned from  the question of  title 
and unlawful  trespass to the consideration  of  the plea  as 
to whether  the defendant's  possession,  however  it arose, 
had  been  acquiesced  in  for  such  a  period  of  time  as  to 
entitle him to remain in possession, and defendant acquired 
the right to lead proof  if  plaintiff  denied. 
$3. The account in the IXth Book is meagre.  Plaintiff 
is  represented  as asserting  sole '  priodolder ' rights  with 
protectors to prove and eyewitnesses to show that the land 
came to him from his family stock on partition.  Defendant's 
reply  amounts simply to a  statement to the same effect, 
and this authority gives  defendant  the right to lead pro- 
tectors  and eyewitnesses, followed by plaintiff.  In this it 
differs from the more logical view of  the VIIth B0ok.l 
(iii) A suit of  ' dadanhudd '. 
I. The next land suit to consider is the suit of  ' dadan- 
hudd '.  A suit of  ' dadanhudd ' was of  the nature of  a suit 
for specific relief.  It could only be brought by the son or 
grandson  of  a  man  alleged  to have been  in  possession  of 
the land in suit at the time of  his death.  The son came on 
to the land, dernanding the right of  ' dadanhudd ', that is 
the right to uncover the hearth of  his father upon the land. 
In a true ' dadanhudd ' suit no question of  ' priodolder ' 
title arose ; there were two facts only to consider : (a) had 
plaintiff's  father  at the time  of  his  death a  hearth upon 
the land ?  and (b) had plaintiff been prevented by defendant 
from continuing the possession of  his father? 
A  case  of  ' dadanhudd ' might  be based  on  ' tilth  and 
VII. 134, 136, 138; IX. 270, 284. 
ploughing ', '  car ', or '  bundle and burthen '.  These terms 
have already been explained. 
The pleadings in all three were identical, and the differ- 
ence between the suits lay in the nature of  the reliefs that 
could be granted. 
$ z.  In the VIIth Book we  are informed that a plaintiff 
in ' dadanhudd ', having entered on the land, asserted : 
(i) that his father had been in occupation of  the land through 
investiture and cultivation ; 
(ii) that he had eyewitnesses to prove ; 
(iii) that  he  had  been  unlawfully ejected, with  eyewitnesses 
to prove. 
No  title  was  asserted ;  nothing  but  occupation  which 
sufficed  to give any man the right to temporary ' dadanhudd ' 
occupation.  Defendant could admit or deny. 
If  he  alleged he was  ' priodawr ', that was  an assertion 
of  title, which could not be gone into in a true ' dadanhudd ' 
suit; and if  he asserted plaintiff had  departed of  his ow11 
free will,  that was  a  mere  denial of  unlawful  ejectment, 
which  did not divert the court  from the question in  issue 
or take away from plaintiff  the right of  proof. 
An avouchment of  law was, however, open, if  he asserted 
that  plaintiff  had  had  ' dadanhudd ' possession,  and had 
subsequently been  ejected.  This  was  in  effect  a  plea  of 
' res judicata ', for ' cladanhudd ' possession could only be 
claimed once, and a person illegally ejected, after obtaining 
' dadanhudd ' possession, must sue to recover possession by 
a ' priodolder ' suit. 
If  this  avouchment  were  raised,  the  question  in  issue 
became not whether plaintiff was entitled to ' dadanhudd ', 
but whether he had had it, and defendant was entitled to 
lead proof, which if  established, debarred plaintiff  claiming 
for fresh ' dadanhudd '. 
In a strict suit for ' dadanhudd ' the successiul plaintiff 
got  specific relief  and held for a  period  varying according 
to whether  he claimed by ' tilth and ploughing ', ' car ', or 
' bundle and burthen '.  There was no judgement in his favour 
as to title, and he got possession not as a ' priodawr ', but 
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possession,  defendant was  entitled  to sue for  recovery  by 
a ' priodolder ' suit, in which the question of  title was con- 
sidered.  So,  too,  if  plaintifl  failed  to get ' dadanhudd ' 
possession, he was not debarred from suing as a '  priodawr '. 
$3. The IXth Book gives the same grounds of  suit, and 
the replies are a denial of  eviction, in which case the plaintiff 
was  entitled  to prove  eviction  by  eyewitnesses,  and  get 
possession if  he could do so, and an avouchment  that he, 
defendant,  was in possession by ' dadanhudd ' in his favour. 
Two persons with different fathers might both be entitled 
to ' dadanhudd ', if  their  fathers had successively  died on 
the land with a hearth thereon. 
Defendant,  by  raising  that plea,  asserted  a  temporary 
title, which did not contravert plaintiff's  assertions, but it 
went to the root of  the claim, for ' one dadanhudd cannot 
be imposed upon another ', that is, while the '  dadanhudd ' 
period  of  one person was  unexpired  no other person could 
claim. 
This defendant  was  entitled  to establish by protectors, 
and, if  he succeeded  in  establishing  it, plaintiff  must  sue 
for  '  priodolder '  possession  or  await  the  expiry  of  the 
defendant's ' dadanhudd ' possession. 
But  plaintiff,  without  denying  defendant's  allegation, 
could raise a counter-avouchment by asserting that the period 
of  defendant's ' dadanhudd ' had expired, and that he was 
seeking, not to enforce one '  dadanhudd ' on top of  another, 
but to enforce his own ' dadanhudd ' on land held otherwise. 
Defendant  must  acknowledge  or deny,  and the issue  was 
narrowed down to the point as to whether defendant's pos- 
session had exceeded the legal '  dadanhudd' period.  Every- 
thing else in the case, by not denying, had been admitted. 
§ 4.  The IXth Book does contemplate the plaintiff assert- 
ing title in a ' dadanhudd ' suit and the production of  pro- 
tectors thereto ; but it is obvious that, if  he did so, his suit 
was  regarded,  as against  defendant in  possession,  not  as 
a  ' dadanhudd ' suit, but  as a  ' priodolder ' one,  for  his 
possession, if he succeeded in establishing title through pro- 
tectors,  became  permanent,  ' for',  as  the  commentator 
says, '  he can never be disturbed thereafter '.  The circum- 
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stances in which title could legally arise in a ' dadanhudd ' 
suit have been indicated above (Pt. 11, c. is, $ 4). 
The IXth Book makes it clear that a person ejected by 
a ' dadanhudd ' claim could sue by a ' priodolder ' suit to 
recover  possession, alleging title, with protectors to prove, 
and trespass, with eyewitnesses  to support.  The possessor 
by ' dadanhudd ' replied by asserting his own title, and this 
authority gave him the right  to lead protectors,  asserting 
that where title was disputed the man in possession always 
led protectors. 
$ 5.  The assertions of  plaintiff are given in practically the 
same terms in the XIVth Book ; so, too, the replies, viz. 
denial  of  eviction  or  assertion  of  defendant's  own  prior 
' dadanhudd '. 
If  there were denial of  eviction, plaintiff  produced  eye- 
witnesses ; if  there were  assertion  of  prior ' dadanhudd ', 
plaintiff must deny or raise a counter-avouchment that the 
period of  defendant's ' dadanhudd ' had expired. 
The account is meagre, but it agrees with what the other 
authorities say.  It further  agrees  that title need  not  be 
asserted  in a '  dadanhudd ' suit ;  but if  asserted, the suit 
was treated as a '  priodolder ' suit having final effect.l 
(iv) A suit of  ' rhan ' (partition) 
$ I.  The suit of  ' rhan ' was a suit to enforce possession 
of  a share in ' tref  tadawc' by partition or readjustment of 
partition between members of  a family of  the same generation 
-two  brothers, cousins, or second cousins. 
The suit could  not be en~ployed  by  any one related  to 
defendants beyond  that degree  of  relationship, nor  could 
any one within that degree claim for ' priodolder ', for the 
latter suit presupposed  a claim for the whole land and not 
for a share. 
$ 2.  In this case plaintiff, according to the VIIth Book, 
recited : 
(i) how  he  was  entitled  to  a  share, i. e.  his  title  with  pro- 
tectors to prove ; and 
(ii) that he  had  not  received  a  share, with  eyewitnesses to 
establish that fact. 
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If  title were denied, plaintiif  led proof ; if  the defendant 
simply  alleged  plaintiff  had received  a  share, it depended 
entirely  on  plaintiff's  reply  as to who  led  proof.  If  he 
simply denied defendant's counter-assertion, he waived his 
own  right  to lead eyewitnesses;  but  if  he  were  wise,  he 
would point out that defendant's reply was not an avouch- 
ment, but a denial, in which  case plaintiff  led proof ; the 
reply, being  a  denial, would  debar defendant  from raising 
another avouchment. 
If, however, instead of  counter-alleging that plaintiff had 
received  a  share, defendant  said, ' I am not  to answer to 
his claim  as I have already shared with  him ', it was  an 
avouchment,  and  plaintiff  must  acknowledge,  deny,  or 
raise a counter-avouchment, which might take the form of 
admitting a  partition, but asserting that only part of  the 
land liable to partition  and claimed  had been  shared.  If 
there were  a  denial  of  partition, defendant  led  proof;  if 
there were  a  counter-avouchment  of  partial sharing only, 
defendant must admit or deny, plaintiff  in the latter case 
leading proof. 
$3. In the IXth Book the account given is briefer.  The 
assertions  of  plaintiff  are the same as in the VIIth Book, 
to which defendant must reply by acknowledgement, denial, 
or avouchment that he was  not to answer.  If  there were 
denial, plaintiff  led proof.  The avouchment  referred  to is 
an assertion  of  complete sharing to be met by a denial or 
counter-avouchment . 
The IXth Book does not differentiate, as does the VIIth 
Book, between the two ways of  urging defendant's avoucll- 
ment, and treats the assertion not as a denial, but as raising 
a  new  issue,  which  defendant  was  entitled  to establish, 
unless  countered by a  counter-avouchment.  The counter- 
avouchment mentioned is an allegation  of  partial sharing, 
which, according to this authority, would  not be admitted 
as an  avouchment  if  defendant  had  asserted  a  complete 
sharing, but would be regarded as a denial entitling defendant 
to lead proof. 
There is here a difference of  opinion as to whether a proper 
avouchment  had  been  raised  or  not ;  but  the  principle 
followed is  the same in both cases, viz. that that was  an 
avouchment, changing the issue, which went to the root of 
the assertion which it was attempted to counter. 
This authority further mentions the avouchment  of  law 
by pleading ' res judicata ', which  gave the defendant the 
right to establish it.l 
(v) The suit of  ' mamwys '. 
§ I.  An  interesting  case  illustrative of  pleadings  is  the 
suit of  ' mamwys ', in which a plaintiff, the son of  a foreigner 
by a  Cymraes, claimed a share in land from the relatives 
of  his  mother, who  had  given  her  in  marriage,  or  had 
handed  her  over  as  a  hostage,  or  had  not  adequately 
protected  her. 
9 2.  In  this  case  there was  no  assertion  of  title,  but 
an  assertion  of  facts, which,  if  proved,  gave  plaintiff  a 
right  to a  share in  land.  Hence  we  find  no  mention  of 
protectors. 
The  plaintiff  asserted  his  mother  was  a  Welshwoman 
given by defendant in marriage to a foreigner, and claimed 
a share not as a ' priodawr ', but as an inheritor, and stated 
he had eyewitnesses to prove. 
If defendants merely  denied  the allegation, plaintiff  led 
proof. 
Defendant could, however, raise avouchment.  Two pleas 
are mentioned, viz. : 
(i) an  assertion  that  the  Welshwoman,  their  relation,  had 
been married to a Cymro and not a foreigner, and that 
consequently  plaintiff  was  entitled  to  ' tref  tadawc' 
elsewhere ; 
(ii) an  assertion  that  though  plaintiff's  mother  had  been 
married to a foreigner, he, plaintiff,  had received land 
after claiming by ' mamwys ' elsewhere. 
The author of  the VIIth Book  draws a  very  clear  dis- 
tinction between  these two pleas.  The latter was  a  clear 
avouchment of  ' res judicata ' or of  settlement out of  court, 
which  defendants  were  entitled  to prove,  if  denied,  as it 
went straight to the root of  the claim ; the former was in 
reality a  denial of  plaintiff's  assertion  that his father was 
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a  denial and not an avouchment, the plea  was  treated as 
a denial entitling plaintiff  to lead. 
$ 3.  The IXth Book  gives  exactly the same pleadings, 
and in  dealing with  the  avouchments  points  out that if 
the  defence  raised  was  that  plaintiff's  mother  was  not 
related to the defendant at all, it would not be an avouch- 
ment,  but  a  denial,  for  plaintiff's  case  was  based  on  an  - 
assertion of  relationship. 
An avouchment must raise fresh facts separate from what 
had been asserted ; a defence which did not do so was a denial. 
If  defendants had asserted that plaintiff  was entitled to 
' tref  tadawc '  elsewhere,  there  was  a  new  fact  asserted 
which  went  to the root  of  plaintiff's  claim,  for  no person 
could  have ' tref  tadawc ' from  two  sources,  and so  this 
defence was an avouchment to be acknowledged, denied, or 
countered by a counter-avouchment. 
The IXth Book  also  mentions  the avouchment  of  ' res 
judicata '. 
$4. The suit is mentioned also in the XIVth Book, but 
that authority confines itself  to saying that where  a man 
sued as the son of  a violated  hostage, he could not prove 
violation  by eyewitnesses,  as violation  was  a  matter  for 
compurgators to determine, and likewise that where a man 
sued on the ground that he had avenged one of  his mother's 
kin and was entitled to a share in their land, he could not 
prove he had committed murder by  eyewitnesses,  for the 
fact of  murder was  also a  question  for compurgators, but 
what he could do was to prove that proceedings had been 
taken in respect to violation or murder in c0urt.l 
(vi) Suit to demarcate boundaries. 
$ I.  As  already  noticed  elsewhere,  the demarcation  of 
boundaries  was  not  a  judicial  function ; where  there was 
a  dispute as to boundaries  between  two  persons,  he who 
had superior status was entitled to demarcate. 
The principal question for decision, therefore, when a suit 
for demarcation was filed, was which of  the two contesting 
parties had superior status entitling him to demarcate. 
$2. The plaintiff, in demanding demarcation, asserted he 
' VII. 138  ; IX. 284,  XIV. 734 ct seq. 
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had  superior  status  with  protectors  to  prove,  Again, 
defendant could  acknowledge,  deny,  or  raise  an avouch- 
ment.  If  he denied, plaintiff led protectors. 
Defendant could, however,  instead  of  denying,  raise  an 
avouchment,  alleging,  with  eyewitnesses  to  prove,  that 
plaintiff  had already had boundaries  demarcated  on  such 
and such a line, and no one could claim to have the same 
boundaries  twice  demarcated.  The  avouchment  went  to 
the root  of  the case.  If  plaintiff  acknowledged  the fact, 
that ended the case ; if  he denied, defendant led eyewitnesses 
to that, the sole issue, and the decision on the issue deter- 
mined the whole case. 
Plaintiff  could, however,  advance a  counter-avouchment 
by alleging that the previous demarcation had been on the 
line he now claimed, but that since then the defendant had 
encroached  beyond  the line, in fact, asserting a new  state 
of things giving him a fresh cause of  action. 
This  became  the issue  in  the  case,  decision  on  which, 
after hearing eyewitnesses, determined the whole suit. 
§ 3.  The  IXth  Book  gives  a  very  brief  account,  and 
confines itself to the issue of  superior status without mention- 
ing avouchments.  l 
The  procedure  in  pleadings  in  respect  to  land  is  of 
particular  interest,  for  it  would  appear  to  be  largely 
indigenous. 
Germanic  Law  rarely  recognized  any action  for  land; 
only actions for debt, or as we would call them, ' civil suits '. 
The reason for this was that, in regard to property, posses- 
sion and right were practically coextensive ; and inasmuch 
as there could be no private possession or property in land, 
land being tribal and not personal, there could be no action 
by an individual to obtain possession of  land. 
By  elaborating a  procedure to enforce private rights in 
land  we  see  that, though  in  many particulars  the  tribal 
idea  survived in  Wales,  that  country  attained  to a  con- 
ception of  private property in land, individual and group, 
at a comparatively early time. 
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6.  Pleadings in civil szlits, 
(i) Suit to recover a commended foreigner. 
$ I.  The first suit to consider is the suit to recover a com- 
mended  foreigner.  We  have seen  in  the law  relating  to 
status that  a  foreigner,  whose  family held  land  for  four 
generations,  acquired  a  permanent  tenure  coupled  with 
a liability to be bound to the soil. 
The suit to recover  a  foreigner  applied  to cases  where 
a foreigner, who had become ' adscriptus glebae ', absconded 
from  the land.  It is referred  to briefly  in both  Southern 
Codes, but our  knowledge  of  pleadings  is  derived  mainly 
from the Vth and IXth Books. 
§ 2. The Vth Book states that in such a case the plaintiff 
was  to assert  that  the man  was  his  commendee,  ' with 
enough to know '. 
Should the defendant traverse the claim, he could assert : 
(i) that he was a free-born Welshman, or 
(ii) that he was the commendee of  another person. 
The second plea was regarded  as a denial, a  denial that 
he was plaintiff's  commendee, and accordingly plaintiff  was 
entitled to lead proof.  The first plea was  regarded as an 
avouchment  and not a  denial, an entirely new  case being 
set up, viz.  that he was  free and could be no one's  com- 
mendee.  The defendant  was,  therefore,  entitled  to lead 
protectors to prove his alleged status, the protectors being 
free Welsh relations of  his own. 
The  Vth  Book  calls  this  diversion  of  proof  from  the 
original allegation to a new one, ' cyfraith atgas ', which it 
defines as ' a case where the defendant shall turn the proof 
from the plaintiff to his own  side like turning law  to the 
opposite side ', pointing out thereby, what has already been 
remarked, that the avouchment might be of  fact or of  law. 
$3. The IXth Book repeats the assertion of  claim made 
in the Vth Book as follows : 
' It  is  due for  you  to be  an "  alltud"  to me,  and  your 
ancestors were also "  alltuds " to my ancestors ;  you, therefore, 
ought to be an "  alltud " to me ', 
the usual assertion of  there being ' enough  to know ' being 
added.  It proceeds that there were  three answers  open : 
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acknowledgemen.t, denial, and lawful avouchment, '  that it 
shall not be necessary  for him to answer ', i.e. a  defence 
going to the root  of  the plaintiff's  claim. 
If  there wcre a simple denial, plaintiff  led  eyewitnesses ; 
if  there  were  an allegation  of  being  a  freeman,  that was 
an  avouchment  entitling  defendant  to lead  protectors  to 
status. 
It proceeds,  then, to consider  the case where there was 
no question of  the defendant being a foreigner, the question 
being whether he was  plaintiff's  foreigner  or the foreigner 
of  another in whose possession he was.  In that case  the 
competitor was to be impleaded, and in reply to plaintiff's 
claim,  if  he asserted he  was  superior,  then,  as he was  in 
possession,  he became  entitled  to lead  protectors  who,  if 
they supported him, excluded the eyewitnesses of  plaintiff .l 
(ii) A suit of  surety and debtor 
$ I. We have already noted that the principal method in 
which transactions of  a business nature were  entered into 
was through sureties, and that the primary mode of  enforc- 
ing a debt was by resort to ' distress '. 
But, notwithstanding the survival  of  distress  in Wales, 
matters of  fact in  dispute were  adjudicated upon, in later 
times at  any  rate, by the courts, before distresscould be taken. 
S 2.  We have, moreover, in the law relating to suits for 
debts secured by sureties, a system quite different from that 
in  which  the  defences  available  were  acknowledgement, 
denial,  and avouchment.  There was  under  this  mode  of 
trial  no  decision  according  to the evidence  of  protectors 
and eyewitnesses-it  was one of  the cases where evidences 
were entirely excluded. 
There  were  two  methods  of  trial  in  surety cases,  viz. 
decision by compurgation, and decision by the tongue-man 
statement of  the surety. 
§ 3.  There was no need for a plaint, though in the XIIth 
Book, p. 464, a model plaint is given in which the plaintiff 
alleged : 
(i) that  the  surety  had  stood  surety  for  payment  by  the 
debtor of  a stated sum on a stated date ; 
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(ii) that the date had  elapsed and  t!le  surety had  not  been 
able to compel payment by the debtor ; 
(iii) that demand for payment by the surety had been made ; 
(iv) that the surety should be  compelled to pay. 
Whether a plaint were used or not, there was no differ- 
ences in procedure after the initial stages. 
The parties appeared before the judge  for him to adjudi- 
cate, according to set form, upon the points in dispute. 
9 4.  The Venedotian  Code  contemplates  three possible 
matters in dispute : 
(i) where the creditor claimed a debt, and the debtor denied 
its  existence  and  the  creditor  was  supported  by  the 
alleged surety ; 
(ii) where the creditor claimed a debt and the debtor  denied 
its existence, and the alleged surety denied that he  was 
surety; and 
(iii) where  the parties  all  agreed  there was  a debt  and  the 
alleged  surety  was  surety,  but  there  was  a  dispute 
between parties as to the amount due. 
It takes each of  these cases, and briefly  states what the 
law applicable to each was. 
In all cases, on the appearance of  the parties, it was the 
first duty of the judge to ascertain if  the surety were admitted 
as a surety, for if  that were so, the surety's statement was 
binding as a tongue-man's. 
In the first case, however, there was an emphatic denial 
by the debtor that there  was  any debt  at all,  and con- 
sequently that there was any surety. 
The  denial  took  the  form  of  denying  the  surety  was 
a  surety, and was made in the first instance without  oath. 
The surety then declared, also  without  oath, that he was 
surety and his statement was at once certified to the court 
by attestators, and he could never  afterwards recede fro~n 
that position. 
Thc debtor was  then  sworn  on  the relics  and declared 
the alleged  surety was no surety of  his.  If  he did not, he 
became liable for the claim.  To this sworn declaration the 
surety was called upon to reply with a counter-oath alleging 
he was surety.  If  he declined to swear, the debtor was at 
once freed from the claim, and the surety, whose unsworn 
statement had been certified to the court, became responsible. 
If he did swear he was surety, he, having performed  the 
duties of  a surety, was freed from liability, and the alleged 
debtor,  to be  absolved,  had  to produce  compurgators  to 
compurgate him from the debt, he paying the judge's  fee. 
The compurgators consisted  preferably  of  himself,  four 
persons  related  to him  on  the paternal  side,  two  on  the 
maternal, all within ' galanas ' degrees, but compurgators of 
paternal relatives alone were admissible. 
If the compurgators supported the alleged debtor, he was 
freed from the claim ; if  they did not, he  had to pay the 
amount sued for.  In case there was a number of  sureties, 
compurgators for each one had to be produced separately. 
$ 5.  This rksz&me'  of  the account is repeated in the VIIIth 
Book  in  a  much  more verbose  form, but  nothing  of  any 
value  is  added, except  that  this latter account  indicates 
that the surety was absolved from liability where the creditor 
sued the alleged debtor for payment, and not the surety to 
enforce  payment,  the moment  that the defendant  denied 
that the alleged surety was a surety. 
$ 6.  The  Dimetian  Code  merely  refers  to the  case  by 
stating that, where  an alleged  debtor denied  a  surety, he 
was to provide compurgators of the same character as those 
mentioned in the Venedotian Code. 
$ 7.  The case is also  mentioned  incidentally in the Xth 
Book, where  it is provided  that a  debtor could  not  deny 
his surety, if  suretyship were given  in the publicity  of  the 
parish, in a lawful session, or in the presence of  the lord. 
$8. In considering the second case, the accounts given in 
the versions contained in  MSS. Titus D. 11. and the Llyfr 
Teg  are followed.  The other  accounts,  which  substitute 
'  ekanogyn ' (debtor) for ' hawlwr ' (claimant) in the latter 
part of  paragraph 7 (V.C. 116) of  Mr. Owen's rendition, make 
the passages meaningIess. 
In this case, i. e.  where  both  debtor and  surety denied 
the creditor's claim, proceedings started by the usual demand 
as  to whether  debtor  and  surety  admitted.  The  surety 
was entitled to three days' time, according to some authori- 
ties :  to none, according to others. 
When  the suretv denied, the creditor swore on the relics, 
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and the surety did likewise,  and ii he  swore  he was  not 
surety, the debtor was at once absolved from the claim. 
The surety was  also absolved from the claim  unless  the 
creditor counter-swore to his being surety.  If  the creditor 
did  that, compurgators  were  adjudged  on  the  surety  to 
compurgate  himself,  they  being  of  the same character as 
those  adjudged  on  the debtor  in the previous case.  The 
decision of  the case followed the finding of  the compurgators. 
Evidences to prove that an alleged surety denying the fact 
was in fact surety were strictly excluded. 
If  the surety were dead, his place in denial might be taken 
by his son  or by the lord, if  the latter had  succeeded  to 
the estate.  In the former case the compurgators were drawn 
not from the mother-kin of  the son, but from the mother- 
kin of  the deceased  surety, and, in the latter case, from the 
surety's kin, and not from the kin of  the lord. 
To this case we  have many refercnces in the other parts 
of  the laws, but they differ in  no way from  the preceding 
accounts. 
§ g.  The third case was where all were agreed that a debt 
was due, but there was a dispute between the creditor and 
debtor as to the amount of  the debt. 
In that case  the surety, being  an acknowledged surety, 
was  sworn.  Whatever  amount  he  swore  to, provided  it 
corresponded with what  either the creditor or debtor had 
declared,  was  conclusive  on  the subject :  the surety was 
a tongue-man. 
If he supported the debtor, that was all the debtor paid ; 
if  he supported the creditor, the debtor paid that amount, 
or, failing him, the surety paid. 
The Anomalous Laws develop this case in a very interest- 
ing manner. 
They contemplate the possibility of  the surety forgetting 
the amount he had stood surety for, or asserting an amount 
which  agreed  with  neither  the creditor's  nor  the debtor's 
estimate. 
In the former case  the surety was  given  three or nine 
days in which to refresh his memory ; if  at the end of  that 
time he did  not  recall,  the debtor became  liable  for  the 
CH. 111  IN  SURETY  CASES  37I 
amount he had himself  admitted,  and the surety for the 
difference between  that sum and the amount declared by 
the creditor. 
In the latter case, if  the surety swore to a sum less than 
what the debtor had admitted, the result was the same as 
if he had forgotten the amount altogether ; the debtor paid 
what he admitted, the surety the difference between  that 
and  the  amount  claimed,  though  some  authorities  omit 
mention of  the latter liability. 
If he swore to a sum exceeding the creditor's claim, the 
debtor  paid  what  he  admitted,  the surety the difference 
between that sum and what he himself alleged. 
The possible  case of  a  surety swearing to something in 
between  the amount claimed  and the amount admitted is 
also discussed.  It is referred to as a case where the surety 
admitted part of  his suretyship and denied the other part. 
In such a case the creditor first swore to the amount, then 
the surety counter-swore, the creditor again counter-swear- 
ing.  A peculiar form of  compurgation was then adjudged, 
viz. the surety's sole oath to be taken in church.  That oath 
was conclusive, as it was considered that a surety admitting 
part liability was more likely  to be telling  the truth than 
one who was denying suretyship altogether.  This diminished 
compurgation  was not, however, allowed where there were 
circumstances existent similar to thosepreventing an acknow- 
ledged surety being a tongue-man. 
If  there were two sureties, and one supported the creditor, 
the other the debtor, then, according  to one version,  the 
lalger amount was payable by the debtor, and, according to 
another, the lesser. 
§ 10.  Not every acknowledgcd surety could be a tongue- 
man. 
An  acknowledged  surety,  whose  veracity  was  doubted, 
could be objected to on the ground of  partiality, and if  the 
objection succeeded, the surety paid the whole debt. 
Likewise a surety could not be accepted as a tongue-man 
if it were manifest that, by reason of  the debtor's poverty, 
the sitisfaction of the debt must necessarily  fall on him ; 
the temptation for him  to swear to the lowest  sum would 
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be too great to admit of  hi3 being accepted without question. 
In this case the decision was left to seven compurgators of 
the same character as the compurgators already mentioned. 
So also a surety who had failed  to perform his duty as 
surety towards the creditor, when  called  on  to perform it, 
could  not  be  accepted  as a  tongue-man.  His statement 
must be supported by a similar compurgation.  Yet again, 
if the surety had become  a  surety in  the presence of  the 
court, his  oath had  to be  supported  by  the  oath of  the 
presiding officer. 
§ 11. Other possible cases besides these three are referred 
to in the Laws. 
The  debtor  might,  for  instance,  admit  the  claim,  but 
assert  that it was  not  payable because  the goods he had 
bought, and payment for which was demanded, had failed 
in  soundness  and  title,  and  therefore  he  was  not  liable 
to pay. 
The law would not allow that defence to be taken, on the 
general principle that there could be no set-off  pleaded  in 
a suit ; it must be urged by separate suit.  So if  a creditor 
sued, say for  the price  of  a horse  sold,  the debtor could 
not urge in that suit that the horse was defective either in 
title or soundness.  As  the law explains, the price was due 
at the time of  sale, but there was  nothing due in respect 
of  failure  of  soundness  or  title  till  the defect  was  ascer- 
tained,  which  must  of  necessity  be  subsequent  to  the 
bargain.  The claim  for  price,  therefore, was  for a ' debt 
certain, a debt present, and a debt known ' ; the counter- 
claim could only be for a ' debt of  chance, a debt hereafter, 
and a debt unknown '. 
If  the creditor obtained judgement  or recovered the price 
in another way,  the defendant  could  sue for  damages on 
the basis  of  his  counter-claim  against  the man  who  had 
stood  surety for  title  and soundness.  Such  a  suit  could 
also be filed without plaint and disposed of  summarily. 
§  12.  The debtor might also, when sued, allege part pay- 
ment,  while  admitting  the actual  transaction.  The pro- 
ced~zre  when this defence was raised is peculiarly interesting. 
The creditor  commenced  by  swearing to his  claim  arid 
citing  the surety.  The  debtor  replied  by admitting  the 
transaction  and the surety, but alleged  the debt was  less 
than what was claimed.  He then asserted part payment. 
The position,  therefore,  was  that there was  nothing  to 
which  the  surety  could  swear.  The  question  whether 
debtor had repaid part was  one  of  which  the surety need 
have no necessary knowledge.  There was consequently no 
pleading by the surety, and, as the creditor could then only 
proceed against the debtor, the surety was free. 
In  order  to  prove  part  payment,  the  defendant  was 
entitled  to produce  eyewitnesses.  If  they  supported  the 
debtor, his  avouchment  was  established.  If  the evidence 
he produced  failed  to support him, he could not thereafter 
change his line of  defence and deny the surety was his surety. 
If the debtor had no eyewitnesses to produce, the creditor 
was  at once  entitled to urge that the debtor was  making 
a  claim, which  it was  the creditor's  right  to deny.  This 
coiltention prevailed, and the creditor was put to oath.  Kle 
counter-swore, clenyiilg part payment, and his oath prevailed. 
It  is possible that this was not a valid reply in early days, 
and that an allegation  of  part payment  would  have  been 
dealt with as a counter-claim, defendant being relegated to 
a separate suit, for  the use  of  avouchment  was  foreign to 
the conception of  a suit of  surety and debtor.' 
(iii) Suit on contract. 
$ I.  The method of  enforcillg a contract was by a suit of 
the  nature  of  an  action  for  specific  performance.  The 
plaintiff  sued  for  performance,  naming  the contract-men, 
and if  the action were successful, the lord enforced it through 
the contract-men. 
§ 2.  The Laws do not say much about the action, beyond 
remarking  that it was  similar  to the action  in  a  case  of 
surety and debtor. 
The  plaintiff  appeared  in  court  and  stated  his  case, 
alleging  that such and such  a  contract  had been  entered 
into, and  .  that such and such persons were contract-men. 
V. C. 108, 112, "4,  116, 118, 126, 136, 138; D  C. 396, 398, 424,426, 
430,432,598,612; V.66,68; VI. 102, 116;  VIII 174, 176, 178,1Soetseq, 
zo8;  IX. 2j6, 264. 304; X  32.1,  334, 388,  XI. 444, 446.  XIV. 57G, 634. 
658, 662, 664, 692, 728. If the fact of  contract  were  admitted,  and the alleged 
contract-men  were  also  admitted,  their  statements  were 
conclusive on the terms of  the contract.  If  the fact of  the 
contract were denied, there was  swearing by the plaintiff, 
counter-swearing by the defendant, and a further counter- 
swearing by the plaintiff. 
Compurgators of  identically the same nature as in surety- 
cases were then adjudged upon the defendant, and the find- 
ing of  the compurgators was conclusive. 
No mention is made of  an avouchment. 
Contract-men could not be  objected to on the ordinary 
grounds on which a witness could be objected  to; nor is it 
indicated that any opposition could be raised to the state- 
ment  of  a  contract-man other than that he was  not  one 
at a1l.l 
(iv) Suit on ' briduw '. 
$ I.  The action to enforce a '  briduw ' was  like that to 
enforce a contract, one of  the nature of  an action for specific 
performance,  the King and the Church  being  required  to 
enforce its performance. 
§ 2.  The suit was based on the oath of  the plaintiff assert- 
ing the nature of  the undertaking.  The defendant  could 
either acknowledge in part or in whole or deny, the denial 
being made on oath on seven sacred altars or on the same 
altar seven times. 
No defence by avouchment was open. 
If  the defendant denied entirely or only partially, his own 
oath was conclusive on the point, unless the plaintiff counter- 
swore.  If  he did so, the question in  issue was left to the 
decision of  compurgators, composed  as in surety and con- 
tract cases, adjudged upon the defendant. 
One  peculiarity  in  '  bridutv ' cases  was  that  a  woman 
defendant could produce women compurgators. 
If  the compurgators supported the defendant, the plaintiff 
lost his cause :  if  they failed, the ' briduw ' was  enforced 
by the King ; the defendant was fined a  ' camlwrw ', and 
proceeded against by the Church for perjury.' 
V. C.  136; D.C. 424,426, 598, 612; IX. 304; X. 388; XIV. 576,634. 
V. C.  128, 132, 134 ; D. C. 430,  598 ; G.  C.  728 ; XIV. 570,  576,  658. 
(v) Suit for damages by animals. 
$ I.  Damages by animals might be caused to crops or to 
other animals. 
The common remedy in the former case was by impound- 
ing  the animals  trespassing,  and in  both  cases  the usual 
course  was  to settle  the matter without  resort  to court, 
according to iixed scales of  damages. 
Cases, however, did come into court, and were apparently 
disposed of  summarily on the oaths of  parties. 
$2. Where damages had been done to crops, the oath of 
the captor was conclusive as to where they were captured; 
but, if  they were not captured, the owner's oath exonerated 
himself. 
If  there were any dispute as to the amount of  the damage, 
it was settled by the oath of  the owner of  the cattle. 
If  the damage caused were the killing of  another animal, 
the oath of  the village herdsman was conclusive as to the 
animal  responsible,  if  the  injury  occurred  in  the herd. 
Otherwise apparently eyewitnesses were allowed. 
It will  be  seen  that  the laws  throw  little  light  on  an 
action of  this nature, but it is clear that there was no com- 
purgation,  other  than  by a  single  oath, and eyewitnesses 
were resorted to rarely.' 
(vi) Other civil suits. 
5 I.  In dealing with the law of  bargaining we saw  that 
the  Welsh  commentators  refer  to a  number  of  transac- 
tions other than ordinary transactions by way of  purchase 
and  sale-'  llog ', ' echwyn ',  ' cyfnewid ', '  benffyg ', and 
' adneu '  . 
In suits to recover, the form varied according to whether 
the property were land or other goods. 
3 2.  Land could be subject to ' llog ' or '  benffyg ', and 
a  suit to recover  such land is specially referred  to in the 
Xtll Book. 
The plaintiff  appeared  in  court, stated his interest  and 
claim, to which the defendant replied by acknowledgement, 
denial? or  avouchment.  The  nature of  the avouchment, 
which mjght be raised, is not indicated, and all we are told 
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is that the dispute was  settled by  the testimony  of  eye- 
witnesses.  That is to say, suits for land, subject to '  llog ' 
or ' benffyg ', followed the ordinary procedure in land suits. 
5 3.  Other property might be the subject of  all of  these 
transactions.  ' Llog ' could  only  be  entered into through 
contract-men, '  cyfnewid' through sureties, and these must be 
sued for by the form applicable to contract or surety cases. 
The  other  transactions might  be  entered  into  through 
sureties, contract-men, or ' briduw ', or without any form. 
If they were entered into through sureties, &c., they were 
sued for accordingly. 
If  they were not, the suit was based, not on the transac- 
tion, nor upon the formalities accompanying it, but on the 
right to recover possession. 
This, and the nature of  the suit and procedure,  indicate 
that these transactions unaccompanied by sureties, contract- 
men, or a ' briduw ' oath, were of  late introduction. 
$ 4.  A  suit re ' echwyn ' could  be  sued without  plaint ; 
that we are informed definitely, but we are not told whether 
a plaint was needed in other cases or not. 
$5. In all of  these cases, where there had been no surety, 
&c., the plaintiff, on appearance in court, stated his claim, 
which might be met by acknowledgement, denial, or avouch- 
ment.  \, 
If  there were denial, the plaintiff  swore to the claim and 
led eyewitnesses. 
The avouchments indicated are : 
(i) A  plea  of  ' res  judicata ', which  could  be  established, if 
denied, either by thc defendant leading eyewitnesses, or 
by the plaintiff appealing to the lord that there had been 
no  claim before. 
(ii) An allegation that the property had been rcstored, which, 
if denied, could be  proved  by  defendant's eyewitnesses. 
(iii) An  allegation, in  thc  case  of  deposit, that  thc  deposit 
had been stolen from the defendant's house, along with 
property of  his own, in  which  case defendant produced 
himself  and others dwelling  with him  as compurgators 
to clear himself  of  the suggestion of  theft. 
This is a peculiar and interesting case, for it is the only 
avouchment  provable  by  compurgation.  It is,  how- 
ever, not a strict avouchment, but a compurgation from 
an incipient charge of  theft. 
(iv) An  aliegztioil, in  the  case  of  deposit, that the  amount 
deposited was  less than what plaintiff asserted.  Here 
again defendant produced himself  and one other as com- 
purgators, but again the compurgation was  directed to 
freeing  the  bailee  from  a  possible  charge  of  theft or 
unlawful detention. 
5  6.  In cases of  ' benffyg  ', where the actual property lent 
had to be  restored, the plaintiff  was  entitled  to meet  the 
avouchment, not only by denial, but by a counter-avouch- 
ment, if  he asserted that the property restored was not the 
original  property  lent.  He  made  it  a  definite  positive 
statement, and not a mere negative, by alleging that defen- 
dant had consumed  or  sold  the originaI  property, and if 
that  were  denied,  plaintiff  led  eyewitnesses  to the  con- 
sumption  or  sale  alleged.  A  counter-avouchment  could, 
however,  be  talten  against  this  counter-avouchment  by 
the defendant asserting that, though the original property 
had been consumed or sold, the plaintiff  had had his claim 
satisfied by the property restored being given in compensa- 
tion therefor.  If this were denied, the defendant led eye- 
witnesses. 
$ 7.  An interesting possible case is mentioned in the VIIth 
Book relative to a suit for ' benffyg '. 
If  plaintiff  sued, and, upon suit, defendant  offered pro- 
perty back which plaintiff denied was the original property 
lent, defendant could assert on oath that it was the original 
property, and he was entitled to lead eyewitnesses to prove 
the fact. 
Plaintiff, however, could raise an avouchment instead of 
denying,  agreeing that the property was  the original pro- 
perty, but alleging  that it was  being  offered back  to him 
subject to a claim on it by a third person, and that, there- 
fore, it was  not exactly the same property.  If  defendant 
denied there was a claim upon it, plaintiff  could lead eye- 
witnesses to prove there was.  Instead of  denying, however, 
that  there  was  a  charge  upon  it,  defendant  could  raise 
a  coun ter-avouchment,  asserting  that  the  charge  existed 
on the-property when given to him, and if  this were denied, 
defendant  led  eyewitnesses ;  though  plaintiff  could,  by 
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possession,  counter this move  by revertiing to his original 
declaration contained  in  his  first  avouchment,  and claim 
tile right to produce eyewitnesses on that issue. 
5 8.  We must not omit to notice that, according to the 
Dimetian Code, if  there were a claim for the restoration of 
property subject to ' benffyg ', instead of  the procedure by 
evidence,  a  verdict  of  country  could  be  directed, if  the 
defendant  were  proceeded  against  for  arrogance  (kaer- 
Zlt~grwydd)  . 
§ 9. It seems  clear  that  in  the  rules  regarding  these 
transactions we are in the presence of  a much later develop- 
ment of  the law than that which existed when transactions 
were entered into with the formalities of  suretyship, contract, 
and ' briduw '. 
It would  seem to be indicated that, as the need for the 
older  formalities in transactions  was,  in  certain cases, not 
insisted  upon, a  new procedure  in suits became  necessary, 
since the old  procedure,  which  relied  on  the existence  of 
sureties, contract-men, or ' briduw ' oaths, was  no  longer 
applicable, and so the procedure relative to land suits and 
some other cases was adapted to new  circumstance^.^ 
7. Civil suits in otlzev systems of law. 
5 I. The Germanic system of  trials of  alleged civil transac- 
tions was of  a similqr nature, but we  cannot do more than 
be very brief. 
Though  similar,  it  did  not  recognize  cornpurgation  in 
actions for debt. 
Under Germanic Law all actions for debt, like the Welsh 
actions for  surety, contract, and ' briduw ', were  founded 
upon the transaction itself, the validity of  the transaction 
depending not on an agreement of  will, but on the observance 
of  strict formalities.  In Germanic Law the transaction was 
concluded by the delivery of  some article, a straw or a glove 
or  other  tangible  object,  by  the  obligor  to the  obligee : 
the ' vetta ' of German Law, the '  wadium ' of  Lombardic 
Law, and the '  wed ' of  Anglo-Saxon Law.  The '  wed '  was 
delivered in the presence of  witnesses. 
D.  C.  46G, 484, 598; VII  168, 170; IX. 234, 236,  238, 240;  X. 378, 
380 ; XIV. 598,  658. 
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To avoid immediate payment, where that was not desired, 
earnest-money  (handgeld or arrha) was introduced, and the 
contract still subsisted. 
Where there was a surety the ' wed ' was deposited with 
him, and he became thereby responsible  to the creditor in 
case the debtor failed to pay.  The depositing of  a ' wed ' 
had  exactly  the same  effect as the grasping of  hands  in 
Welsh Law. 
In all contracts a time was,  as in  Welsh  Law, fixed for 
completion.  On  the expiry  of  that  time,  when  resort  to 
court was compulsory, if  the defendant did not pay or the 
surety  enforce  payment,  the  creditor  went  into  court, 
asking  permission  of  the  court  to  exercise  his  right  of 
compulsion. 
He  sued  on  the fact  that certain formalities  had  been 
observed, which  laid  upon  the defendant  an obligation  to 
make a definite payment, failure to discharge which rendered 
him liable to a fine or '  borh-bryce '. 
After  parties  appeared,  the plaintiff  opened  proceedings 
by a triple oath, or '  for-at11 ', alleging tfiat certain moneys 
were  due.  If  it were  denied,  defendant  replied  on  oath, 
and that sufficed to clear the defendant, without resort to 
compurgators,  or  he  might  reply  by  an  ' exceptio '  or 
avouchment,  e. g.  repayment,  which  was  established  or 
repudiated by oath or counter-oath. 
So, too,  if  the suit were by the vendee in a transaction 
claiming  indemnification  because  the warranty  of  goods 
had  failed,  the vendee  swore  by ' for-ath ' that so  much 
was  due to him.  The vendor  must  either  make  good  or 
deny on oath knowledge of  any unsoundness, and that oath 
sufficed to clear him. 
If he could  not swear the clearing oath, permission  was 
accorded to the plaintiff  to distrain. 
That in brief  was  the Germanic  system.  The principle 
was similar, the details were different. 
5 2.  We  may  simply  add to this  general  account  the 
specifie  case  of  a  suit  in  English  law  on  ' God-borh ' 
= ' briduw '. 
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there was no room for a further counter by plaintiff  or sub- 
mission to compurgation. 
The rule governing procedure is contained in the Laws of 
Elfred, c. 33 : 
' If  any one accuse another on account of  a "  God-born " and 
wish  to complain he has aot fulfilled any of  these " God-borh ", 
let him make his "  for-ath " in four churches, and if  the other 
will prove himself innocent, let him do so in tive11-e churclles.' 
With this may be compared Flata, Lib. 11, c. 63 : 
' Inter  inercatores vero  habetur  talis  consuetude,  quod  si 
tallia proferatur contra talliam, allegando per earn solutionem 
rei petitae, si ex parte adversa dedicatur tunc considerandum 
erit quod ille, cujus  tallia  dedicitur, earn  probet hoc modo ; 
quod adeat  IX ecclesias et super IX alteria. juret,  quod talis 
quaerens  talliam  dedictam  sibi  fecit  nomine  acq~iietantiae 
debiti in ea contenti, sic ipsuin Deus adjuvet et haec sancta.' 
8. Pleadivcgs  isz suits on c~imes  and torts. 
(i) Suit of  theft present. 
5 I. The principal offence, the trial for which is described 
in the Welsh Laws, is the offence of  theft.  It  is particularly 
interesting  because  the  mode  of  pleading  and  trial  is 
described in very minute detail, and because nowhere  else 
is  the  procedure,  which  was  the  common  form  among 
Germanic tribes as well, to be found so fully depicted. 
Not only have we, in the Welsh Laws of  theft, an account 
of  the method  of  trialjin court, but we  have also  in  the 
procedure of  the ' oath of  the absolver ', which has already 
been described, a survival of  the procedure existent in pre- 
curial days. 
$ 2.  There were  two forms of  trial  for  theft  in  \Vales, 
radically  different  in  character,  according  as  to whether 
the case  was  one  of  ' theft  present '  or  ' theft  absent ', 
i. e.  according  as to whether  the  alleged  stolen  property 
was  found in the possession  of  the person  accused or not. 
In one instance of  theft absent the procedure followed was 
similar to that followed in the case of  theft present, and in 
one case of  theft present  the procetlurz  adopted was that 
ordinarily applicable to theft absent. 
$ 3.  In the XIVth Book it is said that the original form 
of  trial for theft in Wales  was  by the ordeal of  hot iron, 
boiling water, or combat.  We may dismiss that at  once as 
inaccurate, for the Welsh Laws have no trace of  ordeal, and 
it was, in  fact, introduced in other  countries  to supplant 
compurgation. 
$4. The trial of  a case of theft present was in its essence 
a  civil  suit  to recover  the property,  and  not  a  criminal 
It is similar in its main  characteristics  to a 
suit to recover possession of  land. 
The procedure consisted of  three stages, the detention of 
property  (duly  Zledrad),  the  swearing  to  the  property 
(dnmdwng),  i. e. the formal claim, and the raising of  shields 
(tarian), or  as  it is  generally  called,  the  assertion  of  an 
avouchment by the defendant.  Except in one case there 
was no submission to compurgation as there was in the case 
of  theft absent. 
§ 5. When  a person  had lost  his  property  he was  fully 
entitled to search  for it, wherever he willed,  and, should 
he discover  it, he was  entitled to detain it  (duly Zledrad). 
If  the property were delivered over to him without opposi- 
tion, he was to take it and proceed at once to the lord or 
judge, and swear he had recovered it and by what method, 
and that the property was his. 
If  the owner removed the property without the accused's 
consent  from  the latter's  custody,  the accused  could  not 
be compelled to answer any charge until the property were 
restored to his possession. 
If accused refused to give up the property, the claimant 
could demand the assistance of  the officers of  the lord, who 
at once  set out, seized  the property,  and brought it with 
the person in possession to court. 
The property was released and handed over to the accused, 
who  retained it until the decision  of  the case,  if he gave 
security, exactly as was the case in the ' actio sacramenti ' 
of Roman Law ; if  the judge, however, decided on parting 
the accused  from the property,  the latter was  not bound 
to give  security, and the property  was  then kept  in  safe 
c~stody,~and  could be used  by no one until the decision of 
the case. 
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liable, should the thief default in appearance, to any penalty 
other than death, which might be inflicted upon the accused. 
A  day was  fixed  for  hearing, and on  the day so fixed 
parties appeared before the court, and the property alleged 
to have been stolen was produced. 
When  the court  had been  arranged the judge  called  on 
the claimant to step forward and state his claim (damdwng). 
The plaintiff  then swore on the relics to the property being 
his.  If  the property were  a live animal, he took hold  of 
its right ear with his left hand, placing his right hand on 
the relics ; if it were a bird, he placed his left hand on its 
head ; andif it were inanimate property, on any part of  the 
property he liked, the right hand always being on the relics. 
He then swore that '  no one was the owner of  the property 
but he and his lord and his wife, and that he was not separated 
from the property except by theft, violence, or surreption ', 
naming the day on which he was separated. 
It will  be noticed  he did  not  swear the defendant  was 
the thief.  The reason will be obvious later.  There was no 
direct charge  of  theft  against  any one, there was  merely 
a claim to recover property which had been stolen. 
Throughout  the  swearing  the  defendant  also  had  his 
hand upon the property, using his right hand to grasp the 
left' ear of  the animal, where  the stolen  property  was  an 
animal. 
$ 6.  This formality is one which, in one shape or another, 
is to be found in all early laws, and was symbolical of  the 
conseesual submission to the jurisdiction of  the court. 
We may  simply  refer  here  to the practice  in  Rome  in 
a trial of  ' theft manifest '.  The thing stolen was produced 
in court and the litigants confronted each other, spear in 
hand, across the subject in dispute, symbolical of  an inten- 
tion to fight for it.  The judge,  the representative of  public 
opinion, demanded  the laying aside of  the spears, and the 
submission  of  the  dispute  to  arbitration.  The  parties 
acquiesced  in  the  demand,  and  the weapons  were  laid 
aside, and the court then became seised of  jurisdiction  by 
consent. 
$ 7. After plaintiff  had sworn to the property being his, 
the  defendant  stepped  forward.  He  might  admit  the 
property was the complainant's ; if  he did so, he fell under 
the law of  theft, and was at once sentenced as a thief. 
It will be noticed he did not admit theft, but, as he was 
found in possession of  stolen property and gave no explana- 
tion, his possession was  conclusive  proof  that he was  the 
thief. 
Instead  of  admitting  complainant  was  the  owner,  he 
might  do one  of  two things :  (a) assert  a counter-title  to 
the property, or, to use  the legal phraseology, advance an 
avouchment or raise a shield, under which he took his stand, 
and which absolved him from replying to the claim, or (b) he 
might simply assert his innocence, or as it is called, raise an 
avouchment of  innocence. 
The first-mentioned reply was the ordinary one employed. 
There was no denial of  theft, for there was no allegation of 
theft against him ; the defendant took his stand absolutely 
on the alleged  counter-title,  and if  the counter-title  failed 
him, the plaintiff  having sworn to his own title and to loss 
by theft, it followed, in the eyes of  the law, that the defendant 
was in dishonest possession and guilty of  theft. 
$8. There were three avouchments which the defendant 
could raise, the avouchment of  custody before loss (aclzadw 
gyn  coll),  the  avouchment  of  birth  and  rearing  (getzi  a 
meithri~z),  and the avouchment  of  a  warrantor  (arwaesaf), 
a term for which  the equivalent in early English Law was 
'  warranty ' or ' geteuma '. 
$ g.  The avouchment  of  birth  and rearing was  a state- 
ment  by  the  defendant,  sworn  to  by  himself,  that  the 
alleged  stolen  property,  if  an  animal  or  a  bird, was  the 
offspring of  a mother owned and possessed by him, born in 
his possession, reared by him, and not separated from him 
for three  nights  either  by  sale  or  gift,  that is,  that  the 
subject of  the case  had been  born  and bred  by him  and 
not transfkred by him. 
The reason for mentioning three nights is connected with 
the rule of  law requiring any one finding stray animals or 
lost property to report the fact in that period to the lord. 
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left his possession for three nights, he could not  raise this 
avouchment, but separation from property for three nights 
did not bar any one claiming property as a plaintiff. 
If  the animal had been caught wild and tamed, the oath 
was varied to assert catching and taming. 
This  avouchment  was  applicable  only  to living  things, 
and of  course was inapplicable to any property alleged by 
defendant  to have been  acquired by  him  by  purchase  or 
otherwise than by breeding. 
The defendant had to mention that he had protectors to 
support his title ; they had  to be  named,  and he  could 
not vary his list unless he had added, ' I  have enough  to 
know '. 
The raising  of  this avouchment gave the defendant  the 
right to lead protectors.  They were produced  on the next 
hearing, and, if they supported defendant, he was free from 
further responsibility ; if  they failed him, he fell under the 
charge of  theft. 
§ 10.  The avouchment of  custody before loss, which was 
applicable to all property, animate or inanimate, was a state- 
ment, similarly sworn to, that the property, alleged to have 
been stolen,  had been in defendant's possession anterior to the 
date  onwhich theclaimant stated that it  had been parted from 
him.  Hence the need there was for the claimant to mention 
the date on which he had been parted from his property. 
This avouchment shifted proof, and entitled the defendant 
to lead protectors ; the result of  the case, as in the previous 
avouchment, depending on whether they supported defen- 
dant or not. 
It must be noted here that, in one passage of  the Dimetian 
Code, doubt arises as to whether a successfully established 
avouchment liberated the defendant from the claim. 
This passage (which applies to the avouchment of  guests 
as well)  states that the avouchment  ' interposes  between 
the litigants and compurgators of  country '.  It proceeds : 
' No  complete answer, nor  complete exculpation, nor  com- 
plete defence is afforded thereby to such as may obtain them, 
only assistance, so that it may be  easier to credit him  under 
the shield that he shall get than without it.' 
D. C.  480. 
This  is  opposed  not  only  to numerous passages  in  the 
Anomalous  Laws, which  liken a successful avouchn~ent  to 
a judgement which liberates a defendant, but to the emphatic 
pronouncement  of  the Venedotian  Code :  ' It is not  right 
that  there  should  be  cornpurgation  after  detention  and 
swearing, only an "  arddelw " ', to the equally emphatic state- 
ment of  the Gwentian Code, ' That defends a person  from 
a charge of theft ', and to references, in the Dimetian Code 
itself, that a lawful  avouchment is produced  ' to clear the 
defendant of  theft '. 
The dubious passage in the Dimetian Code does not occur 
in all the MSS.  from which the tract has been reconstructed, 
though it does in  tllc majority, and inasmuch  as the pro- 
duction of  compurgators after the proof  of  an avouchment 
is  directly  opposed  to the  frequent  pronouncement  that 
' evidences  exclude  compurgation ', we  can  only  conclude 
that this passage is a late interpolation. 
5 11.  The third avouchment, that of  the warrantor, was 
applicable to all property, animate or inanimate. 
The avouchment consisted in the defendant asserting that 
the property had come into his hands from another person 
at such and such  a  time and  at such  and  such  a place. 
That  person  was  called  a  warrantor,  and  any  one,  irre- 
spective of status, not being  a priest or one whose  atten- 
dance could not be enforced  in  court, could be named as a 
warrantor. 
If a warrantor failed, it was impossible for the defendant 
afterwards  to  assert  another  person  was  his  warrantor. 
The mere naming of a person as a warrantor was, of  course, 
not sufficient.  The alleged warrantor was called ;  and either 
he had to admit or it had to be proved against him that he 
had  handed  over  the  property  to  the  defendant  acting 
bona  fide.  The warrantor took upon himself  the responsi- 
bility from the original defendant, and he was substituted 
in  the  proceedings  for  the  latter.  In the  words  of  the 
Dimetian Code : 
' He  is  to  answer  immediately  for  the  disputed property, 
abide by  the law, and do  that which  might be  adjudged  for 
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The plaintiff  again swore to the property in the hand of 
the warrantor, and the latter in his turn was  entitled to 
raise  any avouchment  the original  defendant  might  have 
raised. 
If  he raised the avouchment of a warrantor himself,  and  -  - 
thereby passed on the responsibility of  answering to a third 
person, he could do so, and any new warrantor could proceed 
in exactly the same manner. 
There was, however, this limit to the power of  passing on 
the avouchment of a warrantor.  The first defendant and the 
first warrantor were entitled to the same adjournments in 
which to  produce a warrantor as  parties were entitled to within 
which  to produce witnesses, but the second  warrantor, or 
third hand as he was called, could not set up a  third war- 
rantor, unless such were present  in the field of  judgement. 
Provided, however, there were warrantors in the field, the 
responsibility of  answering could be handed on indefinitely. 
One  passage  in  the  Anomalous  Laws  asserts  that  no 
warrantor  could  be  called  unless  he were  actually  in  the 
field of  judgement,  but this is in  direct  opposition  to the 
provisions of  the Codes. 
We can now understand why all bargains were conducted 
through suretyship securing title ; and why, in a proceeding 
for theft present, the complainant did not accuse the person 
in possession of  theft.  If  he did so, and the defendant set 
up a warrantor successfully, the complainant would be out 
of  court.  As he had definitely charged one man with theft, 
and that man had established bona-fide  acquisition  of  the 
property from a third, the complainant could not vary his 
charge and accuse that third person  of  theft. 
As the warrantor stepped into the shoes of  the defendant 
in  possession  and  accepted  responsibility  for  accounting 
how the property came into his own hands, we can appreciate 
the remark of  one of  the co~nmentators  : 
' A  wonder  that a person  does is becoming " arddelw " to 
another for theft, as to which he is unable to get an " arddelw " 
to take the thing also out of  his hand, and for which he may 
be hanged as a thief without thanks.' 
5  11. We have stated that a warrantor named  ' had to 
admit or it had to be proved against him that he had handed 
over the property to the defendant bona fide '. 
The fact that a man who refused  to accept responsibility 
could  be  proved  to be a warrantor is expressly mentioiled 
on two occasions, and that for an interesting reason. 
It will have been noticed that no suit of  theft present or 
claim  to recover  stolen  property  was  ever  supported  by 
eyewitnesses. 
Protectors could  be  produced,  informers  could  be  pro- 
duced, warrantors could be produced, but never eyewitnesses ; 
but these two passages say that eyewitnesses could be pro- 
duced to establish against an alleged warrantor that he had 
handed over the property to defendant ; and the provision 
is justified  on the ground that the original defendant was 
not charging theft against the warrantor, nor even alleging 
that the property was stolen.  I-Ie was merely establishing 
that he himself had acquired the property ' bona fide '. 
5 12.  What  was  the  effect  of  successfully  establishing 
the avouchment of  a warrantor ?  All authorities are agreed 
th~t  failure  to establish  this  avouchment, when  pleaded, 
re: u'+ed in the defendant falling ' under the law of  theft ', 
and all but one that the proof  of  the plea  resulted  in the 
immediate discharge of  the defendant. 
The one exception  is in  the Dimetian Code, and is con- 
nected with the passage already considered when dealing with 
the avouchments of  birth and rearing and custody before loss. 
The passage runs : 
' So calling a warrantor (the word used is the English word, 
"  warrant ", so pointing to the fact that the passage is a late 
addition) is  not  a complete answer  to  the person  who  shall 
call  him,  but  an  endeavour  to  obtain  some  one  who  may 
fully answer "fr him, and who may bear  the whole  for  him; 
and, on  that  account, whoever  shall obtain  a warrantor let 
them  both  stand together in  the law  in  the  court until  the 
whole suit shall be  determined by  a judgement  between  them 
and the plaintiff; for  it cannot be  known by any way before 
the conclusion  of  the judgement  whether one  of  them  be  in 
fault or  both of  them, or  whethcr either of  them be in  fault, 
and it cannot be  known  likewise whether the warrantor shall 
will  to effect  all for  himself  and  the  disputed property and 
for the defendant, or whether he  shall not  will; and neither 
1s  it known whether he be able or not able.' 
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No reliance can be placed on this passage, for the reasons 
already indicated, and because it is in direct opposition to 
all others. 
We have only to add in regard to this defence that, if 
the  person from whom the defendant alleged he had obtained 
the  property  bona  fide  were  dead,  the  defendant  was 
adjudged cornpurgation. 
5 13. The actual working of  this system may perhaps be 
illustrated by reference  to a  particular case, which  is for- 
tunately preserved to us in the surviving fragments of  the 
Ruthin Court Rolls. 
It appears that during the rising of  Madoc ap Llywelyn 
there was a  consiclerable amount of  cattle-lifting indulged 
in, and among the cattle so stolen was a black cow belonging 
to one William  the Shepherd, who was ltilled  at Cilcein. 
His widow  Leuke started proceedings  against  one  Wilynl 
ap Hywel, who was found in possession  of  the cow.  The 
extracts below relating to the three hearings in the case are 
quoted almost in full, as they show the system of  pleading 
in actual operation. 
First hearing : 
' Wilym ap Hywel was attached because he received  a cow 
of  black colour, which belonged to Wilym, the lord's shepherd. 
Being called  he was accused.  He vouches Wyn, his brother, 
to warranty.  The said Wyn appeared, and vouched a certain 
woman  named Alice  to warranty.  The said Alice  appeared 
and was interrogated.  She answers and says that the afore- 
said cow is her own, of  her own calving and upbringing.  And 
Leuke, wife  of the said Wilym,  asked, "  Who warrants  this 
day the aforesaid  cow ? "  The said Wyn  warranted  it and 
took  the cow  by the ear, and forasmuch  as Wilym  was  not 
present,  therefore  he  is  commanded  to  come  at  the  next 
Court  and  the said Wyn  finds  pledges  for  bringing  up  the 
said cow.' 
Second hearing : 
Wyn ap Hywel brought up a black cow, which was replevied 
at the last preceding  Court, and when in full court he came 
with the aforesaid  cow,  there appeared Leuke, late the wife 
of  Wilym  the  Shepherd,  and  accused  Wyn  concerning  the 
said cow, that it was her own on the same day when the said 
Wilym was  alive  and died  on Saturday, after the departure 
of  the lord  from  Dyffryn  Clwyd,  at Cilcein ;  and  the  said 
Wyn charges that he bought the said cow from English Alice, 
and  vouclled  her  to  warranty,  and  she warranted  it,  and 
immediately  he  releases  the  cow,  and  puts  himself  in  the 
lord's mercy.  The same Leuke by XI1 men sworn to credit, 
proved  the cow to be  her  own, and had it after oath made. 
Afterwards she made fine with Wilym ap I-Iywel.' 
Third hearing : 
' Wilym ap Hywel attached for receiving a cow  of  a black 
colour, which  Leuke widow  of  Wilym the Shepherd claimed 
to be her own proper  chattel, which was her husband's. . . . 
Afterwards he made satisfaction with A5.' 
$14.  We may pause here to consider  the provisions  in 
the early English Law of  a similar character. 
There are numerous fragmentary references to  the avouch-  - 
ment of  a warrantor in English Law. 
In the Laws of  Hlothaire and Edric (A. D. 673-86)  the 
7th clause runs : 
' If  one  man  steal property  froin  another and  the  owner 
afterwards lay claim to it, let him vouch to warranty at the 
King's hall if  he can, and let him bring hither the person who 
sold it him : if  he cannot do that, let him give it up, and let 
the owner take possession of  it ', 
while clause IG runs 
' If  (goods bought in Luildonwic) be afterwards claimed of 
a man  (vendee) in  Kent, let hinl vouch the man who sold it 
him to warranty ; if  he cannot do that (and this is important 
as corroborating  the view  that a person  accused could prove 
a denied warrantor), let  lliin  prove  at the altar with  one  of 
his  witnesses  or  with  the  King's  cvic-reeve  that he  bought 
the chattel openly in the wic . . . but if  he cannot prove that 
by lawful averment, let him give it up and let the owner take 
possession. ' 
In the Laws  of  Ine (AD.  688-725),  c. 75, we  have an 
almost parallel passage : 
If  a maR  attach stolen property and the person with whom 
it is attached then avouch another man to warranty ; if  then 
the man will not accept  it, and say he never  sold him  that, 
but sold  him  other, then must he  prove  who  vouches  it to 
that person  that he sold to him none other but that same.' 
The Ordinance  of  Greatanlea  (A. D.  924)  also mentions 
the defence, § 24 : 
' He who  buys property  with  witness and is after  obliged 
to vouch it to warranty, then let him receive  it from  whom 
before he had bought it.' In clause 4 of  Blfred and Guthrum's peace it is provided 
that every man must know his warrantor for men and for 
oxen and for horses,  and in the Treaty with the Wealhas 
Dunseatas, clause 8 provides that cattle stolen in one country 
and found in the territories of  the other country must be 
vouched to  warranty.  In  EthelredlsLaws  it  is provided that a 
'geteuma' can proceed only to the third hand, recalling the 
identical provision of  the Welsh Laws. 
In  the treaty Ethelred entered into with Olaf Tryggvysson 
(A. D. 993) the law is very clearly stated, cc. 8, 9  : 
' If  any one  attach that which  he  had lost, let  him  with 
whom he attaches it declare whence it came to him : let him 
deliver it back  and appoint  a "  borh " (surety) that he will 
produce his warrantor at the place where it is claimed. . . . 
Let him deliver it to the party who sold it to him, and desire 
that he clear if he can.  If  he accept, he then clears him with 
whom  it  was  first  attached.  Let  him  afterwards  declare 
whence it came to him.  If  an17  one accept and make no such 
further avowry, but will possess it, this may not be  refused, 
if  true witness make way for him to possession.' 
Cnut in 9  23 of  his  Ordinance  of  Winchester appears to 
have amended the procedure and provided : 
' Let  no  man  be  entitled  to  any  vouching  to  warranty 
unless he have true witness who saw and heard whence that 
came to him which is attached with him ', 
obviously  introducing  that  which  had  not  been  allowed 
before, viz. the production of  eyewitnesses to supplant the 
production of  a warrantor. 
A  further amendment was introduced by the Conqueror 
(Leges, c. ZI), which allowed proof  of  innocence by the pro- 
duction of  a warrantor or other title to possession  (he?~told- 
~OY~L)  with  witnesses;  but  if  a  warrantor  could  not be 
produced,  the  possessor  could  exculpate  himself  by 
compurgation, if  he had other proof  of  titlc. 
' Si  clamaverit  quis  vivum  averium  quasi  furto  sibi  sur- 
reptum  et  dederit  vadium,  et  invenerit  plegios  de  clamio 
prosequendo, oportet eum  qui rem in manu habet, warantun1 
suum producere, quod si non  potest, '  hemoldborh'  et testes 
producat.  Si  vero  warantum  produccre  non  potest,  nec 
' hemoldborh ', sed testes habet quod in rnercato regis emerit, 
et ' hemoldborh ' sed nec  warantum  nec  plegium, sit vivum 
vei mortuum, pcrdct rem  illam que calumpalatur, et simplicl 
juramento suo et testium suorum se purgabit.  Quod  si nec 
warantum  nec  plegium  nec  testes  invenerit  tunc,  praeter 
causam clamantis, were domino suo solvet.' 
The avouchment  of birth and rearing is also recognized 
in these Laws of  the Conqueror, for the passage proceeds : 
' Si autem probare poterit  per  tres partes visneti sui quod 
sit de nutritura sua, disrationabit.' 
Mention  is also  made of  the avouchment of  birth  and 
rearing in Athelstan's Ordinance of  Greatanlea, c. 9 : 
' He who attaches cattle, let five of  his neighbours be named 
to him, and of  them let him get one to swcar he takes the cattle 
by folc-right,  and he who  will  keep  it  to  him,  let  there  be 
named  ten  men,  and Ict  him  get  two of  them  and give  the 
oath that it was  born on his property.' 
Both the avouchments are mentioned in the Fragment on 
Oaths, cc. 2  and 3.  We there see the prosecutor swearing 
on the relics that cattle found with a suspected thief belonged 
to himself, and the defendant counter-swearing : 
' But as I  cattle have,  so  did  1 lawfully  obtain  it.  And 
as I vouch it to warranty, so did he sell it to me  into whose 
hand I now set it.  And  as I cattle have,  so did he sell  it to 
me  who had it to sell.  And  as I cattle have,  so did it come 
of  my own property, and so it by folcright my own possession 
is and my rearing.' 
As a last instance of  similarity we may refer to the English 
provisions where the alleged vendor, called  as a warrantor, 
was dead. 
The Dooms of  Ine, c. 53, provide that the dead man might 
be cited as a warrantor '  by vouching the tomb of  the dead 
to warranty ', a  mode of  swearing we have seen elnploycd 
in Wales in the case of  a dead surety also. 
The procedure was to swear on the tomb that the dead 
man had sold the property to the person in possession, and 
the  taking  of  such  oath  absolved  the  accused  from  all 
liability to punishment, though, provided  the complainant 
proved his ownership, the property went to the complainant. 
The Treaty between  Ethelred and Olaf  Tryggvason pro- 
vided that if  any one vouched his warranty to a dead man, 
the sons of  the dead man could clear his name ; but, if  the 
dead  had  no  sons,  then  the  defendant  could  prove  by 
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compurgated his memory.  In that case, because  ' denial ' 
was  always  stronger than ' affirmation ', the result  of  the 
exculpation of  the dead by the compurgation of  his friends 
was  to cause the charge  of  theft  to recoil  on  the person 
vouching the dead to warranty. 
An  exactly  similar  procedure  of  vouching  the dead  to 
warranty existed among the Germanic tribes.' 
The resemblances might be carried even a little further. 
As  in Wales, no unfree man could be vouched to warranty 
for a free man ;  Qvl~ere persons were vouched to warranty 
and resided  elsewhere,  an  adjournment  of  one  week  was 
allowed  for each  shire the accused had to travel to bring 
in  his  guarantor  (Treaty with  Olaf) ; and echoes  of  the 
limitation  of  the right  to call warrantors up to the third 
hand  occur in  the same Treaty, which  says that formerly 
the  law  had  been  that,  where  avouchlnent  took  place 
' thrice ', the warrantor had to be brought  to the locality 
where  the goods  were  seized,  but  not  beyond,  the  new 
regulation of  the Treaty being that all warrantors (whether 
of  the third hand or  beyond) were  to be  brought  to the 
venue of  seizure. 
5 15. Fragmentary  references  to the same system occur 
in the Scots Law, and numerous ones in the Germanic Law. 
To menti011 the latter would be endless, and it is here enough 
to draw attention to the Law of  Filfortis in the Lex Salica, 
Codex I, Tit. XXVIII, XLVII. 
$ 16.  We have consiclered hitherto the three avouch~nents 
which could be raised in defence in an action of  theft present. 
Was there any other line of  defence open to the defendant ? 
It is quite clear that tile three avouchments, though they 
cover most  of  the circumstances in which  the possessor of 
alleged stolen property could assert and establish that the 
property was not stolen, or, if  stolen originally, was in his 
possession bona fide, they do not cover a11 the circumstances. 
For example, it was quite possible for the clefendant to have 
acquired the property  bona  fide, on  the date on  which  it 
was alleged to have been stolen, by purchase from the corn- 
' See e. g. Jus Pro\..  Alarnman., CVII, s 2, and CVIII, §  3. 
Ine, c. 47. 
plainant,  who  dishonestly sought to regain it by an action 
of theft present. 
None  of the three avouchments mentioned would  be  of 
the slightest avail in such circumstances. 
The Laws are perhaps somewhat obscure as to what would 
happen  in  such a  case, but we  have indicated  that there 
was  a  further defence  open  which  is  termed  the avouch- 
ment of innocence.  It was not a true avouchment, but it 
was a defence which some authorities assert could be urged. 
But  before  we  consider  those  authorities  it  must  be 
pointed  out  that  the  law  was  so  framed  as to avoid,  if 
possible,  any action being  brought  at all which  could  not 
be met by one or other of  these avouchments. 
Transactions were almost universally  conducted through 
sureties,  contract-men,  or  by  ' briduw ',  and  this  fact 
ensured or tended to ensure a knowledge of  the real facts. 
In addition to this, a suit for theft present had to be opened 
with an oath that the complainant had not been separated 
from  his  property,  other  than  by  theft  or  surreption  or 
violence ; while, if  a claim failed, the complainant was him- 
self  subjected  to penalties.  This  combination  of  circum- 
stances would  at least reduce the chances of  false charges 
considerably. 
To return  to  the passages  in  which  the avouchment  of 
innocence is mentioned. 
The  Veiledotian  Code  says  very  clearly  that  if  stolen 
property  were  found  upon  a  person,  who  asserted  his 
innocence,  and that the property  was  left  in  his hand or 
forced on  him  against  his will  by  a  third person,  lie was 
entitled to raise that defence and claim compurgation, the 
Code adding that this was  the only case where compurgn- 
tion  was  adjudicated  after  detention  and  swearing.  In 
this  account  it  is  supported  by  the  XIVth  Book.  The 
procedure was identical with the defence of  ' denial '. 
The Vth Book allows a defendant to assert that his captor 
had palmed the stolen property on to him, but refers only 
to an oath, to be met by a counter-oath, as the procedure 
to be followed, adding that, if the defendant only said that 
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inent than his innocence, he was to be allowed compurgation. 
So  also  a  provision  in  the Xth Book,  which  says  that, 
where an alleged warrantor was dead or could not be found, 
the defendant  was  allowed  a  compurgation, points  to the 
conclusion  that  compurgation  could  be  claimed  in  theft 
present  wherever  one  of  the three avouchments could  not 
be raised appropriately. 
The avouchment of  innocence (gwirionyni) is twice men- 
tioned in the XIVth Book as one of  the avouchments which 
were consistent with denial, and which, if not supported by 
compurgation, was tantamount to a confession. 
The XIVth  Book  gives  utterance to quite inconsistent 
views.  In  one  passage  it  says,  in  most  unmistakable 
language, that in  a  charge of  theft  present  no  reply  was 
open  but  one  of  the  avouchments,  and  it  instances  an 
attempt to raise the defence that the goods in defendant's 
possession  were  left  with  him  by  complainant.  Such  a 
defence is stated to be quite inadmissible; and the author 
is  led  to  the conclusion  from  his  premises  that  in  such 
a  case  the defendant, though  in  fact innocent, must pay 
the penalty of  theft. 
Elsewhere, however, the author revolts from  this logical 
conclusion,  and,  besides  mentioning  the  avouchment  of 
innocence, allows  a  warrantor  (and there is  no  reason  to 
suppose a warrantor had  more extensive rights of  defence 
than the original  defendant)  to raise  in defence  that the 
alleged  stolen  property was  left  with  him,  or  exchanged 
with him, or pledged to him, or legally impounded by him, 
if  it were an animal. 
After  discussing  avouchment  it  also  has  a  separate 
chapter ' on  other  legal  defences ', which  it says are not 
avouchments,  but  may  nevertheless  be  proved  by  eye- 
witnesses, and enumerates ' permission  to move the thing, 
gift of  the property by the plaintiff and pledge ', and in yet 
another passage, dealing with surreption absent, it asserts 
that defendant could prove that the property in dispute had 
been  removed by him with plaintiff's  consent, or had been 
given him as a full gift.  Similar is the case in connexion with 
charges of  surreption and violence in the VIIth Book. 
The passage in the XIVth Book re,.,drs  it perhaps unsafe 
to assert definitely that, in a case of  theft  present, it was 
a  well  established  rule that a  defence, other than that of 
the three  avouchments,  could  be  raised;  but  the  other 
authorities mentioned  appear  to prove  that  the practice 
grew up of permitting other defences, which  were disposed 
of either after  hearing eyewitnesses or by adjudicating com- 
purgation. 
5 17.  We have now to consider three peculiar cases, in two 
of  which,  though  the  stolen  property  was  present,  the 
~rocedure  adopted was that applicable to theft absent, and 
the third where  the whole  property  was  not  present,  but 
action was taken as if  it were. 
The cases all involve the question of  identification of  the 
property, which as we have seen by the provision of  ' dam- 
dwng ', or swearing  to the property, was an essential part 
of  an action for theft present. 
The  first  case  relates  to meal,  bees,  honey,  and  flesh 
separated from the skin.  None of  these could be identified 
by the owner, unless they happened to be in a vessel which 
the owner could swear to as his.  The owner, though con- 
vinced  that  the property  was  his,  was  debarred  from  a 
' damdwng ', and so the action of  theft present was closed 
to him.  He must take action for theft absent, that is, there 
must  be  a  prosecution  or ' gyrr ',  the result  of  the case 
being left to compurgation. 
The second  case  was  where  property  was  stolen  from 
a blind man.  Though the property was recovered, the man, 
being blind, could not swear to its being his, as identifica- 
tion in law could only be by sight.  Nor could a blind man 
appraise the value of  his goods, an essential to be observed 
when  the question  of  punishment  arose  in  theft  present. 
Hence he, too, must proceed by an action of  theft absent. 
Tlle third case was where part only of  what was termed 
'  inseparable property ' was  discovered  and part not.  The 
ordinary rule of  law was that, where a portion of  separable 
property was discovered out of  a quantity stolen, the owner 
could only proceed to  claim recovery of  the portion discovered, 
and not  the value of  that not discovered ; for instance, if two cows were stolen  at the same time and only one were 
found with  the suspected  thief,  the owner  could  proceed 
against him, in an action to recover, only for the one found 
with him.  He might prosecute for theft absent in respect 
of  the other, if  he liked, but he could not bring an action 
of  theft present for it. 
This rule was, by some authorities, applied also to a case 
where  a  portion  only  of  inseparable property  was  found, 
but others allowed an action for the whole 011  the strength 
of  the portion found. 
Inseparable property is not defined,  but it implied  pro- 
perty which  could  not  be  divided  without  destroying  its 
original integral character. 
The standard illustration is that of  an animal, the carcass 
of  which  was  separated from  the skin.  Now  the carcass 
was  unidentifiable,  but the skin was  identifiable.  If  only 
the  carcass  were  found  with  a  suspected  thief,  an action 
for theft absent was appropriate, but if  the skin were found, 
then an action of  theft present was available in respect not 
merely of  the skin, but of  the whole animal sto1en.l 
(ii) Pleadings in a suit of  ' theft absent '. 
$ I.  An  action  for  ' theft  absent ' is  alillost  invariably 
styled ' gyrr ', a prosecution, a term which is never appiied 
to an action for theft present.  Its characteristic was sub- 
mission for decision to compurgators. 
The action was commenced with a plaint (gwyn),  a moclcl 
form of  which is given in the XIIth Book. 
$2. The plaint  was  not  supported by what  the Welsh 
Laws  call  ' evidences '-protectors  and  eyewitnesses-but 
by what we would  nevertheless call ' evidence ' in modern 
law.  In order to avoid confusion, this proof  will be called 
hereafter '  supporting facts '. 
These '  supporting facts ' are referred to in different parts 
of  the laws, and the procedure varied according to the ' sup- 
porting fact ' relied upon. 
V. C. 138, 246, 248, 250,  252 ; D. C. 430,438, 448, 462, 480, 482, 492, 
602, 610, 612 ; G  C  702,774,786,788 ; V  Go, 62, 64, 78, 80, 84 ; VI. 100, 
102, 106,  124; VII. 156; IX.  212, 214, 216, 230,  264,  296,  298; X. 340, 
392, 398; XIV. 568, 570.  572, 574, 600, 616, 622. 632, 634. G38, 640,  642, 
644, 648, Gjo, Gjz, 6j4, 662, 670, b74 674, 684, 700, 7U2,  722,  724, 726. 
5 3.  The first to note is where, before proceeding to court, 
the  complainant  had  asked  the  defendant  to take  the 
absolver's  oath, and defendant had refused  to do so.  The 
challenge to such an oath, as we have seen, was a survival 
from the pre-curial period, and refusal to take the oath fixed 
the person challenged with liability to compensate the loser 
for the lost property. 
In the Curial period refusal to take  an  absolver's  oath 
became  a  ' supporting fact ', which  the loser  of  property 
could rely on in support of  his complaint. 
The loser of  property could complain (a) that the suspect 
had refused  the absolver's  oath, or  (b)  that he had refused 
such oath, and was, therefore, guilty of  theft absent. 
If  the  first  course  were  adopted,  the  defendant's  sole 
available  reply  was  a denial of  the refusal.  If  he  denied 
the refusal, some acthorities say that the complainant could 
establish it by eyewitnesses, others that the defendant was 
adjudged twelve compurgators to compurgate himself  from 
the alleged  refusal.  In either  case,  if  the defence  failed, 
the defendant was punished, not as a thief, but as one who 
had refused  the absolver's oath. 
If  the second course were adopted, the ' supporting fact ' 
was provable  by eyewitnesses,  and defendant must  either 
admit  or  deny  the  alleged  theft.  If  he  denied  it, com- 
purgation was adjudged upon him, and if  the compurgators 
supported him, he was  acquitted ; but if  they did not, he 
was punished  for theft absent, and not for refusal to take 
the oath. 
$ 4.  The second ' supporting fact ', on which  a prosecu- 
tion  could  be  based,  was  the tongue-man  statement of  a 
fellow thief  about to be executed. 
Where this supporting fact existed, all that it was neces- 
sary  to  prove  was  the  statement.  No  other  proof  was 
needed,  and  no  compurgation  could  be  adjudged.  The 
statement was conclusive of  accused's guilt of  theft absent. 
$5. The  third  supporting  fact  was  where  there  was 
' dognfanag ', or ' competent  information ', to which  full 
reference has been made already.' 
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In this  case  the lord  prosecuted  on  the  statement  of 
' dognfanag '. 
Nearly  all  the  authorities  assert  that  in ' dognfanag ' 
proceedings  no defence was open to accused :  he was con- 
victed  and  sentenced  for  theft  absent.  The  Venedotian 
Code, however, says that the practice in Gwynedd and the 
view of  many authorities was that accused was entitled to 
deny the charge, just  as if  there were '  gyrr '-  by the owner, 
and that compurgation was to be adjudged. 
fj 6.  The next supporting fact is the most  important of 
all, the supporting fact of  ' lliw ' or ' light ', the procedure 
in which applied generally to other cases of  theft absent. 
In this case  the complainant  came  into court  accusing 
a  particular  person  of  theft,  alleging  either  that he  and 
another man or another man alone, whose veracity he would 
support, would swear to a ' lliw '. 
A  ' lliw ' consisted  of  a  statement, sworn on the relics, 
that the accused had been seen, by the person swearing, in 
broad daylight with the stolen property, when the sun was 
high on hill and dale, passing through a stated ' tref '.  The 
deponent swore he was speaking not for hatred, nor enmity, 
nor reward, nor worth, but for the sake of  truth only. 
No married woman could swear a '  lliw '. 
In the early English Laws (Fragment on Oaths, c. 4) we 
have a precisely identical oath, the owner of  lost property 
swearing '  that he charges not through hatred or  envy or 
unlawful  lust of  gain, that he has  no personal  knowledge 
but what the informer  told him, and that he believes  the 
informer ', and there can be no doubt that the English Law 
of  the time had a similar procedure. 
When  the  court  was  assembled,  the  prosecutor  swore 
three times  on  the relics  produced  by himself, exactly  as 
in early English Law, naming the person on whom he charged 
the theft, describing the thing stolen, the quantity of  matter 
stolen, the ' lliw ' on which he relied, and the time of  the theft. 
The accused formally  denied  thc charge,  and stated he 
would  also deny the informer.  If  there were  a mere  oral 
assertion  of  theft  unsupported  by oath, it was  sufficiently 
answered by the accused's oath. 
The informer was then produced to swear to the ' lliw '. 
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If he declined to do so, after having once asserted a ' lliw ', 
he himself  was proceeded  against  for  theft.  It is  said  in 
the Xth Book, but in it alone, that the informer might be 
objected to as an eyewitness might be. 
After  swearing  to  the  '  lliw ',  the  complainant  swore 
supporting  the  informer's  veracity,  such  oath  operating 
as the swearing of  the charge.  Unless  the ' lliw ' were  so 
supported, it was adequately met by accused's sole oath. 
The accused  was  then  called  on  to answer  the charge. 
If  he admitted, that ended the case, except for sentence.  If 
he were prepared to deny, he took the complainant's state- 
ment, word  by word,  denying it also  three times.  If  he 
failed in denying any part of  it, he was cast. 
That  concluded  the  pleadings  in  case  of  denial.  The 
truth or falsity of  the charge was submitted to compurgators, 
varying in quantity according to the nature of  the property 
stolen.  The decision  of  the compurgators was  conclusive, 
and no  matter what  support was  afforded  by the ' lliw ', 
the charge was overridden by compurgation. 
The XIVth Book, however, asserts that a '  reputed ' or 
notorious  thief  could  claim  no  compurgation  when  pro- 
ceeded against by ' lliw '. 
Instead, however, of  acknowledging or denying the charge 
and thereby claiming compurgation, the accused could rest 
his defence on a particular avouchment, the avouchment of 
custody of  guests. 
This avouchment was an alibi, but an alibi of  a special 
kind.  It is not mentioned in the Venedotian Code, but it 
is in every other part of  the Laws. 
After complainant had stated that his property had been 
stolen  at such  and such  a  time,  if  the time  stated were 
night, but not otherwise, the accused could  reply  that he 
was in a position to prove that, at that particular  time, he 
was in the house of  another person as a guest.  The avouch- 
ment went to the root of  the case, and the proof  was shifted 
from the charge to the defence.  The accused was, there- 
upon, entitled to produce as his protectors the host in whose 
house he had passed the night along with two other members 
of the household. 
These protectors took oath that on the night in question, from the time when the cattle had been tied up for the night 
until the morning, the accused had been in the house with 
them, and, as proof  that he had never left the house in the 
interval, the host  swore that he had passed his hand over 
the accused three times during the night.  The oath so taken 
was  conclusive of  accused's innocence :  if  the oath failed, 
the accused was convicted without further proceedings. 
$7. The next case in which colnplainant asserted a ' sup- 
porting  fact ' is mentioned  in  the Dimetian Code and the 
XIVth Boob.  We have already noted that a person who 
lost property was entitled to search for it wherever he willed, 
and if  he were obstructed in doing so, he could go into court 
and charge the obstructor  with ' theft absent ', using  the  , 
fact of  obstruction as a ' supporting fact '.  The procedure 
thereafter  was,  ' mutatis  mutandis ', identical  with  that 
applicable to a charge based on ' lliw '. 
$8. The question arises as to whether it was possible to 
institute a charge of  theft  absent without  one or other of 
these  ' supporting  facts ' being  alleged.  The  question  is 
not free from difficulty. 
All that the Venedotian Code says is that there could be 
no  compurgation  except  where  the owner  swore that  the 
accused  had really  stolen  the property ; while the XIVth 
Book states that compurgation was demanded where theft 
was '  imputed ', where there had been obstruction to search, 
or where  there was ' lliw '.  ' Imputation ' is not defined, 
nor is it said that a '  supporting fact ' was necessary or not 
to the ' imputation '. 
The Dimetian  Code,  however,  is  esplicit.  It demands 
compurgation  where  a  man  refused  the  absolver's  oath, 
where  there  was  obstruction  or  ' lliw ',  and  states  that 
no  one  is to produce  compurgators  for tlieft without  one 
of  these ' supporting facts ' against him.  The absence  of 
any  explicit  procedure  where  no  ' supporting  fact'  was 
relied  upon  supports  the view  that  it  was  essential  for 
a ' supporting fact ' to be asserted.' 
V  C  110, 242, 246 ; D. C. 400, 402. 418, 424, 438, 463, 480,  j94, 610; 
G.  C. 744, 786 ; VI. 100,  I 10; VII 154  et seq  ; IX 214,216, 224,226,232, 
256, 296, 298 ; X. 310, 312, 388 ; XI. 436; XII.  466; XIV. 574, 576,  Goo, 
618,620,632, 648, 654, 664,666, 676, 680, 682, 684, 686, 692, 708,718. 
(iii) Pleadings in  a surreption suit. 
$ I.  The procedure applicable to trials for surreption was 
identical to that applicable to trials for theft. 
There was the same division into surreption present and 
surreption absent.  The same procedure as to ' detention ' 
existed, and in both cases a plaint was requisite. 
$2. If  the charge were one of  surreption present, no direct 
charge of  surreption was brought against the man in posses- 
sion ; the suit took  the form of  an action  to recover pro- 
perty  taken  surreptitiously ; but  if  it were  an action for 
surreption absent, a direct charge with the time of  offence 
stated was made. 
$ 3.  If  the property  were  present,  there  was  the same 
'  damdwng ', and the defendant could reply by raising the 
same  avouchments,  and  prove  his  avouchments  by  pro- 
tectors. 
He could also assert as an avouchment that the property 
had come to him  with  the plaintiff's  consent,  and, if  the 
plaintiff  denied this, the defendant led eyewitnesses.  Plain- 
tiff,  however, might  assert  that defendant had cited  him 
as a  warrantor,  and  therefore  he  must  rely  on  plaintiff's 
statement, and not produce eyewitnesses ; but the law pro- 
vided  that  if  the  defendant  did  not  expressly  cite  the 
plaintiff  as a  formal  warrantor,  he was  entitled  to prove 
plaintiff's consent to the removal by eyewitnesses. 
S 4.  If  the property  were  absent,  the defendant  could 
acknowledge,  deny,  or  raise  an  avouchment.  The  pro- 
cedure on denial was the same as in theft, viz. submission 
to compurgation.  The avouchment indicated was an asser- 
tion by the defendant that he had restored  the property 
and had  settled  w~th  plaintiff  thereby,  and, if  this  were 
denied, the defendant led eyewitnesses to prove restoration. 
The plaintiff  might  attempt to raise  a  counter-avouch- 
ment, and assert that, though he had received  some of  the 
property back, he had not received  all of  it, or else that he 
had  received  it back  on  account  of  some  other  due.  If 
defendant merely denied this, plaintiff  led eyewitnesses ; but 
if  he  urged  that the restoration  being  admitted,  even  in 
Part,  there  was  a  settlement  of  claim  established,  the 
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objection was valid,  and plaintiff  must sue separately on 
another cause of  action. 
We see, therefore, that the procedure was identical with 
that in theft.' 
(iv) Pleadings in a suit of  violence. 
Trials for violence were also conducted on the same lines. 
There  was  seizure  of  property,  if  possible,  plaint  in  the 
form to recover property if  it were present, and in the form of 
a direct accusation of  violence if  it were not. 
If  the property were present, there was the same '  dam- 
dwng ', and the same denial or avouchment, to be established 
in exactly the same way.  If  it were absent, there was the 
same denial  and  submission  to compurgation, or avouch- 
ment of  restoration  with  eyewitnesses  to prove,  and the 
same counter-avouchment  of  part  restoration  only,  as in 
surreption, similarly countered.' 
(v) Pleadings in cases of  insult. 
$ I. A  trial for insult was of  the nature of  a civil suit- 
to recover the honour-price  due.  Model  plaints are given 
in the VIIIth and XIIth Books. 
$ 2.  The plaintiff  opened proceedings, when parties were 
assembled in court, by giving details of  thc assault, offering 
to establish the charge, if  doubted, as he  hacl  enough to 
know.  Defendant could admit or deny : no other defence 
was open. 
The plaintiff  alleged  on oath that he had suffered insult 
or  disgrace,  assault  or attack, and blood  and wound,  the 
disgrace being to himself, his lord, and kinsmen. 
Denial  had to be word  by word, and on oath, and the 
question  was  submitted  to  compurgation.  If  the  guilt 
were  established,  the honour-price  had to be  paid  and  a 
'  dirwy ' to the lord.3 
(vi) Pleadings in homicide cases. 
$ I.  Little is said anywhere on this subject.  A  model 
plaint is given in the XIIth Book, and there appears to have 
been the usual procedure of  oath, counter-oath, and a further 
' D. C. 480; VII. 154 et seq ,  IX. 23%.  XIV. 600, 642, 724 
D. C. 4G4;  C  C. 764; VII. 132, VIII. 208, IX. 230,  232.  238,  XIV. 
600, 640, 670, 724. 
V. C  238 ; D. C. 594, 598; VIII. 190, 208, XII. 474.  XIV. 578. 
counter-oath.  Evidences were not called, and the question 
was submitted to compurgation. 
The claim  was  in the nature  of  a  suit  to recover  com- 
pensation, and it had to be admitted or denied, ' there being 
no law for murder but denying galanas '. 
$2. We  must  not  omit  to notice,  however,  the very 
drastic provision where a man refused to plead to a charge 
of homicide. 
In all cases where  a  man declined  to plead,  judgement 
was given against him ; but in homicide cases, if  an abso- 
lutely innocent  man  stood on his  innocence  and declined 
to plead, he could be slain with impunity, and his kinsmen 
could claim no blood-fine for him, for they could not deny 
that  which  the dead  man  had  not  troubled  to deny  in 
his life.' 
(vii) Pleadings in a trial for breach of  cross. 
S I.  The  case  where  an  allegation  was  made  that  an 
interdict  by  way  of  cross  had  been  broken  is  of  great 
interest, but unfortunately the references  to the suit  are 
few and brief. 
It is of  interest because it is the only  case where  both 
modes of  decision are said to have becil applicable. 
$2. A cross to be effective had ordinarily to be planted 
in  the presence  of  witnesses,  and  if  a  suit  were  brought 
alleging a breach,  the allegation  was sworn to three times 
by the complainant.  Then, if  the interdict had been placed 
in  the presence of  witnesses, it is stated that the fact was 
proved by eyewitnesses, and breach  of  the interdict could 
not be denied, except by lawful objection to the eyewitnesses 
or by the urging of an avouchment. 
The  particular  avouchment  mentioned  is  an  allegation 
that it had been obeyed, or complained against, or contested 
by suit. 
If, however,  the interdict  could  not  be proved  by eye- 
witnesses,  the oath of  the complainant  could  be  nle by 
a counter-oath of  the defendant, and thereupon tliree com- 
Purgators, the defendant himself, one of  his father-kin, and 
One  of his mother-kin, were adjudicated upon him. 
'  D. C.  412, 598; G  C.  776 ; XII. 466, XIV. 602, 624. 
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3 3  It must  be  stated  that  proof  by  eyewitnesses,  as 
a possible procedure, is mentioned by one authority only ; 
and  the  other  two  authorities, which  refer  to the trial, 
simply state the question of  fact was left to compurgation. 
The employment  of  alternative  procedures  must, there- 
fore, be accepted with doubt, especially in view of  the fact 
that such a course was against the strict rule of  law.' 
(viii) Pleadings in other cases of  tort or crime. 
§ I.  Pleadings or procedure in  other cases are nowhere 
described in detail. 
We are simply told that a case of  arson, when prosecuted 
as a  crime, was  tried  as ' theft  absent ', with  submission 
to compurgation  and  without  power  to raise  an avouch- 
ment ;  that  cases  of  treason,  rape,  accessaries,  fighting, 
public attack, removal of  boundary marks, unlawful build- 
ing  or  ploughing  on  another's  land,  encroachment  on 
waste, stealthy slaying of  cattle, and removal  of  carcases 
belonging to others, were  likewise  all submitted on  denial 
to compurgation. 
3 2.  It is not necessary to give all the numerous references, 
which, without exception, show that the sole procedure in 
other  cases  of  a  criminal or tortuous  nature was  an oath 
by complainant alleging the offence, met by a counter-oath 
denying,  and  followed  by  submission  to  conipurgators, 
varying  according  to the gravity of  the offence  charged, 
the finding of  the compurgators being con~lusive.~ 
(ix) General. 
$ i. A consideration of  the Welsh actions for theft present 
and civil  suits, not  sued on  the formalities  of  a  contract, 
show that they were  actions simply and solely  to recover 
movables. 
An  action  for  theft  or surreption  present  was  a  suit to 
recover property, possession of  which had been lost against 
will,  an  action  on  ' benffyg ',  &c.,  to  recover  property 
possession of  which had been parted with voluntarily. 
In the former case plaintiff could sue to recover the object 
' VIII. 254, x.  305,  XIV. 712. 
'  V  C.  240  ;  D  C  398;  V.  72,  VIII. 208,  210,  IX. 262,  328,  X.  390, 
XIV.  578, 602,  624. 
from the hands of any person in whose possession he found 
it ; in the latter he could only sue the person to whom he 
had himself delivered possession. 
9 2.  In this  the Welsh  Law  was  identical  with  other 
systems.  The  Roman  Law  provided  that  ' Mobilia  non 
habent  sequilam ' ; the  Norman  French, ' Biens  meubles 
n'ont point de suite ' ; the Germanic, ' Hand wahre Hand '. 
A man could only seek his trust where he had left it. 
As  we  have already  seen,  the rule  caused  considerable 
difficulty where a deposit  had been  stolen from the bailee, 
and the commentators were  left  in  a  state of  uncertainty 
as to whether the owner or bailee must sue. 
fj  3.  Now  the Germanic system was  to all intents and 
purposes identical, but it would involve too much space to 
give all the references contained in those laws. 
The Germanic system recognized  two  forms of  trial to 
recover  movables;  one  to  recover  property  parted  with 
voluntarily, the other to recover property lost involuntarily. 
In the former  case  the plaintiff  sued,  not  on  the basis 
of  any transaction,  but  on  the simple assertion  that the 
property was his, and that he was entitled to recover. 
The defendant, if  he admitted the property was plaintiff's, 
but alleged he himself was no longer in possession, was entitled 
to swear on his own oath that the object had perished, or been 
stolen, or otherwise  removed  from  his  possession  against 
his will, and such oath cleared him from the claim. 
If, however, he were in possession, he must either give up 
the property on plaintiff's  oath or establish his own owner- 
ship, by putting  forward  and  proving  a  counter-title  of 
original acquisition, or inheritance, or producing a warranty 
who would  say that he and not plaintiff  had delivered the 
property to defendant. 
There  were,  as  in  Welsh  Law,  two  assertions :  ' the 
property is mine ', and ' it was lost against my will '. 
Where the property was  present,  the trial started with 
a formal seizure and an oath of  plaintiff. 
Defendant could reply by admission or denial or advanc- 
ing '  esceptiones '.  If  there were admission, defendant paid 
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proof that the property was his, and if  he succeeded, defec- 
dant was convicted. 
If  he  alleged  ' exceptiones ', the privilege  of  proof  was 
defendant's,  and  the '  esceptiones ' permitted  correspond 
with the ' arddelw ' of Wales, viz. an allegation of  purchase, 
an allegation of  birth and rearing, or an allegation of  custody 
hefore loss (which proved not that plaintiff had no title, but 
that defendant 11x1 not removed the goods from plaintiff's 
possession), and an allegation of  warranty or ' arwaesaf '. 
The system among the Germanic tribes was, therefore, in 
all main essentials the same as in Wales. 
JUDGEMENT  AND EXECUTION 
§ I.  IN  early law the real judgement  was that which we 
would  now  call the fixing  of  issues.  When pleadings had 
been  completecl  the judges  determined  what  the facts in 
issue  were,  and what proof  was appropriate  to determine 
such issue. 
That was the judgement, given before proof.  The giving 
of  proof  was  a  proceeding  following  upon  judgement  as 
a preliminary to executing it, and was not followed by any 
other judicial function. 
By the time the Welsh Laws were redacted this stage had 
been  passed,  and  that  was  the judgement  which  was  a 
determination  of  the case  after  the necessary  proof  had 
been given. 
§ 2.  We  have  seen  that  the determination  of  facts  in 
issue was arrived at in some cases by compurgation, and in 
other cases by a more or less mechanical rule of  weighing 
evidence,  whic!l  provided  that the statement of  witnesses 
rnust  be accepted, if  they were  of  status to give evidence 
and withstood all legal objections. 
The functions of  a judge  were  (a) to determine whether 
the privilege of  witnesses had been established according to 
customary procedure,  (b) to determine, where  the question 
of  equality  or  superiority  of  witnesses  was  a  matter  of 
import, which  set of  witnesses was, according  to the rigid 
rules of  law, superior, and which  inferior, and (c) after the 
determination of  the facts, to apply  thereto the law  pre- 
scribed as applicable to that particular set of  facts. 
The judge  did not in any sense of  the term, as we now 
understand  it, ' weigh ' the evidence ;  in  fact, there was 
no  room  for  that, for  no person  could  produce  negative 
evidence  to disprove  a  fact  affirmatively  established  by 
evidence produced according to the requirements of  the law. 
5 3.  In cases where there was compurgation, there were, as we  have seen, no ' evidences ' in the Welsh  conceptioil 
of  the term :  the compurgators gave their verdict  on the 
information  and  the oaths of  parties,  using  at the same 
time their local knowledge and knowledge of  the parties. 
This original practice continued unaltered in North Wales, 
where the strict demarcation between  the functions of  the 
judge  and the functions of  the conlpurgators or evidences 
remained  unimpaired.  In  South  Wales,  however,  where 
compurgators of  country took the place of  compurgators of 
kin, and where the compurgation of  country, as time went 
on, was  sworn by the landowners who formed  the bench, 
a bridge was created whereby, without any violence  to the 
older  conception, the deterlninatioll  of  a  question  of  fact 
became a function of  the Court, at least where compurgation 
was the appropriate form.  The bench and the compurgators 
became one and the same. 
$4. To ensure that judges  were cognizant of  the facts to 
which  they had to apply the law, and that they did apply 
the law correctly to the facts, a definite and strict procedure 
was provided in the laws. 
When all the evidence in a case had been completed, the 
men of  the Court summed up.  The presiding judge, in sum- 
ming up, had to be most careful, and his summing up could 
be challenged for certain definite reasons by parties. 
If  a party did object, he was entitled to demand a copy 
of  the record, if  such existed, and that record was conclusive 
proof  of  any fact urged in objection by the party ; if  none 
existed, the party objecting could prove his contention by 
the swearing of  attestators. 
The summing up could be objected to on the ground that 
the judge  had strayed from the point by omitting a point 
in issue, or by introducing a point which  was not in issue, 
and should a judge  commit an error in  this particular, he 
was liable to be fined  a ' cainlwrw ', and his  summing up 
had to be rectified. 
If a  fact supported by testimony were  omitted  in  the 
summing up, the party who had proffered  proof  of  it could 
draw attention to the omission.  If  the judge  said he had 
not heard it (and herein we can see the importance of  pro- 
ducing attestators to certify during proceedings), the party 
could put him to the relics ; and, if  tile judge  maintained, 
on the relics, that he had not heard the testimony, that fact 
could not be used, inasmuch as it was essential that every 
fact  deposed  to should  have  been  in  the hearing  of  the 
judge.  If, however,  there were  more than one judge  and 
' gwrdas ' in the field, and one judge and the ' gwrdas ' had 
heard the testimony, the fact proved had to be considered. 
5 5.  Having summed up, the judges withdrew to consider 
their judgement,  and any person  coming to listen to their 
deliberations without permissioll was fined three or six kine, 
according as to whether the lord was absent from or present 
in the field.  Where there was a bench of  judges  and there 
was  disagreement among them on  any point in  the judge- 
ment,  the  opinion  of  a  two-thirds  majority  prevailed, 
though  the same  authority  indicates  that  there  must  be 
unanimity. 
§ 6.  In arriving  at the judge~nent  applicable,  previous 
written  decisions  could  be  relied  upon  and arialogous  pre- 
cedents  followed,  and much  i~nportance  was  attached  to 
the rule of  ' stare decisis '. 
'  For similar cases, similar decisions  are  required,'  says 
the Dimetian Code, that being one of  the maxims of  Hywel 
Dda's Law, and if  a  judge  gave a judgement  contrary to 
one previously given by him in a similar case, he was fined. 
Written law, that is the opinions  of  jurisconsults  as in 
Rome, must be followed until abrogated by superior decision, 
and if  there were two written opinions regarding the same 
matter, contradictory  of  each  other,  then  and  then  only 
was the judge to apply that which seemed most reasonable. 
9 7.  Having  considered  their  judgement,  the  judges 
returned to the field, taking security again from both sides 
to abide by the judgement  and for payment of  their fees. 
In delivering  judgement,  the judge  again  recapitulated 
the claim and the answer thereto, the facts and pleadings 
in the suit, and then pronounced judgement,  explaining  it 
to the parties. 
§ 8.  A judgement  once delivered could not be altered by 
the judge delivering it.  He was prohibited from '  remembering 410  JUDGEMENT  AND  EXECUTION  PART IX 
his law after judgement ', and the  judgement  could  only 
be amended after a challenge by way of  '  mutual pledge '. 
§ 9.  Every judgement,  in order to be binding, had to be 
delivered in the presence of  parties, and in the hearing of 
the lord.  This rule applied  just  as much to a case where 
a party wilfully absented himself as to a case where absence 
was due to other causes, but there was this distinction that, 
whereas the former could only be reopened if  the defendant 
appeared within a year and a day and submitted himself to 
law, the latter  was  altogether  inoperative, and  could  be 
ignored. 
§ 10.  A  judgement  delivered  ' in  praesentia ' was  con- 
clusive, unless  it were challenged  by mutual pledge,  when 
it became dubious (anznieu)  until the appeal were disposed of. 
The  principle  applied  to criminal  cases  as well  as  to 
civil, so that if  a man were found guilty ' in absentia ', and 
he  appeared  in  Court  before  sentence  was  pronounced, 
submitting himself  to law, the Court  was  bound  to hear 
him ;  and, if  it refused,  the accused  was  freed  from  the 
charge, and the presiding officer became liable to a fine. 
So also where a plaintiff  had absented himself, he could, 
at any time before judgement  (subject to the fine for con- 
tempt), come into Court and submit himself to law.  If  he 
did that, there could be no ex-parte judgement. 
$  XI.  Judges  were  exhorted  to adjudicate immediately, 
but it would  seem that it was  not incumbent  on them to 
deliver judgement  on the day for ' loss and gain '.  We are 
told that ' failure of  the judge  to recollect  his judgement ' 
would  delay  the day for  loss  and gain.  This  appears  to 
imply that a judge had time to consider judgement,  but he 
could not get time, if  parties objected, unless he swore on 
the relics  that he  did  not  recollect, i.e. that he was  not 
clear on his law. 
If  he did so swear, he was allowed a period of  nine days 
in  which  to confer  with  men  of  larger  experience  than 
himself, and on the ninth day he pronounced judgement  in 
the presence of  parties.  During the period of  delay, and in 
fact  throughout  a  suit, the defendant  held  possession  of 
property in suit, and, if  plaintiff  contumaciously  absented 
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himself when judgement  was pronounced, defendant was to 
retain any land in dispute. 
If, on the adjourned hearing, the judge  were  unable to 
arrive at a decision, he was fined 180  pence, and deprived 
of  his  office,  and  the  case  was  heard  ' de  novo ' before 
another judge. 
The Dimetian Code allowed him fifteen  days, if  he were 
an official judge, and if  he then failed to deliver judgement, 
he was dismissed  from office, while judges  by privilege  of 
iand were allowed three adjournments, after which they were 
to be detained in custody until they delivered judgement. 
$12.  A judgement  once passed ' in praesentia ', after full 
hearing and not challenged, operated as ' res judicata '  to bar 
all subsequent claims, and any one  not  abiding by a final 
judgement was liable to confiscation of  all his property. 
We have to add that a  compromise  entered into before 
judgement  operated as '  res judicata ', that where there was 
a definite legal  penalty attached to a  judgement,  it could 
not be averted by the payment of  compensation, and that 
no judgement  could be given for more than that which had 
been claimed.' 
$ 13. The Codes have little to say about the execution of 
judgement. 
The only  direct  provisions  are that execution  must  be 
taken  out within  a  year  and a  day of  judgement,  failing 
which  there became  an ' intervention of  country ', that is 
the decree became time-barred, and the person in possession 
of  the property decreed was no longer liable to give it up, 
and that, where judgement for property was given, the decree 
holder was  entitled to take the Court  apparitor with him 
and seize the property by force, if  necessary. 
This did not apparently apply where a surety had  been 
given  to abide judgement,  which  was  the normal  course, 
and in  that case  it was  the duty of  the surety to secure 
delivery.  It seems that in all such cases the ordinary law 
of distress was applicable. 
I 
The law of  distress was, in fact, adjusted to the execution 
V. C. 28, 154-6,  164; D. C.  400-2.  440,  458, 466-8,  470,  476, 478; 
Iv. 26-8,  VI. 106, VII. 146. IX.  236, 246-8,  X. 328, 350-2,  370,  382, 390, 
XI. 398, 400, 412,  420, XIV. 568,  648,  652, 692. 412  JUDGEMENT  AND EXECUTION  PART IX 
of  decrees of  Court, without  any radical  change in law, by 
making it a condition precedent  to distress that permission 
of  Court should be obtained.' 
$ 14. This is exactly  what happened  in  other countries 
where courts assumed the functions of  previous consensual 
arbitrators. 
Under the Roman Law of  the XI1 Tables, execution was 
postponed until thirty days after decree, at the end of  which 
time payment had to be made or a vindex  (surety) found 
to ensure payment 
In early Germanic Law the right to distress was a private 
right ; but, by the time the laws of  the Teutonic invaders 
of  the Roman Empire were redacted, the previous permis-  , 
sion of  the courts to enforce that right had become a necessary 
preliminary.  The right of  private executive action closed, 
among certain Germanic tribes, with the LPX  Salica, and the 
process was extended, among others, by the Ides Ripuaria, 
Lex Burgundorum, and the Lex Langobardoruin. 
Similar  was  the case  in  England.  Under  the laws  of 
Hlothairc and Edric, c. 10,  it was the law that satisfaction 
of  a decree must be made in  seven  days or security given 
for satisfaction ; while the Laws of  Ine, c. 9, show that the 
right to recover, without resorting to the courts, was recog- 
nized by custom, for that right was expressly abolished : 
' If  any one take revenge before he demand justice, let him 
give up what he has taken to himsclf  and pay bote of  30s.' 
What happened in England was what happened in Wales. 
The party who had a claim was allowed to exercise his right 
of  distress unaltered, subject to permission  of  Court being 
obtained after adjudication.  The transition from the stage 
of  private execution without resort  to law, to the stage of 
exercising  that  right  after  permission  being  granted,  is 
clearly brought out in Cnut's Secular Laws, c.  19,  and the 
Conqueror's Laws, c. 45 : 
' Let no man take distress till he has three times demanded 
his  right  in  the  hundreds.  If  after  three  demands he  does 
not get justice, he  is to go  to the shire-gemot.  If  that then 
fail, let him  take leave either from hence  or  thence that he 
may seize his own.' 
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THE  LESSER  ' GWELYS '  AND  SEPARATE  ' GAFAELS ' 
IN DENBIGH 
Ville.  Nnwe of Gwely. 
Bachymbyd.  Ithel Pengwern. 
Ysceibion.  David ap  Griffith. 
Rrynlluarth.  Ior' ap I-Ieilyn. 
Ken' ap Llywelyn. 
Ienna ap Llywelyn. 
Prees and  Ieuan Wenwes. 
Llechred.  Meurig Wenwes et 
leuan Ddu. 
Remarks. 
Called  progenies,  and  holdicg 
termed a gafael. 
Called progenies. 
(held 5 acres). 
z/jrds  in  Llechred ;  1/3  of 
holders unfree.  Spoken of  as 
gwelys. 














Edcnewy  II  Kingild. 
Ithcl ap Grift'. 
Gwgan Goch. 
Wyrion Barth. 
Bleth ap  Wilyrn. 
Meurig ap Wilym. 
Silene. 
Eleuan. 
Mor~dlc  Felyn. 
z/jrds  gwely  free,  r/pd  un- 
free ;  free  part  divided  in 
2  gafaels  after  sons  of 
Morythe ;  I  gafael being sub- 
divided into a gafaels, named 
after grandsons of  Morythe. 
2/3rds  free,  I/ 3rd unfree ; free 
gwely being also called  gafael 
Pritlydd. 
1/9th free, 8/gth uniree.  Eman- 
cipated  ex  demo  principis ,in 
return  for  military  service 
only. 
Case of  crnancipation by office ; 
otlier gwelys  in ville of  same 
descent being unfree. 
Divided into 8 progenies, named 
after Ithel's eight sons,  each 
holding 3/4-gafael. 
Divided  into  4  gafaels,  2  of 
which were  held jointly,  and 
z  (I of  which mas  also called 
gwely) were held separately. 
Also called progenies.  Divided 
into z gwelys and I  cynnwys. 
Also called progenies.  Divided 
into 3 gwelys, 2  of  which held 
by same co-sharers. 
Called  progenies.  Divided  into 
3 gwelys. APPENDIX  I 
Nante of Gzuely.  Rernarks. 
Cadwallawn ap  Tra-  Divided  into  5  gafaels : Ithel 
haearn.  ap Ririd held  1/3rd ;  Cadw- 
gan  ap  Cadwallawn  in  2 
gafaels,  each  1/6th  of  hold- 
ing ;  Dolphyn  ap  Cadwal- 
lawn in z  gafaels, each 1/6th 
of  holding. 
Eignon ap Meredith.  Called  progenies  only,  in  I 
gafael. 
Cadyfor ap Eignon.  Also  called  progenies ;  in  3 
gafacls  named  after  sons  of 
Cadyfor. 
Map Bonhedcl.  Called,  gwely,  progenies,  and 
wyrlon.  Divided  into  3 
gwelys,  named  after sons of 
one Madoc. 
Wyrion Gwr Newydd.  r/z-gwely ;  also  held  separate 
gafael on rent. 
APPENDIX I1  Ville. 
Treborth and 
Dyserth.  THE  LESSER  ' GWELYS ' IN ANGLESEA 
Ville.  Nat~te  of Gwcly. 
Trefwastrodion.  Ken' ap Tegwared. 
Hywel ap Tudor. 
Elgnon Fras. 
Eignon ap Issac. 
Gwalgeithion. 
Remarks. 
A  falconer's  gwely  from 
'  gwalch ', a hawk. 
Eghissel.  Ithel ap Trahaearn. 






(;\vas  Teynell ap 
Gronw. 
Mochdre.  Elidyr ap Eden'. 











Tegwared.  Divided  into 3 gafaels,  named 




0wa;n ap Cadered. 
1-leched Frych.  Divided  into  gafaels,  z  held 
jointly  by  same  person,  z 
others  by  ten  holders,  and 
Gwytherin. 
Madoc ap Owain. 
Llywelyn ap Owain. 
I'l~illip ap  Owain. 
j separately. 
Eignon Mynachnewydd.  A nlonastic holding, divided into 




Gweithycld or Gwely  Divitlecl into 6 gafaels. 
Mawr. 
Wyrion Iago. 
Gwas Teyniol  Cf. Cerrig Eafael. 
Divided into two halves. 





I  gafael 
Arienallt cum Tre-  Ior' ap Ieuan. 
adol.  Owain. 
Yorgh. 
Trefdol tir Map Ririd 
and tir Eignon Foel. 
I  gafael. 
I  gafael in two portions, I  gafael 
enfranchised  by  office,  1 
named after three people. 
3 gafaels.  Meaning dubious. 
Origin  of  name  lost  by 
135".  1-and  held  by 
advocarii.  Same  holders  in  both,  rest  of 
holdings of  family unfree 
Prees.  2 gafaels. 
Tref Ednyfed.  Gronw ap  Eden'. 
Icuan ap Eden'. 
I'ill  ap Eden'.  Penporchell. 
Gwerneigron 
I  gafael. 
I 74 gafaels.  4 lcnown by same name and held 
by sanle persons, 3 ditto, and 
z  ditto by other holders, sug- 
gesting gafael a defined  area. 
6&  other  gafaels  in ville,  all 
unfree. 
Trefadoc,  Clegarrog,  Culleli ap Caderod. 
and Coedana.  Gwythir ap Caderod. 
I.ly-w'  ap Caswallawn. 
Bwttan.  Mcredith ap Eynon. 
Ior' ap Eynon. 
David ap  Eynon. 
1-lanfecliell.  Griff ap Llywelyn 
Meredith ap  Llywelyn. 
This  Lly\velyn was seventh 
in descent  from  Owain 
Gwynedd. 
Carnedd, Dronwy,  David ap  Gwelsanfrraid. 
Clwchdyrnog, and 
Aberalaw. 
3054.2  E e Ville. 
Llaneilian and Bod- 
cynddelw. 











Name of Gwely. 
David ap  blabon. 
Meredith Cragh. 
Adda Wen.  Nantmawr. 
Bodewrid. 
Hoel ap Llywelyn. 
Crinrithiet.  Possibly of  tribe of  Gwei- 
rydd ap Rhys. 
Ssgubor cum Gaer- 
wen. 
Mcrcdith ap Ior'. 
Hywel Foe1 Ddu. 
Pentraeth.  Geraint ap  Tegwared. 
Madoc ap Meilir. 
More ap Bayre. 
Claimed  to  be  of  one 
stock. 
Gwydryn.  Llywelyn ap Zlywarch. 
Hywel ap Llywarch. 
David ap Tegwared. 
Eneas ap Idris. 
Madoc ap Kefenerth. 




David ap Wyon. 
Heilyn ap Wyon. 
Teg' ap Ieuan. 
Atha ap Ior'. 
Hebbogothion. 
Hebbogothion= falcons. 
That gwely held in two 
halves.  Actual holders 
appear in some cases to 
have been sons or grand- 
sons  of  protonym  of 
gwely.  Possibly of  tribe 




Symo~id  ap Gylmot. 
David ap Wyn ap David. 
David ap Wyn ap Tor'. 
Cerrigdewi. 
Gaerwen. 
Wyon ap Rhys. 
Apparently  of  clan  of 
Hwfa ap Cynddelw. 
Wyrion Mabon 
Griff Whith.  Llandegfan.  Coredyr. 
Iardur. 








Mathafarn Wyon.  Gronw ap  liyon.  Of common stock, perhaps 
Eignon ap UTyon.  connected with Cemlyn. 
Madoc ap Wyon. 
Eignon Vaghan 
Edenewyn. 
Trefor.  Ior' ap Iiendalo. 
Castell Ior' cum  Gronw ap Iago and 
Parciau.  Llew Llwyd. 
David Pritlydd.  A purchased gwely. 
David ap Teg. 
Map Cadwgan. 
Ior' Vaghai~  and Eignon 
Mon. 
Wyrion Iardur. 
Wyrion ap I<endalo. 
Rhys ap Cadwgan. 
Tegwared ap Cadwgan. 
Artlien ap Cadwgan. 
Cynefor ap Ieuan. 
Porthamal.  Menw ap  Moredig. 
Issac ap  Moredig. 
Tegeyrn ap Moredig. 
Ieuaf ap  Moredig. 
Some  indications  of  con- 
nexions. 
Caerdeon.  Grilfith ap Mcurig. 




Madoc ap  Hoel. 
Hoel ap Gjlth. 
Tudor ap Griff. 
L1:;welyn  ap Gwilym. 
Traha~arn  ap Hwfa. 
Ivladoc ap Gronw. 
Teg' ap Gronw. 
Wyon ap Heilyn. 
Ior' ap  Hcilyn. 
Cemlyn.  Hwfa ap Wyon. 
Matloc ap Wyon. 
Eigiion ap Wyon. 
Gronw ap Wyon. 
Alaw Birth.  Moryth. 
Iiefcretli ap Barth. 
Tregaian. 
Rhoscolyn. 
Llanfigel.  Ithcl ap Caradoc. 





Tegheyrn ap  Carwed. 
Hoel ap Carwed. 
Dolfyn ap Carwed. 
Atha ap Griffri. 
Rletherus ap Griffri. 
Brogwell ap Griffri. 
Doynowel ap Griffri. 
Of  common stock.  The 
holder  of  Cwely  Teg- 
heyrn  in  1353  was  a 
great-great-grandson  of 
Teg'.  The  family 
claimed  descent  from 
Cunedda, Carwed  being 
the seventeenth  in de- 
scent from him. Vrlte 
Ceidlo and Rhos. 
Llanengan 
Rhiw 
Nn~ne  of  Gwelv  Remark T 
Was Carrog  1,lterall~ '  brook-ser- 
vants . 
Wyrlon Utot 
Madoc ap Sewyll 
He~lyn  ap hfeiri 
Gwgan ap  \%  ilyn~ 
Rhys ap Seisyll 
Gwryd ap Seisyll 
Pill ap Isaac 
lor  ap Isaac 
Llywarch ap Cynddelw. 
li~rid  ap Cynddelw 
E~gnon  ap Lwgan 
Wyr~on  Cynan 
Gwair  L~terally  '  hay ' 
Wyr~oil  Ithel  lioltlers great great grand- 
Wyrion Lriffr~  sons of  protonym. 
Sess~ll 
Ith~l  Goell 
1  egwared ap lioppert. 
GI onw ap Tegu ared 
\\ yrion Caradawg 
Wyrion Itliel 
APPENDIX  TIT 
GWELY  S ' AND SEPARATE '  GAFAELS 
IN CAERNARFON 
THE  LESSER  ' 
Nnnic of  Gwely 
Tegwared ap R~rid 
Genethlyn ap Rlr~d 
Coyswyn (2) 
Rewtnrks 
A very pecul~ar  collection 
of names 
= cyswyn,  reputed  or 
Vzlle. 
Llanrug.  Bodrydd and Tre- 
faba~thian 
Bodferin  allied 
= the Ir~slimen's  llnld~ng 
= the sin~ster  cloak,  I  e 
illegitimate  Ken  Crwth 
Gwgan ap Ithcl 
Ior  ap Llys~an 
Hynel ap 1 lys1~11 
Lljuelyn xp I  lys1a.1 
(,~onw  ap Mered~th 
Griff ap Mered~th 
Llyw~rch  ap RZcrcd~tll 
\\ yrlon Iorwerlh 
Ken'  ap Tregyr 
P~ll  ap l~egyr 
Edenewyn ap lregyr 
Cefcretll ap Tregyr 
Wyr~on  I lgnoll 
\Vyrlon Morga11 





Ho~dilo  dp Llywarch 
Wyr~on  Roppert 
\rVyr~on  Carwl~ 
Wyrlon Itgwal 
Pennant 
1/1ot11  In T  q/~oths  In  D 
z/3rds  1/3rd 
4/jths  1/5th 
I /2 ncl  1/2nd 
?/lrds  ~/zrd 
Treflan and Dlnlle 
Khedynog 
Pencoed 
Brynbras  Dinlle 
Remarks 
Modern Conway  An  u?connected 










One  termed  Pedwerydd  Ran,  i  e 
the fourth share 
Llechdll 
Glyn and ltowen 
Caerhun 
Bodwayo and 












Wyr~on  Rhys 
U  yrlon L~gnoll 
Wyrion  Iicon 
lor' ap (,enetl~lyn 
Bletherus ap Isaph 
Cw yr Carrog 
D~vlded  into z/3rds and 1/3rd 
As in Penlassog 
Bottwnog 
1.1terally  ' brook-men ' 
E~gnon  Trw} 11 and 
Eden  Genyth 
Llywarch ap Trahaearn 
Wyn ap I%enbrelt 
Robert ap Mryn 
Wyrion Mamr  Maar  =great 
Madoc ap Gron-\  Perh~ps  of llryrlon Eden'. 
Mynytho 
3  Named  after three brothers 
1  rrefabsithian held by one man and 
termed a gafael  Trefgarnedd and 
Marchgroes 
Trefgarnedd 
Madryn and Pen- 
wyn 
I 
I  1  he gafael of  the door keeper. 
I. 
Wyrion Seiq  11 
Wyrion R11rd 
11 vrlon 1  le111n Vzlle. 
Cyllegan. 
Nniize or No. of Stipes. 
Gwely stipes Gladys ver. David. 
,,  Walter ap Gronw. 
,,  Ropert ap Ieuan. 
Rer~znvks. 









'  GWELYS ' IN THE BLACK  BOOK  OF 
ST. DAVID'S  Plus 3 gwelys. 
,,  Cynan Elth.  Said to hold  land one 
league by one. 
Plus  3  gwelys.  One 
stipes  owned  four 
farms, the rest scat- 
















No. or Names of Gwelys.  Remavks. 
8. 
Llandeilo. 
Llandeuaysam.  Gwely stipes Ellillo. 
,,  Redwyth. 
Wern. 
Llangadoc.  Stipes Cadwgan ap Gronw, 
Rhys ap  Meredith ct  heredes, 
Khys ap  Trahaearn. 
Three  men  held  sepa- 
rate plot.  , 
Glasconi.  Gwely stipes Greg. 
,  Cenyllyn. 
,  Cywryd. 
,  Meurig ap Tra- 
haearn. 











Three men holding 160 
acres.  Bangor. 
,,  Gwgan ap Afael. 
,,  Llew ap Denand. 
,,  Tegwared Pen- 
grach. 
Wilyln ap Llywelyn.  Both held  by same lot 
Wyrion Ieuan.  of  co-sharers. 
Wyrion Tawel. 
Griff ap Bleddyn. 
Blegwrycl.  In portions, z/jrds and 
1/3rd. 
Canaystrcf.  Half  a gwely. 
Clare. 
Caradawg ap Uuryn. 
Gwgarl the Parson. 
Llandogi. 
A 40-acre holding.  Iiedwernan. 
APPENDIX VI  Llangadoc. 
FREE AND  UNFREE  ' GAFAELS ' IN BKOMFIELD 
AND  YALE,  1315 
APPENDIX V  V alle .  Tenure.  Rf.:nnuks. 
Wrexham.  Unfrec.  I  gafnel  suage and  held croft  by one  7 acres.  man, area with mes- 
24 gafaels held by one man, area not stated.  THE ' STIPES ' IN  THE BLACK  BOOK 01: 
ST.  DAVID'S 
Gwensanau.  Unfree.  18 I/.-gafaels  held  by fourteen  separate 
individuals,  2  by  two  brothers,  and 
a by another lot of  two brothers.  Area 
not stated. 
Vzlle.  Name or No. ~j  Stiprs.  Rerl~nrks. 
Cefn Newydd.  Gwely stipes Grifl ap Gilbert. 
,  Isac ap Ithna. 
,,  Gronw ap Erelwyn. 
,  Cadwgan ap Do- 
fendr. 
Erryrys.  Unfree.  17 I/Z-gafaels, I 3  held by separate indivi- 
duals,  2 by two men  jointly,  and z  by 
two others jointly.  Areas not stated, 




T~ILILY~.  Remarks. 
Free.  2  gafaels held jointly  by two men.  Area 
not stated. 
Unfree.  I  gafael held by four men, z gafaels each 
held by two men, 3 I/Z-gafaels held each 
by one man,  and  I  1/3-gafael  held  by 
one  man.  Area  not  stated,  but  all 
gafaels equal. 
Llandynan.  Free.  I  gafael held by four men, 22 gafaels held 
separately by single individuals,  I  1/3- 
nafael  held  by  one  man,  and  5  1/4- 
Eafaels each held  by one man.  Areas 
Eot given, but all gafaels equal. 
Bryntangor.  Unfree.  I gafael held by four men, I gafael held by 
three  men,  I  gafael  held  by one man, 
I  I/Z-gafael  held by one man.  Area not 
stitedy but all gafaels equal. 
Diffaeth.  Free.  I  1/3-gafael l~eld by one man,  I  1/6-gafael 
held by three men. 
Unfree.  I  1/6-gafael held  by  a  group  of  nativi, 
I  gafael  held  by  one person,  and 1/3- 
gafael held by one person. 











UNFREE ' GWELYS ' AND  ' GAFAELS ' IN 
DENBIGH 
A.  GWELYS. 
Ville.  No. of  Gwelys.  IZenzarks. 
Galltfaenan.  3.  r/znd,  5/6ths,  and  all  escheat. 
Unescheated  portions  held  by 
four and four men. 
Nantglyn Sanct.  I.  One holder. 
Prees.  5.  1  escheat,  I  as  in  Penporchell, 
I  (Peyned)  called  gafael  in 
Beryn,  I  held  by two brothers, 
I  in 6  gafaels,  almost entirely 
escheat, held by nativi of  Beryn. 
3 and z/jrds of  z.  Largest  gwely three men ; 1/3rd 
of  z gwelys free. 
I  and parts of 2.  I  escheat ; z/3rds  of  2  free. 
2.  Each holding  1/3rd  ville.  Other 
1/3rd  held  free  by  related 
gwely.  Also held in Prees. 
I.  As  in Prees.  Four holders. 
I.  7/8ths escheat.  One holder. 
I.  ~/rnd  escheat.  Three holders. 
2.  Held by five and three men respec- 
tively.  Cesses  on  each indivi- 
dual. 
Ville.  No. 
Garllwyd. 










Segrwyd cum Cader, 






of  Gwelys.  Reiiznrks. 
I.  In 2 plots, six and three holders. 
5.  3 entirely escheat, 3/4ths of  fourth 
also, 1/4th of  which held by six 
men.  Fifth  divided  into  4 
gafaels ;  names  show  recent 
purchase. 
2.  Partly free.  Vide free gwelys. 
3.  8/gths-gwely  Hirodel  held  by 
eight men, gwely Idenerth held 
by  seven  men,  gwely  Hoidilo 
held  partly  by  other  gwelys. 
part escheat. 
2.  Eight and three holders. 
I.  Eighteen holders. 
I.  Abandoned. 
3.  .  Interrelated.  Two, ihrce, and two 
holders. 
8.  Largest number of  holders four. 
2.  Interrelated. Two and one holders. 
4.  Six, six, five, and three holders. 
No. of GafaeEs.  Renzarks. 
224.  Portions  of  I I  only  unescheated. 
1.argest  number of  joint-holders 
three.  Include  I/Z-, 3/4-,  and 
4/5-gafaels. 
8 and ~/jrd. I  escheat.  Sixteen  tenants  held 
each  1/4-gafacl.  Largest  num- 
ber of  joint-holders two. 
23.  I r  s/bths escheat.  Held in I, I/Z-, 
3/4-,  1/4-. and 1/3-gafaels.  All 
single holders. 
54.  4 j/dths  escheat.  Three  holders 
each of  1/4-gafael. 
Gaf. Rethe.  As  names  show,  Gaf.  liethe was 
Gaf. Caeth.  once free, but had become un- 
free in time of  princes.  It was 
divided  into  6  gafaels,  some 
being  tlivided  into  separate 
lloldings.  Some  interrelated. 
Gaf.  Catlle  was  divided  into 
3 gafaels subdivided into plots. 
Largest number of  holders three. 
6  escheat,  also  parts  of  rest. 
Largest number of  joint-holders 
four. 
3  escheat.  Gwely  Peyned  here 
called gafael.  See Prees, stipvcc. 




No. of Gafaels.  Retnavks. 
64.  Ville  also  liad  17)  free  gafaels 
44 escheat.  Largest number of 
holders five. 
9.  I  gafael also called gwely.  Largest 
number of  joint-holders  eight. 
APPENDIX VIII 
THE TREWELOGHE AND TREFGEFERY VILLES IN 
CAERNARFON AND ANGLESEA 









Villes in  Cnevnarfon. 
pen-y-barth.  Llaniestyn.  Brynodol. 
Llanengan.  Llecheiddior.  Gest. 
Nevin.  Pentyrch.  Rhedynog. 
Morfa.  Pennant.  Crugeni. 
Arianos.  Llechan.  Penmachno. 
Kowen.  Dolwyddelan.  Gwydir. 
Cylan.  Bryncelyn.  Wig. 
B.  Treweloglre  Villes in  A nglesan. 
Rhosmor.  Caergeiliog.  Treban Meurig.  Bodenolwyn. 
Aberalaw.  Llanddygfail.  Cafnan.  Cemlyn. 
Bodronyn.  Lligwy.  Nantmawr.  Trefarwith. 
13odrida.  Maesoglen.  Trefgardct.  Treban Pill. 
Trefwastrodion.  Carnedd.  Llysdulas.  Esceifiog. 
Tyndrofol. 
C.  Tvefgcfevy Villes in  Caernavjon. 
Dinorwic.  Llanbeblig.  Dolellog.  Ethinog. 
Penmaen.  Trefcoed.  Hirdref.  Bodfean. 
Bodagho cum  Towyn.  Penarfynydd.  Tydweiliog. 
Bleiddiog.  Crugeran.  Dolpenmaen. 
D.  Trefgefevy  Villes in Anglesea. 
Aberffraw.  Llanlibio.  Llanfol.  Dynyslewl. 
Rhosmynach.  Deri.  Hirdrefaig.  Dinam. 
Bodenriw.  Porthaethwy.  Bodunod. 
E. Villcs in  rl nglesea containitzg ' nillts ' of  the fvee. 
Nantmawr.  Nantfychan.  Trescawen. 
Gwredog.  Penlienllys.  Turrgarlv. 
Ddrainog.  Hendregadoc.  Treffos. 
Trcgaian.  Lledwigan.  Arienallt. 
Llanfighael.  Carnedd.  Dronwy. 
Llaneilian.  Pen Garnisiog.  Dynyslewi. 
Cremlyn. 
F.  I'illcs  in  Cnevnavfon co~tnining  ' nillts'  of  the free. 
Mochras.  Trefgwyn.  Bodrydd. 
Rhyd-y-glair.  Bryn Eithan.  Llanllyfni. 
Penwyn Cybi.  Bryncelyn.  Llandinwail. 


























TIR CYNYF IN THE SURVEYS 
Land.  Term.  Remarks. 
Gaf. Ithel Ringild.  Terra emptica.  Pastus at  low rate. 
1/6-gaf. Waspadrig.  Tyrprid.  Fixed rental of  rod. 
1/8-gaf. Teg' ap  Terra emptica.  On tunc only. 
Ilen'. 
r/z-gaf.  Bagh.  ,  1  .  yrpryn. 
1/3-gaf. Rhys ap  Terra emptica.  On tunc and pastus 
Hunyth.  principis only. 
~/3-gaf.  Moridig ap  Terra ernptica  On tunc only. 
Trahaearn.  and tyrpryn. 
Gwely Griff  ap  Tyr Itennyth. 
Meretlith. 
Land of  Hoidilo.  Tyrprid.  Rental  of  19s.  zd. 
paid by communi- 
tas  ville.  Also 
tunc- and butter- 
rent against which 
the  ville  pro- 
tested. 
Gwely Wyrion  Tyr kennyf.  Tunc  and  military 
Unrth.  service only. 
Land of  Gronw.  Tyrprid.  Escheated. 
Land of  Eden'. 
In Bangor Diocese. 
APPENDIX  X 
TUNC-LEVY  IN THE HONOUR  OF DENBIGH 
I.  CYMWD  CAIMIZIRCII. 
(I) All freemen, except in Rrynlluarth, were exempt from tunc, and 
no tunc-units are traceable. 
(2)  Brynlluarth ; original assessnlent zs., levied at  qd. per 5 acres. 
(3) Unfree  in cylnwd  asscssed  per gafael  at IS.  in Segrwyd and 
&"ion,  79d. in Postu, and qd. in Llewesog. 
11.  CPMWD  ISALED. 
(I) The following tunc-pound units arc traceable : 
i.  Prees.  The ville was divided into sixths.  Five of  these 
were held by separate progellies of the clan Llywarch, 
1/6th in numerous plots, free and unfree. 
One progeny paid  3s.  qd. assessed at  44d. and qd. per 
gafael. One progeny  paid  3s. qd. assessed at jd. per  gwely. 
,  3s. 4d,, half of which was remitted 
and  the rest  assessed  at qd.  per 
gwely. 
,  14$d., all remitted. 
,  14$d., including  8d. remitted, bal- 
ance being assessed on the gafaels. 
The plots  paid  7s. 7d., of which 7s. 42d. are traceable, 
assessed on various units, at rates varying from 144d. 
to id.  per  unit. 
ii.  Lleweni.  The  ville was originally held in  3 free gafaels and 
18  unfree  gafaels,  many  portions  of which  were 
escheat, and the holders of  the rest transplanted. 
The  free gafaels had  paid  5s. qd. at IS.,  IS.,  and 3s. qd. 
per  gafael, the latter  being  divided  proportionately 
among 1/2- and  1/4-gafaels. 
The unfree gafaels had  paid  14s. 8d., at rates from gd. 
to  IS. 3d per  gafacl and 1/2-gafael. 
iii.  Ystrad Cynan, Nantglyn Cynan, and Nailtglyll Sanctorum. 
These villes were held by  I  progeny in 4 gafacls. 
Nantglyn Sanctorum was free of  tunc  in lieu of  albadeth, 
represcnting  apparcl~tly  I/Z the tunc-pound.  The 
other two villes pait1  IOS.,  divided equally among the 
4.  gafaels. 
iv. Carwedfynydd, Dinas Cadicl  (1/2), l'enporchell  (I/z),  and 
Talabryii (1/6th). 
Carwedfynydd  was  held  in 9;  free  gafacls, some  of 
which were amalgamated, the whole tunc on the villc 
being apparently 17s. 6d  Soine  owners also owned 
1/2 of Dinas  Cadfcl and  I-'enporchell, whose  tuncs 
(2s. 6d. and  3s.  4d.) were  irlcludecl  in the Carwed- 
fyilydd  tunc, and  others owiiecl  ~/Gth  of Talabryn, 
whose tunc (1/8th)  was collected  in Carwedfynydd. 
The total tuuc was  distributed  over  the gafaels and 
fractions of  gafaels in varying sums according to  area. 
The owners of  the re~~laining  I/Z  of Dinas paid  2s. Gd., 
divided unequally alnollg  gafaels. 
The owners of the remaining  1/2 of l'ellporchell  paid 
3s. 4d., likewise divided  unequally. 
The owners of 5/6ths Talabrpn (unfrce)  appear at o~le 
ti~ne  to have paicl  8s. 4d,, but practically  the whole 
was escheat. 
(2) Thc following additional  tuncs were  paid  originally, but the 
tunc-pound units cannot be identified : 
i. Galltfaenan, 3s., paid  102d. by free owners of r/jrd the 
ville, zs.  ~d.  by unfree owners of 2/3rds at 8d. and 
gd. per  gwely. 
ii. Gwaenynog, 2s. 6d., pair1  by  the frec tcnants in lump sum. 
iii.  Eriviat, 12s. 6d., paid  2s. 6d. by  each of 5 free and  unfree 
gwelys. 
iv. Bodiscawn, 6s. 8d., paid  2s. 6d. by  I  free 1/2-gafael aud 
2s.  ~d.  by each of 2  unfree gwclys. 
v. Llechrcd, IS. 6d.,  paid  Gd. each by  3 free and mixed gwelys. 
vi. Beryn, js., paid  74d. by  cach gafael, free and unfree. 
vii. Twyssog (unfree),  7s. 6d., mode of  assessment not stated. 
viii. Taldragh, 2s. Gd., paid  in equal shares by  I  free and  I  mixed 
gwely. 
111.  CYMWD  UWCHALED. 
(I) The following tunc areas are traceable : 
i. The clan of  Rand  Vaghan  ap Asser. 
This clan heId  the whole or  part  of  8 villes, and  paid 
a  total  tunc for all  its holdings  of LI.  Originally 
it was  divided  equally  among  the 4 gwelys  of the 
clan,  and,  within  each  gwely,  equally  among  the 
component gafaels. 
In dividing the surveyors increased the total by  6fd. 
ii.  Rarrog.  A free ville held  by  6 gwelys, each of  which paid 
3s. qd.  Each gwely was held  in numerous gafaels, 
but the tunc is not shown as distributed over them. 
(2) The following additional tuncs were paid, but the tunc-pound 
units cannot be identif  ed  : 
i. Llcchtalhaiarn, ~od.,  paid  gd. by  each of  z unfree gafaels. 
ii. Clan  Rhys  Goch  in  FIendrcnennig,  aod.  paid  in  equal 
shares by 6 gafaels. 
iii.  Prysllygod, 5s., paid  20d. by cach of  3 progenies. 
iv. Melai.  Original  total not  ascertainable.  The ville  was 
held  by 4 gwclys  in numerous gafaels, plus  2  addi- 
tional  gaiaels.  The  ultimate  assessment  is  per 
gafael ;  each,  howevcr,  paying  a  different total, 
apparently because of  differences  in area. 
v. Petrual, 5s., divided nearly equally in 13 gwclys. 
vi. Garthgyfanedd,  5s., paid  Gd. by  each of  5 free gwelys, and 
2s. 6d. by  I  unfree gwely. 
vii. Llanfairtalhaiarn. ~os.,  paid  3zd. by  each of  3 gafaels, and 
2s. by  I  gafael. 
viii.  Eeidiog, 6s. 8d., paid  in one lump sum. 
ix. Mostyn, 3s. 4d., paid  in unequal shares by  4 gafaels. 
x. Heskyn, 5s., paid  IS. by  each of  5 gafaels. 
xi. l'encledan,  2s. 6d. (?), paid  ~od.  by  each of  2 unfree gwelys, 
the balance by  several plot-holders. 
xii.  Rudidicn, 3s. qd. (?), unevenly distributed among the free 
and unfree gwelys. 
xiii.  Archwedlog, 6s. 8d., paid  3s. qd. by  each of  z gurelys. 
xiv. Llysaled, zod. 
xv. Garllwyd,  5s.,  paid  1/4th by an  unfree gwely  owning 
1/4th the \rille,  and  j/qths  by 4  free gwelys, owning 
3/4ths the ville, approximately equally. 
IV. CYMWD  ISDULAS. 
(I) The following tunc-units are traceable : 
i. Wigfair.  The ville  appears  to have paid  &I,  but owing 
to  escheats it  was reduced to  17s.  gd., levied unequally 
on free and  unfree gwelys, apparently according  to 
areas held. i.  Trallwyn,  IOS.,  clivided  ilneqilally  among  component 
gwelys. 
ii.  Treborth, IOS., divided as in Ereithlyn. 
iii.  Cefnliaethfaen, 6s. ad., divided as in Tebrith. 
iv.  Colwyn,  2s.  6d.,  divided  as in Tebrith  among free  and 
unfree gwelys. 
ii.  Meifocl,  5s.,  Cilcedog,  5s.,  Dinorbyn  Fychan,  2s.  6d., 
Twlgarth,  2s.  6d.,  and  Dinorbyn  Fawr,  conjectn- 
rally, 5s. 
In hlcifod  leviecl  equally  on  3  gwelys,  mixed  and 
unfree.  In the mixed  gwely  there  were  separate 
assessments  on the free  and  unfree  members.  In 
Cilccdog  and  Dinorbyn  Fychan  lcvied  equally  on 
free and unfree gwelys ; in Twlgarth (unfree) on the 
whole ville jointly. 
(3) Note.  Cilcennus, an unfree maerdref, was exempt as it paid 
autumn food-rents. 
iii.  Gwerneigron,  assessed  at varying  rates  per  gafael,  free 
and unfree. 
iv.  Abergele,  assessed  on each  clan  according to fractional 
share each owned in ville.  Within each clan distri- 
buted over the conlponent gwelys or gafaels, propor- 
tionate to their fractional shares. 
APPENDIX XI 
ARDRETH  IN  THE SURVEY OF DENBIGH 
(2) The following additional tuncs were paid, but the units cannot 
be identifietl : 
ViUe.  Land.  A motfnt.  Remnrks. 
Denbigh.  Gaf. Rethe.  2s. 6d.  For all customs.  Unfree. 
Gaf. Cathe.  12s. 8d.  i.  Rodrochj7n ancl Kinmcl, unfree gwelys.  Owing to escheats 




2 plots.  -5s. od. 
25. 0d. 
Rented  on  old  ardreth 
plus 6s. 8d. 
Old holding of  a nativus 
of  Gaf.  Rethe,  Den- 
bigh. 
Unfree.  Escheat for non- 
payment. 
Free.  Ardreth  did  not 
cover  tunc,  pastus 
satellitum, or forest. 
TJnfree.  Eschcat.  Did 
not cover tunc. 
Unfree.  Also  paid  tunc 
and  did  common 
cymwd services = pas- 
tus principis. 
Unfree.  Paid, tunc and 
cyniwd services. 
An  e~nancipated gwely. 
Paid tunc ; had  com- 
pounded  for  all  ser- 
vices since annexation. 
ITormerly  on  ardreth. 
Escheated. 
All services commuted. 
ii.  Hendregyda, IOS., divided equally by 2 gwclys, and within 
each  gwely  clivided  equally  among  component 
gafaels. 
iii.  Brynfanigl, 2s. Gd.  (?).  Only 32d. survived on 1/8th ville, 
rest eschcated or exempted. 






Penporchell.  iv. Cilcein, 3s. qd. (?), escheats prevent ascertainment of  mode 
of  clistribution. 
v.  Trofarth, 74d., apparently at  14d. per gwely. 









6s. od.  V.  CYMWD  UWCHDULAS. 
(I) The following tunc-areas are traceable : 
i. Tebrith and hamlets ; dividcd equally among the 4 gwelys. 
ii.  Mathebrud, IOS., Llanrwst and Garthmyncannol, 5s., and 
Esgairebrill, 5s. 
Except  in  Esgairebrill  divided  in  each  ville  equally 
among the  gwelys, within which it  was divided equally 
anlong the  component gafaels.  In  Esgairebrill diviclecl 
unequally between 2 g~velys. 
iii.  Ereithlyn, divided  among the gwelys,  according to their 
fractional shares in ville,  and within  gwelys among 
sub-gwclys equally, where such existed. 
iv.  Llwydcoed and hamlcts.  One hamlet assessed  at 5s. was 
exempt.  Rcst cliviclcd  among clans as in Ereithlyn. 
v. Mochdre,  ~os.,  and Rhiw,  IOS., divided  among the free, 
mixed and unfree gwelys, according to area held. 
vi.  Penmaen, 10s.. and Llysfaen, IOS., divided equally among 
the unfree gwelys and gafaels in each ville. 
(2) The following  additional  tuncs  were  paid,  but tunc-pound 
units cannot be identified : 
Rudidien 
r 5/64ths  ville. 
I /qCh  ville. 
4s. gd. 
js. Gd. 
5s. od.  Cilcedog.  Gwely Eden' 
Rin~ild. 
Gaf. Tegwared. 
3 plots.  each  2s. 7d. 
6s. Gd., Gs. IO~., 
3s. 3d., 3s. 3d., 
4s. zd. 
Old free land, rented on 
ardreth free of  all ser- 
vices. 
5  plots. 
Rhiw.  Held on ardreth by whole 
communitas ville. 
1/2  ord. APPENDIX  XI1 
LEVY  OF ' PASTUS PRINCIPIS ' IN THE  HONOUR 
OF DENBIGH 
I.  CYMWD  CAIMEIRCH. 
(I) Each of  5 free progenies  paid  11s. p.a.  in four instalments. 
(2) Rrynlluarth exempt. 
11.  CYMWD  ISALBD. 
(I) Pastus  levied  as  a  rule  at 93d..  or  67d.,  or  93d.  and  47d. 
(= mark of 13s. 4d.), or  multiple thereof per  unit, paid  in 
four instalments. 
When  subdivided within unit, rarely divided equally anlong 
component parts,  distribution therein being determined by 
area held or number of  holders. 
Owing  to escheats,  remissions,  and  practice  of ignoring 
fractions, other than 1/4 or 1/2,  in  dividing, it is sometimes 
difficult to  reconstruct  original  pastus. 
(2) Instances of  general rule : 
i. Lleweni.  Assessed  at 93d on I/;?-gafael  (divided into four 
sub-shares) ;  67d.  on  1/2-gafael ;  G7d.  on  I  gafael ; 
135d on I  gafael. 
ii. Ystrad  Cynan ancl  Nantglyn Cynan.  Assessed  at  18Gd. 
and  16otl. on 2  gafaels ; G7d  on each of  2  1/2-gafaels ; 
gS4d. and 604d. (= app. 16od.) on other 2  1/2-gafaels. 
iii. Galltfaenan.  Assessed  at 4Gd.  on z/jrds of I/Z-gafael= 
total on 1/2-gafael of 6gd. ; originally probably  67d., 
difference  due to  ignoring fractions. 
iv. Eriviat.  Full gwelys originally assessed  at 67d. and  G7d. 
v. Llechred.  z/jrds  of 2  wenwes,  assessecl  at  ~oogd.  = 
67d. x  I i. 
vi. Bodiscawn.  I/Z-gafael  assessecl at 67d. 
vii. Carwedfynydd.  Assessed  2  gafaels each  at 134d ;  1/2- 
gafael at G7d. (divided into four fractions) ; I+ gafaels 
at  G79d.;  2h  gafaels  at  669d.  (= 67d.x1o app.); 
2  gafaels at 267d.  (= app 67d. x 4). 
(3) Exceptions to  general rule : 
Llechred.  I  gwely assessetl  at q84d. app. 
111.  CYMWD  UWCHALED. 
(I) General rule as in Isaied. 
(2) Instances of general  rule : 
i. Clan  Rand  Vaghan  ap  Asser.  Assessed  at  78s.  ad. 
(= 67d x 14). divided  among gwelys, and  again anlong 
gafaels unevenly. 
ii.  Prysllygod  (other holders).  Assessed  at 185d. (= 93d. x 2 
app.), divided  unevenly among the two gwelys. 
iii. Melai.  Unescheatecl gwely assessecl at 19s. 6d. (= 67d. x 34 
app.),  divided  fractionally  among  gafaels,  gs.  gd., 
3s. 3d.. 6s. Gd. 
iv. Barrog.  I  gwely assessed  at 39s.  8d.  (= app. 16od. x 3). 
divided  unequally  among gafaels ;  I  gwely at 681id. 
(= app. 16od.  x 3 and G7d x 3). divided unevenly among 
gafaels ;  I  gwely at  185d. (= app. 93d x 2), in which 
I  gafael was unassessed  and  2  escheat ;  I  gwely  at 
37s. 8d. (= app. 16od. and  67d. x 2) ; 4 gafaels at total 
of 32s.  3d  (= 16ocl. x 2  and  G7d.), cach  assessed  at 
varying sums. 
v. Talhaiarn.  I  gafael assesscd  at ojd. 
(3) Exceptions to  general  rule : 
i. Melai.  Owing  to peculiar  escheats  total  a?-essment 
unascertainable.  In I  gwely of  G gafaels, 4 unescheated 
paid  sums varying from 14d. to 116id.  ;  I  gwely was 
unassessed ;  in  I  gwely  of 5  gafaels,  3  gafaels were 
escheat  and  I  unassessed,  the fifth being assessed  at 
~gAd.  ; 2  other gafaels were escheat. 
ii.  Barrog.  Total  assessment  in  I  gwely  unascertainable 
owing  to escheats;  in unescheated  gafaels  thereof 
division uneven. 
iii. Talhaiarn.  3 gafaels assessed  at 103d., gGd.,  and  48d. 
iv. Postu.  I  gafael at ~ozd.,  I  escheat, I  at 45d., ancl  I  at 86d. 
for two years  only. 
v. Heslcyn.  I  gafael assessed  temporarily at 149d. 
vi. Rnclidien.  I  small plot  at gd. ; rest of  ville exempt. 
IV.  CYMWD  ISDULAS. 
(r)  General rate of assessment \vas  10s. 6d., or fractions thereof, 
5s. jd. and 2s. 74d. per  unit, payable in four instalments. 
(2) Instances of  general  rule : 
i. Wigfair.  6  ,gaf;iels in  I  progeny  assessecl  at  2s.  7id ; 
2  gafaels in I  progeny at 2s. 7id. cach;  I  progeny  at 
2.7.  7:d 
ii. Hendregyda.  I  progeny assessecl at 190d (= app. 15s. gd.), 
divided nearly equally amoilg 8 sub-progenies ;  I  pro- 
geny at 2s.  7id. on each of 3  gafaels;  I  progeny  at 
2s. 74d. 
iii. Gwerneigron.  11 gafaels  at 2s. 7ifd each;  4 jointly  at 
10s. 6d. ;  2  at 5s. 3d., diviclecl into 3s. 6d. and  IS. gd. 
iv. Abergele.  12 gafaels of one clan at 2s. 74d. each ; 6  01 
another d~tto. 
v. Cilcein.  I  gwely at 2s. 7id.,  I  at 5s. jd. 
(3) Exceptions to  general  rule : 
i. Wigfair.  2  gafaels jointly  at 4s. gd 
ii. Abergele.  One clan of 5 gwelys has 2  gwelys and  3 ex 5 
sub-gwelys in third unassessed ; I  gwely paid  8s. ~fd., 
one 6s. 2@., 2 ex  5 sub-gwelys 7s.  6d. and 7s.  74d.  respec- 
tively. 
iii.  Cilcein.  I  gwely at 3s. G4d. 
iv. Garthewin.  2  gafaels at 2s.  8id..  I  at IS. gd. 
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V.  CYMWD  UWCIIDULAS. 
(I) General rule:  Pastus levied at  fixed rates, varying per clan, 
payable in four instalments.  Christmas instalment assessed 
on  units  in  clan;  other instalrnents  on  clan  as whole. 
Allowances on account of  escheats in Christmas instalment 
only. 
(2) Instances of  general rule : 
No. of  Total Joiizt  Separate Christnzas 
Ville.  Gwelys.  Co.r~tvibutioi~.  Contrib~~tion. 
Tebrith. 
(Wyr. Pithlc).  5.  6s.  IS.  6d. per gwely. 
Pviathebrud. 
(Wyr. Iddon).  8.  11s. 3d.  32d. per gwely. 
(Wyr. Gronw).  5  Nil.  hd. per gwely. 
Llanrwst. 
(Wyr. Runon).  5.  6s.  IS.  per gwely. 
Esgairebrill.  2.  IS.  Gd.  I  at 3s.  12d.,  and 
I at II@ 
Ereithlyn.  3.  20s.  I  at 8s.  7;d.,  I  at 
5s.  3d.,  I  at un- 
ascertainable sum. 
Trallwyn.  5.  10s.  I  at IS.  8d.,  I  at 
2s.  104d.,  I  at 
2s. 8d., 2 exempt. 
Treborth.  I  (in 5 gafaels).  22s. 6d.  12s.  divided  un- 
evenly among ga- 
faels. 
I.  Nil.  2s. IO~. 
I  (in 3 gafaels  hTil.  10s. unevenly divided. 
and plot). 
Llwydcoed. 
(Wyr. Hfelyw).  3.  1.5s.  15d per gwely. 
(Wpr. illurecl).  2.  NI~.  3s.  ghd.  unevenly 
di\ided. 
Mochdre.  I.  5s.  3d.  2s.  ~od.  unevenly 
divided  in  3  ga- 
faels. 
I.  IS.  gd.  Nil. 
(3) Exceptions to general rule : 
hlochdre.  I pelypaid  lump sun1 of  3s. II~.  at  each of  four 
terms. 
Ccfnllaethfaen.  3 gwelys unassessed, one paid annual sum 
ol 10s. 7d.,  another annual sum of  Gs. 8d. 
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Walter de Manny. 
Clainz. 
As Constable of  Harlech, Vice- 
comes  of  Merioneth,  full 
baronial jurisdiction. 
To  hold  courts  thro~ighout 
their lands in respect of  per- 
sonal pleas based on delicts 
and contracts, and to have 
the blood-fine exacting fee, 
infangenatheof,  and  leyr- 
wite. 
Edeyrnion.  Madoc ap Griffith, 
Madoc ap Griff  ap 
Owain, 
Ywel  ap Griff  ap 
Owain. 
Llangair.  View of  frank-pledge, baronial 
pleas and fines. 
Doldrewyn.  Ior' ap Eignon, 
Griffith ap Eignon. 
Court  of  personal  pleas  and 
contracts, blood-fine exact- 








Bishop of  Bangor. 
Prior of  Abbey.  Fines  on tenants on basis  of 
gift by last Llywelyn. 
Trefgarnedd ancl 
Dinorwic. 
Ioan ap Griff.  Manorial court. 
Hywel ap Grono, 
Tudor ap Grono. 
Manorial  court,  assize  of 




Tri-weekly  courts  over  all 
tenants,  excluding  Crown 
pleas ancl murders. 
Trefcastell and 
Gwredog. 
Llywelyn ap Grono. 
Anglesea.  The Queen.  Throughoiit her own ebtates. GLOSSARY  OF WELSH  TERMS 
Note -\fiords marked t are now obsolete in Welsh 
Ach 
Arh ac edvj d,  t edr~  f,t 
or edrydd + 




Agweddz  7 




Amobj r t 
Amod 
A nzodwr (pl  amodze~  I  ) 
Anlloddog t 
Anlloedd  t 
Anlloeddog  + 
Anoddezr, t anodez~ 
AY ac aredzg 
A rdreth 
Arddelw  + 
Arddelwr t 
Arglwz dd 
Argj  frezr  t 
Ar had  (arawl) 
Arwaesnf  t 
Arwydd carennydd 
Aswvnwr t 
Degree of  relatlonship 
Commonly  rendered  as  k:n  and descent '  A 
Welsh land sulf  ' Edrl  ti ' In OW  =stock, also 
to  restore ,  edrydd '  In  Oil' =paternity 
5uit n  as one for restoration of  share in paternal 
land on ground of  fescent 
MW  ' cadw gyn coll  ,  c~~stody  (to lceep) before 
loss  A defcnce in thrft cases 
I tt  home coming inan  A temporary tenant of 
land 
Deposit or plctlge 
Partition or reidjustment of  partition 
Marrlage scttleincnt by llusbantl on wlfe 
An  unirec landholder of  \\ elsh oriqn 
Probably  corruption  of  ' abaclacth '  (abbacy) 
A  rtnder in  Survey  of  Denbigll,  payable  to 
' abbot ' landowner 
A foreigner In M  ales 
MW  ' anlheuq '  Dublous,  suspcci 
Maiden-fee payable to lord 
Contract  covenant  one of  forins of  bargaining 
bf\\  contractor  Jil Codes nlinesstoan ' amod ' 
1)estltute  x~asteful 
Estate  usual place of  abode 
\Z ealthy , one having a residence 
Without intcntioi, or design 
Tilth and ploughing  One of  the suits of  '  dadan-  --- 
hudd ' 
hlW  rent  tax  A render in Surtey of  Dcnb~gh 
Avouchment,  assertloll  espec~ally  of  owilership 
or status  A ilefence 111  many suits 
One who avouches on behalf  of  another  Fictl- 
tlously in Trlads  an oft~cer  of  a kin-group 
Lord, superlor 
A voinan's ' peculium ' , pCiraphernalia 
Counter-claim set-off 
\Vanantor , one who took over responsibility in 
theft charge 
' A sign of  relationship ' 
1~t  an absentee=' essoln '  A temporary tenant 
of  land 
Renlhvg, benffyg.  From  I at  ' beneficluin '  A  gratuitous  loan, 
equal  to  Roman  ' mutuum '  MU =loan 
slmply 
Bonheddrg, -zon  1 it a man of  lineage, i e  a free Welsh trlbes~nan 
MI\  =a gentleman 
Bragod  t  From  ' brag ',  malt  A  superior  malt-l~quor, 
fine ale 
Brarnt  Status, prlv~lege 
Brnwd  Brother 
Brenzla  Ictng 
Bwrn a batch (blcvn a 
be)  ch) 
Bwth, fwd, vwd 
Bwynll 
Cnv (pl ceratnt) 
Cnrdyckwel 
Caren~dd,  g~vcnydd 
gevnz,t &c 
Cavgychwyn 
Car llawedrog t 
Cartrcf 
Ceghnus t 
Coj~adav  (pl cojiod- 
ovlon) 
Cof lly  s 
Covddlan t 
Cor  an t 
Cor ?  an 
Cowyll,  t cawell 






Cyjarch cvf31l t 
Cyfavws,  t cyfavwys.t 
c  yff 
Cyff nessaf, gyfness- 
afyert, 6.c 
Probably  popular  corruptloll  of  '  Pro  Deo '. 
An  oath  taken  on  bargaining  without  wit- 
nesses 




Bond, serf, slave 
A standardized fine of   sod 
Lat  ' cancellarlus ' , one of  King s oft~cers 
I lt a handrail  A ' guider ' in a las-sult 
-4 territoiial subdlvlslon, containing two or more 
' cymwds '  Cf  ' a hundred '. 
A relation, friend 
Return to home of  relatives 
Relations, relatlonship, clan 
Departure from home of  relatives 
OW  equal to ' cargycllwyn'  See Pt I, c  xv. 
Home  Llt  settlement of  ' car ' 
Froin  'ceg',  a  lnoutli  A  pleader,  one  who 
babbles 
Protector,  saviour  A  specid1 cldsb  of  witness, 
prote~t~ng  title or  status  Obsolete  In  latter  - 
sense 
Spear  penny,  an  additional  levy  towards  a 
blood hne 
Nation,  tribe,  ~lan,  relations  of  an individual, 
specles 
Group of  relations forining a ' gwely ' 
Adjective froill ' cenedl ' 
' The  pale  of  the  warrantor ' ,  the  precincts 
within which one person  had right to protect 
another 
Renletnbrancer  Witness  attesting proceedings 
in Cou~t MW  recorder 
Tlje recolle~t~on  of  ,Court,  wrongly rendered as 
record of  Court 
Ongin  dubious  Equals  either  '  corldn '  or 
' corfflan ' 
A graveyard 
A sheep-fold 
Maiden-fee,  payable  to bride  Colloq  MW  a 
peat-basket 
Lit  a pestilence  I lne payable to wife  by un- 
faithful husband 
Unsightly scar 
A ineasure equal to 8 bushels 
Startlng  departure 
Uillawful or unkind departure 
Ploughing  In Flint ' an acre ' 
Meainng  dubious  Inqulry as to stock,  or full 
inqulry,  or  supplicatio~l  of  stock  or  neigh- 
bourhood 
OW  present,  grant:  penslon  Employed  in 
Triads as equal to  maintenance ' , otherwise 
unknown in that sense 
Stock 




Cylch dt  frgwn  (dour- 
gon) 
Cplch grcor ton : 
C3lrh Izrbbogvddzon 
(hrbbcgotltzon) 
Cj  lch Mnwr. 
CyriiwJ 
Cyniyn (cciizniz, k~tnatz) 
Cynlzwyszad, cjnhnsedd. 
Cynnogvn f 
Cynn~j,:  cvnnzj.~ 
Cynwvs (kenwcs, 
wenwes) 





Dndnnhrtdd  t 
Dndferwyr t 
Datvt-d t 




E\change  barter, sale 
Law 
1.1t  hateful law  Query, is not ' dtgas '  a deriva- 
tive from ' atcgu '  to stay, and not '  atgasu ', 
to hate, where used in laws ' 
The Laws of  the Court 
The Laws of  tlie Count? 
lrr  Owell  renders  as  d  piece  of  flesh  with  a 
hundred returns orperpleuities '  ' Canystyr ' of 
very doubtful meanlng , it  conveys apparently 
soine sense of  en~barr~~ssrnent  In  laws phrase 
applied  to a  particular  offence  of  receiving 
stolen flesh 
Progress  circi lt  tour 
Progress of  the otter Iiounds 
' Greorlon ', pl  of  obs  ' grcanr '  I'rogrcss  of 
the lierdsincn 
Progress of  the falconers 
The Grand Tourn  thc grcat circuit of  thc royal 
houscl1old 
1  o equalize 
To take 
Alcl,  help  Speciallq, a  levy of  cattlc in South 
Wales 
The ~hief  territorldl unit in \\'ales 
Bequest 
MW. lncluslo~i  I'ermission,  inc estiiure 
Debtor 
OW  meant  ' toil ', licncc  ' tir cynnyf '  meant 
land. acqulred by toil ', i e  self-acquired land 
Is  ofteilconfuscd with ' cynnydd ',  which means 
' increase ', ' tir ~ynnydd  ' meaning, therefore, 
lancl  of  increase, i e  also self-acquired  land, 
dddit~onal  to  inherited land 
MW  contents  01% perinission  Term used in 
Surveys for shdre of  an illegitirlldte son in land, 
obtained ' permissively ' 
Lit  public ~ttach An  offence  of  gang-rioting. 
In  MW  ' cyhocddus ' 
To compare 
A reputed or illeg~tlmatc  soil 
Collateral  heir  The  particle  ' cyt '  conveys  a 
sense of  ' lolntness ' 
Movable property 
Idit uncovering  A special land-sult 
Iiestorers (of boundaries) 
Income, funeral-fees, masses for dead 
Detention or seimre of  stolen property 
\wearing  In Court  especially to  value 
brom ' dangos ' to show  Showing, claim 
Lit  ' gift  of  food '  Iiender In  kind due from 
unfree 
Dechvetc (dechvef)  vhnn  The beginning of  partition 
Dedfryd hawl  Lit  verdlct on clam 
Defnydd hawl  Cause of  actlon  subject of  claim 
Dsalwv  One who avengcs  In Triafs, a fictitious offic~al. 
Dtasbnd  T  t~wck  annwfn  Lit  ' a cry over the abyss  A special claim for 
sharc in ancestral land 
Dzddj m  Nothingness,  a nullity 
Dtl>sdawd,t dtlpsvwydd.  Guaranteed soundness (of title). 
Dtrwy  A standardized fine of  f  3 
Dofod t  Household effects, from ' dofi ', to domesticate. 
DofinetA t  Hospit~lity,  billets 
Dognfnnng  7  From  dogn ',  enough,  ' manag,  mynegi ', to 
report  Sufhclent report  A  speclal  kmd  of 





Est)  n 
Etzfcdd 
Lat  ' obitus '  Ascension  fee, heriot 
Gratuitous loan  equals Roman ' commodatum '. 
MW  used biblically =loan 
Heir apparent  EP~  ' Atheling ' 
See ' tyddyn '  SW form 
Lat ' obsonium '  Foocl eaten  with bread , relish, 
sauce 
A land measure  The Welsh acre 
On to invest,  MW  to  prolong 
MW  heir,  OW  lineal descendant 
17~02,  fcol  Milk-can, bowl 
l'fyrn~gvwydd.  Ferocity,  ferocious or cunnlng act 
Gnfael  MW  hold, tenure  OW  a hold~ng  of  land 
Gn7nnnc  MW  slaying  011  also compensation for slaying, 
blood-fine 
Genz n nzectkrzn.  Birtll'and  rearing (to bring forth and to rear) ; 
an  arddelw ' in theft cases 
Goddnu,t ode?/ 7  Intention, design 
Gofynznd  Lit  questioning  A land-suit , 
Gogoy (yog~)  nc r/vnn  T  A levy In  klnd in Merioncth  Gogor '=  winter 
(?  ebmn)  food for cattle, provisions, but '  gogr '=  sieve. 
' Ebran '  in  MW = provender,  bpt  ' efran ' 
appears  to  be  connyted  with  yfe? ',  to 
drlnk  Rendered  as  food  and  drink  Cf 
Gogor (gogr)  nc Izyl  t 
(MW hzlif). 
Golwe 





Gosgordd j  bvenzn 







Gwnvndo:  f 
Gwernrchadw (fr gwnr- 
clzod) 
Gwnvfheg dzjach. 
' gogor ac hyl ' 
A levy in kind in Merioneth  Lit provisions and 
drink 
Sight 
To ascend, coine Into possession 
End or final adjustnlent of  partition 
Surety In Lritne, ' obllgor ' 
Suretyship in crime, bail 
Intrusion, trespass, tyranny, invasion. 
Thc Icing's retinue 
lhe  grades of  land 
Denial, to deny 
MIY  dowry  OW  a  daughter's  share  in  her 
father's movables 
' Blood-lancl ' 
Protcctor, pledgcr 
Loose, faulty  defect11 e 
Support, prop 
Delusive, causing downward descent 
Occupation, haling custody 
Llt  cattle without surety, or cattle of  defective 
lineage  A  term  applied  to the liab~lity  of 
maternal relatives of  an unaffiliated son, com- 




Gwetszon bl chnn, gwns- 
ston brchan, wasszon 
baghetn 
Gwelztnfod, wely tafod 
Gwel~  ,  gwelygovd,t  ~elc 
Gwelyog t 
Gwenrgnzd t cacth, 
gweznyddol cneth. 
(7wcstfn t 
~wzrkni  wzt yoiz~~zizs  t 
Gwzr lelnd 
Gwobi,  gobr 





Gwrthpryn,t wvtlrprzd  t 
Gwrthfyst 
Gwvthwan,~  gwvthneu t 
Gwybyddzad t. 
Gd~nwyu  t 
Gwyv gwnrth 
Gwvv ma/ 








Rv~zafgwyv  v cenked- 
loedd 
Hynafwj  1r)net. h3 naf- 
gw)  r or hetznzd gdad 
Henw).rat, Aentcrznzd 
cyn~wd 
I ladvad ancj nnjrchawl 
Lladvad cynn)vchnwl 
Lleduch t 
I ledtv cyhoeddog 
I  ftw 
I loegv 
Llog 
Lit service  The ploughinan's '  erw '  in co-tlllage. 
Scattered lands 
Lit  lineages  tribes  Small tribal entities 
Lit  freeman  The absolver 
Youths, military retainers 
Tongue wound 
h$W  bed  OW  a clan association holding  land 
jointly 
Adjectivc from ' gwely ' 
Domestic servant or bondman. 
Lei y in hind on free tribesmen=iunc 
To be innocent 
Lit  the truth of  the country, verdi~t 
Reward, fee , son~ctimcs='  amobyr 
Invcstiturc fee 
Mariied uife  especially 111 laws one nlarried with 
church ccrcmonies 
' Good man ', gentleman 
' The man who comes ' ,  first settler 
I rce man 
Return of  prlce 
Counter-witness 
Llt  couiltertlirust  to reject  An  objection  to 
adniissibillty of  witness 
Lit  ' knower '  A class of  witnesses who knew ; 
'  eyewitness ' 
Armed band of  youths, bodygudrd 
Lit  Inen of  work  Crown boon-tenants. 
Lit  inen of  coin  Crown cash-tenants 
Pledge, ' wadiurn ' 
Arrogance, impudence 
Summer farm  suininei grazing grounds. 
A pollutcd or forfelted house 
An unfree land-suit, clalming equity or equation, 
Claimant  creditor 
Elder,  used in Trlads to designate the fictitious 
seven elders 
The older inen of  the klnsmen 
Elders of  the countryside 
Elders of  the ' cylnud ' 
llieft  stolen propcrty  In mdrriage law a mar- 
riagc n~tliout  consent of  kin 
Theft absent  I e  where goods not found 
Theft present, i e  where goods produced. 
Mean descent 
Notorious or public thlef 
Light,  appearance  sight, colour  An  informa- 
tion on which charge of  theft could be based 
In 1\IW  sense of  ' Ilght'  found only in  com- 
pounds 
England 
Lat  ' locatio '  Hire, hiring fee.  MW. interest 
Llw.  Oath 
Llw gwetlydd t  Oath of  a free man, i e  absolver 
Llys  Court 
Llyszant t  Rejection  Principal  grounds  of  objeckon  to 
admissibility of  witnesses 
Alab atlzhcurdzg t 
hlab dzoddef 
Mach t 
Mach cynnogyn t 
Afnchnz t 
dlacwyayntd,t innchwyczt 





4 son on sufferan~e  or suspected 
A doubted or waiting son 
Surety 
A debtor surety 
Suretyship 
1 Youths of  the bodyguard 
MW  manor  OW  territorial units 
Lat  inajor '  One  of  tlie  principal  distrlct 
officers  ' Land-inaer ',  an  Inferior  unfree 
officer 
The lord's hoine-farm 
I,at  ' ina~ula  '  Lit  a snare  knot, bond  Thc 
bond  of  agreeinent  In  co-tillage  Cf  Italian  - 
' inaglia '=a llnk 
Maternity  The right of  a son of  d  ' Cyinraes ' 
and a foreigner 
A knight  OW  d horse~nan 
LI~  dedd liouse  OW  escheat  on  account  of 
intestacy 
Nar, netuznt , nuv,  A nephew 01  glandson= 1,a1  ' ~icpos  '. 
nez, nvernt 
Nnwdd  Piotection, l?re~iiicts 
~Vernf  rddo, ncssn  f  NealcsL of  kin  Lit  next to Inin 
add& 
Nod  Marked  l.at  ' notum ' 
Odyn 
Ofev. 
Paeo1.t  bayol t 









Slip, flolll ' pdllu ' 
Clan or tribal chief 
Chief  of  Song 
The supreme (king) 
The fire back-stone 
Head  ol  household  Comnidnder  of  Klng's  - 
bodyguard 
Pevclrenogrceth.  Belongings 
Przod  Wedded 
Pvzodns  A marriage (especially in cliurcli) 
~'vzodolder  OW  right of  exclu-,ire  occupation  Mm. owner- 
s111p 
Pvzodor, -rzwr  One entitled to ' priodolder ' 
I'tcnt  cyjlog, reflo  Lit  fee pound  Probably equals ' tunc '. 
J'yizf(~rch  t  5umpter horse  Source of  revenue 
Hhnglnw, vcrglot  The reeve  MW  a deputy. 
Rhntlh, t vnzth  Body of  compurgators 
Rhnn, van  Division, share, partition. 
Rhandzv, mndiv  A land measure 
Rhtent, rhznznf  Ancestors 
Rhzngjll, rzngyll  The beadle 
Rhodd j  cenedl  Rod  Gift of  kln  The highest form of  marriage 
o cenedl 
i?lbodd, rod  Glft. 444  INDEX 
res~orislb~l~ty  for  acts  of,  11  3  j  /  ot witnesses, 11  j  33 
Anglo-Saxon Law-cont 
81,  86  et seq ,  I 16, 127 et seq , 
I  58 et seq , 168,  169,  175,  180, 
181,  182, 183,  184,  187,  189, 
190,  191,  192,  213,  214,  21  5, 
216,  231,  232, 235,  "9,  257, 
278, 279,  280, 286, 288, 290, 
296, 299, 304, 308, 309, 310. 
311,  319.  333, 338, 341.  347, 
352, 378, 379, 380, 383, 389, 
390, 391,  392. 398,  412 
Anlmals, law of, 11  28,  .17 et seq 
of  blrth and rearlng, 11  I 52,  317, 
316,  353. 384 
of  custody  before  loss,  11  I 52, 
317,  318.  383 
of  custody of guests, 11  155,  317, 
346,  349,  384,  399,  400 
of  fact, 11  348,  349,  403 
of  innocence,  11  383,  393 et seq , 
401 
of  restoration of  property, 11  qor 
of  status or law, 11  317,  348,  349. 
159  See also Res judicata 
339,  341 
Ardreth, 1  302 ct seq ,  11  431 
Arfon, pr~vileges  of, 1  25,  306, 330, 
338,  416,  11  44,  204,  263 
Arglwyddl, or Lords, the, 1  19,  30, 
24 et seq , 206, 207 
as ' tafodogion ',  11  277,  31  2 et 
Seq . 3  30 
uorths of, 1  25,  356,  455,  456 
Argyfreu, 1  404,  415,  416 
Arson  or F'lre,  law of,  11  97,  164 
et seq 
'gala~zasdoesnotfollow',11  97,166 
In other systems, 11  168  et seq 
permissible, 11  I  G7,  I 68 
su~ts  ve, 11  306,  307,  404 
tortuous naturc of, 11  165  et seq 
Arwdcsat  See Avouchment 
Asnph, Llyfr Goch, I  149  et passim 
Assault  11  179 
Attestators  or ' lystion ', 11  277, 
311, 318,  320, j",  334, 325, 
333. 334,  335,  368,  406,  409 
objections, to, 11  331  ct seq 
Avenger  or  dialwr ', I  45,  46,  qS, 
it scq , 96  et seq 
self-defence by, 11  44 
sults re, 11  375 
uorths of, 1  372 et seq, n 40, 
in other systems, 1  i7; ct seq 
Anllocldog, anlloeddog, 1  I  bc~,  I  81 
Appeal  See Mutual pledglng 
Arb~tration  in  early  law,  11  I  g  j, 
213,  315,  219,  'ji)  ct seq, 299, 
49,  73,  7$ 76 
Avoucher or  arddelwr ', 1  45,  46, 
13angor  d~ocese,  Extent of,  1  147, 
276 et passim 
Hzntshment, 1  184,  11  73,  71,  155, 
156,  I74 
liard of  Houscl~old,  1  ;4 
I3a1  ds in the Laws, I  197 et seq 
Hargalnlng, Forms of, 11  3  et seq . 
19  ,  in  other  systems,  11  1'3 
46,  492 73,  74,  75 
Avo~lchmcnt  or ' arddelw ', I  74,  75, 
11  346,  347 et seq , j5 5, 356, 
357 358, 359,  360, 362, 363, 
364,  365. 366,  367. 3.3, 371, 
375, 376, 377, 376, 381,  381, 
385,  401.  402.  404 
in other systems, 1  74,  11  337, 
389 et seq .  405,  406 
of  alltudship, 11  330 et seq 
of  ' arwaesaf ', 11  27,  30, 153,  157, 
200, 283, 284, 337, 383, 385 
et seq ,  401. 
ct scq 
Bees, law of,  1  775,  11  55,  56 
Benffyg, 1  254,  11  28 ct seq 
5i11ts  on, 11  375 et seq 
Bequest, 11  34 ct seq , 197 
Blank days, 11  275,  379,  280,  2b2 
33lcddyn of  Powys, 1  6, 7,  11  155, 
223,  226 
13len1ishcs affectlilg succession, 1  29, 
24s 349 
Blood hne, 1 66.  07,  Ob,  77,  84.  90, 
91,  92,  252, 253, 361  et seq, 
42% 437.  4479 455 
augmcntat~on  of,  1  363,  11.  I", 
I 26 
tllstrlbut~on  of,  1  77,  11  106  et 
5cq 
cxcmptions troll1 liability for, 11. 
lub,  109 
In  otller  systems, 1  363,  j64 et 
seq , 11  127  et seq 
levy of, 1  84,  65,  11  08 ct scq 
of  ind~viduals,  I  32,  78,  80,  172, 
301  et seq . 437 
remvery of, 11  I  LO  et seq 
Blood-land, I  I;,  184,  252,  "3,  11 
110,  I1  l 
Bond-lands, the, i  265 ct s~q 
enfra~lchisement  of,  I  17,  32,  11 
415 41'5 
' Bonds of  the Free ', the, 1  189 
Bonds of  Su~t,  11  342,  343 
Bonherltlig class, the, 1  18,  40-1 57 
organization of, in the Laws, 1 63 
et  seq ,  summary  of  con- 
clus~ons re,  I  55  et  seq  , 
theories as to, 1  44  et seq. 
privileges of, 1  174  et scq 
worths of, 1  358,  362 
Boon-w orks, I  33  j  et seq. 
Boundaries,  breach of, 11  I 57,  261, 
275.  404 
demarcation of, 11  263 et seq 
law  of, 11  260  et  seq , In Gernlan~c 
laws, 11  266 
explanation of, summary of, 1  55 
et  seq , 59,  60, 82,  83 
In the laws, 1  63  et seq , 88,  89 
In the Triads, I  64 
Sir P  Vlno~radoff's  vlews  re.  1 
Caergybi cl~urch,  1  140 
Caerndrfon, Record  of, 1  139,  275, 
11  417  et scq , 426  et passlm 
Caeth, the, or bondman, 1  18,  172, 
173,  177.  426 
responsib~lity  for, 1  17  3.  11  288 , 
in other systc~~is,  1  17; 
wortlls of, I  .358,  ;62. 11  I  18 
prellnunary reports vc, 1  77  5.r 
also Elders of  Country 
' stays ' of,  11  261  et  seq , 325,  1" 
suits re, 11  209,  pleadings in, n 
364,  365 
Brcwer, the, 1  34 
Criduw, 11  3,  4,  q,  30,  31, 35,  ;o j, 
376,  379 
suits on, 11  275,  374 
Hromfield  and  Yale, Extents of, I 
149,  276,  11  423,  424  et passim 
PJrynmor-Jones,  Slr  J , 1  47,  r 67, 
440 11  91,  174, 
B~iilding  on  oth~r  s  land,  11  149, 
'85. 275,404 
Eulldlngs, repalr of, I  318 et seq 
wort11 of, I  378,  379 
Butler, the, 1  34,  36 
13utter-rents, 1  294,  295,  296 
Camlwrw,  1  2<;1  73,  1  57, 174  et 
passlm 
Candle-bearer, the, I  34,  37 
Canghellor, the, 1  33, 38,  80, x  3, 
306,  455.  11  206,  264,  265,  274, 
287.  202 
- 
52  et seq 
welyauc ', 1 66,  68,  85 
words Interchangeable w~th,  1 71 
(Scc Kin,  Officers alleged  of  kin, 
et passim ) 
Cliicf of  Song, 1  34,  198.  199 
Children  law of, 1  382 et seq , 417, 
418 11  81,  82,  83,  151  , In other 
systcms. i  383 et seq , 412 
majority of, I  382, 384,  386,  11 
27  5 
rcsponslbility for, I  382,  11  151 
status of, 1  57,  382 ct seq 
Cli~~stianity,  effect of, on status, 1 
IS, 16 
Chnstnlas hens, 1  295 et seq 
Church, the, 
Celtic priesthood of, 1  19G 
Courts of, 11  I 51,  197  et seq  ; in 
wortiys oi, 1  358,  362 
C'lntref,  the, 1  24,  25,  21  2 
Capon-rents,  i  296,  297  See also 
Christmas hens 
Castles, maintenance of, 1  299,  726,  -. . 
338 
Castle-uard, 1  340,  341 
Cattle-trespass,  law of,  11  37  et 
seq . I49 
' nets ' In, 1 a7,  11  44 
Cause of  action, 11  343 et seq 
Caveat Einptor, rulc of, 11  I  3,  25. 
Ceidwad  or protector,  11  283, 31  r, 
317  et seq ,  329 et seq , 349, 
355, 357. 358. 360, ,361.  363, 
365. 366. 367, 384, 387, 396, 
399 
objections to, 11  318,  329 et seq 
qualifications of, 11  317 
Cenedl, the, 
existing explanat~ons  of, 1  44  et 
seq  ,  prllna  facie  objections 
to, 1  50  et seq 
England, 11  198,  21  3- 
- 
enfranclnsen~ent  by  See Status 
e~communication  by,  I  197,  11 
322 
gifts to, 1  194,  207,  208,  21  I , in 
Irish law, 1  2  I I. 
In Wales, 1  8,  I  I, I  a,  I  93 et seq , 
276,  328,  358,  392,  455 
influence of. on codification. 1  I 
et scq  ,  on  marrlage  law,  1 
392,  393,  408.  414,  430  et scq . 
451  ct seq ,  11  197  , on wills, 11 
34 et seq , 197 
ju~~sdictio~~  of  courts of,  1  3;7, 
362,  11  36,  180,  187,  197  ct seq 
lands  of,  1  194,  196,  207, 205, 
338 et passim 
See  also  Uangor,  Priesthol~n,  St 
Asnph, St David's 
offences~n,  1  197,ll  180,  181,  185 
supremacy of  Iiing over, 1  25,  26, 
193  et seq, 205, 207, 208,  11 
19s.  199,  200,  209 
C~vll  obligations, law of, 11  I et seq 
Clans, the, 
growth of  new, 1  56,  57. 
in Anglesea, 1  104,  I 39 et seq 
111  Bangor diocese, 1  149 
in Brolnfielcl and Yale, 1  105,  149 
et seq 
in Caernarfoii, 1  104,  142  et seq 
In Denbigh, r  105 et seq 
in Doinesday, 1  I  56 
In Llyfr Goch Asaph, 1  149 
in Merioneth, 1  105,  145  et seq 
In Prlestllolm extent, 1  147. 
in St  Da~ld's  1  147,  149 
111 Soutl~  Walcs, 1  I 56. Clans, the-rollt 
in the surveys, 1  10; et seq. 
in Wales, 1 60, 81, 83, 216 
meanlng of  word, 1  5  3,  5  5, 56 
orlgin of names of  Welsh, i  104 
of  Braint Hlr, 1  104, 124. I27 et 
seq ,I  37,196,302,303,346,399 
of  Collwyn ap Tango, I  104, 143, 
I44 
of Ednowa~n  ap Bradwen, 1  105, 
I 46 
of  Edred  ap hlarchudd, 1  rod, 
106 et seq , 226  23 j 
of  Efelyw, I  I 16  et seq , 3;6,  238 
of  Gwalchmai  I  142 
of  Lweirydd  ap Rhys  Goch,  I 
104, 141, 11  419 
of  Hedd  hlolxynog  or  Rand 
Vaphan, 1  104, I 30,  I 32,  233, 
23< 11  429 
of  Hwfd  ap  Cyi~ddclw,  1  104, r 39, 
140, 315,  322, 11  418 
of  Tnethlan ap Carwed  1  I 21 
of  Llywarch ap 13ran. 1  104, I 40, 
141 
of  Llywarch ap Cynddelw, 1  2335 
of  Maelog Crwnl, 1  104, 142, 1433 
184 
of  Marchwithian or Cadwgan ap 
Ystrwth,  1  104,  121  et seq , 
236 
of  Rhys Goch or Idenertli, 1  I 32 
et seq ,  238, 11  429 
of  Wyrion Alurecl, I  I 20 
of  Wyrion  Eden',  I  I I a,  I I ;, 
114,  143,  1-46,  zbo,  281,  289, 
304,  3'39  314,  339.  340s  399, 
11  420 
smaller, 1  I 35  et seq , 141 et seq 
(See  also  Cencdl,  (.wely,  and 
IZin ) 
Classes, in other systems, I  18, 19, 
41, 43.  43 
in Wales, I  I 8, I 9 
Cledran Gwaesafw, 1  255 
Clerics,  offences by  (See Church, 
courts of  ) 
sons of, successlon by, 1  249 
status of  See Status 
wort11 of, 1  65, 357, ;j8  11  8: 
Clod-fee, 1  170, 280 
Codes, the Welsh, 
amendments In, 1  6, 7  8 
' ancient ' character of, 1  8, 10 
commentaries on, in Bk  11, 1  5, 
-" 
in Wales, 1  4 et  seq 
influence  of  Church  on  (See 
Church) , of  King on, 1  I, 6 
Coercion, 11  6, I I 
Cof  Llys  See  Court, record of 
Cofx~adorion  See Attestators 
Collateral, meanlng of, 1 23?,11  104 
successlon, 1  22  j, 229 et  seq ,  246, 
248 , 111  Irish law, 1 99 
Commorth  1  ?oo et seq 
Cornpurgation  See Raith 
Contract  Cee An~od 
competency to, 11  4, 5, 12 
in other systems, 11  20 et Seq 
overrides law, 1  7, 360 
Contract men  See Amodwyr 
Contracting out, 1  7, 396, 11  6  j 
Cook, the, i  34.  17 
Corn co~ntracts,  11  6 
Corn-rents, I  295 et seq 
Co-tillage  In Ireland, 11  59 
in trefgefery vlll~s,  I  207, 268, 11  -  - 
5  6 
law of, 11  57 et  seq 
su~ts  of, 11 63 
Counter-contrntlon,  proof  of,  11 
333 et seq 
Court,  contempt  of,  11  185,  zib, 
284, 291, 295, 298, 409, 410 
-fees, 1  27, u  203, 209, 233,  123, 
205 
non-appearance  in,  e\cuses  for, 
11  i95, 296 
record of, 11  320,  3'1,  724, 408 
Courts, cor~vocat~on  of, I  38 
ecclesiastical  See Chur~h 
growth of, 11  195,  196, 218, 239  - 
et seq 
un  otlier systcins, 11  195. 196. 21  3 
et seq 
of  cymwd, 11  63, 201, 203 et seq 
of lords, 11  204, 208 et seq , 435 
of maerdref, 11  203, 1-87 
royal supreme, 11  198, 201, 208 
et seq 
sltt~ng  in and cenue of,  11  206. 
292, 393 
Courtsand ludiciary, I  25, 26.11  195 
et seq 
Cownrd~ce,  challenge for, 11  3  31 
Cow levy, I  287,  301 
Cowyll, i  401, 402, 415, 416, 11  183 
Cr~rne,  pre\~ention  of, 11  I 88 et seq 
Crimes and Torts, law of, 11  65  et 
seq  ,  pleatlings  in  suits  011 
~n~scellaneous,  11  404 
Cyfarch Cyfyll, I  5 I,  67, 68, 11  I r I, 
112. 
Cyfarwys, 1  176 
Cpfreithiau y Wlad ac y Llys, 1  33 
Cyhyrn eanastyr, 11  157, 307 
Cylch, I  286,  305  et seq 
dourgon, i  317 
greorion, 1  3  16, 31 7 
hebbogyddion, 1  31 5, 316 
of IZlng, 1  33, 305 
of Maer  and Canghellor,  1  306, 
1s 
MbS  of, 1  5 
not immutable, 1  7 
rat~fication  of, by Pope, I  6 
references to, passlln 
Codit~catioin  in  otller  5)  \lenls,  I  I, 
3'37,  309 
of  officers, 1  37,  38,  307 
of  penteulu, I  305,  306, 30'3 
of  Queen, 1  30.  3o6, 307 
(Sce also Pastus 
Cross,  inlunction  of  the,  J  -136, 11 
1x0, 112, 149, 245, 248, 273 et 
seq , 40 3  404 ,  breach  of, 11. 
27,  , breach of, smts  re,  11  306, 
403, 404 
~Gnrnd,  the,  I  z5: 38,  212,  213 et 
passlm 
Cynhasedd, I  27,  263, 277 et seq 
Cyrch Cyhoeddog, 11  I So, 306, 4u.1 
Dadanhudd, in Irelanrl,  I  262 
meaning and klnds of, 1  260  et 
seq,  11  260.  358 
suits for, 1  254, 258,  259 et seq , 
11  291,  322,  329,  353,  358, 
plead~ngs  in, 11.  358 et seq 
Daered, 11  34 
Dafydd ap Llywelyn, 1  6, 207 
Daly Lledrad, 11  381, 401, 402 
Damage,  compensation  for  Sec 
Worths, szrb  $aot$z 
Ilamd\+ng,ii 381, 382, 395, 401,402 
Da~vnbmyd.  I  26, 286, 291 et seq 
Dead testimony, 11  325, 326 
Death penally, 1  168,ii 72, 76, I 26, 
2, 3  Cunetlda, 1  9, 34, 28 et passiln 
on women, 11  I 5  2 
Debtor  See Surety 
Debtor-surety, 11  I 3 et seq , 18 
Debts, ancestral, payment of, 1  232, 
253, ii  18, 48 
Deeds, as causes of  action, 11  345 
Delict and sin, dist~i~ction  between, 
1  195 
Denb~gh,  Survey of, 1  275,  11  415 
et seq ,  424 et seq ,  427 et seq , 
et passim 
Den~als  In  suits, 11  346,  355,  356, 
357,  359.  362.  364.  365.  366. 
Distress, general law of, 11  8, 195 
in Irish law, 11  239 et seq ,  259, 
289 
in other systems, 11  257 et seq, 
In  Welsh law, 11  25,  245 et seq , 
367. 411. 412 
pledges in, 1;  248 et seq , value 
of, 11  250 et  sea 
property  exemptL  from,  ii  254, 
255 
sitting '  dharna ' in, 11  241, 247 
Divorce, law of, i  414 et seq , in 
other systems, 1 421 et seq 
Doctor,  the,  1  34,  36,  369,  370. 
11  97 
~ocumentar~  ev~dence,  1  254,  11 
,311, 325 
Dofraeth, 1  164, 177, 307. 
Dognfanag,  ii  154,  155, 278,  289, 
290,  1-01, 316,  397.  398 
Doomsday Book, 1  I I, 42,  11  168 
et passlni 
Doorward, the, i  34, 36, 37, 11  83 
I)os, 1  402 
Dyfnwal  Moelmud,  accession  of, 
1  28 
cotlification by, I  4.  5 
measurements by, i  21  2 
Triads of, 1  5, 47, 49 et passim. 
Ebedim, 1  27,  196, 245 n , 269, 277 
ct seq ,  ii  198 
Eclnu yn, 11  28 et seq , 375 et  seq 
Edl~ng,  the, 1  28, 29, 31 et seq ,  38, 
278,  336, 357,  361. 
Ednyfed  l'ychan,  1  107,  108, 113, 
115. 247 
Elders of  Country, 1 77,11  265, 292, 
1-93, 3255.  354 
of  Cyrnwd, 1  77 
the Seven,  1  45,  46,  47.  48.  76, 
et seq 
Enllyn, 1  2b5 
Entourage, tile Royal, 1  30  et seq 
Equation, the law of,  1  220,  221, 
11  2658  iV8  333,  335 
hrror, 11  147, 148, I 56 
111  pleadings,  11  340,  341,  344, 
345 
Erw, i  x  3 
5eq . 405 
- 
oral, in Welsh law, 11  31  I  et seq 
theft of, 11  32, 289  right to  lead. 11  328,  329 
Dilvsrwvdd  See ' Teithl '  tradit~on  as.  9.) c 
3b7,  374,  375,  376,  377,  401, 
40  2 
Deposlts (Adneu),  11  31 et  seq ,  I 5 7 
burning of, 11  166 
suits and plead~nps  ve.  11  375  et 
. .'  5'3 
Diriefw< i  23 et passim  ~$elghlng,  11  335, 407 
Dirwy,  I  27,  11  73,  154, 155,  174,  Fvldence and Proof, law of, 11  301 
402 et pass~rn  et 5eq ,  407, 408 
unextinguished  See Trefgefery 
Escheats, 1  zoG,  231 et seq , 142 et 
seq , 246,  269,  282 et passim 
Evltlence,  land  marks as,  11  325, 
;  zG seq., 256. 
Fishing, ii. 54, 55. 
Foetus, worth of, i. 363, 365. 
Food-forbiddance, ii. 74, 295. 
Food-levies, i. 284 el: seq. 
Footholder, the, i. 34, 37. 
Forests,  dues from,  i.  316,  142  et 
' Evidences ', trial by, ii.  281,  283,  Gafael, explanations of  term, i. 45, 
302,  311 et seq.,  346 et seq.,  1  46, $0, 53, 54, 54, 223. 
.  - 
seq. 
rights in, i. 27, 342et seq. 
Forfeiture, i. 27, 80, ii. 32, 73, 152, 
153, 155, 156, 157, 182, 411. 
367,  370. 403.  408; 
(See also  Attestators ,  'Ceidwad ', 
and ' Eyewitnesses '.) 
Exchange.  (See Sale.) 
suits  and  pleadings  re,  ii.  375 
et seq. 
Fosterage, i. 385. 
Fraud, ii. 6, I I. 
Free  and  Unfree,  the, ' daer ' and 
' saer ' in Ireland, i. I g, 43, 209 
in the Laws, i. 84, 87. 
in the Surveys, free, i. 105 et seq., 
ii. 415, 416, 420 et seq., 423 et 
seq. ; unfree,  i. 160, 161, 162, 
ii. 423 et seq. 
summary of  meaning of, i. 61, 62, 
et seq. 
in other systems. i. 41, 42. 
in Wales, i. 105 et seq., 16o et seq. 
men  neither  free  nor  unfree,  i. 
191, 192 et passim. 
Freedom, meaning of, i. 40. 
to move, i. 175, 178 et seq., 203. 
French  and  Norman-French  law, 
ii. 125, 158, 405. 
' Fuidhir ' in Irish Law,,.i. 19.  167, 
171, 172, 211,  270,  11.  243. 
104: 
Germanic  Tribal  Laws,  references 
to, i. 2, 3, 19, 31, 94, 95, 97, 99, 
165,  169.  173,  195,  250.  257, 
316,  361,  365,  366,  371,  372, 
3779  378,  379,  388,  3893  3909 
402,  408,  409,  410,  411,  412, 
Execution  of  Judgement,  ii.  228,  226. 
249, 256,259, 407 et seq.  i  (et passim.) 
Extents and Surveys, i.  10 et scq.  I  Galanas or Homicide. 
See  also sub. nom.  /  accidental  and  negligent,  ii.  gr. 
Extradition, ii. 206,  207.  1  94 et seq. 
ICyewitnesses, ii. 277, 31 I, 318,  319,  /  aggravated, ii. 91, 97 et seq., 12;. 
422,  423,  429:. 430,  431,  433, 
434, 454. 455, 1'.  14. 23, 32, 43. 
47. 48.  54.  78. 88, 89, I 15, 116. 
117, 141 et seq., 162, 163, 169, 
170,  175,  181,  182,  184,  187, 
191,  232,  235,  258,  260,  266, 
273,  279,  287.  297,  3008  3'18 
319.  338.  341,  347.  352,  357, 
365.  378,  379,  380,  392,  405, 
406, 412. 
Gift, ii. 33. 
Gilclas, i. 21, ii. 196. 
Giraldus  Canlbrensis,  i.  198,  336, 
339,  414,  421,  4259  430,  431, 
434. ii. 58, 261, 337,  339. 
Glove-rents, 1.  35 I. 
Gobr Estyn.  See  Cynhasedd. 
Gofyniad, suit of, i. 253,  254. 
(;ogr ac Efran, i. 308. 
321. 329 et seq., 344, 355,  356, 
357.  358.  359,  360,  361,  362. 
,363,  364,  365,  367,  373,  376, 
377,  378,  387,  395,  396,  397, 
401, 402, 403, 404. 
in other systems, ii. 319. 323. 
objections to, ii. 146, 321 et seq., 
3.31, 333 et seq. 
Faderfio, i. 21 I, 402. 
Falconer, the, i. 34, 36, 37, 38, 286, 
307. 
False claim, punishment for, ii. 279. 
Gogr ac Hyl, i. 30% 
Gorfodogaeth, ii. 8,  188 et seq. 
Gowyn,i. 405, 413, 415, 416,ii. 80. 
Grand Tourn, the, i. 306,  309. 
Grcom, the Chief, i. 34. 
Guardians, ad litem, ii. 288. 
by  son  of  Welshwoman,  ii.  I 13 
et seq. 
by waylaying, ii. 97.  125, 126. 
calamitous, i. 68. 
exacting  share in, ii. 85,  106 et 
seq. 
justifiable,  i.  419,  420,  ii.  91  et 
seq., 403. 
law of, ii. go  et seq. ;  in other 
systems, ii. I 27 et seq. 
of  relatives,  ii.  I I 2  et seq. ;  in 
other systems, ii. I I 5  et seq. 
suits  for,  ii.  120.  281,  306 ; 
pleadings in, ii. 402, 403. 
of  minors, i. 263, 383. 
Guests,  liability  for.  See  Hospi- 
tality, law of. 
Gwaddol, i. 389, 402, 431, 
Gwarchadw  or  occupation,  i.  215, 
217. 
Father, as tafodiog, ii. 277, 313.  tortuous  or  criminal, ii. go,  97, 
Fencing dues, i. 341.  ~zgetseq. 
Ferries, i. 334, 351.  (See also ' Blood-fine '.) 
Ffyrnigrwydd, ii. 148, I 56,  307.  Ganle-laws, ii. 52 et seq., I $2. 
Fighting, ii. 179, 180, 307, 404.  Garden-tenants, i. 161, 265,  272 et 
Fine.  (See Camlwrw and Dirwy.)  passim. 
Common, i. 298,  344.  348  1  Gavel-kind in Ireland, i. 270. 
Fine, the, in Irish law, i, 63, 98 et  Genealogies, value of  Welsh, i. 103, 
fees for, i. 222, 263, 264. 
temporary, i. 222,  223, 249. 
Gwarthekig, i. 300. 
Gwehelythau, the, i. 104, 137, 142. 
Gwely, the, explanations of, i. 45, 
46, 47.  50, 53. 54, 68. 84, 89, go. 
224, 225. 
in the Laws, i. 84, 87, go, 242. 
in the Surveys, free, i. 105  et seq., 
I  recipients of, ii. 84, 85.  ,  (See also Saraad.) 
Horsemanship, right to, i. 177. 
Hospitality, laws of, i. 165, ii. 192. 
Hostages, i. 363, 428 
Household, the, i. 57, 88, 89. 
Houses in Wales, i. 378, ii. 164. 
Hunting, laws of, i. 175, 378, ii. 52 
et seq. 
Huntsman, the Chief, i. 34,  38. 
Hywel Dda, i. I, 5,  8 et passim. 
Illegitimate son, i. 249, 440 et seq., 
45 I et seq.  See  also Affiliation. 
Immovable property,  meaning  of, 
ii. 252. 
Imprisonment, ii. 74, 75. 
Improvements, compensation for, i. 
259,  263. 
Injuries,  compensation  for.  (See 
Limbs, worth of.) 
375. 
Heriot.  (See ' Ebediw '.) 
Highways, crimes on, i. 25, 26. 
Historical changes, affecting Welsh 
law, i. 8,  I 2. 
Honey-rents, i. 287, 296. 
Honour-price,  augmentation  of,  i. 
359, 360, ii. 84, 183. 
contributors to, ii. 85. 
for  particular  offences,  ii.  179, 
180, 183, 402. 
174, ii. 415 et seq. ; unfree,-i. 
160 et seq., 266, ii. 424 et seq. 
neither free nor unfree, i. 191, 192. 
summary of explanation of, i. $5, 
61, 62, 225 et seq. 
(See also Treweloghe.) 
Gwelygord, i. 66, 68, 69, 71, 85, 86, 
87, 148, 232,  242, ii. 271. 
Gwestfa, i. 26,  214,  305.  See  also 
Tunc. 
Gwrdas, i. 33, ii. 292, 293, 409. 
Gwrthneu,  or  grounds  for  contra- 
vention, ii. 322, 323, 334. 
Gwynedd, i. 23, 24 et passim. 
Gwynwyr, i. 336. 
Gwyr  Gwaith,  i.  161, 265,  272  et 
passim. 
Gwyr Mbl, i. 161, 265, 272 et passim. 
Hafodydd, i. 345. 
Harvest-works.  (See '  Boon-works'.) 
Haw1 Cyhyd, suit for, i. 269. 
Herdsman,  as tafodiog. ii. 46.  ZI  q. 
Joinder  of  parties  and  claims,  ii. 
285,  286, 291. 322. 
Jones, Mr. G. A., i. 106, 127. 
Jubanville, M. d'A de, i. 98,  101. 
Judgement, ii. 327,  342. 407 et seq. 
dubious, ii. 228, 410. 
time for,  ii.  281, 282,  284,  295, 
301.  302. 407, 410. 
void, ii. 227, 228. 
Judges,  as tafodogion,  ii.  226,  313 
et seq. 
conspicuous scars, i. 369. 
Innate claims, ii. 286. 
Insolvency, rule of, ii. 16, 248 
Intention in Crime, ii.  70  et seq., 
and under crimes sub. nom. 
in other systems, ii. 75 et seq. 
Interest on Mortgage, i. 254. 
Investiture.  See  Cynhasedd. 
Irish Law, codification of, i. 2, 3. 
references to, i. 29, 43, 98, 99, 100, 
166,  167,  169,  171.  188,  209, 
210,  211,  255,  256,  287,  301, 
357.  360,  364,  370.  371,  381, 
383,  384,  385,  402,  411,  412, 
413.  423,  424.  430.  431.  434. 
453, 454. ii. 20 et seq.. 24.  26, 
28, 29, 33, 36, 42, 47, 48, 54, 55. 
59,  75, 76, 81. 85. 86.  117. 136 
et seq., 158, 159. 169, 175, 176, 
177, 181, 192, 231,  235, 239 et 
seq..  259,  273.  289.  299.  300, 
3'9,  323,  339.  350. 
in other systems, i.  16, 96,  360, 
361, ii. 85 et seq. 
of  corpse, i. go, 96, 360, ii. 79, 81, 
84. 85. 107. 
of individuals,  i.  30,  32,  78,  80, 
355 etseq., 382. 455, 456. 
rates of, I. 355 et seq. 
as witnesses, ii. 320,  321. 
by privilege of  land. i. 359, ii. 204, 
205,  208. 
challenge  of  before  judgement, 
ii. 224. 
duties of, ii. 209, 220 et seq., 407. 
enforcing attendance of, ii. 206. 
3054.2  Gg Partition of  land, I  224, 229 et  seq , 
330. 11  7 
-instances  of, in surveys, i  I 39, 
233 et seq 
-suits  for, 1  230,  262,  11  322, 
329, 353. 361,  pleadings in, 11 
361 et seq 
Pastus dextraril. 1  3  I 4, 3  I 5 
famuliae pnnclpis, 1  308, 309 
forestarium, 1  316. 31 7 
lucrarii, 1  31 2,  31 1 
~ennackew  et wasion  b~gheyn,  1 
3'28  313 
principis,  i  307,  308,  11  432  et 
sea 
ragl&i, 1  309, 310 
serjeantis, 1  31 3,  314, 31  5 
waission cum leporariis, 1  3  I 3 
(See also Cylch ) 
Patria Potestas, 1  57, 251, 257, 382, 
386. 405. 421. 437 
Patrimony, loss of, 1  183 
Pencenedl, the, 1  29, 36, 44 et seq . 
59, 60,  73  et seq . 78  et seq, 
358,  362,  384, 440 et seq , 447 
et seq,  456,  ii  211,  "2  et 
passlm 
Penteulu, the, 1 33 et seq ,  357,361 
370,  11  292  et passim 
Perjury, law of,  11  187, 322,  332, 
336 
Personal claims, 11  286 
Persons, law of, i  35 5 et seq 
Petitions of  1360, I  186,  188, 253, 
279.  299. 320.  323, 329. 401 
Plaints, 11  287, 341 et seq ,  396,401, 
A0  2 
Precincts, law of,  11  80,  81,  181 
in other systems, 11  86.87  See 
also OfficiaIs, protection by 
Pre-codification period 
promulgation of  law in, 1  I 
Pre curial survivals. 1  237 et seq 
Pre-emption of  cattle,  1  177.  298 
et seq , 301 
of  land, 1  243, 244, 247, 248, 280. 
282,  283,  11  27,  in  other 
systems, i  257 
Priest as tafodiog. 11  34. 277.  316 
Priest of  household. 1  34  36, 37.  38. 
197, 11  292, 324.  350.  351 
worth of, 1  357,  362 
Priest of  the Queen, 1  34, I97 
Priestholm,  Extent of,  1  147, 296, 
3  34 
Primogenlture, i  28,  29, 45 I 
Priodnwr  See  Priodolder 
Priodolder, right of. 1 61,  63. 89. 92, 
93,  170, 171, 211,  215 et seq, 
227,  228,  244,  245,  254,  266, 
267,  387, 11  58.  186, 260,  354. 
effect of, on other duties, 1 244, 
245 
in Church land, 1 21  7 
suits on, 1 219, 22;. 258, 259, 260, 
261,  11  ,353 ,  diaspdd  uwch 
annwfn  in,  1  219,  11  272, 
pleadings in, 11  354 et seq 
Priority in hearing, 11  285, 286 
Prisage of  Ale, 1  346, 347 
Prisoners, guarding of, 1  348,  349. 
of  war, 1  339 
Procedure, law of, 11  267 et seq 
Proceedings  quo warranto,  1  340, 
amendment of, 11  343  347. 11  201, 204. 435 
reception of, 1  38, 11  287  Proof,  diversion  of  See  Avouch- 
Pleadings, aids in, 11  281, 282, 283  ment 
amendment of, 11  343, 345, 350  Property,  -.  loint, sole user of, 11  149, 
In other systems, 11  339  et seq ,  18b 
347, 351, 352, 365, 378 et seq  meaning of, 11  50,  51 
In Welsh law, 11  301, 302,  339 et  Punishment,  law  of,  1  76,  11  70 
seq 
rigidity in, 11  282, 339 et seq 
times for. 11  281, 283,  342,  345 
et seq 
Pledges,  ii  19  See  also  Distress. 
law of, and Mutual pledging 
Ploughing  another's land,  11  150, 
185. 275. 404 
Poison. use of. 11  I 7 z  - - 
porter,. the, 1 .34, j< 
Porterage, I  320 et seq 
Pound-fees, 1 349, 11  42 
Pounds, law of, 11  40  et seq , 149, 
375 
in Ireland, 11  42, 242 
Powys, 1 g, 23 et passim 
privileges of, 1  65,  r 82, 306, 307, 
387. 
et seq 
in other systems, 11  75 et seq 
persons exempt from, 11  72,  93, 
94 
Punlab tribal custom, references to, 
1  243, 253 
Punt Cyflog, 1 289 
Queen, the. 1  30.  31,  357, 361. 
Raglot, the  See  Maer 
Raith, or compurgation,  1  67,  I 70, 
11  153. 154. 277, 284.  301.  302, 
303  et seq , 336.  345  et seq. 
364,  367,  369,  370,  371,  372. 
374.  376,  377.  385,  393.  394. 
395,  396,  397,  3980  399,  400. 
401, 402, 403, 4041 407 
Rentals in kind, r  293 et seq 
Res ludicata, 11  328, 356, 359,  363, 
3648  376, 41 1 
Res nullius, 11  50,  53,  54, 56 
Revenue, collectlon of, I  38 
Rewards for capture, 11  191, 192 
Rhuddlan,  statute of,  1  746.  140. 
INDEX  453 
~hri&,-~rotection  of, 1 347, 348 
Sights, the three, 11  344 
Silentiary, the, i  34, 36, 286 
S~PP~,  the, 1  53, 55, 94, 95, 99 
Snaring, 11  54, 186 
Social  structure in early Wales,  I 
I < et sea 
effect of. 11  308, 374, 404 
In other systems, 11  304,  309  et 
seq 
numbers of, required, 1 402.  403, 
11  303 et seq. 
objections to, 11  146, 308 
product~on  of, 11  281. 283, 308 
qualifications  for,  11  12,  304 
et seq 
Raith of  country, i  79, 177, ii  211, 
212.  703, 378  408 
Iiamyon  1  351, 352 
Rape  1  398  402,  403, 40s.  11  80, 
183 et seq , 404 
suit3 re, 11  306 
Rees, Prof  W ,  1 47  281 n 
Register land  See  Trefgefery 
Relations,  the near,  1  31, 32,  278, 
3578  361 
Rellcs, use  of, i  348,  446,  447,  11 
274,  276,  312,  334,  336,  368, 
369, 374,  39% 409, 410 
Relief  See  Ebediw 
Renders and services, 1  27, 29, 275 
et sea 
-.  -  ">. 
331,  45!,  11  90.  136, 173. 296,  1  Sons Gy  forGgners, I  68,  359,  363, 
suits for,  11  85,  307 , pleadings 
in, 11  402 
to K~ng,  priest, and judge, 11  80, 
83.  185. 230 
(See also Honour-price ) 
Scandinavian law, references to,  I 
244.  365.  372, 383. 408, 409. 11 
23. 116. 131. 141, 144. 309, 310, 
320 
Scots law, references to, 1  97,  166. 
195.  257,  361,  365.  372,  377, 
383, 384, 390,429,11 23.48, 88, 
89, 141, 142, 146, 158, 162, 169. 
187. 257, 287.  310,  311. 392 
Search, resisting, 11  I 54, 400 
Seebohm, Dr  F ,  i  44 et seq ,73,76. 
87. 89. 90. 92, 93. 137. 176, 178, 
185, 186, 224 et seq, 229, 251, 
366. 440, 11  I1  2,  113, 115, 116 
et passim 
Self-defence, right of, 11  82, 91, 92, 
179 
Sets-off,  11  285. 350, 358, 372 
Sheep-renders, 1  287, 294, 295, 296, 
inn 
298, 338  11  I I 8, I 19, r 20, 305  See  also 
Rhys, Sir  John, 1  47,  187, 440.  11  I  Mamuys 
I02 
Rhys. the Lord, 1  6, 30,  375, 430 
Ringyll, the, 1  38, 11  265 
Robbery  See Treis 
Roman law, codificat~on  of, 1  I, 2 
references to, 1 2,  3, 5,6, 372, 382, 
386.  387,  393. 402, 405 et seq . 
421.  431,  432,  435.  438.  453, 
11  8.  1% 27.  28,  31,  34, 46,  53, 
55, 56, 158. 169. 175. 176. 213, 
219,  257,  262,  298,  299,  319, 
340,  341,  351,  352,  3818  382, 
405, 412 
Ruthln Court Rolls, 11  388,  389 
St  Davld s.  Black  Book  of,  1  10, 
147, 265, 11  422, 423 et passim 
Sale, 11  24 et seq 
Sanctuary, law of, 1  194 et seq ,  11 
249 
Saraad,  acts  amounting  to, i  37, 
384.11 4. 9, 79 et  seq ,  181, 183. 
184, 185 
intention in, 11  81 et seq 
lustifiable, 11  82 et seq 
law of,  11  79  et seq  ,  in other 
systems, 1 96, 97, 362. 
unaffil~ated,  1  359,  363,  441  et 
seq .  450 
crimes by and against, 1 446,447, 
11  I 19 et seq  See  also Affilia- 
tlon 
Spear-penny, the, 1  $1, 67, 92,  11 
109, 110, 275 
Spoils of  war, 1  339 
Spurs1-rents,  I  351 
Stammering, 11  341 
Stare decisis. rule of, 11  230, 409 
Statements not ' evidence ', 11  336, 
1 
- - 
I  I 5 et seq 
enhancement  of.  1  16,  17,  41, 
I 
I 
177 et seq ,  185 et seq 
by arts, 1  176, 188 
by church. I  16, 17, 163  190, 
276.  357. 455 
by grant. 1  143. 189, 190. 191. 
192. 455, 11  415 
by goods, 1  16, 17, 42, 43 
by office, 1  16, 11  41 5 
In other systems, I.  16, 17, 18, 
43.  189 
kinds of 
by land, I.  16, 17. Status-cont  futile, 11  r I, 13. 
by office, i  16, I 89  in Irish law. 11  22 
natural, 1  16, 40, 41.  172.  objections to,  11  314,  332,  333. 
of  land, 1  16, 17 
loss of, 1  16, 17, 41, 178 et seq 
by abandonment of  country, 1 
179, 181, 183, 184 
by  crime,  i  183,  184, 11  75, 
I I0 
by decree, 1  143. I 84 
in other laws, 1  16, 18, 19, 41, 
42 
Staurus, 1  298 et seq 
Stay, law  of,  11  253  et seq  ,  in 
Ireland, 1  287,  11  I 59,  241  et 
seq 
Steward, the, 1  34, 36, 38, 358, 362, 
11  227, 292 
of  Queen, 1 34 
Stipes, 11  422, 423 
Stolen  property,  detention  and 
reception  of, 11  I 56,  I 57  See 
also Daly Lledrad 
Succession, rules  of, 1  229  et seq , 
248 et seq , 387 
equal division in, 1 248 et seq 
heirs excluded from, 1  248, 249 
in  Germanic  sippe,  1  95,  96, 
250 
in Irish ' fine ', 1 98, 100, IOI 
in trefgefery villes, 1  269,  278 
intestate, 1  27 
of  illegitimate sons, 1 450. 451 et 
seq  , In  other systems, 1  453 
et seq 
of  subsequent-born son, 1  252 
of  twins, I  249 
representation in, 1  250 
to bishop-land, 1  27 
to land, 1 24, 29, 229 et seq 
to minor son, 1  383, 385 
to self-acquired lands, 1  246, 248, 
278 
to ' tyddyn ', 1  32,  269 
Suit as render, 1 330, 332, 339  346 
Suits, institution of, 11  287  et seq 
kinds of  See sub  nom 
persons entitled to bring, 11  145, 
288 et seq 
re-institution of, 11  342 
Sullivan, Dr ,  1  98, loo 
Summons  on defendant,  1  338,  11 
293 et seq 
in other systems, 11  296, 297 
Supper-money, 1  214. 286 
Supporting facts, 11  396 et seq 
Sureties,  as ' tafodogion ', 11  3  14, 
367 et seq 
duties and liabilities of, ii  I 5  et 
seq , 246  et  seq .  314.  369 
et seq , 376, 41  I , of  son of, 11 
15 
371 
persons incapable of  being, 11  I I, 
I2 
property requiring no, 11  I 2,  I 3 
slip or delusive, 11  g et seq , 38 I,  -  - 
382 
to abide law, 11  8, I 88 et seq ,  28 I 
et seq , 297  et seq , 381, 409, 
in  other  systems,  11  298  et 
seq 
Suretyship, law of, 11  1, 7 et seq , 
27.  30, 3'9  33 
suits re, 11  275,  282,  305,  367 , 
pleadings in, 11  367  et seq 
Surreption, 11  145 et seq , 165 
excusable, 11  149 
punisliment  for  11  156 
suits for, 11  289, 404,  pleadings 
in, 11  401 
Survivorship in Gwely-land, 1  242, 
244, 248,  279,  387 
Swine, damage by, 1  342,ii 43, 166 
See  also Pannage 
Taeog  See  Aillt 
Tafodogion, the, 1  398, 436,  11  34, 
46, 154, 155, 226, 277, 290, 291, 
31 I  et seq , 367,  368.  370, 371. 
372. 3758  397 
Tak  See  Pannage 
Tallages, 1  328, 35 I 
Teispantyle, i  45  et seq , 73 et seq , 
78 
~eitdi,  law of, 1 373, 376, 377, 11  9, 
24,  25 et seq 
Tenure  conception of, 1  203 et seq , 
338,  346 ,  in Irish law, 1  209, 
21 I 
land-, 1  I 74 
Teriysc, 11  181 
Terms in Court, 11  279 et seq 
Terra Dominicalis, 1  162, 265, 270, 
294 
Terre Mal, 1  162 
Territorial Organizat~on  in Wales, 1. 
212 et seq 
Theft, absent and present, 11  148, 
149, 150, 153. 154, I 58 et seq, 
377, 349.  380 et seq 
by bondman, i  I 73 
conviction  of,  effect  of,  ii  146, 
322 
criminal or tortuous, 1 76, 145 et 
seq , 158 et seq 
definit~on  of, 11  145 et seq 
excusable  11  149 
in  other  laws,  11  145,  158  et 
of  unidentifiable  and  separable 
property, 11  395,  396. 
offences charged as, 11  149, r 50, 
I57 
punishments for, ii  I 50 et seq 
responsibility of  k~n  for, In Ireland 
and England, 11  I 59.  I 60 
suits for, 11  145, 289 et seq , 291, 
306,  307,  317,  336,  337, 380 et 
seq , 404,  compromise  in, 11 
146,  pleadings  in,  11  380  et 
seq  , in other systems, 11  381, 
382,  389 et seq 
Thief, arrest, duty to, 11  191 
as tafodiog, 1  154, 155, 277, 290, 
291,ll  315. 397 
ebediw of, i  278 
fugitive, 11  151, I 53,  156 
necessitous, i  165,ii 149,  I 51,152 
notorious, 11  I 5 I, 399 
saleable, 1 184, 336, it 72, 73, I 50, 
I 55,  I 56 , redemption of, 1  27, 
65. ii  155, 156, 168 
Times in cases, 11  281 et seq  , in 
other laws, 11  286, 287 
Tunc, -areas, i  21 3,  214, 288,  290, 
291, 11  427 et seq. 
collection of, 1 36 
in Ireland, 1  286, 287 
-revenue,  1  284  et seq , 302  et 
seq ,  et passim 
Turbaries, 1  346 
Twins, 11  291, 316 
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MAPS NOTE ON NAPS 
THE  identification  of  some villes  with those recorded  in  the 
Surveys is tentative. 
Names  recorded  in  the  original  Surveys  are  spelt  as  they 
appeared  to  sound  to  Normans  and  Englishmen.  The  tran- 
scribers of  the Surveys in the last  century, being  mostly igno- 
rant  of  Welsh  place-names,  have  frequently  mistranscribed 
them  from  the  original;  e.g.  in  the  Record  of  Caernarfon, 
'  Dinas  Mawddwy ' appears  as ' I<yraskadwy ', ' Llanberis ' as 
'  Bourenethlan ', ' Cwm-is-tir ' as ' Gomms ', &c.  It has,  there- 
fore, been  difficult  to  identify  some  places,  and mistakes  in 
identification may have occurred. 
In addition, many names of  villes now  only survive in field- 
names  and  names  of  farm-houses ;  a  few  have  disappeared 
altogether, some of  which it has not been possible to trace out. 
The Record of  Caernarfon, in particular,  also contains many 
mistakes as to location, e.g. it enters Rhoscolyn (in Holyhead 
Island) as in Cymwd Menai, i. e. on the Straits. 
Many of  the villes are not villages in any sense of  the word. 
Particularly  in  Merioneth  they  represent  areas  only,  e.g. 
Streflyn, Maestron, &c., where there are not and never have been 
any ' villages '. 
The point (.) indicating locality, therefore, must be taken, not 
as marking the inhabited village, but as marking some more or 
less central point in the area of  the ville.  It is impossible, unfor- 
tunately,  after  this  lapse  of  time,  to  ascertain  the boundary 
lines of  the various  villes; at least without  the devotion  of  an 
amount  of  time incommensurate with  the value of  any results 
obtainable. 
It is particularly desired, therefore, that the tentative nature 
of  the maps should be recognized; they are as accurate as it has 
been possible to make them. 